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ABSTRACT 
The railway system is a complex network that involves continuous interaction of human 
operators with technology, procedures and regulations to ensure safe and efficient 
operations. From an architectural perspective, the complexity of the interactions presents a 
risk of failure with the consequence that safety incidents and accidents may occur. The 
common approach to the development of measures for mitigating such occurrences is the 
retrospective analysis of accidents and incidents; in order firstly to identify, classify and 
acknowledge the contributing factors and secondly, to suggest mitigation strategies.  
Research undertaken globally using retrospective analysis indicates that a large number of 
railway accidents and incidents are associated with human errors due to degraded human 
performance. In particular, it has been shown that train operators (drivers, signallers and 
controllers) account for the majority of accidents and incidents. For example, between 1990 
and 2009, at least 75% of fatal railway accidents in Europe were due to excessive speed, 
signal passed at danger or signalling/dispatching errors.  
There has been a significant research effort to examine, identify and understand the factors 
that affect human performance in railway operations, so as to prevent conditions related to 
degrade performance and to reduce the probability of human errors. However current 
methods, developed on the principles of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), are based on 
research from other domains, including nuclear, oil and gas, and aviation. Hence, they are 
not suited to the rail industry and can be difficult to apply reliably to railway specific 
operations.  
Moreover, in the case of the factors that affect human performance, current methodologies 
have either adopted lists of factors from other domains or slightly modified existing lists, and 
then applied them to the railway industry. In addition, even in the cases where the lists of 
factors have been modified, such alterations have been designed on the basis of regional 
accident and incident analysis. Although the number of factors that influence performance 
can be claimed to be limited, e.g. fatigue, training, organisational culture and system design, 
the analysis of only regional occurrences does not provide analysts with a worldwide 
perspective of the significance of factors on human performance. 
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Therefore, this thesis addresses the current limitations and proposes a new framework to 
identify the factors that affect the performance of railway operators, and assess human 
performance. 
In particular, this thesis developed for the first time a novel and comprehensive taxonomy for 
railway operations, referred to as the Railway-Performance Shaping Factors (R-PSFs) 
taxonomy. The taxonomy is derived from a variety of sources including: extensive literature 
review, operators’ hierarchical task analysis, and the analysis of global accidents and 
incidents. Subject matter experts validated the taxonomy. Results identified 43 contributing 
factors, whilst further statistical analysis indicates that 12 out of 43 factors are responsible 
for more than 90% of total occurrences regardless of the type of network, responsibility and 
severity of consequences. Unlike current taxonomies, the framework developed accounts for 
both the influence of each individual factor and the dynamic interactive influence of the 
factors due to their mutual dependencies. It is recommended that the R-PSFs taxonomy be 
used by railway stakeholders to enhance the Safety Management Systems of their 
organisation. In addition the taxonomy can be used as part of the training program of the 
organisations in order to inform and engage the railway personnel with respect to the factors 
that primarily affect their performance.  Finally, the taxonomy is recommended for use by the 
investigator stakeholders to obtain information about the human aspect that may have led to 
railway occurrences.   
This thesis also developed, tested and validated a framework, referred to as the Human 
Performance (HuPeROI) to enhance safety in railway operations. Based on the 12 largest 
contributing factors, the HuPeROI is a novel scheme to assess human performance, as 
function of the various R-PSFs. The HuPeROI for the first time introduces an approach to 
quantify the impact of each of the factors that affect human performance accounting for all 
the dependencies amongst those factors. HuPeROI has been developed by integrating the 
generic concept of two techniques, the Analytic Network Process and the Success 
Likelihood Index Methodology (SLIM). The former is one of the best known and widely used 
multi-criteria decision making techniques and was used to evaluate the influence of each R-
PSF on operators’ performance. SLIM was applied to rate the importance of each of the R-
PSFs for different operational actions and finally to estimate the reliability index for these 
actions. The HuPeROI framework was demonstrated in a case study in three different types 
of railway operations: regional, high-speed and underground, and helps to define the 
influence of each individual factor on human performance as well as to indicate the relative 
likelihoods of different human errors.  
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Finally, both the R-PSFs taxonomy and HuPeROI can be transferred and used with minor 
modifications not only in other railway procedures, e.g. maintenance, but also domains, e.g. 
aviation, maritime and oil. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter gives an overall insight into this research by presenting the key role of human 
performance on the reliability and safety of railway operations. It presents the research 
problem and its context, and discusses its rationale, objectives, methodology and 
contributions. The chapter concludes with a summary of each chapter and a generic outline 
of the structure of this thesis. 
1.1 Background to the problem 
From ancient Greece to the present day, and in particular since the opening of the world’s 
first passenger service in 1825, railways have played a crucial role in world history. Their 
significant contribution has been widely described in the literature (Berghaus, 1964, Nock, 
1975, Ransom, 1981, Wolmar, 2007, Revill, 2012) and includes amongst others: trade 
proliferation, industrial development, transportation of passengers and goods and the 
formation of nations, countries and/or continents.  
In order to play such a role, railways have radically evolved during their history and many 
technological achievements have been accomplished. Today’s railways, which transport 
millions of passengers and millions of dollars’ worth of goods worldwide every day (Dhillon, 
2007), are faster, more powerful and more efficient than ever before. This has required 
relevant national government, operational and regulatory entities to develop rules, 
regulations and practices to achieve high performance in terms of efficiency, reliability, 
quality and safety (Wilson et al., 2007a). Furthermore, whilst railways and their operations 
have traditionally been the preserve of individual nations, in Europe there is currently a 
major shift towards the interoperability of railway services across borders that necessitates a 
very different approach to operations and the rules that govern them. 
Railways constitute a complex system that consists of several components and 
stakeholders. The performance of this system in turn depends on several factors including 
rail traffic rules, infrastructure and rolling stock reliability, organisational management and 
human factors (Dhillon, 2007). To assess and improve its performance it is necessary to 
understand the components of the modern railway system, their dependencies and 
interactions. Furthermore, it is necessary to understand this for the different types of railway 
operation, e.g. main line, metros, in order for a railway to be effective. 
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One performance measure, safety, is of vital importance to operators and to the public. The 
complexity of the railway system means that accidents and incidents are inevitable. 
Statistics worldwide indicate a steady general improvement in railway safety in recent years, 
in terms of the reduced number of accidents and fatalities. Yet, it remains the case a train 
accident, such as that in Spain’s Santiago de Compostela region in July 2013 with a major 
loss of life, invariably becomes a matter of grave national and international concern.  
Statistics also show that the main cause of railway accidents worldwide is human error, 
which is broadly defined as “any deviation from the performance of a specified or prescribed 
sequence of actions” (Leveson, 2004, p.245). Such an error can involve either third parties, 
e.g. trespassers, or operational personnel. Although the former are responsible for the 
majority of accidents and fatalities, they are not within the scope of this research. This thesis 
concentrates on operational errors involving train drivers, signallers and controllers whom 
the literature (Dhillon, 2007, Evans, 2011) and statistics indicate that primarily affect the 
system in terms of safety. 
This can be readily seen in some well know train accidents. Possibly the best known human 
error related railway accident in recent years is the catastrophic Ladbroke Grove train 
accident in the U.K. (Health and Safety Executive, 2000, Cullen, 2001), which involved a 
train driver. Initial investigations also appear to indicate that the accident in Santiago de 
Compostela was primarily due to human error. In addition, a recent study by Evans (2011) 
shows that at least 75% of the fatal railway accidents in Europe between 1990-2009 were 
due to operational human errors including exceeding speed limits, signal passed at danger 
and signalling/dispatching errors. 
It would therefore seem that a proper investigation and analysis of operational human errors 
in the railways, with the subsequent development of mitigation measures, would make an 
invaluable contribution to the further improvement of railway safety. 
However, to classify and subsequently examine human error poses considerable difficulties 
given numerous classification schemes. Furthermore, since human errors are related to 
degraded human performance, it is actually human performance that should be assessed. 
Human performance can be thought of as “the human capabilities and limitations that have 
an impact on the safety and efficiency of operations” (Maurino, 1998). The importance of 
human performance has been recognised by the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
in their analysis of safety data which indicates that during the last decade, consistently more 
than 30% of the total rail accidents were related to human performance (Federal Railroad 
Administration, 2012). Therefore, the factors that affect human performance should be 
Chapter 1     INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 30 
identified and techniques that assess human performance should be reviewed and 
mitigation measures developed subsequent to this. 
Several studies have indeed been conducted to investigate, understand and reduce human 
errors and subsequently incidents and accidents in railway operations (Wilson et al., 2007a). 
There has also been a significant increase in the interest in the area of human performance 
within railway operations (Priestley and Lee, 2008).  
These studies are developed on the principles of Human Reliability Analysis building on 
relevant research from other domains including nuclear, oil and gas, and aviation (Bell and 
Holroyd, 2009). In this thesis HRA is described as “the use of systems engineering and 
behavioral science methods in order to render a complete description of the human 
contribution to risk and to identify ways to reduce that risk” (Swain and Guttmann, 1983, 
Boring, 2005). However, these studies are based on data and scenarios from the domains 
listed above, and therefore, they are not well suited to the rail industry and can be difficult to 
apply reliably to railway specific operations (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b).  
Furthermore, in analysing the factors that affect human performance in the railways, current 
methodologies typically adopt lists of factors from other domains, without appropriate 
definitions being given. In addition, even in the cases where the lists of factors have been 
modified to become more applicable to railways, such alterations have been designed based 
on regional accident and incident analysis (Baysari et al., 2009). Subsequently, although the 
number of factors that influence performance can be claimed to be limited, e.g. fatigue, 
training, organisational culture and system design, the analysis only of regional occurrences 
do not provide analysts with a worldwide perspective of the significance of factors on human 
performance. 
On account of the above limitations, this thesis proposes a novel and comprehensive 
taxonomy for railway operations. This is the first railway performance shaping factors 
taxonomy developed through extensive literature review, operators’ hierarchical task 
analysis, and analysis of accident and incident investigation reports internationally. The 
taxonomy is validated by subject matter experts (SMEs) to identify the factors that affect the 
performance of railway operators and assess human performance. 
Building on the taxonomy this thesis also develops a comprehensive framework to quantify 
the impact of each of the factors that affect human performance. The framework accounts 
for the dependencies amongst the factors, while it can be also used to compare the relative 
likelihoods of different human operational errors.  
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1.2 Aim and objectives  
Given the background above, the aim of this thesis is to develop a novel approach to assess 
human performance in order to enhance railway safety. The following objectives have been 
formulated to achieve this aim: 
1. Specify the modern railway system, categorise and describe its components and 
finally define the operational concept of railway operations.   
2. Review the literature on the operational concept of human errors and the models 
underpin them, including state-of-the-art Human Performance Analysis (HPA) 
techniques, identifying their strengths and limitations. 
3. Determine the contextual factors that affect the performance of railway operators and 
develop a holistic framework that captures the railway performance shaping factors 
based on a novel taxonomy.  
4. Develop a Human Performance Railway Operational Index (HuPeROI) to:  
(i) assess the influence of each identified contextual factor on the performance of 
railway operators, accounting for all the dependencies amongst the factors 
(ii) assess the performance of operators for several railway operational scenarios, 
by comparing the relative likelihoods of different human errors. 
1.3 Outline of thesis 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters. Chapter 2 captures the current railway system, 
including its main components and stakeholders. Furthermore, it presents the human aspect 
of the system by introducing the Railway Operational System Architecture (ROSA). The 
ROSA addresses the duties and responsibilities of railway operators, and identifies the 
interconnections between operators, signalling systems and communication systems. 
Chapter 3 introduces the fundamentals of railway safety. In particular, it presents the 
historical developments in railway safety, including the analysis of a number of serious 
accidents fatalities and injuries on the worldwide railway network. The Chapter identifies the 
people are most exposed to danger in railway operations. Finally, it explores and determines 
the role of each component of the system to the safety of the network.  
Chapter 4 provides the definitions and classifications of human error, and presents the 
existing methodologies to identify the causes of human error. It introduces human reliability 
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and human reliability analysis,and  explains the link and relationship between the notions of 
human performance and human reliability. This is followed by an extensive review of several 
Human Performance Analysis (HPA) techniques and identification of the state-of-the-art in 
the area of HPA techniques in railway operations. Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of 
the techniques are described and the latter used to justify the need to develop an alternative 
approach to investigate human performance for the railway industry. 
Having identified the weaknesses of the current HPA techniques, Chapter 5 introduces the 
Railway Performance Shaping Factors taxonomy (R-PSFs) and its underlying theory. The 
Chapter presents the approach to create, verify and validate the taxonomy. In particular, this 
chapter presents the findings from the literature, and introduces the R-PSFs taxonomy. In 
addition, it describes the different categories of the taxonomy, classifies each of the 
identified factors and provides precise definitions and examples for each of the factors. 
Finally, it discusses the characteristics of the required data for the consolidation of the 
taxonomy, while it also details the data quality criteria.  
Based on the findings from the literature, Chapter 6 presents the consolidation of the 
taxonomy based on analysis of accident and incident reports and consultation with subject 
matter experts (SMEs). The interdependencies amongst the factors are defined and the 
most significant contributing factors, which constitute the “lite” R-PSFs taxonomy, are 
obtained. For these factors, any potential associations with the variables that characterise 
railway occurrences are determined, and the likelihood of different types of occurrences are 
estimated also. 
Based on the R-PSFs taxonomy, Chapter 7 introduces the Human Performance Railway 
Operational Index (HuPeROI) and its underpinning methodology. This chapter introduces 
one of the leading multi criteria decision-making (MCDM) methodologies, the Analytic 
Network Process (ANP), and describes how it is used for the development of HUPeROI in 
conjunction with the Success Likelihood Index Methodology (SLIM). Based on the qualitative 
process of dependencies between the R-PSFs from Chapter 6, the impact of each R-PSF on 
human performance is assessed. For this, pairwise comparisons are performed between the 
factors that indicate dependencies. The Chapter concludes with the presentation of the 
pairwise comparison limit supermatrices, which are applied to define  the contribution of the 
R-PSFs to human performance. To verify the methodology, Chapter 8 presents a study that 
was carried out in collaboration with three U.K Train Operators in order to evaluate three 
possible causes of a “Signal Passed at Danger” – the most typical railway operational error 
(Pasquini et al., 2004, Dhillon, 2007, Evans, 2011). The analyses of data are discussed and 
finally the indexes for the three causes are estimated.  
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The thesis ends with Chapter 9 reviewing the achievements of the thesis together with 
recommendations for further research. Figure 1-1 presents the overall structure of this 
thesis.  
  
Figure 1-1 Thesis overview 
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Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF THE RAILWAY SYSTEM  
One of the principal objectives of this research presented in this thesis is to quantify and 
evaluate the factors that affect railway operators in the execution of their tasks. This requires 
a detailed understanding of the railway system, its components and operational framework. 
This chapter contributes to this in three ways. Firstly, it briefly presents the evolution of the 
railway system and highlights some of the most significant changes that have occurred over 
the years. Secondly, it captures the modern railway system, starting with the various 
definitions, identifies the differences and limitations of these definitions and subsequently 
proposes a new definition of the railway system. Based on this new definition, the chapter 
describes the constituents of the system in detail. Thirdly, the chapter introduces and 
discusses the Railway Operational System Architecture (ROSA), including its specific 
functional elements and their interactions. The ROSA is used in Chapter 5 to create the 
taxonomy of factors which influence the performance of railway operators. 
2.1 Evolution of the railway system 
For over 170 years modern railways have played a major role in the global history of 
transport. Their expansion has not only influenced the development of economies but also 
the structure of modern societies (Wolmar, 2007). Cities have been created or expanded, 
nations have been built and countries have come closer (Nock, 1975). Throughout the years 
many technological feats have been achieved. Faster trains have been designed, e.g. High 
Speed trains, additional safety countermeasures have been installed, e.g. the Train 
Protection Warning System (TPWS) and many infrastructure developments have been 
accomplished, e.g. the Channel tunnel.  
The concept of railways can be traced to ancient Greece where heavy carts and two 
wheeled coaches were run in ruts built into stone paved roads for the transfer of goods 
(Berghaus, 1964, Wolmar, 2007). However, there was very little evidence of railways found 
from the period of the Roman Empire (Berghaus, 1964, Guy and Rees, 2011), leading 
historians to believe that the railways from that period were either destroyed or never found 
(Guy and Rees, 2011). Similar railways re-appeared in the medieval times and were clearly 
established from the 15th century (Wolmar, 2007). They were primarily used to move wagons 
with coal from deep shafts underground to the surface in English, German and Austrian 
mines (Wolmar, 2007). During this period and until the themed-18th century, the operational 
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concept of these primitive railways was relatively simple. Mineworkers either pushed or 
pulled the coal wagons along the tracks to the top of the mines. Then, the loaded wagons 
were rolled along towards their destination by gravity, while horses, almost the only form of 
traction on land, were used to haul them uphill when required (Nock, 1975).  
The first significant change on railways came with the creation and use of the steam engine, 
as well as with the evolution of manufacturing techniques resulting in new materials and new 
types of rails: iron, wrought iron and finally steel rails (Bonnett, 2005). This evolution led to 
the rapid expansion of railways, and by the 1850’s countries with an existing railway network 
were planning extensions, whereas countries with no railways were looking for means to 
introduce them (Nock, 1975). At the same time, the first safety regulations to maintain 
railway operations were introduced (Nock, 1975, Ransom, 1981, Revill, 2012), while 
considerations regarding the train braking system (automatic braking) was progressively 
implemented. However, the large expansion of railways led to capacity limitations. At the 
beginning of railway operations no signalling system was installed, but trains operated on a 
time interval basis and policemen secured their movements (Wolmar, 2007). This approach 
had several constrains regarding the flexibility and safety of the system. No trains could be 
added, rescheduled or delayed on the network, while their safe movement depended almost 
entirely on the performance of the policemen (Ransom, 1981). Later, with the invention of 
the telegraph and installation of fixed mechanical signals (semaphores) safety and capacity 
enhancements were achieved. However, the safety of railways was significantly improved 
only after the implementation of signal boxes and the interlocking system (Bonnett, 2005). 
By the end of the 19th century railways had been transformed into a complex system which 
in its totality was greater than the sum of its individual parts (Revill, 2012). The system 
consisted of tracks, locomotives, wagons and coaches. It was operated by train drivers and 
signalmen and controlled by signalling and telegraph systems. It had extensive civil 
construction elements including bridges, viaducts and tunnels (Revill, 2012). At the 
beginning of the 20th century faster (more than 150 km/h) steam locomotives were 
introduced (Nock, 1975), while the railway network expanded, leading to a significant 
increase in passenger and freight services. Major improvements in the infrastructure were 
attained, e.g. new tunnels the Alpines (Nock, 1975, Ransom, 1981), whilst further safety 
considerations led to the installation of new measures such as the Automatic Train Control 
(ATC) system (Wolmar, 2007). 
During the period between the First and Second World Wars (Nock, 1975), additional 
improvements on both rolling stock and infrastructure were accomplished, such as the 
introduction of the first diesel-electric locomotive in Argentina. Compared to steam 
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locomotives, the diesel-electric could not only run at higher speeds and accelerate faster but 
could also be operated by only one person. Furthermore, maintenance was faster and 
cheaper. In terms of infrastructure, the first colour-coded signals were installed, which could 
be identified more easily and clearly from a longer distance, especially during night 
operations (Nock, 1975). At the end of the Second World War and for the following fifteen 
years, railways were characterised by the rapid advance of the diesel-electric locomotive in 
addition to the successful use of Centralised Traffic Control (CTC), primarily in the USA. 
While steam locomotives were gradually replaced by the diesel-electric, new faster trains, 
high-speed trains, were introduced and used by many countries to compete against road 
and air transportation. Therefore, despite the strong competition of the automobile and 
aviation industry, the safer and faster railways remained a popular means of transportation 
and played a substantial role in the post-war reconstruction (Nock, 1975). 
In the 1980’s and for the following twenty-five years, essential technological and structural 
changes were accomplished worldwide. Railways became extremely fast, (with high-speed 
passenger trains travelling at speeds of up to 300 km/h), safer (e.g. the introduction of 
modern safety systems such as Train Protection Warning System), and more efficient (e.g. 
fewer delays). In addition, railway systems reduced their environmental impact (e.g. fewer 
emissions), whilst in some cases they became cheaper compared to other means of 
transport (Revill, 2012). In contrast, the privatisation of railways in many countries led to 
rather controversial results with respect to how beneficial it was for both the state and public 
(Wolmar, 2007).  
Going forward, the future of railways, their efficiency and safe performance remains an issue 
of great concern to all railway stakeholders including train operators, infrastructure 
managers and maintenance contractors, regulators, suppliers and rolling stock operating 
companies (Revill, 2012). This has resulted in a number of initiatives including new 
concepts, and technologies such as, the construction of Maglev trains (Ryall, 2012) and the 
implementation of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS). New 
technologies, i.e. renewable energy resources, are being tested to improve efficiency and to 
maintain the environmental advantage of railways compared to the other means of transport. 
In addition, research is underway to improve infrastructure and rolling stock through new 
materials such as, carbon fibres. Driverless operations have been also investigated and 
partially implemented by introducing Automatic Train Operation (ATO), primarily in metro 
services including the metros in London (Railway Technical Web Pages, 2012a), Paris, 
Madrid, Copenhagen, Singapore and New York (Rumsey, 2009).  
Chapter 2     FUNDAMENTALS OF THE RAILWAY SYSTEM 
 
 
 37 
Since the introduction of the railway, operational personnel, especially train drivers and 
signallers have played the most critical role concerning the safety of railway operations 
(Dhillon, 2007). Therefore, despite the improvements in technology and safety systems, the 
performance of operators (i.e. human performance) continues to be monitored and analysed 
in order to improve safety. This is particularly, important in today’s rail industry, which has 
the goal of 24/7 style operations (Dadashi et al., 2013). In this context, the impact of any 
new developments (technological or procedural, or both) on the performance of operators 
must be studied in depth in order to ensure the competence and capability of the operators 
to continue to perform their duties in a safe, secure and reliable manner. Therefore, amongst 
other studies, the factors that have an impact on the performance of operators must be 
clearly identified, defined and carefully examined with respect to their contribution to both 
past and potential railway accidents and incidents. This requires, in the first instance, a 
thorough understanding of the modern railway system.  
2.2 The modern railway system  
Over the years, although the main concept of operation of the railway system has largely 
remained the same, new systems have been implemented and entities established, 
significantly increasing the level of complexity (European Commission, 2004). This section 
defines the railway system and describes its elements.  
2.2.1 Definition of the modern railway system  
The European Commission (EC) (2004) defines the modern railway system as “the totality of 
the subsystems for structural and operational areas, as defined in Directives 96/48/EC and 
2001/16/EC, as well as the management and operation of the system as a whole”. For the 
conventional railway system, the structural subsystems are divided into infrastructure, rolling 
stock, energy, control-command and signalling, traffic operation and management, while the 
operational subsystems are separated into maintenance and telematics applications for both 
passenger and freight trains (European Commission, 2001a). On the other hand, for the 
high-speed railway system the two subsystems differ slightly. Here, the structural includes 
infrastructure, rolling stock, energy, control-command and signalling but not traffic operation 
and management, while the operational subsystem includes maintenance, operations, 
environment and users. The US Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) (2007), in contrast, 
considers that the railway system definition should be a narrative statement that “fully 
describes, at a minimum, train operations, rolling stock, track configuration, signal systems, 
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infrastructure, and environment, while also matching or complementing the system definition 
included in the railroad’s existing system safety program plan”. In addition, the Australian 
Transport Safety Board (ATSB) (2005) defines railways as “a guided system designed for 
the movement of rolling stock, which has the capability of transporting passengers, freight or 
both on a railway track, together with its infrastructure, and associated sidings”.  
The above definitions describe the modern railways to some extent. However, there are a 
number of significant differences. For example, the EC definition distinguishes the signalling 
system from infrastructure, while the Australian definition provides no comparative 
information. On the contrary, although the FRA definition refers to environmental factors 
neither the EC nor the ATSB definitions do so. Finally, while the EC definition addresses 
maintenance, this is not the case for the FRA and ATSB, which primarily describe the 
system from its operational perspective. However, the main limitations of the above 
definitions are that only one accounts for the users of the railway system, and none 
addresses trespassers and the railway environs or neighbourhoods. Therefore, an 
alternative definition of the railway is proposed below based on Murtagh (2011). 
From Murtagh’s (2011) the railway system comprises five main components: infrastructure, 
trains (rolling stock), railway staff, third parties and neighbourhoods. The five components 
are further classified into technical and human, with the former including infrastructure and 
trains, while the latter includes railway staff, third parties and neighbourhoods. However, an 
additional and more useful classification is also introduced, dividing the five components into 
controlled and uncontrolled. The controlled components are described as “the components 
that belong to a railway organisation1, hence can be controlled, designed and/or trained by 
the organisation”. These are infrastructure, trains and railway staff. Conversely, third parties 
and neighbourhoods, the uncontrolled components are described as “the components that, 
although having an influence on the railway system and contributing to its safe operation, do 
not belong directly to the railway organisation and are therefore difficult to be controlled, 
ruled and maintained by the organisation“. Both the controlled and uncontrolled components 
are further divided in sub-components and elements, as shown in Figure 2-1. In addition to 
its controlled and uncontrolled components, the railway system incorporates a number of 
stakeholders who have a reasonable interest in safe and reliable railways. The stakeholders 
have either a direct relation to the railway operational scheme, e.g. train operators, 
infrastructure managers, or an indirect one, e.g. regulation and safety bodies, rolling stock 
                                                
1 Railway organisation is described as any private or public enterprise acting as a railway transport 
operator, infrastructure manager or integrated company Eurostat et al. (2009). 
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suppliers and infrastructure maintenance contractors. Finally, to obtain the overall picture of 
the railway system, the operational and environmental conditions, as well as implemented 
standards and regulations are taken into account. 
Based on the system’s description, the dependencies amongst its elements and its 
components can be identified. These are established either between or within components. 
For example, within infrastructure the type of track is linked to whether that track is electrified 
or not. Similarly, with regard to trains, the length of a train is related to its speed limits. On 
the other hand, train speed is dependent on the track’s curve radius. 
Figure 2-1 Railway transport system  
The main components and stakeholders of the railway system are presented in the next 
subsections. 
2.2.2 The railway controlled components  
2.2.2.1 Infrastructure 
Infrastructure is generally described as “the system of facilities, equipment and services 
needed for the operation of an organization” (International Organization for Standardization, 
2005). The EC (2001a) defines railway infrastructure as “the track, points, engineering 
structures (bridges, tunnels, etc.), associated station infrastructure (platforms, zones of 
access, etc.), safety and protective equipment” necessary for the operation of the system, 
based on the definitions given in (European Commission, 1996, European Commission, 
2001a). The FRA (2007), on the other hand, refers to railway infrastructure as “the bridges, 
tunnels, stations, industrial sidings or sites and other fixed objects or facilities along right-of-
way”, while the ATSB (2005) as “the permanent way/area on or about the track”. In order to 
adapt a more comprehensive definition for railway infrastructure and to bridge the different 
definitions presented above, railway infrastructure is defined in this thesis as “the system of 
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facilities, equipment and services necessary for the operation of railways, including tracks, 
signalling, command and control systems, electrification, premises and structures”.  
2.2.2.1.1 Track 
A railway track is defined as “a pair of rails over which the railway vehicles can run” 
(Eurostat et al., 2009). Apart from rails, the main structure of tracks comprises sleepers, 
ballast, fastenings, sub-ballast and subgrade, as shown in Figure 2-2. Depending on the 
type of traction, track can be either electrified or not, as described in Section 2.2.2.1.3.  
 
Figure 2-2 Principle of track structure (Esveld, 2001) 
The sleepers are the units of tracks that are used to (i) support rails by holding them upright, 
(ii) maintain the correct distance between rails, (iii) spread wheel loads to the ballast and 
provide the basis for rail fastenings, (iv) transmit the lateral and longitudinal train forces and 
(v) isolate rails electrically (Bonnett, 2005). The distance between rails is called gauge and is 
“measured between the inside edges of the railheads” (Eurostat et al., 2009). Today, most 
railway tracks are at or about 1432 mm gauge (standard gauge) (Bonnett, 2005). Sleepers 
lay upon the ballast, which is the set of stones/natural rocks used to provide vertical and 
lateral stability to the track and to drain water from the bottom of sleepers (Bonnett, 2005). In 
addition, ballast and sub-ballast layers are used to disperse track load in such a way that the 
subgrade layer can resist the imposed pressure adequately (Bonnett, 2005). Fastenings, on 
the other hand, are used to connect rails together and the track with the sleepers. Sub-
grade, finally, is the term used to describe the soil stratum or embankment soil upon which 
the track bed is constructed (Bonnett, 2005). 
In order to be operational, railways should allow trains to change and be diverted from one 
track to another. Therefore, along the tracks there are switches (points) and crossings 
layouts to guide trains to the correct direction (De Fontgalland, 1984, Bonnett, 2005, 
Eurostat et al., 2009). Switches, the moving part of the layout, guide train wheels to the 
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correct direction, while crossings, the stable part, allow trains to pass in either direction once 
the switch has been set, as illustrated in Figure 2-3. Different types of switches and 
crossings are used depending, amongst others, on the number of lines involved, frequency 
of use and running line speed. For example, high-speed trains need long switches and 
crossing layouts, while at stations trains can make tighter turns due to their lower speeds.  
 
Figure 2-3 Points and Crossings description (Railway Technical Web Pages, 2012b) 
2.2.2.1.2 Signalling, command and train control 
The importance of signalling and controlling train movements was recognised from the early 
days of railways. In principal, such systems aim at providing train drivers sufficient time to 
stop trains before meeting any obstacles ahead, with minimal reduction of line usage (De 
Fontgalland, 1984). Due to the individual train characteristics, e.g. length, weight and 
adhesion, braking cannot be immediate. Thus signalling is essential for informing drivers 
well in advance of the actions that they should take, e.g. reducing train speed or proceeding 
at normal speed. According to Bonnet (2005) although modern signalling systems may differ 
not only between but also within countries, they should all have the following objectives: (i) 
control trains in a safe manner for the conditions ahead; (ii) maintain a safe distance to any 
train in front or behind; (iii) prevent the setting of conflicting movements; (iv) ensure that 
switches are locked in the correct position; (v) enable trains to operate at the scheduled 
speed with a minimum of possible disruptions, without affecting the safety of operations; and 
(vi) assure that trains always maintain the minimum required time interval between them.  
The operational concept of the modern railway signalling is developed on the “block system” 
concept (Pasquini et al., 2004). A route line is divided into blocks, where each is protected 
by a signal. The operational principle can be summed up to “no more than one train shall be 
in a block section on the same line at the same time” (Hall, 2005). If a Block n is occupied 
then the signal protecting that block should be set to red, while the preceding signal should 
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be yellow, as illustrated in Figure 2-4. The yellow signal alerts the driver that the signal 
ahead is likely to be red, unless the block is cleared during the time required for the train to 
move between the two signals. For normal running movements different types of signals are 
used, including, amongst others, the “two”, “three” and “four” aspect colour signals. For other 
specific movements, i.e. shunting operations, small signals are used (ground or dwarf 
signals). Signals can be found at the start of a block, on the approach to switches, before 
other signals and level crossings, at stations or ahead of junctions. To ensure that trains 
have sufficient time to stop, the distance between signals depends on the line speed, 
gradient of the track and a safety margin specified by the designers (De Fontgalland, 1984, 
Bonnett, 2005).  
 
Figure 2-4 Signalling blocks protection (Pasquini et al., 2004) 
In addition to signalling, there are many protection systems implemented worldwide, which 
all primarily aim to warn train drivers of signals and their indications ahead. In addition, many 
of them are able to stop trains automatically when drivers do not obey signals indications. 
Some of the best-known protection systems, as described by Hall (2005), are : 
• The Automatic Warning System (AWS). This is widely used in the UK and Australia 
primarily on main line operations for both passengers and freight trains. AWS is 
designed to warn train drivers of the need to slow down or stop their trains. 
• The Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS). Widely used in the UK and 
Australia, TPWS has been developed as an improvement of the AWS. It is used to 
reduce the consequences of Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs). The TPWS is 
designed to capture the probability of a driver acknowledging the AWS warning 
indicators but failing to apply braking appropriately. Subsequently, if the train passes 
the signal at danger, the TPWS will force the train to stop regardless of the actions of 
the train driver.  
• The Automatic Train Protection (ATP). ATP is widely applied in the US, UK and 
Canadian railway operations to ensure that trains operate within the required speed 
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limits. ATP differs from AWS and TPWS, as it applies braking automatically if it finds 
that train drivers fail to reduce train speed to the extent required. ATP is very popular 
on metro services due to the very dense train services.  
• The Integra-Signum protection system. This is used in Switzerland and is similar to 
the TPWS in stopping the train automatically when train drivers either do not 
acknowledge signals ahead or pass signals at danger. 
• The European Train Control System (ETCS). ECTS has been developed to introduce 
a single train protection system on the European network in order to simplify cross-
country and within countries operations. There are three ECTS levels, Level 1, 2 and 
3. Depending on the Level, train controls rely on: the conventional line side signals 
and ATP system (Level 1); the conventional detection systems and information that 
drivers receive by a secure radio system, referred to as the Global System for Mobile 
communication-Railway GSM-R (Level 2); on-board calculations of train location and 
transmission to control centres by GSM-R (Level 3).  
With respect to the concept of controlling the train movements, this lies on the “track circuit” 
idea, which is considered as the heart of the modern signalling (De Fontgalland, 1984, Hall, 
2005). It is the simplest and probably most efficient method to identify if a train is operating 
on a particular length of a track and to set up the signals and switches accordingly (Bonnett, 
2005). The passage of the wheels over a section activates an electrical circuit between the 
rails which subsequently turns on the relays and causes the signal and switches to change 
(De Fontgalland, 1984, Hall, 2005). The track circuit is responsible for a number of essential 
functions, such as: holding signals in the rear at danger; locking the facing points in the route 
direction; notifying signallers of the presence of a train; changing signals ahead from danger 
to proceed aspect; supporting signallers to keep in step with train movements; and finally 
giving warnings of broken rails or obstacles on the line (Hall, 2005). Finally, in addition to 
track circuit, the interlocking of signals and switches is another way to enhance safety of 
railway operations. Interlocking has been used to prevent signallers accidentally clearing a 
signal before the points are properly set and to clear signals that could lead to a conflicting 
movement (Bonnett, 2005).  
In addition to the signalling and control of trains, the railway communication systems (RCS) 
are vital for a safe and secure railway operation. Similar to the railway protection systems, 
the RCS may differ across countries. However, they all aim to provide and maintain secure 
communication between trains and control rooms along the rail network, as well as provide 
passengers with essential journey information. Radio is the primary means of 
communication, while in some cases the use of telephones is permitted (Bonnett, 2005). In 
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most European countries and others including India, China and Saudi Arabia, national 
telecommunication railway systems, e.g. the Cab Secure Radio (CSR) and the National 
Radio Network (NRN) in the UK, are gradually being replaced by GSM-R (Smith et al., 
2013). This improves safety and facilitates the interoperability of the railway operations. 
2.2.2.1.3 Electrification  
Electrification provides trains with electrical energy, which is transferred either by overhead 
or earthing equipment. The scheme is characterised by its current and voltage. Current can 
be either direct (DC) or alternating (AC) with a broad variety of voltage (Bonnett, 2005, 
Eurostat et al., 2009). The main difference between AC and DC systems is the way of 
transforming and rectifying energy (Bonnett, 2005). While in the case of the DC this takes 
place at fixed sub stations distributed along the railway lines, in the AC system this occurs in 
a mobile on board substation (Bonnett, 2005). Most metros, trams and trolleys use the low 
voltage DC system, while the high voltage AC system is used on the main lines. 
Electrification has several advantages compared to diesel traction including: fuel efficiency; 
reduced environmental pollution; faster acceleration and braking, which is particularly 
important in the cases of rapid transit; almost unlimited power supply; and lower cost 
locomotives (Bonnett, 2005, Hoffrichter, 2009). On the other hand, it is characterised by: the 
necessary high capital cost for its installation; its vulnerability especially in the cases of 
overhead equipment; and finally its higher maintenance cost.  
2.2.2.1.4 Premises and structures 
Structures and premises are used to facilitate railway operations. Train stations, level 
crossings, depots, tunnels, bridges and viaducts are included in this category. 
Train stations, according to Eurostat (2009), is a railway premise “either open or not to the 
public, usually staffed and designed for one or more operations”. Such operations include: 
formation, dispatch, reception and stabling of trains; boarding or disembarking of 
passengers; loading and unloading of goods; and when open to public, ticketing and 
information facilities.  
Level crossings (or high-way grade crossings for US railways) are considered as “any level 
intersection between the railway and a passage, as recognised by the infrastructure 
manager and open to public or private users. Passages between platforms within stations 
are excluded, as well as passages over tracks for the sole use of employees” (European 
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Railway Agency, 2013a). Level crossings constitute an essential part of the railway system. 
First, they facilitate the movement of both road vehicles and pedestrian traffic across the 
railway (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004c). Second, as stated in Chapter 3, they 
significantly affect the safety of railway operations. 
Depots are railway premises where trains are stabled, train units are formed and 
maintenance works are performed. Depots are usually located close to larger train stations. 
Depending on their functions, they should address the following requirements (Bonnett, 
2005): adequate sidings to stable the maximum number of trains that could be in the depot; 
adequate points and crossings to enable trains movements within the depot; sufficient staff 
facilities, office, training rooms; adequate equipment for train maintenance work; and safety 
protection measures, e.g. fire alarms.  
Finally, the tunnels, bridges and viaducts contribute significantly to railway operations, e.g. 
the undersea Channel Tunnel, which connects the UK with continental Europe and the Forth 
Bridge in Scotland. Such constructions simplify train operations by reducing travelling time. 
2.2.2.2 Trains 
Trains are described as “a convoy of railway vehicles moved by a traction railway vehicle or 
integral motor, or a traction railway vehicle travelling alone” (De Fontgalland, 1984, Eurostat 
et al., 2009). They are classified based on the type of use primarily into passenger and 
freight trains. A wide range of rolling stock (all vehicles run on railways) is used nowadays, 
including: locomotives, passenger carriages and freight wagons, multiple units, metro cars, 
light rails and trams and rail machines (Bonnett, 2005).  
Locomotives are “traction vehicles which are not intended to carry a payload and have the 
ability to uncouple in normal operation from a train and operate independently. There are 
two main types of locomotives used worldwide (European Railway Agency, 2009): 
• The electric, which derives energy from electrified tracks or on board accumulators. 
• The diesel, where a diesel engine is the main power source. 
Passenger carriages are non-traction railway vehicles which are ”used for the conveyance of 
passengers and they include saloon cars, sleeping cars, dining and ambulance cars” 
(European Railway Agency, 2009, Eurostat et al., 2009). Conversely, freight wagons are 
“railway vehicles normally intended for the transport of goods” (Eurostat et al., 2009). Finally, 
multiple units are “tractive railway vehicles constructed for the conveyance of passengers or 
goods” (Eurostat et al., 2009). They are distinguished in electric (EMU) and diesel (DMU) 
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multiple units according to the type of the received power. Metros, another type of 
passenger trains, are electric trains operated primarily on underground lines, while light 
trains and trams are also passenger trains used for over ground urban transportation. Rail 
machines, finally, include types of trains like cranes or tampers, which are used on specific 
occasions, e.g. to carry ballast.  
Trains are characterised based on their technical specifications, such as their axle load, 
braking system, traction mode, length, speed or size of the wheelbase, which depend on the 
infrastructure design they operate on.  
2.2.2.3 Personnel 
The railway industry employs a large number of staff, broadly classified in two categories: 
administration and operational. The former refers to “general administration employees, 
including central and regional management staff (e.g. finance, legal, personnel) as well as 
the board of directors” (Eurostat et al., 2009). The operational staff, on the other hand, 
consists of the frontline personnel, and regional and headquarters staff (Murtagh, 2011). 
Frontline personnel include train drivers, signallers and controllers, train crew, station staff 
and maintenance personnel. The central and headquarters personnel, depending on the 
size of the railway organisation, comprise safety managers, driver train managers, operation 
competence managers, operation risk managers and the board of directors (Eurostat et al., 
2009).  
2.2.2.3.1 Train driver 
EC (2007) describes train drivers as “any person capable and authorised to drive trains, 
including locomotives, shunting locomotives, work trains, maintenance railway vehicles or 
trains for the carriage of passengers or goods by rail in an autonomous, responsible and 
safe manner”. Train drivers perform several tasks during their shifts. At the start of each 
shift, before a train departs, drivers are responsible for conducting all the necessary safety 
checks, e.g. braking. After a train’s departure, they operate the train on the set route, 
respond to signals, obey speed restrictions and comply with a common set of railway rules 
and regulations, which are provided by the rail company or the regulators (Rail Safety and 
Standards Board, 2009). Additionally, drivers have to stop at the stations on the route and 
keep to the timetable as far as possible. They also stay in contact with control rooms, station 
staff and on-train colleagues to report any problems on the line or train. A more detailed 
description of a train driver’s duties is provided in Section 2.3.1. 
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2.2.2.3.2 Signaller 
Railway signallers are the operators responsible for the control of the movement of trains on 
railway networks. Their main duty is to ensure that a train progresses from a point A to B 
safely and on time. In addition, signallers are in charge of setting the tracks on which trains 
run and of changing, when required, the signals to inform train drivers either to proceed or 
stop the operation. 
Signallers are responsible for a large number of actions over the period of their shift 
(Network Rail, 2008b). At the beginning of their shift they study and acknowledge the daily 
operational schedule. They must also be aware of all train movements, timetable changes, 
speed restrictions or faults. In addition, they are responsible for planning trains routes and 
communicating with their co-workers in other control rooms or signal boxes. For example, 
giving clearance to the previous signal box for trains to enter a section, while waiting for 
authority from the next signal box before allowing a train to proceed (Roth and Malsch, 1999, 
Network Rail, 2008b). Signallers are also in charge of sending out appropriate signals and 
set all the points on the train’s route as required. They also warn the proceeding signal 
boxes that a train is approaching, stay in radio contact with train drivers and maintenance 
workers, and record details of all train movements (Roth and Malsch, 1999, Network Rail, 
2008b). Finally, they have to coordinate access to the railway premises for technicians and 
engineers who need to carry out maintenance works, to deal with and to resolve any 
incidents affecting the safe operation of the railway (Garner et al., 2007, Network Rail, 
2008b). 
2.2.2.3.3 Controller 
In addition to signallers, the larger control centres are staffed with controllers who are 
responsible for the provision of real time integrated management of train operations. This 
includes the coordination of the supply of information on significant events to the directors of 
railway organisations (Network Rail, 2008a).  
Controllers compile and maintain the daily national operations centre log and review 
significant incidents for industry-wide transmission. They also update a network’s availability 
display board in order to enable the visual illustration of the fitness of the network. 
Controllers also review train services, particularly during times of national disruption and 
liaise with both internal and external controls (Network Rail, 2008a). Additionally, they 
identify significant incidents, determine the incidents that require statutory reporting and 
monitor the management of all incidents. They provide leadership and direction to route 
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control staff, and manage the flow of the necessary information between the frontline 
personnel of the organisation (Network Rail, 2008a). Finally, controllers lead the daily joint 
national route control and train operating companies briefing, disseminate the daily weather 
forecast and identify potential high risk situations (Network Rail, 2008a). 
2.2.2.3.4 Conductor 
Train conductors are the supervisors of a train crew, responsible for the safety of the non-
operational duties of the train (Eurostat et al., 2009). In principal, conductors are responsible 
for ensuring that trains operate according to the time schedule and that any passengers and 
cargo are embarked and disembarked safely. Train conductors are also in charge of 
completing the en-route paperwork and ensuring that trains operate on the relevant safety 
rules and practices. Finally, they are in control of: train movements when operating in 
reverse; coupling or uncoupling coaches; assisting with setting out or picking up additional 
rolling stock; carrying out running repairs and collecting tickets from customers.  
2.2.2.3.5 Station staff 
The station staff refers to any employee who is allowed to work in the station, e.g. ticketing 
personnel. Station staff report to the station manager who is the responsible for the day-to-
day management of the station (European Commission, 2008).  
2.2.2.3.6 Maintenance personnel 
The maintenance personnel can be described as any qualified worker who maintains, 
repairs or renews railway property or constructs new work in relation to the railway property. 
Maintenance personnel could be either internal, e.g. belong to infrastructure manager or 
external, belong to certified maintenance contractors.  
2.2.3 The railway uncontrolled components 
2.2.3.1 Third parties 
Third parties are sub-divided into the customers of the system and trespassers, with the 
former comprising passengers and freight customers. In addition, third parties also include 
the people who interact with the railway system at level crossings. 
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2.2.3.1.1 Customers - Passengers 
A railway passenger is defined as “any person who makes a journey by rail, excluding the 
members of the train crew” (Eurostat et al., 2009). Freight customers, on the other hand, are 
people who use freight railway operations to transfer goods. 
2.2.3.1.2 Trespassers 
The railway trespassers are broadly described by (Network Rail, 2012b), as those people 
who “without permission go on to the railway tracks, the embankments or any other 
restricted area – for any reason at any time”. Trespassers could be suicidal or people who, 
for example, take a shortcut across the train tracks or jump off the platform to pick up 
something that was accidentally dropped.   
2.2.3.1.3 Individuals at Level Crossings  
Individuals at level crossings refer to both road vehicles occupants and pedestrians who 
attempt to cross from one side of the level crossing to the other.  
2.2.3.1.4 Neighbourhoods 
Railways are located and operated within three main types of neighbourhoods: residential, 
industrial and rural (Murtagh, 2011). Residential areas are described by Murtagh (2011) as 
“any districts primarily occupied by private residences”, while the industrial areas are defined 
as “any districts occupied by heavy industry buildings and premises”. Finally, rural 
neighbourhoods are areas “with relatively low population density and premises, such as the 
agricultural areas and forests”. 
As shown in Chapter 3, the type of railway surroundings may have a significant impact on 
railway operations in terms of safety. 
2.2.4 The main railways stakeholders 
Railway stakeholders are all persons and organisations with a reasonable interest in train 
service delivery, including train operators, infrastructure managers, regulators and safety 
bodies, and finally other suppliers.  
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2.2.4.1 Train operators 
Train operators are described as “any certified public or private enterprise, which provides 
railway transportation for passengers and/or goods” (Eurostat et al., 2009).  
2.2.4.2 Infrastructure managers 
EC (2004) identifies an infrastructure manager as “anybody that is responsible in particular 
for establishing and maintaining railway infrastructure as well as for operating the control 
and safety systems”.   
In the case that an infrastructure manager is also a train operator, e.g. the Swiss Federal 
Railways (SBB), then this body is called an “integrated company” (European Railway 
Agency, 2009).  
2.2.4.3 Infrastructure maintenance contractors 
The infrastructure maintenance contractors constitute certified enterprises, which conduct 
specific maintenance works assigned to them by the infrastructure manager.  
2.2.4.4 Rolling Stock Companies  
Rolling stock companies (ROSCOs) are the “owners of the trains, which however, are not 
eligible to operate on the railway network”. Therefore, they provide train operating 
companies with trains to cover future development.  
2.2.4.5 Regulators and safety bodies 
EC (2001b) requires each country to have a regulatory body “which can be the Ministry 
responsible for transport matters or any other body, shall be independent in its organisation, 
funding decisions, legal structure and decision-making from any infrastructure manager, 
charging body, allocation body or applicant. The main task of the Regulatory Body should be 
to ensure a fair and non-discriminatory access to the rail network and services”. 
In addition to the regulators, states across the world have established relevant independent 
organisations, usually referred to as safety bodies (boards), which are responsible for the 
investigation of all relevant accidents and incidents.  
Chapter 2     FUNDAMENTALS OF THE RAILWAY SYSTEM 
 
 
 51 
2.2.4.6 Suppliers 
Suppliers are described as “any certified entity other than train operator or infrastructure 
manager who manufactures and supplies products to the railway industry” (European 
Railway Agency, 2009). 
2.3 The Railway Operational System Architecture framework 
The preceding section has presented in detail the modern railway system including its basic 
components and elements. Based on this description, this section discusses the operational 
concept of the system by introducing its functional architecture, which is described as “a high 
level decomposition of the overall system into a logical set of functional blocks” (Subotic, 
2007). In addition, the dependencies between the constituents of the operational scheme 
are briefly illustrated. The functional architecture, referred to as the Railway Operational 
System Architecture (ROSA), is an integrated system of people, infrastructure, rolling stock, 
actions and information, developed in an efficient way to achieve the common objective of 
safe and undisturbed movement of a train from an origin to a destination. The ROSA has 
been developed from the results of: (i) a literature review; (ii) on-site observations in train 
driver cabins of mainline and underground train operators and finally (iii) on-site visits to a 
number of  railway control centres.  
The ROSA was primarily generated based on the characteristics of the UK main line railway 
operations. However, it can be transferred to other countries, type of operations and/or 
services with appropriate modifications. For example, long haul services in the US and 
Australia operate with two train drivers on-board, while the existence of controllers in control 
centres worldwide depends on the relevant size of the designated area of responsibility. 
Signalling, controlling and safety protection systems may also vary. Again, in the case of the 
US railways there is no TPWS, while on some metro operations, e.g. London, although the 
AWS is not implemented, the ATP is installed. 
2.3.1 The ROSA - Literature review 
From the literature (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2009) the architecture of a driver 
advisory system, as shown in Figure 2-5, was first derived.  
It can be seen that the architecture consists of three main components: control centre, train 
and signalling system. Various forms of data are transferred via and between the 
components, to informing operators of the status of railway operations. For example, train 
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drivers continuously receive information on the route timetable and any required adjustments 
e.g. accelerate or slow down, in order to achieve the scheduled service. Moreover, signallers 
receive information on their monitors from the signalling and controlling systems on train 
location and the conditions of the technical equipment. This enables signallers to identify 
and resolve any potential conflicts.  
In addition to the architecture in Figure 2-5, a hierarchical task analysis (HTA) was 
conducted to define the tasks that operators should perform during their shifts. The HTA was 
used in order to decompose the complex tasks of operators into a hierarchy of high and low 
level operations. Such an analysis aimed at identifying the tasks that are more likely to fail 
due to, for example, poor design, equipment failure and lack of competence (Stanton et al., 
2005a).  
 
Figure 2-5 Driver advisory system architecture (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2009) 
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There are three main phases of the services provided by train drivers: pre-operational, 
operational and post-operational. The pre-operational phase includes the tasks associated 
with the preparation of a train for service. The operational phase comprises the main sets of 
activities of train driving, including performance of activities related to the type of service and 
response to potential failures during the service. The post operational phase consists of the 
tasks required at the conclusion of a service. Figure 2-6 provides a high level HTA for all the 
three phases. In addition, Figure 2-7 presents the activities involved in train driving in the 
UK. These include: (i) departing from a scheduled stop; (ii) driving towards a scheduled stop; 
(iii) stopping at the next scheduled stop. All the activities are characterised by two essential 
goals: maintaining safety and schedule of service. The three activities are further broken 
down into sub-activities, which in most cases encompass different tasks requiring 
elaboration. For example, in order to define the driving strategy, train drivers collect and 
recall from route knowledge the current and future speed targets that apply to the service 
(Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2009). In addition, they constantly monitor the train speed 
by collecting information from the speedometer and various sources (e.g. cab noise, and 
motion). They compare the suggested speed with the actual train speed and subsequently, 
when the train speed does not match with the required speed, they modify the power or 
brake control settings accordingly (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2009). 
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Figure 2-6 The top levels of a hierarchical task analysis for UK train driving (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2009) 
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Figure 2-7 Train driving activities in the UK (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2009)  
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A similar process was followed for signallers and controllers. The former, as stated in 
Section 2.2.2.3.2, are responsible for the maintenance of the train traffic along a specific part 
of the network. The latter ensure train traffic along a larger part of the network by 
overviewing train services, particularly during times of national disruptions. Based on 
findings from the literature (Wreathall et al., 2004, Garner et al., 2007), HTA for both types of 
operators were developed. Figure 2-8 shows HTA for signallers, with their main task defined 
as “train traffic control in the assigned area”. This is separated further into: (i) set train 
routes; (ii) communicate the necessary information; (iii) respond to failures; and (iv) 
authorise railway works. 
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Figure 2-8 The top levels of a hierarchical task analysis for train signaller 
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Figure 2-9 illustrates in more detail the activities of controllers and indicates their primary 
goal as ”maintain train traffic”. This is divided into: (i) make an overall plan of train routing; (ii) 
communicate the necessary information to signallers, controllers, authorities and railway 
stakeholders; (iii) respond to failures; (iv) plan long term railway works along the network; 
and finally (v) monitor the management of all types of incidents. 
 
Figure 2-9 The top levels of a hierarchical task analysis for train controller 
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the second longest and fourth busiest line of London Underground, serving 53 stations along 
the route, with approximately 210 million passengers per year (2012 figures personal 
communication with Ms. Erica Hudson, LUL Improvements Service Manager).  
In addition, to satisfy the criterion of transferability to other countries, observations were 
conducted in collaboration with a widely recognised European integrated company, the 
Swiss Federal Railways (SBB). The main reasons for the selection of SBB were: the 
organisation’s excellent reputation for safety; easy and complete access to both trains and 
control centres; availability and accessibility of SBB personnel and the complexity of its 
network. The SBB network, although small, is complex and dense. Its complexity is 
characterised by 804 stations within a 3,139 km network length, almost 347 million 
passengers and 50 million tonnes of goods transported every year (2010 figures, personal 
communication with Mr. Andreas Hönger, SBB Safety Manager). The extremely high 
percentage of its punctuality, combined with the lack of a dedicated freight train line and the 
multiple maintenance procedures on the network underpin the characteristics of its 
complexity.  
Moreover, observations with additional two UK mainline operators were also performed in 
order to consolidate the findings from the literature and the HTA. These operators were the 
First ScotRail and First Hull Trains. The former is the main train operator in Scotland, 
primarily considered as a commuter service. The latter is the intercity train operator between 
Hull and London.  
Observations at SBB were conducted in the period April-June 2011 on freight, commuter 
(inter-regio) and intercity passenger trains. In addition, a visit to a shunting yard took place, 
where trains are secured and stabled after completing service. Observations at FirstScot 
and First Hull Trains were conducted in December 2012 and February 2013 respectively on 
stabled trains. Finally, the Piccadilly Line observations took place in March 2013. 
Figure 2-10 shows the layout of a typical train cabin of the Piccadilly Line, which has been in 
use since 1973. Figure 2-11, on the other hand, displays a part of the signalling and 
controlling system. Both Figures indicate some of the most critical parts of the on board 
equipment and external infrastructure.  
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Figure 2-11 Part of signalling and controlling system, Piccadilly Line, London Underground 
While travelling in train cabins, the author monitored and recorded the tasks and activities of 
the train drivers, starting from the time they commence the service until the time that they 
secured the trains. Such activities were then compared with the findings from the task 
analysis. In addition, the information that train drivers were receiving from the different 
sources along the route were also recorded and compared to those described in the Figure 
2-5.  
In addition to train observations, onsite visits were made to two different control centres of 
the SBB, in May 2011. The first was the master railway control centre located in Zurich 
airport responsible for monitoring all services in the northern part of Switzerland. The control 
centre was staffed with both signallers and controllers. The second control centre, located in 
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Figure 2-10 Train Cabin, Piccadilly Line, London Underground  
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Wetzikon of Zurich, is in charge of train movements on a smaller dedicated part of the 
network and is operated by signallers only. 
Observations, in both trains and control centres, confirmed the findings from the literature, in 
addition to providing further insights on operational procedures and system design. For 
example, although passenger trains operate on a strict time schedule, this is not the case for 
freight trains, when running on non-dedicated freight lines. The time planning of such 
services depends on the passenger train services with the implication that priority is given to 
a passenger trains over freight trains. The same applies to intercity and commuter trains, 
where priority is always given to the former. Another example is related to the information 
train drivers receive along the service. While the SBB train drivers are equipped with 
personal computers, where not only the route but also stops, speed limits and any 
unplanned maintenance works are displayed, such equipment is not provided to train drivers 
on the underground services of the Piccadilly Line. For these operations, train drivers are 
updated at the depots before starting their duties. During the operation, if something 
unexpectedly occurs they then contact or are contacted by dedicated signallers via the 
communication handsets.  
2.3.3 The Railway Operational System Architecture scheme 
The Railway Operational System Architecture (ROSA) has been designed taking into 
account combined findings from the literature review and on-site observations. As shown in 
Section 2.3.1, railway operations rely on the coordinated function of operators with the rolling 
stock and infrastructure. Therefore, the ROSA comprises four main components: (i) the train, 
and in particular the train cabin, (ii) the control centre, (iii) the signalling and controlling 
systems and finally (iv) the communication systems. The basic concept of the ROSA 
represents the interconnections between the two main operators, i.e. train drivers and 
signallers2, in conjunction with the on-board train systems, the signalling and control and the 
railway communication systems. The ROSA is presented in Figure 2-12. 
                                                
2 Controllers positions are not found in all control centers.  
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Figure 2-12 The Railway Operational System Architecture (adapted from Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2009 and modified) 
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As shown in Figure 2-12, the ROSA railway communication means include the legacy 
conventional radio and modern telecommunication systems (Smith et al., 2013). For the UK 
main line network, for example, the Cab Secure Radio (CSR) and National Railway Network 
(NRN) are the main radio systems. On the other hand, the Global System for Mobile 
Communications-Railways (GSM-R) represents the modern telecommunication system, 
mandated as standard for the European railways by the European Commission in 1997. 
With respect to the signaling and controlling of train movements, a number of protection 
systems are being implemented. Again, in the case of the UK network, apart from the 
signals (open, at station, at yards), which inform train drivers whether they should proceed, 
slow down or stop the service, on board and on track safety systems are installed. These 
include those identified in Section 2.2.2.1.2 (AWS, TPWS and ATP) with additional 
countermeasures implemented to assure safe train movement. Such measures include axle 
counters, which are track mounted equipment to count the number of axles on a train along 
the route and the track circuit (see Section 2.2.2.1.2). Further to the received amount of 
information from the signaling and controlling systems, an additional set of data flows 
between the components of the ROSA, informing the operators of the current and overall 
operational profile. The set of data is classified by the RSSB (2009) as:  
• Near real time data, which are delivered within less than 30 seconds (excluding the 
Piccadilly Line operations). 
• Quasi-static data, which are either given at the start of the journey or on a daily basis. 
• Static data, which are given when infrastructure, rolling stock or any other changes 
are made. 
Under the assumption of normal operations, train drivers, before starting the operation, are 
updated by receiving the quasi-static data essential for planning an appropriate driving 
strategy. The signallers and controllers, on the other hand, who have set the routing of trains 
on the entire network, inspect and confirm that the services are operated as scheduled. 
During the journeys or train movements, train drivers constantly receive near real time data 
and information by the signaling and controlling systems. In addition, signallers and 
controllers, receive information on their panels with respect to the location of each train 
along the network. All the exchanged information is indicated in Figure 2-12 by the black 
arrows. It is shown, for example, that a train driver receives information from the signals 
while the panel is being updated based on the location of the train relative to the locations of 
the other trains on the network. Further, signallers and controllers receive also information 
from the signaling and controlling systems. They use this information to maintain the traffic 
on the network or perform any necessary changes, aiming at resolving any potential conflict 
between the trains. 
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It is apparent from the ROSA that the safety of railway operations depends on the reliability 
and quality of the technical systems, as well as on the performance of the relevant 
operators. Again, assuming normal operations where no technical failures are reported, it is 
sound to claim that either the actions or inactions of operators or any external to the 
operational scheme factors, e.g. trespassers, can compromise the safety of operations. For 
example, a train driver who does not acknowledge the received information may maintain 
the train’s speed above the permitted limits, leading to a signal passed at a danger (SPAD) 
(Dhillon, 2007). However, even under the assumption of technical failures, the performance 
of operators remains significant with respect to the safe operation of the system. For 
example, in the case of a failure of the signalling system or on a train, depending on the size 
of the disruption, new routings may be required, which could be complicated to set and 
therefore, any wrong actions from the side of signallers or controllers may jeopardise the 
safety of the system (Dhillon, 2007). Therefore, railway organisations should define and 
further examine the causes and factors that have an impact on the performance of railway 
operators, in order to enhance performance of their employees. 
2.4  Summary 
This chapter started by a review of the evolution of railways over the years. This was 
followed by the description of the modern railway system and a detailed analysis of its main 
components, elements and stakeholders. Based on this description, this chapter then 
introduced the operational concept of the railway system, from the perspective of operators, 
referred to as the Railway Operational System Architecture (ROSA). The ROSA displays the 
operational constituents, and identifies the interactions between operators, equipment and 
transmitted information. In addition, ROSA has facilitated the identification of a number of 
issues that should be taken into account concerning the safety of railways operations, 
including the reliability of infrastructure and rolling stock as well as the significant influence of 
human performance. The next chapter investigates the contribution of each component of 
the railway system to the overall safety of railways. 
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Chapter 3 FUNDAMENTALS OF RAILWAY SAFETY  
The previous chapter presented the modern railway system and its components, which were 
classified as controlled and uncontrolled. Furthermore, it detailed the operational framework 
of the system by introducing its architecture. The main characteristics of the operational 
concept of railways were identified together with the interactions and dependencies amongst 
its components.  
Following the description of the system and its operational framework, this chapter 
completes the description of the context of this thesis by addressing the relevant 
fundamentals of railway safety. It starts with the relevant definitions of railway safety, 
accidents, incidents, fatalities and injuries. The chapter justifies the need for research on the 
contribution of the human operators to railway safety through evidence from safety reports 
from a variety of sources including the European Railway Agency (ERA), US Federal 
Railway Administration (FRA), Australian Transport Safety Board (ATSB), Transportation 
Safety Board of Canada (CTSB) and the International Union of Railways (UIC).  
3.1 Introduction to railway safety 
Railways are a vital means of transport, moving millions of passengers and a vast amount of 
goods worldwide, as shown in Table 3-1. The safety of railway operations is therefore an 
issue of international concern. 
Table 3-1 World railway traffic (International Union of Railways, 2011a) 
Passenger – km 
(billions) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Europe* 642.1 642.6 659.7 624.1 611.9 
Africa 61.5 61.6 62 62.2 62.3 
America 12.8 13.3 14 13.5 12 
Asia and Oceania 1,646 1,788.6 1,950.9 2,012.0 2,079.3 
World 2,362.4 2,506.1 2,686.6 2,711.8 2,765.5 
Tonne – km 
(billions) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Europe* 2,646.6 2,813.6 3,103 2,411.4 2,603.8 
Africa 142.2 139.2 138.4 137.1 139.2 
America 3,519.5 3,540.2 3,513.8 2,973.2 3,076.1 
Asia and Oceania 2,872.6 3,095.9 3,452.7 3,466.2 3,462.0 
World 9,180.9 9,588.9 10,207.9 8,987.9 9,281.1 
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Length of lines 
(km) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Europe* 349,458 348,788 349,000 353,747 370,370 
Africa 52,159 52,400 52,482 52,299 50,275 
America 385,272 389 863 386,773 383,079 375,774 
Asia and Oceania 221,788 222,645 221,827 224,151 224,205 
World 1,008,677 1,013,696 1,010,082 1,013,276 1,020,624 
*including Russian Federation and Turkey 
Railways are considered to be one of the safest modes of travel, as expressed by the 
number of passenger fatalities. For example, on the European (EU-27, CH, NO) mainline 
network for the period 2008-2010, 188 passenger fatalities were recorded over 1,200 billion 
passenger-km (European Railway Agency, 2012c), while the registered fatalities of road 
accidents were more than 100,000 (European Commission, 2013). Nevertheless, railway 
transportation is prone to structural risks, such as technical failures, human failures and 
vandalism. When railway accidents occur, e.g., the recent fatal derailment in Santiago de 
Compostela of Spain (Topham, 2013), society is distressed and debates on the safety of 
railways arise. Hence, railways safety is a matter of great concern for all relevant 
stakeholders including, operational, regulatory and governmental entities, as well as the 
academic community and the public, all having the goal of high performance in terms of 
reliability, quality and safety (Wilson et al., 2007a).  
According to Collins English Dictionary (Collins English Dictionary, 2009, p. 1442) safety is 
defined as “freedom from danger or risk of injury”. However, railways, similar to any systems 
consisting of technical and human components, cannot be completely free from either 
danger or risks (Huang, 2009). Therefore, many researchers tend to associate safety with 
accident prevention and define safety as “as few accidents as possible” (Huang, 2009). 
In the railway industry safety is defined as the “freedom from unacceptable risk of harm“ 
(CENELEC, 1999), where unacceptable risk is identified by the risk classification matrix 
shown in Table 3-2. This matrix is recommended in the European Standards EN 50126-129 
(1999, 2001, 2003), and used in the railway industry because it provides a quick and easy 
method to represent risk (Bearfield et al., 2012). It consists of a two-dimensional matrix with 
the Y-axis representing the frequency or likelihood of a hazard occurring. The X-axis, on the 
other hand, shows the severity or consequences of the hazard. The final risk, which is 
classified as low, medium and high, is indicated as a combination of the frequency and 
consequence of the hazard. Based on such frequencies and severities associated to certain 
cases and specific scenarios, each band of the matrix can be quantified.  
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Table 3-2 Typical risk classification matrix 
 Severity Band 
Frequency Band 4 Catastrophic 3 Critical 2 Marginal 1 Minor 
A Frequent High High High Medium 
B Probable High High Medium Medium 
C Occasional High Medium Medium Low 
D Remote Medium Medium Low Low 
E Improbable Medium Medium Low Low 
F Incredible Medium Low Low Low 
The safety of the railway system is affected by any failures associated with its components 
and elements. Therefore, railway organisations and safety authorities monitor, record and 
investigate the failures caused by the controlled and uncontrolled components of the system, 
in order to identify the principle causes that lead to railway occurrences. Since the number of 
serious and fatal accidents is relatively small, less serious events are also investigated. 
These are used as indicators of incidents, i.e. precursors to accidents, which under different 
conditions could lead to an accident.  
Railway safety can be measured in terms of the number of: (i) accidents, incidents, fatalities 
and injuries, (ii) fatalities per train kilometre, (iii) accidents per train kilometre and (iv) 
fatalities and injuries per passenger kilometre. While (i) provide the most obvious indicators 
of safety, (ii)-(iv) support the identification of safety trends and comparisons between the 
railway organisations as well as the different modes of transport. However, the definitions 
used by safety authorities to describe the different types of railway occurrences and their 
consequences are not always consistent. For example, the European definitions clearly 
define the concept of serious accidents, whereas the US definitions do not classify the 
different types of accidents. This has the potential to result in differences in statistical 
outcomes and their interpretation. However, as shown in the next section, regardless of the 
differences in definitions, national and international safety authorities follow similar 
guidelines with respect to the occurrences that must be reported.  
3.2 Definitions and description of railway occurrences 
This section presents the definitions of railway occurrences and their consequences as 
given by five international railway administrators and authorities: the European Railway 
Agency (ERA), the US Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the Canadian (CTSB) and 
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Australian (ATSB) Transport Safety Boards and, finally, the International Union of Railways 
(UIC). In addition, the events that must be reported are identified.  
3.2.1 The European Railway Agency (ERA) definitions 
The European legislation (European Commission, 2009) requires every Member State to 
report to the ERA any serious or significant accident that occurs. The National Investigation 
Bodies (NIB) are responsible to investigate and report all serious accidents, whilst the 
National Safety Authorities (NSA) are required to report all significant accidents, as 
determined by the European Commission’s (EC) definitions.  
According to the EC (2004) railway occurrences are classified as: 
1. Serious accidents refer to “any train collision or derailment of trains, resulting in the 
death of at least one person or serious injuries to five or more persons or extensive 
damage to rolling stock, the infrastructure or the environment and any other similar 
accident with an obvious impact on railway safety regulation or the management of 
safety; “extensive damage” means damage that can immediately be assessed by the 
investigated body to cost at least EUR 2 million in total”. 
2. Accidents describe any “unwanted or unintended sudden event or a specific chain of 
such events which have harmful consequences; accidents are divided into the 
following categories: collisions, derailments, level-crossing accidents, accidents to 
person caused by rolling stock motion, fires and others”.  
3. Incidents are “any occurrence, other than accident or serious accident, associated 
with the operation of trains and affecting the safety of operation”. 
In addition, the EC (2009) defines significant accidents as “any accident involving at least 
one rail vehicle in motion, resulting in at least one killed or seriously injured person, or in 
significant damage to stock, track, other installations or environment, or extensive 
disruptions to traffic. Accidents in workshops, warehouses and depots are excluded. 
Significant damage is defined as equivalent to EUR 150 000 or more, and extensive 
disruption to traffic with tracks blocked for more than 6 hours. Suicides and suicide attempts 
are excluded”. This broad definition covers a wider range of events than serious accidents, 
which by legislation should be reported. 
Finally, the EC (2009) defines a fatality as “any person killed immediately or dying within 30 
days as a result of an accident, excluding suicides”, while a serious injury is defined as 
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“any person injured who was hospitalised for more than 24 hours as a result of an accident, 
excluding attempted suicides”. All other injuries are considered minor injuries. 
3.2.2 The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) definitions 
The FRA (2003, 2011) requires that “all accidents and incidents resulting in injury or death to 
an individual or damage to equipment or a roadbed arising from the carrier’s” are reported. 
These occurrences include “train collisions, derailments, and other events involving the 
operation of on-track equipment and causing reportable damage above an established 
threshold; impacts between railroad on-track equipment and highway users at crossings; 
and all other incidents or exposures that cause a fatality or injury to any person, or an 
occupational illness to a railroad”. The occurrences are further classified into: 
1. Train accidents refer to “any collision, derailment, fire, explosion, act of God, or 
other event involving the operation of on-track equipment (standing or moving) that 
results in total damages to all railroads involved in the event that is greater than the 
current reporting threshold (e.g. the threshold for 2008 was $8,500) to railroad on-
track equipment, signals, track, track structures and roadbed”.  
2. Train incidents are events “involving the movement of on-track equipment that 
results in a reportable casualty but does not cause reportable damage above the 
threshold established for train accidents”.  
3. Non-train incidents are events “resulting in a reportable casualty, but does not 
involve the movement of on-track equipment nor cause reportable damage above the 
threshold established for train accidents”. 
4. Other accidents describe “other than train accidents or crossing incidents that cause 
physical harm to persons”. Such events primarily define accidents caused by 
trespassers. 
In addition, the FRA considers fatalities as “any death of one or more persons instantly or 
within a month after the event occurs”. On the other hand, injuries are described as “any 
harm to a person resulting from a single event, activity, occurrence ort exposure of short 
duration”.  
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3.2.3 The Canadian Transport Safety Bureau (CTSB) definitions 
According to the Canadian regulations (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2012), 
railway occurrences should be reported by the accident investigation authorities if they 
describe “any accident or incident associated with the operation of rolling stock on a railway 
or any situation or condition that the Safety Board has reasonable grounds to believe could, 
if left unattended, induce an accident or incident”. 
The CTSB (2012) defines accidents as “any event resulting directly from the operation of 
rolling stock where: 
1. A person sustains a serious injury or is killed as a result of: being on board or getting 
off the rolling stock or coming into contact with any part of the rolling stock or its 
contents. 
2. The rolling stock is involved: in a grade-crossing collision; in a collision or derailment 
and is carrying passengers in a collision or derailment and is carrying dangerous 
goods or is known to have last contained dangerous goods the residue of which has 
not been purged from the rolling stock; sustains damage that affects its safe 
operation; causes or sustains a fire or explosion, or causes damage to the railway, 
that poses a threat to the safety of any person, property or the environment”. 
In addition, incidents are defined as “any occurrence resulting directly from the operation of 
rolling stock, where: a risk of collision occurs; an unprotected main track switch is left in an 
abnormal position; a railway signal displays a less restrictive indication than that required for 
the intended movement of rolling stock; an unprotected overlap of operating authorities 
occurs; a movement of rolling stock exceeds the limits of its authority; there is runaway 
rolling stock; any crew member whose duties are directly related to the safe operation of the 
rolling stock is unable to perform the crew member's duties as a result of a physical 
incapacitation that poses a threat to the safety of any person, property or the environment; 
any dangerous goods are released on board or from the rolling stock”.  
Finally with respect to the consequences, serious injuries are defined as “any injury that is 
likely to require admission to a hospital”, whilst neither fatalities nor other injuries are 
defined explicitly.  
3.2.4 The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) definitions 
The “Memorandum of Understanding” (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2005) between 
the ATSB and the Australian safety regulators defines the reportable railway occurrences 
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as “any accident or incident involving a railway train or other railway vehicle operated on 
rails, whether in motion or not, or other event on railway property affecting the safety of 
persons and property, including: train collisions, train derailments, fires, explosions, acts of 
God or other events; slips, trips and falls on trains or railway infrastructure”. 
According to the Australian Infrastructure and Transport Administration (2009) accident is 
described as ”an investigable matter involving a transport vehicle where: (a) a person dies or 
suffers serious injury as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the 
vehicle; or (b) the vehicle is destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of an occurrence 
associated with the operation of the vehicle; or (c) any property is destroyed or seriously 
damaged as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the vehicle”. Any 
other occurrence is an incident. 
Fatalities describe “any death within 30 days of a railway occurrence, from injuries 
sustained in that occurrence”, while serious injuries are characterised by “any person 
admitted to hospital as the result of injuries sustained in a railway occurrence”. Finally, any 
injury, not followed by admission to a hospital, is considered as a minor injury (Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau, 2005).  
3.2.5 The International Union of Railways (UIC) definitions 
The UIC acknowledge and adopt the EC definitions in their entirety as given in Section 3.2.1. 
However, amongst the definitions, the declaration of significant accidents is in accordance 
with the definition given by the Commission Regulation (EC) N° 1192/2003 (2003). 
According to this “significant accident means any accident involving at least one rail vehicle 
in motion, resulting in at least one killed or seriously injured person, or in significant damage 
to stock, track, other installations or environment, or extensive disruptions to traffic. 
Accidents in workshops, warehouses and depots are excluded”. 
Given the various definitions, it can be seen that the safety authorities do not describe the 
types of railway occurrences and their consequences in a consistent manner. For example, 
the EC definitions indicate three severity levels of accidents, while the remaining definitions 
provide two levels. In addition, although the EC, Canadian and Australian definitions account 
for serious injuries, the US definitions do not provide such a classification. Nevertheless, it 
can be argued that the differences in the definitions are mainly related to the severity 
classifications rather than to the content. Thus, the EC definitions are adopted and used in 
this thesis, as it is considered that they provide the more detailed and well distinguished 
definitions in terms of the events severity. 
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3.2.6 Accident causes and precursors to occurrences  
The ERA (2013b) specify that railway occurrences can be caused by: (i) infrastructure 
failures, e.g. signals, switches and crossings or electricity supply lines failures; (ii) rolling 
stock failures, such as failures in the braking systems, wheels or axles; (iii) operational 
failures, i.e. human performance and human factors; (iv) third parties, including level-
crossing events, occurrences caused by rail passengers or unauthorised personnel. In 
addition to the causes, ERA monitor precursors to accidents by annually reporting all the 
cases that involve broken rails, track buckles, signals passed at danger (SPAD), wrong-side 
signalling failures, broken wheels and broken axles. 
Similarly, the FRA (2013) indicate that railway occurrences are caused by: (i) human factors, 
e.g. use of brakes, signals observations and use of switches; (ii) track defects, e.g. track 
geometry, roadbed and switches; (iii) signal defects, e.g. signal and communication codes; 
(iv) equipment defects, e.g. brakes, wheels, locomotives, axles; and (v) miscellaneous 
causes, such as environmental conditions, loading procedures or unusual operational 
conditions.  
Likewise, the CTSB (2012) and the ATSB (2005) acknowledge technical failures, human 
failures, third parties behaviours and miscellaneous events as the most common causes of 
railway occurrences, while only the ATSB detects animal activities as an additional cause. In 
addition the ATSB report SPADs, track irregularities and load irregularities as precursors to 
accidents.  
Finally, the UIC (2012) identifies that railway occurrences can be caused by internal or/and 
external causes. The latter are further subdivided into third parties and environmental 
conditions, whilst the former into human factors and railway sub-systems. Furthermore, the 
UIC monitors the number of SPADs, broken rails, broken wheels or axels, overheated axle 
boxes and dangers due to over-speeding as precursors to accidents, in particular train 
derailments.  
Given the various classifications, it can be seen that all the authorities acknowledge the 
same factors as the causes of the several railway occurrences. On the other hand, only 
three of them monitor and account for precursors. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis the 
ERA classifications are adopted, in order to be in agreement with the definitions adopted for 
the severity of railway occurrences. 
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3.3 Railways safety statistics  
Based on the definitions in the previous section, this section discusses the development of 
railway safety, and investigates the types of accidents and their causes. In addition, it 
examines the contribution of each of the components of railway system to the overall system 
safety. The investigation relies on railway accidents and fatalities records, as these are both 
difficult to conceal and must be reported within the reporting scheme of all organisations.  
For the contribution of components in the overall railway safety, data were extracted from 
the safety performance reports of ERA, FRA, ATSB, CTSB and UIC for the period 2006-
2011. The ERA data include those from all EU Member States, Norway (NO) and 
Switzerland (CH), while the UIC data are from 19 European railway entities, including the 
UK’s Network Rail, the Swiss Federal Railways, the ProRail in the Netherlands and the 
Deutsche Bahn in Germany. The FRA and Australian data include information from all 
railway companies that operate in the US and Australia, while the Canadian data represents 
only railways under federal jurisdiction.  
3.3.1 Development of railway safety 
European data on train derailments and collisions in Figure 3-1, from the ERA (2012c) 
database shows that the overall railway safety performance of the EU Member States, NO 
and CH has progressively improved by up to 70% since 1990. In addition, Figure 3-1 
presents the 5-year moving average statistic for safety, which suggests that despite the 
positive long-term trend over the past two decades, safety improvement has been slowing 
down since 2005. This can be exlained by the inability of the current safety and protection 
systems to provide any further significant improvement in safety.  
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Figure 3-1 Fatal train collisions and derailments per billion train-kilometers in 1990–2011 for the 
EU-27, Switzerland and Norway (European Railway Agency, 2012c) 
Furthermore, the same data show a downgrade in the number of railway accidents that 
resulted in more than five fatalities. Figure 3-2 presents data derived from accidents at level 
crossings, fire in rolling stock and accidents involving persons hit by rolling stock in motion, 
in addition to train collisions and derailments. It is observed that the average number of eight 
accidents per year during the 1990s has been reduced to five in the 2000s, while the 
number of fatalities caused by those accidents has dropped accordingly.  Considering that 
only three serious accidents occurred in 2010 and one in 2011, it can be claimed that the 
downgrade is substantial.  
 
Figure 3-2 Train fatalities and train accidents with at least 5 fatalities (1990–2011) (European 
Railway Agency, 2012c) 
Table 3-3 presents a summary of significant accidents in Europe and their consequences, 
for the period 2006-2011. The large difference in the number of significant accidents in 2006 
and the following years is due to a change in the reporting procedures in some of the EU 
State members (European Railway Agency, 2012c). Nevertheless, the trend of all reportable 
variables both in absolute numbers as well as per million train kilometres, indicate significant 
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The development of railway safety indicators at EU level 
has been underway since early 2000. The railway safety 
directive (2004/49/EC) introduced the !rst indicators, so 
called CSIs that focus on safety outcomes and provide 
the basis for risk measurement. Member States continued 
to use their national de!nitions to report these indicators 
during the !rst four years of reporting; now, since 2010, 
the harmonised de!nitions of CSIs in Commission Directive 
2009/149/EC must be applied.
Not all safety performance indicators are covered by the CSIs; 
so new indicators may be introduced in the future. Similarly, 
there is no common approach towards the measurement 
of a risk regulation regime at Member State level. Indicators 
re"ecting corresponding levels of the pyramid may be 
subject to future development. Not all of them are traditional 
quantitative indicators such as CSIs or KPIs. They may lead 
to a new approach to the assessment of railway safety 
management systems at both Member State and EU levels.
Historical development of railway safety
The overall level of railway safety in Europe, as measured by fatal train collisions and derailments per billion train-kilometres, 
has gradually improved since 1990, though there is considerable scatter from year to year. The estimated overall trend is 
a reduction in the accident rate of 6 % per year (7). This gives a fall of 70 % from 1990 to 2011 (Figure 2). The estimated 
underlying average number of fatal train accidents per year in Europe was about 18 in 1990 and 6 in 2011. Despite a 
positive long-term trend in the risk of fatal train collisions and derailments over the past two decades, the data in Figure 2 
suggests that the progress has been slowing down, in particular since 2004.
The number of fatalities in railway acci nts has s en a 
distinct, downward trend for all categories of accidents, 
except level-crossing accidents. This can be partly explained 
by the continuous increase in road tra#c across Europe, as 
contri uting to the likelihood of a l vel-crossing collision. 
The current programmes to remove or upgrade level-
crossings might not be extensive enough to compensate 
for the increased risk of a level crossing collision.
(7) A. W. Evans (2011), ‘Fatal train accidents on Europe’s railways: 1980–2009’, Accident Analysis and Prevention 43(1), 391–401.
(8)  Figure courtesy of Andrew W. Evans (Imperial College and University College London), based on own database of fatal train accidents and collisions 
and on the train-km data from the UIC, Eurostat and the ERA.
Figure 2 _  Fatal train collisions and derailments per billion train-kilometres in 
1990–2011 for the EU-27, Switzerland and Norway (8)
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improvement in safety of railway operations, in particular with respect to the number of 
recorded fatalities. Similar findings and positive trends result from the UIC (2012) database 
(Table 3-4). This was expected as both the ERA and UIC databases to a great extent use 
data from the same sources.  
Table 3-3 Summary of significant accidents and their consequences of the European State 
Members (European Railway Agency, 2012a) 
ERA database 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of significant 
accidents 5,057 3,831 3,744 3,073 2,421 2,377 
Number of fatalities 1,471 1,519 1,480 1,391 1,265 1,188 
Number of serious 
injuries 1,459 1,375 1,383 1,114 1,241 1,037 
Significant accidents 
per million train-km 1.26 0.92 0.88 0.75 0.60 0.57 
Fatalities per million 
train-km 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.29 
Serious injuries per 
million train-km 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.27 0.31 0.25 
Number of million train 
kilometres 4,011.66 4,184.45 4,243.61 4,101.84 4,065.06 4,159.55 
 
Table 3-4 Summary of significant accidents and their consequences from 19 European Railway 
Companies (International Union of Railways, 2012) 
UIC data* 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of significant 
accidents 2,256 2,215 2,178 2,016 1,935 1,812 
Number of fatalities 1,230 1,320 1,194 1,244 1,049 985 
Number of serious 
injury accidents 2,031 2,074 1,977 1,815 1,662 1,574 
Significant accidents 
per million train-km 0.58 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.57 0.46 
Fatalities per million 
train-km 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.25 
Serious injuries per 
million train-km 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.39 
Number of million train 
kilometres 3,881.1 3,948.4 4,078.8 3,855.4 3,392.6 3,980.0 
*NRIC (Bulgaria) ended its contribution in 2010, MAV (Hungary) did not provide 
data for 2008 and HZ (Croatia) started its input in 2010 
 
Similar to the findings in Europe findings, the FRA (2012) data suggest that the safety of the 
US railways has also gradually improved (Figure 3-3). The number of train accidents has 
progressively dropped by 68% since 1990, and the number of fatalities by 46%. This is 
explained by the numerous and effective technological improvements and company-wide 
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safety programs that were implemented within the US railways. The former include, track 
and equipment improvements, e.g. welded rails and hot box detectors. The latter include 
remote control operations, personnel fatigue countermeasures and interactive video training 
programs (French, 2008). 
 
Figure 3-3 US train accidents - incidents per million-train miles and train accidents - incidents 
fatalities (Federal Railroad Administration, 2012) 
The US trends for the number of accidents, fatalities and injuries for the period 2006-2011 
are given in Table 3-5. Two main observations can be made. Firstly, the number of recorded 
accidents in the US is approximately five times higher than in Europe. However, this is due 
to the differences in the definitions, where the FRA does not distinguish significant from non-
significant types of accidents. Secondly, the number of US million train kilometres is almost 
half of the Europe’s, as due to its large size the US railway network is less dense. 
Table 3-5 Summary of US train accidents and their consequences (Federal Railroad 
Administration, 2012) 
FRA database 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of 
accidents 13,803 13,936 12,958 11,263 11,628 11,434 
Number of fatalities 903 851 803 696 736 698 
Number of injuries 8,797 9,669 9,064 8,037 8,372 8,333 
Accidents per 
million train-miles 16.97 17.56 16.74 16.86 16.50 15.93 
Fatalities per million 
train-miles 1.11 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.04 0.97 
Injuries per million 
train-miles 10.81 12.18 11.71 12.03 11.88 11.61 
Number of million 
train miles 813.58 793.62 774.05 667.97 704.83 717.6 
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Similar to the European and US findings, the overall safety of Canadian railways has also 
improved. The CTSB data (2012) show reductions of 23% and 13% in total train accidents 
since 2002 and 2006 respectively. In addition, the largest proportion of train accidents 
occurs on non-main track operations. These typically result in minor consequences and take 
place during switching operations at speeds of less than 10 mph. Therefore, focus should be 
on the main track accidents. As shown in Figure 3-4, slight improvement is observed with 
regard to main track accidents per million main track train miles (MMTTM). Although the 
main-track accident rate increased by 18% (excluding level crossings and trespasser 
accidents) compared to 2010, the long-term rate is down by 1.5% from the ten-year average 
of 2011. On the other hand, considerably higher improvement is observed on the number of 
fatalities, which gradually dropped by 20% since 2002.  
 
Figure 3-4 Canadian train accidents and main track accidents per million main track train miles 
(Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2012) 
Table 3-6 displays Canadian trends for the period 2006-2011. It is worth mentioning the low 
number of fatalities and injuries on the Canadian railways compared to the European and 
US. This is explained by the nature of the Canadian network, which is primarily used to 
transfer goods. Therefore, when train accidents occur, they usually involve freight trains and 
subsequently involve either the train crew or level crossing users.  
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Table 3-6 Summary of Canadian main track train accidents and their consequences 
(Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2012) 
CTSB database 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of accidents 209 257 209 169 161 192 
Number of fatalities (all 
tracks) 95 84 74 71 81 71 
Number of serious 
injuries (all tracks) 71 58 64 50 62 51 
Main track accidents 
per MMTTM 2.41 3.04 2.52 2.34 2.07 2.45 
Fatalities per MMTTM 
(all tracks) 1.09 0.99 0.89 0.98 1.04 0.91 
Serious injuries per 
MMTTM (all tracks) 0.82 0.69 0.77 0.69 0.80 0.65 
Million main track train 
miles (MMTTM) 86.9 84.5 83.1 72.2 77.6 78.3 
Finally, data from the ATSB (2012) indicate a slight improvement on the safety performance 
over the last decade, as measured by the number of train derailments, collisions and 
fatalities.  
 
Figure 3-5 Australian train derailments, collisions and fatalities (Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau, 2012) 
Table 3-7 presents the Australia trends for the last six years. Again, it can be observed the 
low number of fatalities and serious injuries, despite the high number of accidents per million 
train miles. Similar to the Canadian network, this observation is explained by the nature of 
the Australian network, which is primarily used to transfer goods.  
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Table 3-7 Summary of Australian train accidents and their consequences (Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, 2012) 
ATSB database 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of accidents 804 766 878 842 796 808 
Number of fatalities 39 42 31 28 29 39 
Number of serious 
injuries 135 183 114 91 38 66 
Accidents per million 
train miles 8.93 8.37 9.37 9.25 8.73 8.37 
Fatalities per million 
train miles 0.43 0.46 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.40 
Serious injuries per 
million train miles 1.50 2.00 1.21 1.00 0.42 0.68 
Number of million train 
miles 90 91.47 93.75 91.05 91.22 96.53 
In summary, from the high level analysis of safety performance of European, US, Canadian 
and Australian railways, it is clear that safety has improved. It is also clear that the current 
safety protection measures are quickly approaching their maximum capabilities. Therefore, 
the railways industry must continue their efforts to improve safety by investing in the most 
vulnerable and fundamental areas: infrastructure, rolling stock, employees’ competence and 
public awareness. This requires a detailed understanding of railways accidents to identify 
and prevent the causes that lead to such events. 
3.3.2 Railway accidents breakdown 
Railway accidents are classified according to their characteristics, as shown in Table 3-8. 
Despite the differences in the classifications all the schemes include the same types of 
events. These are train derailments, train collisions, train collisions with obstacles, accidents 
to persons hit by trains in motion, accidents at level crossings, fire in rolling stock, and 
miscellaneous events. Based on Table 3-8, Figures 3-6 to 3-9 present the contribution of 
each type of accident to the total train accidents for all databases. 
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Table 3-8 Type of accidents as classified per database 
Type of accidents as classified per database 
UIC*  ERA*  FRA  CTSB**  ATSB  
Train derailments Train derailments Train derailments Train derailments** (all) Train derailments 
Train collisions Train collisions and collisions with obstacles within clearance gauge Train collisions Train collisions** (all) Train collisions 
Train collision with obstacle 
LC accidents, including accidents 
involving pedestrians at LC Train collision with obstacle Level Crossing accidents 
Train collisions with other 
Rolling Stock 
Accidents to persons caused by 
RS in motion - excluding suicides 
Level Crossing accidents 
Employee/passenger 
accidents 
Train collision with 
infrastructure  
Individual hit by train Trespassers accidents Person hit by train 
Individual falling from train Accidents involving track units 
Train collision with road 
vehicle 
Fire in rolling stock Fire in rolling stock Fire/ Explosions Level crossing collision with road vehicle 
Electrocution by overhead 
line or third rail 
Other types of accidents Other types of accidents Other types of accidents  Level crossing hit person 
Accident involving 
dangerous goods 
*ERA and UIC databases refer to significant accidents, FRA, CTSB and ATSB to the reportable accidents as defined in Section 3.2 
** CTSB data distinguish derailments and collisions on main and non-main track occurrences 
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Figure 3-6 shows the European findings based on the ERA and UIC databases. It is clear 
that in Europe on average 77.3% of the 20,503 occurrences (European Railway Agency, 
2012a) involve accidents to persons caused by rolling stock in motion and accidents at level 
crossings. The former, excluding the cases of suicides, refer to all the accidents caused by 
unauthorised individuals, i.e. trespassers, who occupy rail tracks or premises and interfere 
with the railway operations. The accidents at level crossings, on the other hand, involve all 
level crossing users, i.e. pedestrians and road vehicles occupants. Based on the ERA data, 
level crossing accidents have consistently decreased in the last five years. This is due to 
relevant campaigns and safety programs within the EU Member States (European Railway 
Agency, 2012b). Finally, train derailments, train collisions and fire in rolling stock although 
proportionally low cannot be neglected. 1,542, 1,519 and 560 accidents respectively were 
recorded with more than 80 fatalities (European Railway Agency, 2012a).  
 
Figure 3-6 Types of accidents in Europe based on the ERA (left) and UIC (right) databases 
From the ERA (2012b) data, the total reported number of fatalities for the period 2006-2011 
was 8,314, 61.7% and 27.8% of which involved trespassers and level crossing users 
respectively. Passengers and railway personnel account for 4.5% and 2.6% respectively. 
Both passengers and railway personnel fatalities are usually caused by accidents to persons 
by rolling stock in motion and train collisions (European Railway Agency, 2012c).  
The UIC data (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011b, 2012) show that train collisions with 
obstacles and persons hit by train account for more than 80% of all 11,133 accidents. Third 
parties were involved in 93% of the total of 7,580 fatalities, while passengers and railway 
personnel account for 4% and 3% respectively. Regarding the 6,391 serious injuries on the 
other hand, figures differ with approximately 71% accounting for third parties, 20% for 
passengers and 9% for railway personnel. 
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In contrast to the European findings, the Canadian (2012) data in Figure 3-7 (left) show that 
the majority of 7,012 train accidents are related to train derailments. As presented in Figure 
3-7, train derailments account on average for 58% of all railway accidents, while the level 
crossing accidents represent about 17% of the occurrences. Finally, train collisions and 
trespassers accidents follow with 8.5% and 7.5% respectively.  
Australian data (2012) in Figure 3-7 (right), on the other hand, show that train derailments 
and collisions with infrastructure, i.e. buffer stops, represent about 65%, of the total 2,447 
accidents. Again, 26% of the occurrences involve events at level crossings and individuals 
hit by trains (trespassers and passengers). Finally, train collisions amounted to less than 
10% of all events, with more than 9% taking place on non-main tracks, e.g. while trains are 
preforming shunting manoeuvres.  
   
Figure 3-7 Types of railway accidents in Canada (left) and Australia (right) 
Despite the differences in the proportions of the types of accidents compared to the 
European data, similar findings are obtained for fatalities and serious injuries. Specifically in 
Canada, between 2006 and 2011, about 95% of 476 fatalities involved trespassers 
(accounting for 63.66%) and level crossing users. Only 2.5% were associated with railway 
staff and less than 1% with passengers. In addition, from 356 reported serious injuries more 
than 95% were related to level crossing and trespassers accidents. 78.1% of the serious 
injuries involved third parties, 18.8% railway employees and 3% passengers.  
The ATSB data do not provide explicit information on the type of persons killed or seriously 
injured.  
Finally, from the FRA (2012) data, level crossing and other accidents account for 85% of the 
total 72,147 occurrences. These accidents are usually caused by trespassers and level 
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crossings users. The contribution of train derailments is also a crucial factor for US railway 
safety, explaining 14% of the events. Additionally, level crossing and other accidents explain 
98.7% of 4,687 fatalities, while they are also responsible for 98% of 52,272 injuries. In 
contrast, train collisions and derailments are responsible for 1.3% and 2% of the fatalities 
and injuries respectively. Finally, 57.8% of 4,687 fatalities were due to trespassers, less than 
1% to passengers and about 2.4% to employees on duty. The remaining approximately 
38.8% represents level crossings user fatalities. On the other hand, trespassers are 
responsible only for 4% of the total of injuries, while the corresponding proportion for 
employees on duty and passengers were up to 52.4% and 15.12% respectively. A summary 
of fatalities and injuries ratio per type of person is illustrated in the Table 3-9. 
 
Figure 3-8 Types of railway accidents in the US 
Table 3-9 Proportion of the total fatalities and serious injuries per person type 
Period 2006-2011 ERA UIC FRA CTSB ATSB 
Fatalities (%) 
Employees 2.59 2.81 2.48 2.31 n.a. 
Passengers 4.57 3.78 0.91 0.84 n.a. 
Level crossing - 
Trespassers 89.59 93.4 96.59 95.59 n.a. 
Serious 
injuries(%) –  
Injuries for FRA  
Employees 7.32 9.31 52.44 18.82 n.a. 
Passengers 21.39 19.59 15.12 2.81 n.a. 
Level crossing - 
Trespassers 59.29 71.1 32.42 78.09 n.a. 
Comparing the results from the five databases, two main observations can be made. Firstly, 
the number and type of people who either die or get injured due to railway occurrences are 
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related to the characteristics of the network in terms of usage. Secondly, regardless of the 
network characteristics, most fatalities involve trespassers and level crossing users. 
Concerning the first observation, it is acknowledged that the European railway network is 
used to an equal extent to transport passengers and goods. In the EU Members States, 
Norway and Switzerland, about 406.75 billion passenger-km and 308.62 billion tonnes-km 
were moved in 2010 (UIC (2011a)). In contrast the US, Canadian and Australian railway 
networks are used primarily to transport goods. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the US 
only 6.518 billion passenger-km were registered in 2010, while the corresponding value for 
freight operations rose to 2,468.738 billion tonnes-km. The corresponding figures for Canada 
are 1.346 billion passenger-km and 322.741 billion tonnes-km. Finally, the relevant figures 
for the Australian railway network were 1.5 billion passenger-km and 64.172 billion tonnes-
km. Therefore, while in Europe about 75% of accidents (International Union of Railways, 
2012) involve passengers trains, the opposite is the case for the US, Canada and Australia. 
Subsequently, the number of passenger fatalities in Europe, which are primarily caused by 
train collisions or train collisions with obstacles, is six times higher compared to the US. 
Likewise, the number of passengers seriously injured in Europe is considerably higher than 
in Canada. However, similar findings cannot be extracted with confidence for the US 
railways, since the FRA does not distinguish the types of injuries. 
With regard to the second observation, it is reasonable to claim that trespassers fatalities 
constitute the great majority of total fatalities in railway operations. Trespassing actions are 
more common amongst young males, while they are also strongly associated with vandalism 
acts (see also Section 2.2.3.1.2) (Forsdike et al., 2007). For example, the FRA (2008) 
identifies the average trespasser “as a 38-year-old Caucasian male under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs, with a median household income of $36,000, while more than 25 
percent of these individuals did not graduate from high school”. Therefore, it could be argued 
that the type of neighbourhood could be used as precursor for the cases of trespassing and 
for vandalism actions on railway premises. Clearly, research is required to confirm such an 
argument. In addition, especially for the dense European railways proximate to residential 
areas, trespassing actions are common with individuals who either attempt to take a shortcut 
or walk very close to the railway tracks and subsequently are hit by moving trains.  
Secondly, concerning the level crossing accidents, it is acknowledged that railway networks 
are usually sited close to road networks, and in some cases close to residential areas. 
Therefore, a large number of level crossings exist along the tracks to accommodate the 
transfer of car vehicle users and pedestrians. Particularly in Europe, circa 120,000 level 
crossings, or five per 10 line-km, are operational currently (European Railway Agency, 
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2012b). Due to the fact that only 38% of level crossings are equipped with automatic 
protection systems, level crossing users are vulnerable to accidents. However, it should be 
noted that although the proportion of level crossing accidents of the total accidents in the 
European countries is similar across the Member States (European Railway Agency, 
2012c), not all the countries record the same number of fatalities. This is explained by the 
different number of level crossings in each country. Similarly, the proportionally large 
number of level crossings compared to the train line miles in the US and Canada (about 
210,000 (Association of American Railroads, 2013), and 27,600 (Railway Association of 
Canada, 2011) respectively together with the fact that many are located in rural areas, 
increase the number of accidents due to inattention of their users.  
Although the consequences of trespassing and level crossing accidents primarily affect 
trespassers and level crossing users, the literature shows that train drivers who have met 
such accidents are likely to face post-traumatic stress disorder. Subsequently, this may 
affect their abilities to conduct their duties in future (Briem et al., 2004, Lunt and Hartley, 
2004). Therefore, railway organisations worldwide run campaigns to inform and educate 
people about the dangers of trespassing and careless use of level crossing. It is also 
indisputable that both level crossing (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004c) and 
trespassing accidents (definition in Section 2.2.3.1.2) are caused primarily by third parties. 
Hence, neither type of accidents constitutes an occurrence caused by the railway operators. 
Subsequently, it is out of the scope of this research to investigate them further. Hence, the 
rest of the thesis is focused on the remaining types of accidents. 
3.3.3 Contribution of railway constituents to safety 
Having identified the types of accidents and their proportion of the total number of accidents, 
this section investigates the contribution of each railway component to railway occurrences.  
European data from the UIC (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011b, 2012) databases (Figure 3-9) 
show, that for the past six years, third parties were responsible on average for about 76% of 
the train accidents. The contributions of the “controlled” components of the system were 
associated with human factors at 17% and railway sub-systems at 4.33%, while the 
remaining 2.67% was not defined.  
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Figure 3-9 The UIC primary causes to accidents 
A further analysis of the railway sub-systems, Figure 3-10 (left), indicates that infrastructure 
and rolling stock inconsistencies cause most accidents. It also shows that within the 
infrastructure the most common causes are broken tracks and wrong-side signalling failures. 
The former is associated with train derailments, and the latter with both train collisions and 
derailments. The most usual rolling stock inconsistencies, on the other hand, are associated 
with broken axles and broken wheels, which may both lead to train derailments. 
 
Figure 3-10 The UIC second level causes to accidents 
The causes of human factors are shown in Figure 3-10 (right) with passengers and freight 
customers contributing most to accidents. However, these types of accidents are considered 
as third party accidents, and are therefore outside the scope of this thesis. Figure 3-10 
(right) shows that operators, i.e. train drivers and signallers, have a significant effect on the 
safety of the railway system. For the period from 2006 to 2011, operators contributed on 
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average to 18% of human factors accidents and to approximately 3% of total accidents, 
resulting in more than 330 accidents. In addition, the literature shows that the largest 
number of serious accidents leading to a high number of fatalities and financial losses, have 
been attributed to operators (Dhillon, 2007).  
Moreover, the ERA (2011) data (Figure 3-11) indicates that SPADs and broken rails are the 
most common precursors to accidents. The data shows that the accidents caused by broken 
rails although resulting in large financial losses are not extensive with respect to human 
losses. This is in contrast to accidents caused by SPADs (e.g. the Ladbroke Grove accident 
in the UK in 1999, the Chatsworth trains collision in Los Angeles in 2008 and the train crash 
in Hordorf in Germany in 2011) with extensive human losses. In particular, the Ladbroke 
Grove accident initiated a debate about the role of human performance and human factors in 
railway safety. Rail organisations have started to investigate and examine in detail the 
contribution of railway staff to the safety of the system. Many studies have been published 
(Wilson et al., 2005, Wilson and Norris, 2005, Wilson and Norris, 2006, Wilson et al., 2007a, 
Wilson et al., 2007b), in addition to the establishment of many Human Factors groups 
including the RSSB and Network Rail HFs. 
 
Figure 3-11 Precursors to the EU train accidents (European Railway Agency, 2011) 
In addition, FRA (2012) data (Figure 3-12) show that in the past six years human factors 
consistently contributed to 33% of the total train accidents. Again, train drivers and signallers 
were identified as the operators with the most significant impact on safety. In the case of the 
drivers, failure to comply with restricted speed and failure to control train over shoving 
(shunting) movements are the most representative examples. With respect to signallers, on 
the other hand, authorisation for trains to enter an already occupied line, and the change of 
switches before a train runs through lines, have been reported as the most typical errors. 
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Figure 3-12 Primary causes to US train accidents (Federal Railroad Administration, 2012) 
From the CTSB (2012) data, it was shown in the previous section that train derailments 
constitute the majority of train accidents. It is clearly shown in Figure 3-13 (left), that human 
actions have caused most of the derailments. Amongst the actions the majority is related to 
operator incompetence specifically in protecting and securing the railways, as well as 
maintaining the required speed and using the on-board equipment (Transportation Safety 
Board of Canada, 2012). Even more profound are the results with respect to train collisions, 
Figure 3-13 (right). Again, data shows that operator incompetence in protecting and securing 
the railways, as well as using the on-board equipment is responsible for nearly all the 
identified actions. (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2012). 
The analysis so far has focused on OECD countries. However, similar data from India 
(representing developing countries) show similar trends. In particular, the data show that 
approximately 59% of the total railway accidents for the period 1996-2006 were attributed to 
failures of railway personnel. On the other hand, 25.5% of the occurrences were caused by 
other than railway employees’ failures and 6.5% by equipment failures (Agarwal, 2006).  
Based on the findings presented in this section, it is clear that further analysis of the impact 
of railway operators on safety of railway operations is required. Such an analysis will support 
railway organisations to direct resources more efficiently towards the development of smart 
and effective solutions to reduce operator errors.   
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Figure 3-13 Canadian causes to train derailments (left) and collisions (right) (Transportation 
Safety Board of Canada, 2012) 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter summarised the history of the development of railway safety in Europe, US, 
Canada and Australia and explores the types and causes of accidents. To this end, firstly a 
high level analysis of the recorded injuries and fatalities was undertaken, from which the 
categories of people who are most affected by incidents and accidents associated with 
railway operations were determined. Subsequently, the causes of these were scrutinised in 
greater detail. Overall, the analysis showed that the uncontrolled components, i.e., third 
parties comprising trespassers or level crossings users, are involved in the majority of 
railway accidents. Although their contribution to the railway safety overall is significant, 
occurrences caused by such uncontrolled components are violations external to the system. 
As the focus of this thesis is on controlled components, occurrences, associated with 
uncontrolled components are henceforth not considered further.  
With respect to the operational concept of the controlled components of the railway system it 
was shown that human actions are responsible for nearly 80% of the total accidents 
attributed to the controlled components of the system. Out of this 80%, more than 60% of 
the occurrences refer to railway personnel, and in particular to train drivers, signallers and 
controllers. It was shown from the analysis that most of the human failures are associated 
with signals passed at danger (SPADs), non-compliance with speed restrictions, failure to 
secure operations, wrong authorisation to trains and change of switches before trains run 
through.  
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In addition to the findings from the data analysis, the literature (Andersen, 1999, Rail Safety 
and Standards Board, 2004d, Dhillon, 2007, Wilson et al., 2007a, Evans, 2011) confirmed 
that most of human failures occur while trains move from one point to another. The most 
common failures are SPADs, ignoring train speed limits and signalling or dispatching 
inconsistencies (no technical failures included), confirming that train drivers, signallers and 
controllers have a significant impact on the network in terms of safety (Dhillon, 2007).  
Therefore, a critical issue within the railway community is to identify and explore the reasons 
that lead operators to commit errors. These are described in detail and analysed in the 
remainder of this thesis, starting in the next chapter with a discussion of the types of human 
errors and the methodologies employed to understand their origins, capture and quantify 
their impacts. 
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Chapter 4 HUMAN ERROR - HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
Chapters 2 and 3 identified human factors as having a significant role to play in the safety of 
railway operations. This chapter reviews the existing techniques for the analysis of human 
performance. This chapter first presents the concept of the railway operational error. 
Subsequently, the different types of human errors are classified, and the models used to 
identify the origins of human errors are described. After having identified the origins of 
human errors, the relevant terms of human factors, human reliability and human 
performance are then introduced. This is followed with a critical review of the most common 
human performance analysis techniques employed in the railway and cross-industry 
domains. This review identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the existing techniques and 
defines requirements of a technique suitable for railway operations.  
4.1 Concept of operational error in railways  
Based on the Railway Operational System Architecture (ROSA), the framework used to 
classify the tasks of train drivers, signallers and controllers can be divided into three phases: 
(i) receiving and assessing information, (ii) making decisions and (iii) executing actions. 
Each phase is prone to errors, which are referred to as operational errors. The concept of 
railway operational errors is similar to what Wickens (1992) describes as the information 
processing stage, which is a cognitive process consisting of the three fundamental phases of 
input, processing and output. In the first phase, also captured in the ROSA, operators 
receive information via sensors, usually in the form of visual or auditory stimulus, such as 
signal indications. In this phase operators detect, perceive and acknowledge information. In 
the second phase the perceived information is processed. This entails interpretation, 
judgement and decision making regarding the most suitable cognitive/behavioural 
response/action. During this phase recall or recognition of related stored information within 
working or long-term memories may also be required. Finally, in the output phase, the 
selected response is applied according to a predetermined plan. Within the context of 
information processing stages, all phases are associated with attention resources, which 
indicate the performance of operators. Hence, it is usually assumed that the higher the 
attention resources (performance), the safer the execution of the phases.  
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Figure 4-1 illustrates an example of the process in its entirety. The example refers to a train 
driver, who receives a signal at danger and should act according to a predetermined plan. 
As can be seen, the input phase comprises the sensory processing and perception, that is, 
the driver detects the signal, reads and acknowledges its indication. During the second 
phase the driver processes the information, deciding to stop at the signal. Finally, in the 
output phase, the decision to stop at the signal is executed by applying the brakes. In 
addition, Figure 4-1 shows how attention resources and memory, both working and long-
term, support the three phases. 
 
Figure 4-1 Process of operational error in railway operations by (Wickens, 1992) as cited in (Rail 
Safety and Standards Board, 2004b) 
However, each of the three phases is prone to errors. For example, at the input stage the 
train driver may not detect the signal, while at the processing phase the signal may be 
misinterpreted. Finally, in the output stage, the train driver may not apply the brakes 
appropriately, resulting in a signal passed at danger. The different types of relevant human 
errors and their origins, within the operational concept of railways, are reviewed and 
presented in the next section. 
4.2 Definitions of human error 
Over the last thirty years a lot of progress has been achieved in understanding human errors 
(Health and Safety Executive, 1999). According to Leveson (2004, p.245), the term human 
error usually describes “any deviation from the performance of a specified or prescribed 
sequence of actions”. 
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A psychological definition, given by Reason (1990, p.9) indicates human error as “a generic 
term to encompass all those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical 
activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed 
to the intervention of some change agency”. Matthews et al. (2000, p.147), on the other 
hand, define human error from the perspective of a system as “any inappropriate or 
undesirable human decision or behaviour that violates one or more system tolerance limits”. 
A more comprehensive definition given by Swain and Guttmann (1983, p.2-7) and adopted 
later by EUROCONTROL (2007, p.1) is that human error is “any member of a set of human 
actions or activities that exceeds some limit of acceptability, i.e. an out of tolerance action (or 
failure to act) where the limits of performance are defined by the system”. Finally Gertman et 
al. (2004, p.xxvii), determine human error as “an out-of-tolerance action, or deviation from 
the norm, where the limits of acceptable performance are defined by the system. These 
situations can arise from problems in sequencing, timing, knowledge, interfaces, procedures, 
and other sources”.  
Although a variety of definitions exist, it can be concluded that human error is generally 
associated with failure to deliver the expected outcome, deviations from norms and violation 
of a system’s limits of tolerance. Nevertheless, such variety confirms Hollnagel’s (1998, 
p.23) earlier observation that “practically everyone who has published work on the topic of 
human fallibility in a work context has attempted, at one time or another, to provide a 
technical definition of the concept of "error". The net result of this effort has been a clear 
demonstration that it is extremely difficult to provide a precise definition, despite the fact 
that the term "error" has a relatively simplistic meaning in everyday life”. 
Due to the lack of a commonly agreed definition of human error, this thesis introduces two 
new definitions. Both are developed based on existing definitions, as described above, and 
define human error more narrowly from the perspective of railway personnel and railway 
operations3. In the context of railway personnel, human error is “any inappropriate or 
undesirable action or behaviour from railway personnel, which compromises the safe 
operation of the system and jeopardises the system’s limits of acceptability, where the limits 
of performance are defined by the system and regulations”. Based on the definition for 
railway operations, the railway operational human error is defined as “any inappropriate or 
undesirable action or behaviour of a train driver, signaller or controller, individually or as 
team, which compromises the safe operation of the railway and increases the probability of 
                                                
3 “any train movement from one point to another including shunting operations” 
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an incident/accident”. This definition of railway operational error is used throughout the 
remainder of this thesis.  
4.3 Classifications of human error  
Although errare humanum est (“to err is human”), not all humans or all errors are the same. 
The literature indicates different ways to classify human errors, of which  the 
phenomenological and cognitive approaches are considered to be predominant (Matthews 
et al., 2000). 
4.3.1 The phenomenological approach 
The phenomenological approach separates human errors into omission and commission 
errors. According to this theory, errors are described as they are observed, i.e. actions have 
either not been performed or have been performed inadequately (Meister, 1964, Swain and 
Guttmann, 1983, Matthews et al., 2000). In line with this, omission errors define actions 
which, although they should have been performed, have not been carried out, e.g. the failure 
of a train driver to test the braking system before starting the service. Errors of commission, 
on the other hand, comprise actions which have been executed poorly, including actions 
performed imprecisely, at the wrong time or in the wrong sequence (Kirwan, 1994), e.g. a 
signaller changes points before train passes.  
Furthermore, commission errors are sub-divided into extraneous acts, sequential errors and 
time errors (Matthews et al., 2000). Extraneous acts refer to situations where an action is 
likely to prevent the achievement of a particular goal, e.g. a train driver using a mobile phone 
while approaching a station and consequently failing to stop within the designated area. 
Sequential errors indicate actions executed out of sequence, e.g. a train driver departing 
from a station and checking the appropriate signal only after departure. Finally, time related 
errors are actions that were performed either too early or too late or outside a permitted 
period, e.g. signaller does not inform train driver about a signalling failure in time. 
This phenomenological classification is a simple and straightforward scheme to distinguish 
human errors. However, due to its simplicity, the model focuses only on the outcomes of an 
error rather than on its causes. Hence, it does not provide any insights for probable 
underlying causes that may have contributed to the error, such as weaknesses in the system 
design, inadequate supervision, procedures or training. Subsequently, the available 
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information on the causes of error is inadequate for developing efficient remedial measures 
(Kariuki, 2007).  
4.3.2 The cognitive approach 
The main feature of cognitive approach, which is very similar to the operational concept of 
human errors in railways, is the assumption that errors are associated with the stages of 
cognition in conceiving and executing a task sequence (Reason, 1990). According to 
Reason (1990) there are three cognition stages in a task sequence. These are: (i) planning, 
which refers to both the identification of a goal and to the sequence of the selected actions 
(plan) to achieve that goal, (ii) storage, which refers to the storage in memory of a selected 
plan until the time it is executed and (iii) execution, which refers to the implementation of the 
stored plan by carrying out the selected actions. Each of the cognitive stages is further 
associated with a basic type of error, known as slips, lapses and mistakes, as shown in 
Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 Classification of error types according to cognitive stages 
Cognitive stage Basic type of error 
Planning Mistakes 
Storage Lapses 
Execution Slips 
Slips and lapses are described as “errors which result from some failure in the execution 
and/or storage stage of an action sequence, regardless of whether or not the plan which 
guided them was adequate to achieve its objective” (Reason, 1990, p.9). Specifically, slips 
which occur during the execution stage are described as actions not as planned errors 
(Reason, 1990, Health and Safety Executive, 1999). They indicate errors where the intention 
is correct but the execution of the required action is false, e.g. a signaller activating the 
wrong switch. Lapses, on the other hand, are errors associated with the memory storage 
phase, primarily characterised by missed actions and omissions. They are referred to also 
as forgetting state errors (Reason, 1990, Matthews et al., 2000, Kariuki, 2007) and happen 
when an individual fails to perform an action because of inattention and/or memory failure, 
e.g. a train driver forgetting to check the signal before departing the station.  
Finally, mistakes, which occur in the planning stage, are defined as any “deficiencies or 
failures in the judgemental and/or inferential process involved in the selection of an objective 
or in the specification of the means to achieve it, irrespective of whether or not the actions 
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directed by this decision-scheme run according to plan” (Reason, 1990, p.9). By their nature, 
mistakes are not only more dangerous than slips and lapses, but also more difficult to 
detect. Mistakes occur when people wrongly execute a task in the belief of doing it correctly. 
They are related to individuals’ mental capabilities to plan, assess available information, 
make and/or take decisions and evaluate consequences. For example, applying a rule in a 
situation where it is not appropriate, because it is often used and seems appropriate for the 
current situation (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2011).  
Although the cognitive classification provides a constructive way to distinguish human errors, 
it is not always clear and straightforward to identify whether an error is to be classified as a 
slip or a mistake. For instance, there are cases of erroneous behaviour that contain 
elements of mistakes and slips, when operators execute wrongly a selected task based on 
inadequate assessment of the state of the system (Reason, 1990). Consequently, the final 
error classification leads to inconclusive and misleading findings, which provide insufficient 
feedback for remedial measures. Additionally, similar to the phenomenological approach 
there is no information causes of error. 
4.3.3 Summary of errors classifications 
The phenomenological and cognition human error classifications have been widely used to 
identify the different types of human errors. Both classifications focus on analysing errors 
from the perspective of an individual. Their findings are used to (i) distinguish and better 
understand the different types of human error and (ii) statistically analyse human error 
occurrence in a variety of contexts. Table 4-2 provides a summary of the concept, strengths 
and weaknesses of both approaches. 
Table 4-2 The human error classifications 
Models Concept Pros Cons 
Phenomenological 
! Human errors are 
described just as 
they are observed, 
i.e. omission & 
commission 
! Simple and 
straightforward 
classification to 
distinguish human 
error 
! Focus on the outcome rather 
than the cause of errors 
! No insights concerning any 
underlying factors that 
contribute to an error 
Cognitive 
! Human errors are 
related with the 
different cognitive 
stages in 
conceiving and 
executing an 
action 
! Constructive 
approach to classify 
human error 
! Associates human 
error with cognition 
stages 
! Not always clear how to 
distinguish slips and mistakes  
! Insufficient feedback for 
remedial measures 
! No insights concerning any 
underlying factors that 
contribute to an error 
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As shown in Table 4-2, the main drawback of both classifications is that they do not account 
for any underlying or hidden contextual factors that may have affected the performance of 
frontline personnel and subsequently contributed to the error’s occurrence. Therefore, 
although they explain the types of human errors as the final outcome of a broader context, 
they do not provide any information about the origins of the errors within a specific context. 
To address this limitation, human error models were developed and implemented. These 
include Heinrich’s domino theory (1931), Reason’s generic error modelling system and 
Swiss cheese (1990) and more recently Leveson’s STAMP (2004) and Hollnagel’s FRAM 
(2012). 
4.4 Models of human error 
The contribution of human error classifications is substantial in the identification of the nature 
of human errors. However, they do not provide conclusive information or capture the overall 
picture of why and under which circumstances an error occurs. Since the majority of serious 
accidents in railways are caused by human errors, it is important to seek means to identify 
and define the causes of such errors. Reason (2000) proposed two distinct ways to consider 
human errors, the person and system approaches. Each has its models of error causation 
and provides different theories of error management. Both approaches have been widely 
used in the process of understanding human error causations in the railway industry. 
4.4.1 Person approach 
The person approach focuses on the unsafe acts4 of frontline personnel, primarily caused by 
aberrant mental processes such as distraction, loss of concentration, memory lapses, poor 
motivation or decision making skills (Reason, 2000). It is expressed by the Generic Error 
Modelling System (GEMS) created by Reason (1990), based on the Skill-Rule-Knowledge 
(Rasmussen, 1982) classification of human performance and the cognitive error 
mechanisms (Reason, 1990).  
                                                
4 According to Reason (1990) “unsafe acts” are perpetrated by system operators and are directly 
linked to an accident/incident. 
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4.4.1.1 The Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) 
The GEMS is a conceptualised framework used to identify the origins of human error types, 
which in large part stems from the Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SRK) classification of human 
behavior introduced by Rasmussen (1982).  
The SRK framework is the first of its kind that successfully combined psychology and 
engineering into a single approach. The SRK refers to the degree of conscious behavior of 
an individual during the execution of their tasks. It comprises three hierarchical levels, as 
illustrated in Figure 4-2, each representing a discrete level of behavior.  
 
Figure 4-2 The continuum between conscious and automatic behaviour (Reason, 1990) 
The lowest level, skill-based, refers to almost unconscious (automated) behavior, where 
well-practiced actions are instinctively executed. The intermediate level, rule-based, 
indicates performance controlled by stored rules. At this level, both the acknowledgment of 
the necessity to apply the rules and the cognisance of selecting and implementing the 
appropriate rules are entailed. Finally, the knowledge-based mode refers to tasks that for 
their execution require a highly conscious state of mind. This type of behavior typically 
occurs either under abnormal conditions or during a learning process and therefore, 
demands a thorough understanding of the functions of the system and its characteristics. 
(Reason, 1990, Kirwan, 1994, Matthews et al., 2000, DiMattia, 2004, Kariuki, 2007, 
Kyriakidis, 2009). 
With the integration of the SRK based framework and the cognitive error mechanisms (see 
Section 4.3.2), Reason (1990) generated the Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS). The 
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GEMS allows analysts to: (i) understand the origins of human errors, (ii) comprehensively 
understand the nature of errors, (iii) expect and predict the time and conditions in which a 
specific type of error may occur, (iv) understand better the transition from the skill- to 
knowledge-based behavior and (v) assess the cognitive determinants within complex 
sociotechnical systems5 (Kirwan, 1994). 
 
Figure 4-3 Unsafe acts framework (Health and Safety Executive, 1999, Rail Safety and 
Standards Board, 2011) 
The GEMS focuses on a person’s unsafe acts, which are classified as: errors and violations. 
Within the GEMS concept, the former generally refer to any “unintentional deviation from the 
accepted standards”, while the latter to any “deliberate deviations from rules, procedures, 
instructions and regulations” (Health and Safety Executive, 1999). Moreover, it considers 
human errors as the combination of behavioural and cognitive errors. Therefore, skill-based 
errors are associated with slips and lapses. Such errors happen when the tasks are very 
familiar, their execution is almost automatic (reflexive) and therefore, do not require a lot of 
attention. On the other hand, mistakes are associated with the rule- and knowledge-based 
errors. Rule-based mistakes happen when the behaviour of an operator is dependent on 
either memorised rules or their familiarity with procedures. Hence, there is strong tendency 
to either misuse well-defined rules or implement inappropriate procedures, e.g. authorising a 
train driver to pass a signal at danger. By contrast, knowledge-based mistakes arise under 
unfamiliar or unusual conditions, when no rules or procedures exist to support and handle 
                                                
5 A complex sociotechnical system is defined as “the complex interaction between humans, 
machines and the environmental aspects of the work system” (Vanderhaegen, 2001, Cacciabue, 
2004b). Nowadays this interaction is true of most enterprise systems, including railways. 
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that specific situation, e.g. coping with a major signalling failure (Reason, 1990, Kirwan, 
1994, Health and Safety Executive, 1999, Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004e). 
With respect to violations, the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (1999) divide these 
into routine, situational and exceptional. The Rail Standards and Safety Board (RSSB) 
(2011) have later highlighted two more categories, the personal interest and sabotage 
violations. A routine violation refers to any rule or non-compliance with procedure or 
disregard that over time becomes a standard process within a work group. Such violations 
happen when the rules are believed to be too restrictive, unnecessary or out of date, e.g. a 
shunter getting on and off the engine while it is running (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 
2011). In the case of situational violations, rules are not followed due to work pressure 
including time pressure, understaffing or adverse weather conditions. They usually occur 
under extraordinary conditions where the work situation makes the rules difficult or 
impossible to follow. For instance, a train driver continuing a shunting operation after losing 
visual contact with the person in charge of the movement (Health and Safety Executive, 
1999, Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2011).  
Exceptional violations, on the other hand, occur in new, critical or emergency situations, 
when it is believed that the risk of breaking a rule would be less of a risk taking than sticking 
to the rule during the execution of a task. For instance, a train driver exceeding speed limits 
due to an emergency situation in one of passengers coaches (Health and Safety Executive, 
1999, Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2011). The personal interest violations include any 
deliberate disregard of rules that leads to a personal benefit. In these situations a task is 
executed in an unsafe manner because it is faster and considered beneficial to do so, e.g. 
driving a train above speed limits in order to return home earlier. Finally, sabotages refer to 
violations due to acts of vandalisms, which are executed deliberately and consciously to 
cause harm and damage (Health and Safety Executive, 1999, DiMattia, 2004, Rail Safety 
and Standards Board, 2011). 
The GEMS has been broadly applied to several domains, including aviation, railways and 
offshore operations to identify and mitigate human error (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000, 
Khan et al., 2006, Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2011). However, the model has its 
limitations. Firstly, human errors are seen as random and independent events, while frontline 
operators are considered incorrectly as the only cause of errors. However, it is often the 
case that the best people make the worst errors (Reason, 2000). As a result, the possibility 
of individuals with an overall good performance making an error should not be overlooked. In 
turn, investigation should consider the overall context of error’s occurrence. Secondly, 
human errors tend to fall into repeated patterns. The same conditions can produce similar 
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errors regardless of the characteristics of the involved personnel, which again indicates the 
significance of studying the overall context of an error’s occurrence. Finally, due to the fact 
that the models based on the cognitive approach ignore the underlying causes of errors, 
limited insights with regard to the origins and propagation of human error are provided. 
Consequently, this negatively impacts the development of remedial countermeasures 
(Kariuki, 2007). To address these issues, the system error causation models were derived. 
Such models are the most widely used for investigating the origins of human errors. 
4.4.2 System approach 
As discussed in the previous section, the person approach considers human errors as 
random and independent events caused exclusively by frontline personnel (Health and 
Safety Executive, 1999). However, it has been proven that this theory is no longer valid 
(Leiden et al., 2001). Analyses of railway accidents and incidents for the past 30 years, for 
example, show that in most of the cases frontline personnel errors do not contribute in 
isolation to unwanted safety outcomes. Instead, they coincide with additional contributing 
factors stemming from the operational environment. These factors include technical and 
organisational failures, such as, e.g. in the Clapham Junction (1998) accident, Ladbroke 
Grove (1999) trains collision in London and Chatsworth (2008) trains collision in Los Angeles 
(Health and Safety Executive, 1999, Evans, 2011, Federal Railroad Administration, 2012).  
Therefore, the system approach to study the origins of human errors was developed. The 
approach is expressed by Reason’s (1997, p.126, 2000, p.768) statement that “errors should 
be considered as consequences rather than causes, while their origins are not found so 
much in the perversity of human nature as in “upstream” systemic factors”. The system 
approach focuses on the conditions in which individuals work with the aim to suppress 
accidents/incidents by establishing defences that prevent errors or mitigate their effects. 
Subsequently, human errors are studied as the result of a series of events that eventually 
lead to an accident/incident and are investigated within the broader prism of accidents 
causation (Reinach et al., 2007). 
In the literature, a multitude of models are available to assist in this search. These models 
are necessary to facilitate accident/incident investigations by accounting for all the factors 
and conditions (including but not restricted to human errors), apparent or not. A critical 
review of the numerous models that have been developed and implemented across several 
industries shows that they all rely on one of the sequential, epidemiological and systemic 
theories (Hollnagel, 2004, Dupuy, 2011, Salmon et al., 2011). The three theories are in turn 
explained in the following sections. 
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4.4.2.1 The sequential models  
Characterised by Heinrich’s (1931) domino accident causation model, sequential models 
explain accidents as the result of a series of discrete events, including human and 
component failures that occur in a particular order (Hollnagel, 2004). They are based on the 
cause-effect concept, where a sudden undesirable or unexpected event initiates a sequence 
of upcoming events, until the occurrence reaches its final state, i.e. the accident (Hollnagel, 
2004, Qureshi, 2007, Dupuy, 2011). 
According to the model, human errors can be identified, as shown in Figure 4-4, in the social 
environment, fault of person, and unsafe acts, domino pieces. The first refers to human 
errors at management level, while the second describes errors caused by factors such as 
fatigue, lack of training, competence, and attitude. The unsafe acts, are those errors made 
by the frontline personnel just before an accident occurs, e.g. train driver exceeds speed 
limits leading to train’s derailment. The dominos are arranged in such a way that once the 
first in the series falls, it sets off a chain reaction, causing the entire row of upended dominos 
to fall. Within this context, the model provides a constructive framework to identify human 
errors not only as “unsafe acts” caused by the frontline personnel but also as errors that can 
arise at the higher levels of hierarchy within an organisation. Nevertheless, due to its nature, 
the model considers human errors as the result of root cause events. Thus, an error would 
be prevented if the single event that causes that error were removed, e.g. a tired train driver 
is released from duty.  
A limitation of the sequential models is that it is not always clear how to determine the 
unique root event in the sequence that started the domino effect (Dupuy, 2011). Therefore, 
the models have limited power in complex systems. This is explained by the fact that in such 
systems human errors are considered as the result of combining multiple factors, hidden and 
apparent, that occur together in space and time (Qureshi, 2007). Subsequently, since the 
sequential models focus only on the root causes of an error, they fail to capture any other 
factors that may contribute to such an error. Hence, the epidemiological accident models, 
characterised mainly by Reason’s Swiss Cheese model (1990), were introduced to address 
such limitations. 
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Figure 4-4 Domino model of accident causation and human error exploration (Qureshi, 2007) 
4.4.2.2 The epidemiological models 
The epidemiological models provide an analogy between the events leading to accidents 
and the spreading of a disease, as the result of a combination of factors, hidden or apparent, 
that happen together in space and time (Qureshi, 2007). Therefore, when considering the 
human contribution to accidents, the active (apparent) and latent (hidden) types of errors 
should be taken into account. The former are associated with the actions of frontline 
personnel, while the latter are more likely to occur with personnel whose activities are not 
related to the direct function, execution and control of the system, e.g. maintenance 
personnel, designers, or local and headquarters management (Reason, 1990).  
The Swiss Cheese developed by Reason (1990) is probably the most well-known 
epidemiological model. The model comprises a number of layers (cheese slices), as shown 
in Figure 4-5, which represent the defensive mechanisms of a system. In a perfect world the 
defensive layers would be flawless and thereby successfully preventing any potential 
accident. However, in reality all layers have weaknesses (holes), which under certain 
circumstances can lead to an accident.  
relationship between latent and immediate causes of 
accidents. 
Sequential and epidemiological accident models are 
inadequate to capture the dynamics and nonlinear 
interactions between system components in complex 
socio-technical systems. New accident models, based on 
systems theory, classified as systemic accident models, 
endeavour to describe the characteristic performance on 
the level of the system as a whole, rather than on the level 
of specific cause-effect “mechanisms” or even 
epidemiological factors (Hollnagel 2004). A major 
difference between systemic accident models and 
sequential/epidemiological accident models is that 
systemic accident models describe an accident process as 
a complex and interconnected network of events while 
the latter describes it as a simple cause-effect chain of 
events. Two notable systemic modelling approaches, 
Rasmussen’s (1997) hierarchical socio-technical 
framework and Leveson’s (2004) STAMP (Systems-
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) model, 
endeavour to model the dynamics of complex socio-
technical systems. 
Modern technology and automation has significantly 
changed the nature of human work from mainly manual 
tasks to predominantly knowledge intensive activities and 
cognitive tasks. This has created new problems for human 
operator performance (such as cognitive load) and new 
kinds of failure modes in the overall human-machine 
systems. Cognitive systems engineering (Hollnagel 1983) 
has emerged as a framework to model the behaviour of 
human-machine systems in the context of the 
environment in which work takes place. Two systemic 
accident models for safety and accident analysis have 
been developed based on the principles of cognitive 
systems engineering: CREAM - Cognitive Reliability and 
Error Analysis Method (Hollnagel 1998); and FRAM - 
Functional Resonance Accident Model (Hollnagel 2004). 
During the last decade many attempts have been made on 
the use of formal methods for building mathematically-
based models to conduct accident analysis. Formal 
methods can improve accident analysis by emphasising 
the importance of precision in definitions and 
descriptions, and providing notations for describing and 
reasoning about certain aspects of accidents. 
As the understanding of industrial, transportation and 
aerospace accidents has evolved, they are no longer 
considered as simply the failures of technology alone, nor 
solely arising from the ubiquitous “human error”, but also 
as a result of a historical background and an unfavourable 
organisational context (Vaughan 1996). Sociological 
analysis of accident causation is gaining momentum as an 
effective approach towards understanding the social and 
organisational causes of accidents (see, for example: 
Perrow 1984, Vaughn 1996, Hopkins 2000).  
The Columbia investigation Report identifies a “broken 
safety culture” as a focal point of the ccident’s
organisational causes (CAIB 2003). The report examines 
how NASA’s organisational culture and structure 
weakened the safety structure that created structural 
secrecy, causing decision makers to miss the threat posed 
by successive events of foam debris strikes. 
Organisational culture has an influence on the overall 
safety, reliability and effectiveness of the operations in an 
organisation. Safety is a part of the organisational culture, 
and it is the leaders of an organisation who determine 
how it functions, and it is their decision making which 
determines in particular, whether an organisation exhibits 
the practices and attitudes which make up a culture of 
safety (Hopkins 2005). 
This paper is organised as follows: in the following 
section, we discuss the traditional accident models; in 
Section 3, the issues and complexities of socio-technical 
systems are delineated; in Section 4, systemic accident 
modelling approach and models are described; a brief 
review of the application of formal methods to accident 
modelling is given in Section 5; sociological and 
organisational theories and research on accident analysis 
is discussed in Section 6; and finally, in the last section, 
we summarise the work on accident modelling and 
discuss future research trends. 
2 Traditional Approaches to Accident 
Modelling 
2.1 Sequential Accident Models 
Sequential accident models explain accident causation as 
the result of a chain of discrete events that occur in a 
particular temporal order. One of the earliest sequential 
accident models is the Domino theory proposed by 
Heinrich (Ferry 1988). According to this theory there are 
five factors in the accident sequence: 1) social 
environment (those conditions which make us take or 
accept risks); 2) fault of the person; 3) unsafe acts or 
conditions (poor planning, unsafe equipment, hazardous 
environment); 4) accident; 5) injury. These five factors 
are arranged in a domino fashion such that the fall of the 
first domino results in the fall of the entire row (Figure 1). 
This illustrates that each factor leads to the next with the 
end result being the injury.  
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Figure 1: Domino model of accident causation 
An undesirable or expected event (the root cause) initiates 
a sequence of subsequent events leading to an accident. 
This implies that the accident is the result of a single 
cause, and if that single cause can be identified and 
removed the accident will not be repeated. The reality is 
that accidents lways have more than on  c ntributi g 
factor. 
 Sequential models work well for losses caused by 
failures of physical components or human errors in 
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Figure 4-5 The Swiss Cheese model of human error, adapted from (Rail Safety and Standards 
Board, 2011) 
With respect to human errors, the latent types are identified within the fallible board 
decisions and policy, line management deficiencies and preconditions for unsafe acts. They 
all refer to failures that may exist for years and never be related to any accident (or incident), 
until the time that a loss occurs, e.g. safety culture, lack of supervision. The active errors 
refer to unsafe acts and determine an operator’s actions and decisions that take place 
exactly before the accident (or incident) and they are directly associated with the event 
(Reason, 1990, Hollnagel et al., 2006). According to the model, any accident is considered the 
result of errors that emerge from unsafe acts caused by frontline personnel in conjunction 
with the organisation’s latent failures.  
The Swiss Cheese model has been used to analyse accidents in several domains, including 
railways. An example was the Clapham Junction accident, which occurred in London in 
1988, as illustrated in Figure 4-6. It is known that the accident was caused by a wiring fault 
during a re-signalling replacement process (Hidden, 1989). The faulty wire was left by the 
responsible signalling technician connected at the one end and loose and not insulated at 
the other. At first glance, it could be claimed that the accident happened due only to the 
technician’s oversight. However, once the findings from the enquiry had been mapped to the 
Swiss Cheese model, several factors were identified that significantly contributed and finally 
resulted in the accident. 
Trains 
collision 
active failures 
latent failures 
Some holes due to 
active failures 
Some holes due 
to latent failures 
Unsafe acts 
Engineer does not 
isolates wire - fault in 
signal wiring keeps 
signal at green 
Preconditions for unsafe acts 
Excessive supervisor workload 
prevents checking work of 
subordinates 
Line management deficiencies  
Failure to inform standards to 
supervisors 
Fallible Board Decisions and Policy 
Inadequate planning and designing of 
the replacement of signalling 
equipment 
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Figure 4-6 The Clapham Junction accident - the Swiss cheese model, adapted from (Rail Safety 
and Standards Board, 2011) 
Starting with the fallible decisions, the board neither planned nor designed the replacement 
process adequately, since they did not ensure that sufficient staff would be available to 
perform the maintenance works. Consequently, supervisors were not properly informed 
about the required standards, leading to non-compliance with installation procedures. 
Furthermore, the understaffed supervising personnel were unable to monitor all frontline 
employees, including the technician. Finally, the technician who was asked to carry out the 
task was not sufficiently trained, which significantly contributed to his false decision not to 
secure the old wiring. The combination of all factors led to the fault in signalling, which 
resulted in the collision.  
By introducing the latent conditions the Swiss Cheese model radically changed the way of 
considering human errors and accidents, which in turn expanded the scope of the 
investigation process beyond the proximate causes. However, the model has some 
considerable drawbacks. The main weakness is that the model does not provide analysts 
with a detailed guidance on its application in a real-world context (Shappell and Wiegmann, 
2000). In particular, it does not indicate the exact notion of the holes, hence it can be difficult 
and ambiguous for analysts to exactly identify and define the weaknesses for a specific 
operation. As a result, the causal associations between the distant latent failures, i.e. fallible 
board decisions, and the active failures can be difficult to identify and tackle. However, new 
models, such as the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (Shappell 
and Wiegmann, 2000) and the HFACS version for railways (HFACS-RR) (Reinach and 
Viale, 2006) (explained in Chapter 5) were introduced to address such limitations. Secondly, 
due to the linear nature of the model, although the cause of an error is no longer a single 
chain of events, the errors are still explained as the outcome of a fairly simple combination of 
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events. In addition, the failure of any defensive mechanisms is deemed as the failure of an 
individual system component, rather than the failure of the entire system (Hollnagel et al., 
2006). Hence, the systemic models, which are characterised by, Rasmussen’s (2002) 
Accimaps, Leveson’s (2004) STAMP and  Hollnagel’s (2012) FRAM, were developed to 
overcome these limitations. 
4.4.2.3 The systemic models 
As shown in the previous two sections, sequential and epidemiological models underpin the 
cause-effect concept, where accidents and human errors are expressed as the result of a 
combination of factors that occur in a linear fashion. More recently new approaches have 
been adopted, referred to as systemic models, which have two main features: (i) they focus 
on the performance of the system as a whole and (ii) they support the theory of non-linear 
causality.  
Systemic models usually refer to the term of concurrence (Hollnagel et al., 2006). That is, an 
accident or error can be deemed as the outcome of an unexpected combination of 
conditions or events taking place at the same time, thereby affecting each other (Perrow, 
1984, Hollnagel et al., 2006). Therefore, accidents and human errors are recognised as 
emergent phenomena, which arise from complex (nonlinear) interactions between the 
components of the system (Qureshi, 2007).  
Leveson (2004) suggests that systems should be “viewed as interrelated components that 
are kept in a state of dynamic equilibrium by feedback loops of information and control”. 
Within this context, human errors should be “treated as part of an on-going process that is 
influenced by context, goals, motives, and mental models” (Leveson, 2004, p.266). In 
particular, errors are seen as the product of faulty activities involving complex interactions 
amongst the frontline personnel, managerial and organisational structures as well as 
regulatory system components. Systemic models provide a detailed and robust framework to 
investigate in detail accidents and human errors. However, due to their complexity these 
models can be highly time-consuming, may require extensive resources and a large amount 
of information in order to provide conclusive results. Finally, in most of the cases it is 
questionable whether the systemic models add significant benefit compared to 
epidemiological models with respect to their generated remedial measures or 
countermeasures (Salmon et al., 2011).  
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4.4.3 Summary of human error modelling  
Human error modelling is used to identify the origins of human errors through the prism of 
accident causation. The strengths and limitations of the dominant approaches are provided 
in Table 4-3.  
Table 4-3 Error causation models  
Approach Model Concept Pros Cons 
Person 
G
EM
S 
! Combination of cognitive 
mechanisms 
! Focus on cognitive errors 
! Distinguishes errors and 
violations 
! Identifies the exact 
type of cognitive 
error just before an 
accident/incident 
! Focus only on “unsafe 
acts” without addressing 
any contextual factors 
! Considers errors as 
random and independent 
events 
System 
Se
qu
en
tia
l ! Identification of individual 
factors in a linear sequence  
! Identifies types of 
errors in the higher 
hierarchy levels of 
an organisation  
! Unclear what the single 
root cause is 
! No insights concerning 
any underlying factors that 
contribute to an error 
Ep
id
em
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
! Errors seen as analogous to 
spreading of a disease  
! Identification of active and 
latent errors 
! Identification of defensive 
mechanisms 
! Identifies active and 
latent failures 
! Causality no longer 
a single chain of 
events 
! Not always clear 
identification of latent 
failures 
! Ambiguous definition of 
causal associations 
between active and distant 
latent failures  
! Considers error as the 
failure of an individual 
component 
Sy
st
em
ic
 
! Consideration of the 
whole system 
performance  
! Consideration of 
complex interaction 
amongst systems 
components 
! Consideration of 
errors in a nonlinear 
fashion 
! Errors are 
identified as 
emergent 
phenomena 
that arise from 
complex 
interactions 
amongst 
system’s 
components 
! Time-consuming 
and intensive 
resources 
! Remedial measures 
or countermeasures 
strongly related to 
analysts experience 
! Require a lot of 
information for 
constructive 
findings 
The two approaches, the person and system, can be claimed to be complementary. This 
implies that in order to achieve the best understanding of the origin of human errors the two 
models should be integrated. Firstly, the system approach is used to identify the active and 
latent failures and address all the factors that may contribute to an error. In turn, the person 
approach is used to define the exact type of error that an individual made just before the 
accident/incident occurred. Depending on the complexity of the model, errors can be viewed 
as the product of linear or complex combinations of factors that happen coincidentally. 
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Based on the nature of the approach, analysts have the ability to investigate and identify 
common patterns in the occurrence of human errors with regard to or regardless of the 
characteristics of the individual in a broad variety of contexts. Subsequently, human error 
modelling supports analysts to examine and determine the contextual factors, apparent and 
hidden, that may affect the performance of the individual and contribute to the occurrence.  
Thus, the next section discusses the context within which human error occurs. 
4.5 Human Factors 
The previous section presented the different approaches to classify human errors and 
identify their origins. It was determined that errors should be studied within the conceptual 
framework of a reference system, by taking into account the interactions between operators, 
organisations, technology, environment, procedures and regulations. Therefore, the 
discipline of Human Factors (HFs) was established and has been broadly applied, aiming at 
reducing human errors and the frequency of their unwanted consequences in the operation 
of several systems (Swain, 1990). 
4.5.1 Definition of Human Factors 
One of the first definitions for Human Factors (HFs), in the mid 1960’s by Murrell (1965, 
p.xiii), is “the scientific study of the relationship between man and his working environment”. 
Meister (1989, p.2) later expanded it to “the study of how humans accomplish work-related 
tasks in the context of human-machine system operation and how behavioural and non-
behavioural variables affect that accomplishment”. Further to this, the UK HSE (1999, p.5) 
introduced a more generic definition of HFs as “the environmental, organisational and job 
factors, and human and individual characteristics which influence behaviour at work in a way 
which can affect health and safety”.  
With regard to railways the RSSB (2004e, p.181) defines HFs as “the study of all of the 
‘people’ issues that must be considered to assure the lifelong safety and effectiveness of a 
system or organisation”, while Priestley and Lee (2008, p.1) define HFs as “the application of 
knowledge of human capabilities and limitations to the design and management of the tasks 
that people do”.  
Besides the above, many other definitions are listed in the literature, e.g. (Stanton et al., 
2005a, Shaver, 2009). However, the interpretation of all definitions implies that a simple way 
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to consider HFs is to integrate three parameters: type of work, individual and organisation. 
Subsequently, both human error and human performance should be tackled as the 
consequence of the dependencies and potential failures between individual capabilities, 
tasks demands, organisational and environmental conditions. 
4.5.2 Railway Human Factors  
Railway HFs research has developed rapidly over the past two decades. Early work was 
conducted by a few institutions during the 1960s and 1970s, followed by a period of inertia in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. However, the evolution of the industry, the implementation of 
new technical systems and equipment, as well as the need to improve safety and reliability, 
have accelerated and supported the railway HFs research programs in several countries 
(Wilson and Norris, 2005).  
The literature shows (Wilson et al., 2007a) that there are eight main areas of railway HFs 
research: (i) system ergonomics and staff attitudes, (ii) train driver behaviour and 
performance, (iii) performance and behaviour in rail traffic control, (iv) design of human 
machine interfaces, (v) automation, (vi) track engineering, (vii) human reliability, including 
reporting schemes, procedures and violations and finally (viii) design for neighbours, 
passengers and the public. It is apparent that research covers almost all aspects of the 
railway system such as: driving, signalling and control; maintenance; change of technical 
systems; passenger interests; design and planning. However, this research focuses on the 
performance of railway operators. Hence, the next subsections review only the studies that 
assess and evaluate human performance. A review of the remaining areas of research can 
be found in Wilson et al. (2005), Wilson and Norris (2005, 2006), Wilson et al. (2007a), 
Wilson et al. (2007b), Stanton (2012), and Dadashi et al. (2013). 
4.6 Human performance and Human reliability  
Human performance is broadly defined as “the human capabilities and limitations that have 
an impact on the safety and efficiency of operations“ (Maurino, 1998, p.29). Within the 
concept of this thesis, human performance is expressed by the frequency of human error 
occurrences. Human performance is measured by Human Reliability (HR), which describes 
“the probability that a person will accomplish a given task under given conditions in a given 
time interval within the acceptance limits” (Bubb, 2005, p.358). Human reliability, in turn, is 
characterised by Human Error Probability (HEP), which is simply defined by Kirwan (1994, 
p.5) as: 
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Many techniques for the assessment of human performance have been created and 
implemented across several industries along the years. They are referred to as Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) techniques (Kirwan, 1994). However, by definition human 
reliability is strongly related to human performance; therefore the techniques are hereafter 
referred to as Human Performance Analysis (HPA). The majority of the techniques are 
developed on the concept of identifying and quantifying the factors that have an impact on 
human performance under different conditions, known as Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSFs). A number of traditional and new HPA techniques, which support the concept of 
PSFs are discussed in the next sections.  
4.7 Overview of Human Performance Analysis 
Human Performance Analysis (HRA) is generally described as “the use of systems 
engineering and behavioural science methods in order to render a complete description of 
the human contribution to risk and to identify ways to reduce that risk” (Swain and Guttmann, 
1983, Boring, 2005). Its roots are associated with the study of human performance and its 
principle functions rely on the identification, quantification and reduction of human errors 
(Kirwan, 1994). HPA is a substantial part of the risk assessment process in complex 
systems, broadly known as Probabilistic Risk assessment (PRA) (Kirwan, 1994). 
The main purpose of HPA is “to estimate the likelihood of particular human actions (that may 
prevent hazardous events) not being undertaken when needed, or other human actions that 
may cause hazardous events (by themselves or in combination with other conditions) 
occurring” (Wreathall et al., 2003, p.ix). In turn, as Hirschberg (2004) states, the main 
objectives of HPA are to (i) ensure that the key human interactions are systematically 
identified, analysed and incorporated into the safety analysis in a traceable manner, (ii) 
quantify the probabilities of human interactions success and failure and (iii) provide insights 
to improve human performance. With respect to the quantification of failure probabilities it 
should be noted that any attempt at estimating the likelihood of errors requires the 
consideration of the contextual framework within which the error occurred (Kyriakidis, 2009).  
Kirwan (1994) introduces the traditional process of HPA, as shown in Figure 4-7. However, 
based on this description, Boring (2010a) indicates a simpler representation of the process, 
which can be seen as encompassing three main phases: (i) the modelling of the potential 
contributors to human error, (ii) the identification of the potential contributors to human error 
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and (iii) the quantification of human errors. The first phase, which comprises steps 1 to 3 of 
Figure 4-7, contains the definition of the problem and the required task analysis to break 
down an overall sequence of events into smaller, more suitable for the analysis units. The 
task analysis is used to determine what human actions could occur and the probability of 
errors for these actions, as shown in Chapter 2. In the second phase, step 4, the relevant 
PSFs are selected. The PSFs are used to determine which aspects of human behaviour 
have an impact on the outcome of human actions. Finally, within the third phase, steps 5-8, 
the quantification of errors is conducted with the calculation of human error probabilities, 
while the overall risk level is also determined. Many approaches are used for the 
quantification of errors including experts’ estimation, the use of performance shaping factor 
multipliers, Bayesian approaches, and simulations.  
 
Figure 4-7 The Human Reliability Analysis process  
4.8 Synopsis of HPA techniques 
HPA techniques were initially developed to study the influence of human performance on the 
safety of nuclear power plants. However, over the years they have been widely applied to 
several domains, including transportation, health and oil. Due to their widespread use, many 
reviews have been conducted, including, the studies by Gertman and Blackman (1993), 
Kirwan (1994), Hollnagel (1998), Pyy (2000), Stanton et al., (2005a), Forester et al., (2006) 
the EUROCONTROL (2007), Gibson and Kirwan (2008a, 2008b) and Bell and Holroyd 
(2009). 
Based on the findings from the literature, the HPA techniques can be classified into six 
categories according to: (i) generation, (ii) outcome, (iii) level of model details, (iv) contextual 
factors, (v) dependence on time, and (vi) type of data used. Figure 4-8 shows the 
classification of HPA techniques, and provides examples of techniques for each of the 
categories.  
1. Problem definition 
2. Task analysis 
3. Error identification 4. Risk model 
5. Quantification 
6. Impact assessment 7. Error reduction 
8. Problem evaluation 
Chapter 4     HUMAN ERROR – HUMAN PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
 
 
112 
 
Figure 4-8 Classification of HPA techniques (Pyy, 2000, Boring, 2005) 
4.8.1 First and second generation methods 
Since the 1970s, HPA has become highly developed to improve the study of human 
influence and contribution to a system’s reliability (Kyriakidis, 2009), developing techniques 
that evolved from the first to second generation HPA. 
First generation approaches were developed to help risk assessors predict and quantify the 
likelihood of human error. They encourage researchers to break tasks into sub-tasks before 
considering the potential impact of modifying factors such as time pressure, equipment 
design and stress (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). Furthermore, they focus on the skill and rule 
base level of human action. Therefore, they are often criticised for failing to incorporate 
factors such as the impact of context, organisational factors and errors of commission (Bell 
and Holroyd, 2009).  
The 1990s saw the development of second generation techniques, a process that it is still 
on-going. In contrast to the first generation methods, the main characteristics of these are (i) 
an emphasis on decision-making and cognitive performance, (ii) the use of a theory-based 
error taxonomy (often coincides with cognitive model of human behaviour) and (iii) the use of 
a complex match of error scenarios for the error identification and quantification (Bell and 
Holroyd, 2009). Such techniques attempt to consider context and errors of commission in 
human error prediction. However, despite their widespread use, their evolution has been 
slow, with their empirical validation still to be confirmed. Subsequently the benefits of the 
second generation over first generation approaches have not been established. (Bell and 
Holroyd, 2009, Kyriakidis, 2011). 
HPA techniques 
Generation Model details Time related Contextual factors Data Outcome  
First Second 
Third 
THERP, 
SLIM, 
HEART 
CREAM, 
ATHEANA 
Qualitative Quantitative 
SLIM, 
HEART, 
SPAR-H, 
CARA 
Holistic Analytic 
ATHEANA 
 
THERP, 
SLIM 
Few Many 
CREAM, 
HRMS 
SPAR-H 
THERP, 
CARA, 
ATHEANA 
Dependent Independent 
ASEP, 
AIPA 
THERP, 
ATHEANA, 
APJ 
Historical,  
simulators Experts 
THERP, 
SPAR-H, 
HEART 
SLIM, 
APJ 
HERMES 
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4.8.2 Qualitative and quantitative methods 
A further classification distinguishes the HPA techniques based on their outcomes, into 
qualitative and quantitative methods (Boring, 2005). The former focus on identifying and 
defining the human erroneous actions or the events are caused by them. In addition, they 
can be used to design a new system or redesign an existing one, based on the findings of 
the factors that affect the performance of operators. Qualitative methods also provide the 
necessary information for the quantitative part of the analysis (when a method supports both 
parts). Finally, they can be considered as the result of a task analysis or incident 
investigation. 
On the other hand, quantitative methods focus on converting the identified errors into 
Human Error Probabilities (HEP). These techniques are dependent on existing data from 
previous studies on simulations. If such data are not available, then subject matter experts 
(SMEs) are asked to determine HEPs for a given context. The majority of the quantitative 
techniques portray human actions as a combination of tasks that operators should carry out 
in conjunction with the factors that affect their ability to perform these tasks. Quantification 
determines the likelihood that a particular action will fail, while the error likelihood ranges 
from 1/100,000 for high reliability to 1.0 for guaranteed failure, with the nominal values to be 
between 1/1000 to 1/100 (Gertman and Blackman, 1993).  
4.8.3 Methods with performance shaping factors 
Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs), describe the influence of the contextual factors on 
human performance and subsequently on the probability of human error. There are two main 
ways to classify HPA techniques based on the number of PSFs, such as techniques with (i) 
many and (ii) few PSFs (Boring, 2010b).  
Techniques that include a few PSFs incorporate a higher level of factors that encompass 
large categories of contributing factors to human performance such as environmental, 
organisational or personal factors. In contrast, models that comprise many PSFs provide a 
more comprehensive list of factors, such as training, fatigue, stress or low visibility. Such 
models do not count all PSFs for every event or error, but only those that have been 
identified from the investigation scheme. Therefore, they also attempt to monitor and control 
the cases of double-counting of the related influences.  
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4.8.4 Holistic and analytic methods 
Further to the distinction of many or few PSFs, HPA techniques could also be classified as 
holistic or analytic, primarily depending on how analysts perceive and tackle a particular 
problem. Holistic models account for human performance as indivisible part of a greater 
situation that cannot be broken into smaller parts. In contrast, analytic techniques consider 
human performance as a compound of individual elements of a whole situation, which can 
be decomposed and analysed individually (Pyy, 2000). Boring et al. (2005) state that 
analytic approaches estimate human error probabilities by judging the influence of individual 
PSFs on operator performance. On the other hand, in the holistic methodologies, the 
judgments do not account for the influence of each PSF, but they view the event instead as 
an irreducible whole. 
4.8.5 Time dependence 
Time dependence is another way to classify HPA methodologies. However, only a few 
techniques in this category are addressed in the literature (Gerdes, 1995, Pyy, 2000). They 
are used to assess time dependent error probabilities, which describe the relationship 
between the available time during which an operator is allowed to perform a task and the 
probability to fail to perform the task in time. Time dependent models are appropriate to be 
used for assessing error probabilities after an initiating event, especially when the reaction 
time is short. However, they are time consuming and cumbersome methods in terms of 
collecting data; therefore they are not broadly developed.  
4.8.6 Data used 
Finally, the HPA techniques can be distinguished based on the type of data they use to 
quantify human performance (Pyy, 2000). These can be data derived from the relevant 
literature, simulators, operating experience or expert judgment. Such classification is 
strongly related to the PSFs classification, since data are used primarily to assess and 
quantify the level of influence of PSFs. Within this classification, three approaches are 
identified. In the first, generic human reliability data, which are derived from the relevant 
literature are used to estimate human performance and then updated by using PSFs, e.g. 
the HEART methodology (Williams, 1988). In the second approach, specific operational 
data, when available, are directly implemented. Finally, in the third approach experts are 
asked to assess the status of PSFs and the level of PSFs influence on human performance 
(Pyy, 2000). 
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4.9 Performance Shaping Factors 
As already stated, Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) constitute a substantial part of the 
HPA process, widely used to assess human performance within a defined context. PSFs 
have been defined by Boring et al. (2007) as “all these factors such as age, working 
conditions, team collaboration, mental and physical health, work experience or training 
which enhance or degrade human performance”. Hence, they express all various situational, 
organisational, systemic, personal and environmental factors that may influence the 
performance of an individual. PSFs account for both the positive and negative influence of 
the factors on human performance. However, generally, researchers are primarily interested 
only in the negative impact. Many HPA methods use the state (level of influence) of PSFs to 
assess human performance or to obtain qualitative insights about a specific operational 
scenario. The level of influence of PSFs is expressed in various ways. However, the 
qualitative approach of characterising the influence on a scale from low to high with 
increments of very important, medium or less important has been most broadly applied 
(Hollnagel, 1998, Groth, 2009).  
PSFs have been numerously classified. Based on their characteristics they are primarily 
classified as internal and external, with the latter describing situational characteristics, job 
and task characteristics or environmental circumstances whereas internal PSFs refer to 
individual characteristics (Kumamoto and Henley, 1996). This classification, due to its 
simplicity, has been widely accepted and applied to several cases (Sasou and Reason, 
1999). In addition to this classification, Boring et al., (2007) distinguish direct from indirect 
PSFs with the former describing those PSFs that “can be measured directly, whereby there 
is a one-to-one relationship between the magnitude of the PSF and that which is measured”, 
e.g. training as expressed in hours of  simulators. Conversely, indirect PSFs include those 
that “cannot be measured directly, whereby the magnitude of the PSF can only be 
determined multivariately or subjectively”, e.g. team collaboration, there are several scales 
to measure team dynamics, but these are of the indirect variety. Although the distinction 
between direct and indirect PSFs is useful, without setting clear criteria to distinguish 
between them, researchers may form opinions that vary from case to case. Therefore, the 
use of direct and indirect PSFs may be inefficient and lead to inconsistent results amongst 
researchers.  
Further to PSFs classification, several PSFs taxonomies are addressed in the literature, e.g. 
(Rasmussen, 1982, Swain and Guttmann, 1983, Williams, 1988, Hollnagel, 1998), including, 
amongst others, the THERP, SLIM, PHECA, HEART and CREAM taxonomies. The existing 
taxonomies are applied to a specific domain and for a pre-defined purpose, while they are 
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divided into those that comprise a detailed set of PSFs and those that include a more 
generic set. Despite this, detailed and generic taxonomies have considerable similarities and 
include similar PSFs regardless of their domain and application. Detailed PSFs taxonomies 
comprise factors such as supervision, temperature, training, or stress. In contrast, generic 
taxonomies include factors such as working conditions, organisational factors or personal 
factors. As shown in Table 4-4 there is an obvious overlap between the generic and detailed 
taxonomies, i.e. the generic taxonomies are expressed by categories, which contain the 
individual PSFs, e.g. the category organisational factors includes supervision.  
Table 4-4: A sample of performance shaping factors  
Detailed PSFs Generic PSFs 
Training Personal factors 
Visibility Environmental factors 
Temperature  Working conditions 
Supervision Organisational factors 
Fatigue Adequacy of Procedures 
Leadership Available time 
Time to execute a task Team collaboration 
Job satisfaction  
Roster planning  
Although the role of PSFs in studying human performance is significant, several limitations 
of the existing taxonomies have been acknowledged. Boring et al. (2007) and Groth (2009) 
indicate that with the large number of current taxonomies, there is neither an agreed set to 
be used within the context of HPA methods nor a confirmed number of PSFs that should be 
included in each of the taxonomies. Forester et al., (2006) suggest that at least fifteen PSFs 
should be included in a taxonomy, however this suggestion cannot be applied to already 
established taxonomies.  
A further limitation is related to the given definitions of current taxonomies. Definitions of 
current taxonomies are usually neither available nor explicitly described. For instance, 
working conditions can be described as the nature of the physical conditions such as 
ambient light, noise or temperature (Hollnagel, 1998). However, this definition is similar to 
what Kim and Jung (2003) define as environmental conditions. Therefore, due to the 
differences in definitions, researchers may reach controversial conclusions even when using 
the same factors.  
Moreover, the impact of each PSF on human performance is another matter of concern, 
since not all PSFs affect performance equally. For instance, for a task A, lighting or training 
may influence human performance more than communication, while for another task B, 
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communication may be considered more significant. However, the quantification of the 
impact of PSFs on human performance is not straightforward. Thus, only a few HPA 
techniques provide analysts with a framework for such a quantification (Kirwan, 1994). Some 
techniques, such as the CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998) and SLIM (Forester et al., 2006) consider 
the different levels of the influence of PSFs on human performance and use simple 
equations to estimate this (Embrey et al., 1984, Hollnagel, 1998), yet there is no justified 
claim that they provide reliable results (Bell and Holroyd, 2009).  
Furthermore, the majority of current taxonomies assume that the PSFs are independent, 
which in most of the cases is an arbitrary assumption. For example, when operators execute 
a complex task, their level of training is related to the level of stress. Therefore, the 
dependencies between PSFs should also be taken into account in order to derive more 
accurate estimations. Finally, the relationship between PSFs and time poses considerable 
problems since many of the PSFs are ”dynamic” variables, which implies that these they 
change while a task is executed, e.g. weather conditions or fatigue. Because it is too 
complex to estimate these changes, most of the techniques neither account for the relation 
between PSFs with time nor analyse PSFs separately for every condition (Kyriakidis et al., 
2012). 
4.10 Review of Human Performance Analysis Techniques 
The need to include human factors research in the safety assessment of railways is widely 
recognised by most of the stakeholders of the railway system (Cacciabue, 2004b). Thus, to 
determine the appropriate HPA technique, it is necessary to start with a review of the 
existing approaches that have been developed and used in the railway domain. The 
characteristics of the approach should contain: (i) a detailed list of contextual factors, PSFs, 
that affect human performance in railway operations, including factors that may affect train 
drivers, signallers and controllers, (ii) the ability to quantify PSFs (considering their mutual 
dependencies) and subsequently to assess human performance based on PSFs 
quantification, (iii) the ability to compare human performance for certain actions or estimate 
the likelihood of errors and (iv) the ability to use the findings to direct resources more 
efficiently towards the development of sound solutions for improving operators performance. 
However, due to the limited number of the techniques customised for the railway industry, 
the review also considers approaches employed in other domains. These approaches have 
been developed primarily for the nuclear, aviation and oil industries. Figure 4-9 presents the 
methodology used in this thesis to determine whether an existing taxonomy can be used for 
the assessment of human performance on the influence of PSFs. 
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Figure 4-9 Review of HPA techniques 
4.10.1 Railway Human Performance Analysis approaches 
Throughout the continuous development of the research, different approaches have been 
developed to assess human reliability and performance. However, the relevant literature, 
(European Commission, 2000, Vanderhaegen, 2001, Wreathall et al., 2004, Wilson et al., 
2005, Wilson and Norris, 2005, Wilson and Norris, 2006, Wilson et al., 2007a, Wilson et al., 
2007b, Dadashi et al., 2013) shows that very few were established on the concept of PSFs, 
while only one can be argued to be a complete HPA methodology. Table 4-5 presents in 
some detail the approaches, their strengths and limitations. 
. 
Review of Human 
Performance Analysis 
Techniques 
Railway related HPA 
techniques 
Non-railway relevant 
HPA techniques 
Outcome 
Outcome 
Suggested Technique 
Identified gaps 
Identified gaps 
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Table 4-5 Railway Human Performance Analysis Techniques 
HPA technique Overview Advantages Disadvantages 
Analysing and modelling train 
driver performance (McLeod et 
al., 2005) 
1. An approach that aims to understand 
and assess risks of driver unreliability 
with extended uses of Automatic 
Warning Systems (AWS) on the UK rail 
network. 
2. It provides a situational model to 
identify possible states of cognition at 
the time of interaction with any 
perceptual/cognitive task that could 
lead to the loss of driver’s reliability. 
1. Analysis of driver’s performance at a 
specific time “Now”. 
2. Illustrates factors for understanding 
human cognition and performance. 
3. Takes into account characteristics of 
context and situation at the time 
behaviour of interest was occurred. 
4. Proposes a detailed situational model 
for human performance. 
1. The method has been applied only for 
one set of H-M interaction. 
2. It provides only qualitative analysis 
(level of risk of driver unreliability is 
given by ALARP). 
3. Experts’ judgment is involved in 
defining and modelling the scenarios. 
4. Neither comprehensive nor rigorous 
approach.  
Driver performance modelling to 
railway safety  
(Hamilton and Clarke, 2005) 
1. A model that is capable to predict the 
performance time, workload and error 
consequences of different operational 
conditions. 
2. The method aims to support SPADs risk 
management strategies. 
1. Accounts for conflicts between time 
pressure, cognitive and behavioural 
demand.  
2. Investigates interactions between train 
driver and equipment. 
3. Objective and quantifiable approach. 
4. It can be applied to several tasks.  
1. Time consuming. 
2. Experienced analysts. 
3. Time data are derived from literature. 
4. It is centred only on the requirements 
of the train driver. 
5. The quantification part is based on 
SHERPA, which has been developed 
for process industries. 
Human factors in the railway 
system 
(Hammerl and Vanderhaegen, 
2009) 
1. A model to structure the influence of 
PSFs on human performance. 
2. Provides a model of work system core 
and shows the interactions of 
contextual factors within the concept of 
this model. 
1. New PSFs classification. 
2. Accounts for dependencies between 
PSFs. 
3. Introduction of human – barrier 
interaction. 
4. Detailed qualitative analysis. 
1. It is not a complete HPA approach. 
2. Quantitative approach is not 
introduced. 
RARA  
(Gibson et al., 2013a) 
1. A methodology to quantify human error 
across railway industry developed on 
the HEART approach. 
2. The first tailored, complete and 
customised HPA for railway industry. 
1. It is a quick and simplistic approach 
that needs little of training. 
2. It gives error reduction suggestions. 
3. It gives the analyst a quantitative 
output. 
4. Accounts for overlaps amongst EPCs. 
1. It is a subjective method, thus, its 
reliability and consistency may be 
debatable. 
2. Little guidance is offered as to the 
assignment of EPCs, or their exact 
number is included in a scenario. 
3. Still on-going validation process. 
4. Focusing primarily on drivers tasks. 
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4.10.1.1 Analysing and Modelling Train Driver Performance  
McLEod et al., (2005) analysed and modelled the performance of train drivers in conjunction 
with a safety system, i.e. the Automatic Warning System, on the UK railway network. The 
research focused on understanding human performance within the AWS context at the time 
a signal is intended to influence the behaviour of driver. For this, the study introduced a 
situational framework. Such a framework highlights the significance of understanding the 
state of driver cognition at a specific time, i.e. “Now”, in a specific situation and a specific 
context. 
 
Figure 4-10 Situational model of driver performance in interacting with AWS (McLeod et al., 
2005) 
The model relies on a simple-information process, i.e. perceive, decide, act, alike the 
concept of railway operational errors (Section 4.1). According to the model, the performance 
of train drivers is based on their knowledge and experience, while the acknowledgement of 
the current “state of the world” has an impact on the their driving strategy. Subsequently, to 
define the cognitive status of train drivers at any specific moment two factors should be 
considered. The immediate priority and the expectation of what will be the situation within 
the coming few moments. Both immediate priorities and expectations change along the 
route, affecting a driver’s allocation of attention and driving strategy. 
Chapter 4     HUMAN ERROR – HUMAN PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
 
 
121 
The model aims at identifying the possible levels of cognition at the exact time of interaction 
with an AWS signal (or any other perceptual/cognitive task) that may compromise the 
reliability of a driver in a straightforward and simple way. However, neither the situational 
framework nor the methodology to assess train driver performance is comprehensive or 
rigorous. Further to this, the approach strongly depends on the experience and ability of 
researchers to bridge complex psychological constructs to real world situations. Therefore, 
although the main advantage of the method is focus on deeper understanding of complex 
psychological factors involved in real-time human performance, it does not provide detailed 
information of how inexperienced personnel could apply its concept. Furthermore, although 
the concept of the methodology is novel, the authors do not provide any remarks with 
respect to its transferability and necessary modifications if the framework changes, e.g. 
TPWS instead of AWS. Moreover, although it is supposed to support the assessment of 
human reliability, it does not provide any quantitative measurement. On the contrary, it does 
only qualitatively show the consequences of the interaction between drivers and AWS. 
Finally, although the generic concept of the model could be transferred and used for the 
assessment of the performance of signallers and controllers it requires substantial 
modifications. Thus, its current format is not suitable for such purposes.  
4.10.1.2 Driver Performance Modelling to support Railway Safety  
The process of modelling train driver performance (Hamilton and Clarke, 2005) attempts to 
understand and manage the interactions between train drivers and infrastructure. The model 
deploys the features of cognitive theory and identifies driver performance in association with 
the infrastructure characteristics and operational conditions. Consequently, the model 
predicts the performance time, workload and consequences of driver error for different 
operational scenarios.  
The model uses a defined driving line layout, where memory, perception and anticipation of 
drivers are measured. Since all the variables have different levels of capacity and reliability, 
their measurement shows where a driver’s capacity is over-used, well-used or under-used. 
The model measures the timing of key tasks, e.g. stop at a signal, on the defined line, while 
it also takes into account parameters with respect to rolling stock, train speed, track and 
visibility conditions. The model assesses the driving capability of operators by calculating 
their workload, time to perform an action and error proneness. The time to execute an action 
is given by the Fitt’s Law equation:  
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!!" ! !! ! !! ! !! ! !!!"#! !! ! !!!     (4-2) 
where,  TPa is the time to perform the action, TP perceptual processing, TC cognitive 
processing, TM motor processing and IM movement iteration time.  
However, for the calculations the model, instead of creating its own dataset, e.g. simulations, 
uses data from the literature for elementary behaviours on engineering psychology for three 
different reaction times: fast, median and slow. In addition, the model describes workload in 
three dimensions as: (i) time pressure workload, (ii) cognitive demand workload and (iii) 
behavioural conflict workload. However, although the authors refer to workload statistics to 
assess workload, this is not explicitly conveyed in the study. Finally, the method claims to 
support error prediction. Again, no clear instructions are given for this, apart from the fact 
that the SHERPA (as described in Stanton et al., 2005a) methodology is used to identify the 
generic error sources. However, since SHERPA is not a quantitate technique, errors 
predictions are purely qualitative.  
The creators of the method claim that their work offers a powerful means for identifying 
human performance problems in an objective and quantifiable manner. In addition, they 
state that their approach could also be applied to any aspect of any task that imposes 
workload on the driver, e.g. the cab interfaces, the design and placement of furniture on the 
track, or the impact of speed profiles and timetabling on the way the route is driven 
(Hamilton and Clarke, 2005). However, the approach is time-consuming, cumbersome for 
inexperienced analysts, and requires extensive resources. In addition, although it accounts 
for external factors that affect driver reaction times, the approach does not consider any 
internal factors, e.g. distraction or stress that may affect the performance of the operators. 
Finally, the methodology focuses only on the train driver tasks and duties. Therefore, its 
transferability and applicability to other operators is tentative.  
4.10.1.3 Human Factors in the Railway System Safety Analysis Process  
Hammerl and Vanderhaegen (2009) have addressed the issue of human factors in the 
railway system with the aim to resolve the limitations of existing HPA techniques. The 
authors reviewed: (i) the areas of human error in the quantitative risk analysis, (ii) the 
existing techniques for human reliability assessment and (iii) the great variability of human 
error. Consequently, they found that no agreed values were established for human error 
probabilities in the railway industry. In addition, they suggested that cross-industry HPA 
techniques have limitations (described in the next section) which restrict their direct 
transferability to the railway industry. Therefore, the authors propose that a new approach is 
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required for the railway industry. This approach should be “less fine-grained” in order to stay 
practicable and it should provide at least quantitative assessments of performance. Thus, 
the authors introduced an approach that relies on a model of working environments, which 
illustrates the engineering and psychology perspectives of the system, as shown in Figure 4-
11.  
 
Figure 4-11 Model of working system and PSFs (Hammerl and Vanderhaegen, 2009) 
In addition, this model defines the work system core as an interaction of individuals, their 
tasks and their instruments, while human performance is influenced by a number of PSFs. 
The PSFs are classified into three main categories, physical, personal and organisational 
factors. The three categories are further subdivided into seven groups and contain a list 
tailored to railway industry. Moreover, the model accounts for the dependencies between 
PSFs. For example, it indicates that some of the organisational factors affect personal 
factors, e.g. training methods have an influence on the competence skills of employees. 
Within the system two types of variables can be observed. The first is located at the top and 
bottom of the system core and continuously affect it. This type of variables, although 
continuously affecting the core system, does not change over a certain period of time, e.g. 
during a shift, and is therefore, defined as less dynamic. On the other hand, the second type, 
i.e. the variables on the horizontal axis, represent the exact moment of operation and 
therefore are defined as dynamic, i.e. information that drivers receive.  
Hammerl and Vanderhaegen provide a simple, qualitative approach to structure the PSFs 
that affect the performance of railway operators. In addition, it is the only railway approach 
that concerns the dependencies between PSFs and the influence of such dependencies on 
Task 
Human 
Instruments 
Work system core 
Physical factors 
Organisational factors Personal factors 
Input Output 
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human performance. However, the dependencies are only qualitatively represented. The 
authors suggest that weighting of dependencies is required in order to firstly assess the 
degree of influence of particular PSFs on performance and secondly, reveal the most 
frequent and severe error favouring conditions. They propose that such weighting should be 
conducted either by both railway and human factors expert judgments or with the support of 
simulations and human factors studies in relevant environments. However, although they 
highlight the importance of the quantitative assessment, there are two main drawbacks. 
Firstly, such quantification is not supported in their study. Secondly, they do not address how 
the assessment would be conducted in the real world, e.g. methodology, experts 
characteristics, interpretation of weighting.  
4.10.1.4 Railway Action Reliability Assessment (RARA) 
The Railway Action Reliability Assessment (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012b, 
Gibson et al., 2013a), introduced by the UK RSSB, is the most recent and comprehensive 
approach to human error quantification in the railway industry. It is the only approach that 
can be claimed to be a HPA methodology. The technique relies on the principles of Williams’ 
HEART (1986) methodology (described thoroughly in Section 4.10.2.4) and was initially 
developed to capture human errors related to train driver tasks (Rail Safety and Standards 
Board, 2004b). The required steps for conducting the Railway Action Reliability Assessment 
(RARA) are: 
1. Define the task under investigation. 
2. Determine the nominal human reliability for the particular task, as expressed by the 
Generic Tasks, usually by consulting local experts.  
3. Identify the Error Producing Conditions (EPCs), which are evident in the given 
situation and would have a negative effect on the outcome.  
4. Assess the effect of each EPC on human performance on a scale 0-1, where 0 
represents the minimum and 1 the total effect. This is again indicated as the 
Assessed Proportion of Affect (APOA). 
The methodology is mathematically expressed by the Equation 4-3:  
!"# ! !"#! ! !"# ! ! !!"#! ! !      (4-3) 
where, NEP is the given nominal error probability for a selected generic task; EPC the given 
maximum predicted effect of the EPC on human performance; and APOA the assessed 
proportion of the value of the effect between 0.1 and 1, where 0.1 is a small effect and 1 is a 
full affect. 
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The methodology includes eight generic tasks tailored to the railway industry, primarily 
associated with train drivers’ duties, e.g. “fairly simple task performed rapidly or given 
insufficient or inadequate attention”. The tasks are grouped in three broad areas of human 
performance, based on the SRK framework (Section 4.4.1.1). In addition, the approach 
introduces twenty-seven EPCs that affect performance, classified in six main categories, e.g. 
task design, procedures and competence management. Contrary to the HEART, the RARA 
accounts for potential overlaps between EPCs or between generic tasks and EPCs. For 
instance, depending on the definition of EPCs, the terms ‘unfamiliarity’ and ‘level of 
experience’ may overlap. Within the context of the approach, both terms are related to the 
frequency that an operator is exposed to a specific task. However, while ‘unfamiliarity’ 
primarily indicates rare events, the ‘level of experience’ refers to routine tasks which may not 
often have been executed before. The overlapping of EPCs may lead to over conservative 
results in the cases that EPCs are twice considered in the assessment. Similarly, some 
generic tasks and EPCs combinations may imply overlapping and result in conservative risk 
estimations. For example, for the generic task “performed rapidly or given insufficient or 
inadequate attention” it is essential to define the underlying factors that cause inadequate 
attention, e.g. personal or task EPCs.  
The RARA methodology thus provides a useful framework for human error quantification 
and human performance assessment in railways. Its main contribution is that it offers 
researchers a list of generic tasks which are prone to errors and, furthermore, provides the 
ability to estimate operator error probability for such tasks. Although developed based on the 
tasks of train drivers, evidence  suggests that it could also be used to estimate human error 
of other railway employees, including signallers, electrical control room operators, station 
staff and track workers (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012b). A significant advantage of 
this technique, apart from is transferability, is that it accounts for the potential double-
counting of EPCs and thereby avoids overly conservative risk assessments.  
However, similar to the HEART, the RARA methodology has its limitations. First, it is a 
subjective method, and therefore, its reliability and consistency may be controversial since 
both depend strongly on researchers and their level of experience and understanding of the 
approach. In addition, inadequate instructions are offered to researchers concerning the 
assignment of EPCs, or the proportion of effect of such EPCs. For instance, for a particular 
task, a researcher may choose not only different generic tasks but also select EPCs and the 
proportions of effect of the tasks. Subsequently, completely different results may arise. 
Moreover, it is a very recent approach which is why its application and acceptability are yet 
to be established. Furthermore, although both the generic tasks and EPCs have been 
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tailored to the railway industry, this is not the case for their values, which primarily have 
been adopted from the HEART methodology. Moreover, although the technique provides a 
list of factors tailored to the railway industry, these factors have been derived based only on 
the UK railway operations, focusing only on the UK mail line train drivers. In addition, 
although the technique accounts for overlap amongst EPCs, it treats them as independent 
entities. Subsequently, it does not account for any potential influence of one EPC over 
another or their combined influence on human performance. 
4.10.1.5 Summary of railway HPA approaches limitations 
The main drawbacks of the existing techniques can be summarised as follows:  
1. Adequacy of data: The main problem of railway HPA is the lack of empirical data for 
model development and validation. Therefore, despite the extensive research on 
human performance / reliability in railway operations, only a few models have been 
developed in order for the quantitative evaluation of performance. 
2. Lack of data: This has led to the exploration of alternative sources including subject 
matter experts (SMEs) and simulators. However, both may provide inaccurate or 
misleading results if not specified appropriately.  
3. Inadequate proof of the applicability of techniques: The majority of the current 
techniques have not been applied widely in railway risk assessments. Since they 
have been developed for specific cases and scenarios, their applicability and 
transferability is limited.  
4. Dependencies of PSFs: Only one of the techniques accounts for dependencies 
between PSFs. However, the dependencies are only represented qualitatively. 
Due to these limitations, none of the current railway HPA approaches is suitable for this 
thesis research. However, some of the features of the methodologies, such as the lists of 
PSFs, are used here to inform the development of a new tool to quantify the impact of PSFs 
on human performance. 
4.10.2 Cross - industry Human Performance Analysis techniques 
Nine cross-industry, quantitative HRA techniques, developed on the concept of PSFs, are 
reviewed in this section. The techniques, which are referred to as Human Performance 
Analysis techniques, are the: THERP (Swain and Guttmann, 1983), SLIM (Embrey et al., 
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1984), ATHEANA (Forester et al., 2007), CARA (Kirwan and Gibson, 2007), HEART 
(Williams, 1988), CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998), SHERPA (as described in Stanton et al., 
2005a), HRMS (Kirwan, 1997), HEPI (Khan et al., 2006), and SPAR-H (Gertman et al., 
2004). These represent some of the most well-known and broadly cited techniques in the 
literature ((Swain and Guttmann, 1983), (Kirwan, 1994), (Hollnagel, 1998), (Pyy, 2000), 
(Lyons et al., 2004), (Stanton et al., 2005a), (Forester et al., 2006), (Kim et al., 2006), (Bell 
and Holroyd, 2009), (Kyriakidis, 2011) and (Di Pasquale et al., 2013)). Table 4-6 illustrates a 
synopsis of the conducted literature review.  
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Table 4-6 Main features of human performance analysis techniques 
HPA 
technique Overview Advantages Disadvantages 
THERP 
(Swain and 
Guttmann, 
1983) 
1. A first generation technique that provides both 
quantitative and qualitative results. 
2. Initially designed for the nuclear industry, but 
has been applied to offshore, medical and 
transport domains. 
3. Training is required on the method. 
1. It is a broadly used and acceptable methodology. 
2. It offers a powerful methodology, which can be made 
auditable by the assessor. 
3. It performs well in terms of accuracy. 
4. It accounts for dependencies between human errors 
1. It is relatively unstructured. 
2. It can be time consuming. 
3. It is highly judgmental based on 
assessor’s experience. 
4. Its interaction between certain PSFs is 
unknown; therefore no guidelines can be 
given for possible combinations. 
SLIM 
(Embrey et 
al., 1984) 
1. A first generation technique, initially designed 
for the nuclear industry, but has been applied 
to chemical industry. 
2. Suitable for application in major hazard 
domains. 
3. Requires an expert panel to conduct 
assessment. 
1. It is a flexible technique and good theoretical method. 
2. It is able to deal with the total range of human error 
forms. 
3. It does not need task decomposition (task analysis 
and error taxonomies).  
1. It is a complex method that needs 
intensive resource. 
2. The choosing of PSFs is quite arbitrary. 
3. It is a subjective method, which reduces 
its reliability and consistency. 
4. Sometimes there are problems regarding 
experts’ group synthesis. 
5. There is a lack of valid calibration data.  
 
ATHEANA 
(Forester et 
al., 2007) 
1. A second generation technique that provides 
both quantitative and qualitative results. 
2. Initially designed for the nuclear industry. 
3. Training is required on the method. 
4. No evidence that it has been applied to other 
domains. 
1. It focuses on the prediction of a specific error and on 
the most influential factors which lead to this error. 
2. It provides confidence that the major risk associated 
with the human failure has been captured. 
3. It is able to estimate HEPs for all sorts of 
combinations of factors and various conditions. 
4. It considers more PSFs than other techniques. 
5. It provides a comprehensive approach to explore how 
action failures can occur. 
1. Too complex and difficult to be applied 
by inexperienced researchers. 
2. Strongly dependent on subject matter 
experts and their level of experience. 
3. The provided instructions are complex. 
4. The quantification method is weak, and 
results are unjustified. 
5. It requires extensive resources. 
6. It is a subjective method, which reduces 
its reliability and consistency. 
 
HEART 
(Williams, 
1988) 
1. A first generation technique that quantifies 
human errors. 
2. It has been applied in the nuclear, chemical, 
aviation, rail, health industries. 
3. It can be applied to all major hazards sectors. 
4. It is easy to use by engineers and human 
factors specialist.  
1. It is a quick and simplistic approach that needs little 
training. 
2. It gives error reduction suggestions. 
3. It gives the analyst a quantitative output. 
4. A number of validation studies have produced 
encouraging results. 
 
1. It is a subjective method; hence its 
reliability and consistency may be 
questionable. 
2. Neither dependence nor EPCs 
interaction are taken into account. 
3. Little guidance is offered to the analysts 
in a number of the key HEART stages, 
such as the assignment of EPCs, or their 
exact number included in a scenario. 
4. Sometimes there are problems regarding 
experts’ group synthesis. 
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CARA 
(Kirwan and 
Gibson, 
2007), 
1. A first generation technique that quantifies 
human reliability aspects as failure and 
success rates of mitigation actions in ATM. 
2. Designed for the air traffic control domain, 
based on HEART approach 
1. It provides an initial indication that HRA can be used 
to deal with human factors arguments in a quantified 
ATM safety case context. 
2. It is a quick and simplistic approach. 
3. It gives a quantitative and qualitative output. 
4. It uses customised to ATM GTTs descriptions. 
1. It has been applied to limited cases. 
2. It can be time consuming when new 
tasks are introduced. 
3. Neither dependence nor interactions 
between error production conditions are 
taken into account. 
4. It is a subjective method, which reduces 
its reliability and consistency. 
CREAM 
(Hollnagel, 
1998) 
1. A second-generation technique that can be 
applied for both retrospective analysis and 
performance prediction. 
2. Has been applied in the nuclear, rail and 
aviation industries. 
3. It can be applied to other major hazards 
sectors. 
4. No special skills or knowledge are required but 
human factors knowledge would be 
advantageous for its use.  
1. It can be extremely exhaustive. 
2. It is a clear, well structured, schematic and systematic 
approach to error identification and quantification. 
3. It can be used proactively and retrospectively as well 
as in several domains. 
4. Its classification scheme is detailed, exhaustive and 
takes also into consideration environment and system 
causes of error. 
1. It appears complicated and daunting for 
a novice. 
2. The exhaustiveness of the classification 
scheme (error taxonomy) makes the 
method more time and resource 
intensive than other techniques. 
3. It has not been used extensively. 
4. It does not offer any remedial measure. 
5. It would presumably require analysts with 
knowledge of human factors and 
cognitive ergonomics, thus analysts with 
less experience might face difficulties on 
apply it. 
HRMS 
(Kirwan, 
1997)  
1. Originally designed for the nuclear industry. 
2. Due to HRMS complexity a new, quicker 
technique, called JHEDI was developed, but it 
was more conservative. 
3. In the cases that HEPs are found to be risk 
significant, the HRMS should then be applied. 
4. Training should be provided for both 
techniques. 
1. It is useful for scenarios which require in depth 
analysis. 
2. It covers the whole HRA process. 
3. It was founded based on real-industrial data. 
4. It provides a list of questions to assess PSFs. 
5. Questions are factual rather than judgmental. 
1. It can be time consuming. 
2. Highly resource-intensive. 
3. Difficult to be applied by inexperienced 
researchers. 
4. It has not been empirically validated. 
5. It has only been applied to one 
assessment; no additional information 
could be found discuss its validity. 
HEPI 
(Khan et al., 
2006)  
1. Designed for offshore platform musters, based 
on SLIM methodology. 
2. No evidence that it has been applied to other 
domains. 
1. It provides a quantitative approach for inclusion of 
HFs in risk assessments. 
2. It provides insights about the mechanisms and modes 
under which human errors occur. 
3. It offers a robust approach to overcome the lack of 
existing data. 
1. It has been applied to only three muster 
scenarios. Therefore its validity needs to 
be examined.  
2. It can be time consuming and requires 
intensives resources.  
3. It does not consider the dependencies 
and interaction amongst PSFs. 
SPAR-H  
(Gertman et 
al., 2004) 
1. A second generation approach, originally 
designed for the nuclear industry. 
2. No evidence that the methodology has been 
1. It is a simple and straight forward to be applied 
method.  
2. It provides a list of eight PSFs with precise definitions.  
1. It can be difficult to address the influence 
of one PSF on another. 
2. There are no clear instructions on how to 
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applied to other domains. 3. It considers dependencies and interactions amongst 
PSFs. 
4. It decomposes probabilities in contribution from 
diagnosis and action errors. 
5. It provides a worksheet to simplify estimation process  
incorporate a wider range of PSFs when 
needed. 
3. The validation of the nominal HEPs was 
not clearly justified. 
 
Chapter 4     HUMAN ERROR – HUMAN PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
131 
The nine techniques were initially evaluated according to their level of accuracy, validity, 
usefulness, effective use of resources, acceptability and maturity, as shown in Table 4-7. 
Kirwan (1994) describes the set of criteria as: 
1. Accuracy represents the level of agreement between the numerical outcomes of the 
methodology with already known HEPs values, as well as the level of consistency 
between the experts and the assessors.  
2. Validity considers whether the technique uses a set of PSFs that supports the 
quantification, empirical validity and degree of validity as perceived by the experts 
and assessors. 
3. Usefulness refers to the level of qualitative practicality in identifying the error 
mechanisms and generating reduction measurements and whether such 
measurements can be assessed. 
4. Effectiveness of resources concerns the appropriateness of equipment, personal 
effort and data to conduct the analysis. 
5. Acceptability refers to the level of the techniques’ acceptance by the assessors, 
experts and relevant scientific community. Finally,  
6. Maturity, describes the current status of techniques’ maturity and the potentials for 
future development. 
Table 4-7 Comparison of Human Performance Analysis techniques 
 Accuracy Validity Usefulness Effective use of resources Acceptability Maturity 
THERP H M M L/M H H 
SLIM M M/H H M H H 
ATHEANA L/M M M L M L/M 
CARA M M H H M/H M 
HEART M/H M/H H H H H 
CREAM M L/M H M/H M L/M 
HRMS L/M M M/H L/M M L/M 
HEPI L/M M/H M/H M L/M L/M 
SPAR-H M M/H H M M/H M/H 
Note: L = Low, M = Medium, H = High 
This assessment was conducted to explore whether the techniques show sufficiently 
significant performance, to be further considered for application to this thesis. 
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4.10.2.1 THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate and Prediction)  
THERP, as described by Swain and Guttmann (1983), is the best-known, first generation 
HRA method (as cited in EUROCONTROL, 2007). It aims to calculate the probability of the 
successful performance of the activities necessary for the accomplishment of a task. The 
technique utilises PSFs and models human errors using probability trees and models of 
dependence. THERP involves a task analysis to describe the performance characteristics of 
the human tasks being analysed. The results of the task analysis are represented 
graphically as event trees that are a formal representation of the required sequence of 
actions. Hollnagel (1998) describes the six steps of THERP as: 
1. Define the system failures that may be influenced by human errors and for which 
probabilities are to be estimated. 
2. Identify, list and analyse the human operations performed and their relationships to 
system tasks and function of interest, i.e. undertake a task analysis. 
3. Estimate the relevant Human Error Probabilities, i.e. predicted error rates. 
4. Determine the effects of human errors on the system failure events of interest. 
5. Recommend changes to the system in order to reduce system failure rates to an 
acceptable level. 
6. Review the consequences of proposed changes with respect to availability, reliability 
and cost benefit. 
THERP has been demonstrated to achieve high accuracy. Initially developed for estimating 
risks in the nuclear power industry, THERP has subsequently been applied to other sectors 
such as offshore oil and gas, and healthcare (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). According to Kirwan 
(1994) THERP is one of the few complete first generation techniques, in the sense that it 
describes both how events should be modelled (event trees) and quantified. The dominance 
of the event tree, however, means that the classification scheme and model are necessarily 
limited, as the event tree can only account for binary choices (success-failure). Therefore, it 
is difficult to introduce more complex error modes in the context of THERP. In addition, 
THERP neither accounts for dependencies amongst the PSFs nor supports the 
incorporation of such a feature. Finally, data used for the quantification of the HEPs are 
derived only from scenarios tailored to process industries.  
4.10.2.2 SLIM (Success Likelihood Index Method)  
SLIM was developed by Embrey (1983) and provides a structured judgement about error 
probabilities in both procedural and cognitive tasks (EUROCONTROL, 2007). SLIM is a 
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decision-analytic approach that uses expert judgement to quantify the PSFs that affect 
human performance. Therefore, a panel of experts is asked to identify the PSFs that are 
considered to affect human performance for a specific scenario and task. These PSFs are 
then used to obtain a Success Likelihood Index (SLI), which represents the overall belief of 
experts concerning the positive or negative effect of each PSF on the likelihood of success 
for the task under consideration. The SLI can also be calibrated against existing data to 
derive the final HEPs. The SLIM methodology comprises the following nine steps: 
1. Selection of the expert panel. 
2. Definition of situations and subsets. 
3. Elicitation of PSFs. 
4. Rating of the tasks on the PSF scale. 
5. Ideal point elicitation and scaling calculations. 
6. Independence checks. 
7. Weighting procedure. 
8. Calculation of SLIs. 
9. Conversion of SLIs into probabilities. 
Typical PSFs used in SLIM include time pressure or stress levels, quality of information or 
interfaces, quality of procedures, task complexity, and adequacy of training or level of 
competence. The SLI for n PSFs is deduced using the Equation 4-4:  
!"# ! ! !!!!!!! !!     (4-4)!
where, wi and ri are the weighting and rating factors respectively. In turn, SLIs are converted 
into probabilities by using Equation 4-5: 
!"# !"# ! ! ! !"# ! !     (4-5)!
where, HEP is the success probability,  a (slope of the line) and b (the intercept of the line 
with the vertical axis) are constants which are derived by processing simultaneous 
equations, as long as at least two calibration probabilities have been assessed within each 
task subset or from already estimated HEPs. 
The main feature of SLIM is that it defines preferences representing the relative likelihoods 
of different human errors as a function of various PSFs (Kirwan, 1994). However, as the 
number of PSFs increases, the method becomes cumbersome and time-consuming, and the 
panel of experts must be carefully selected to meet the criteria of the study. Therefore, for 
complex SLIM models empirical data are required to validate the results from experts 
judgments (Hollnagel, 1998).  
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The level of accuracy associated with SLIM is indeterminate due to lack of data. However, 
its theoretical validity is at a reasonably high level. In addition, the list of PSFs, which are 
included in SLIM is not predefined but tailored every time to the scenario under examination. 
Subsequently, the methodology is regarded as flexible and applicable to many domains. 
Furthermore, although SLIM does not account for dependencies amongst PSFs, its concept 
supports and allows for such consideration. Finally, SLIM allows analysts not only to 
estimate error probabilities, but also to compare several actions in terms of their proneness 
to errors by estimating the success likelihood index. Therefore, the SLIM concept is 
considered suitable for the development of an approach to estimate human performance in 
railway operations. 
4.10.2.3 ATHEANA (A Technique for Human Event Analysis) 
ATHEANA was developed and designed for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(Cooper et al., 1996) to support the understanding and quantification of human failures in 
nuclear power plants. The approach is also suitable for application in other industries 
(Subotic, 2007, Bell and Holroyd, 2009). The basic concept of ATHEANA is that significant 
human errors are considered as result of “error-forcing contexts” (EFCs), which are defined 
as the combination of the system conditions and all other influences that contribute and lead 
to errors caused by operators (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). Forester et al. (2007), summarise 
the nine steps of ATHEANA approach as follows: 
1. Define and interpret the issue (in this step analysts define the objective that is to be 
achieved by performing the HRA).  
2. Define the scope of the analysis. 
3. Describe the accident scenario and its nominal context. 
4. Define the corresponding Unsafe Actions, which may affect the task in question. 
5. Assess information relevant to human performance and characterise the factors 
(PSFs) that could lead to potential vulnerabilities. 
6. Search for plausible deviations from the assessment scenario. 
7. Evaluate the potential for recovery. 
8. Estimate the HEPs for the unsafe actions. 
For a given scenario S the final quantification step of ATHEANA is expressed by:  
! !! ! !!"!!!!""#"!!"#$%&'!!"#$%&$!!!!!"#!"#!!"#$%&!!!!      (4-6) 
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where P(E/S) is the probability of the Human Failure Event (HFE) in scenario “S” , Pij(S) is 
the probability of unsafe action “i” resulting from EFC “j” in scenario “S”.   
The literature, e.g. (Cooper et al., 1996, Forester et al., 1998, Reer, 2008, Bell and Holroyd, 
2009) indicates that ATHEANA is considered as useful methodology for deeper and more 
comprehensive understanding of the contexts of human performance as the cause of 
occurrences. However, it is also highlighted that its quantification capabilities are weak with 
questionable levels of accuracy. In addition, within its concept, the quantification of PSFs is 
not supported. Results are excessively dependent on assessors, making its findings difficult 
to verify independently. Furthermore, ATHEANA can be extremely complex resource 
intensive to operate (Bell and Holroyd, 2009).   
4.10.2.4 HEART (Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique) 
HEART was introduced by Williams (1986) as a quick, easy to use and understand 
approach for the assessment and quantification of the probability of human failure. HEART 
defines error probabilities for a set of predefined generic task types, and introduces a list of 
error producing conditions (EPCs) that address only negative influences on human 
performance. One of the main features of the approach is that in order to reduce resource 
usage, it only deals with those errors that have a significant impact on the system under 
consideration. HEART is built upon three main assumptions: (i) basic human reliability is 
dependent upon the generic nature of the task to be carried out; (ii) under perfect conditions, 
reliability tends to be achieved consistently with a given nominal likelihood within 
probabilistic limits; and (iii) given that these perfect conditions do not exist in all 
circumstances, the predicted human reliability may degrade as a function of the extent to 
which the identified EPCs may apply. Stanton et al., (2005b) define the six steps of HEART 
as follows:  
1. Refine the task in terms of its generic, proposed and nominal level of human 
reliability.  
2. Identify the full range of sub-tasks that a system operator would be required to 
complete within a given task. 
3. Determine a nominal human reliability for the particular task, usually by consulting 
local experts. Establish a 5th – 95th percentile confidence range based around this 
calculated score.  
4. Identify EPCs, which are evident in the given situation and would have a negative 
effect on the outcome.  
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5. Assess the effect of each EPC on human performance in a scale 0-1, whereas 0 
shows the minimum and 1 the total effect. 
6. Calculate a final estimate of the human error probability (HEP). 
HEART is mathematically expressed by the Equation 4-7:  
!"# ! !"#! ! !!"# ! !!!!"#! ! !    (4-7)!
where, NEP is the given nominal error probability for a selected generic task type; EPC the 
given maximum predicted effect of the EPC on human performance; and APOA is the 
assessed proportion of effect value between 0.05 and 1, with 0.05 being very weak effect 
and 1 representing full effect. 
HEART is one of few HRA techniques that has been independently and empirically 
validated, where the results show a strong correlation between the assessed values and the 
true values (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). Therefore, the HEART framework has been used to 
develop new techniques for specific domains, such as the CARA (Kirwan and Gibson, 2007) 
for aviation and RARA (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012b) for railways. In addition, 
HEART is considered to be a quick and straightforward technique that provides 
recommendations for the mitigation of errors, does not require a lot of training, while its 
validity and acceptability are quite high (Kirwan, 1994). However, HEART has certain 
limitations. Firstly, it does not provide clear instructions on how the generic tasks should be 
selected, thus making its consistency questionable. Furthermore, there is little guidance and 
instructions on how the analysts should rate the EPCs. As a result, often significantly 
different weightings are derived for the same scenario and conditions. Finally, HEART does 
not consider either dependencies or interactions amongst EPCs.  
4.10.2.5 CARA (Controller Action Reliability Assessment)  
Building upon the framework of HEART, CARA was introduced by Kirwan and Gibson 
(2007) to assess and quantify human performance in the context of Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) safety assessments. CARA introduces a set of generic task types (GTTs), which are 
specific to the ATM environment, and have been quantified using existing human 
performance data. In addition, new EPCs tailored for ATM operations are used to assess the 
negative influence of the contextual factors on human performance. Finally, for the HEP 
estimation CARA uses the calculation method of HEART, as shown in Equation 4-8:  
!"# ! !""! !"#! ! ! !!"#!! ! ! ! ! !"#! ! ! !!"#!! ! !   (4-8) 
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where GTT is the human error probability associated with a GTT; EPC is the maximum 
affect associated with an EPC; and, again, APOA is the assessed proportion of the effect 
value between 0.05 and 1, where 0.05 is a very weak effect and 1 the full effect. 
CARA has been applied to three safety ATM scenarios with initial results to indicate that it 
can be successfully used to deal with human factors arguments in a quantified ATM safety 
case (Gibson and Kirwan, 2008a). However, CARA does not address any of the HEART’s 
limitations; subsequently it shares the same limitations and drawbacks, without providing 
any further improvements.  
4.10.2.6 CREAM (Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method) 
CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998), was developed to address the limitations of the existing first 
generation techniques. It was designed to predict, analyse and quantify potential human 
errors. CREAM enables researchers to (Stanton et al., 2005a): (i) identify the tasks or 
actions that require or depend on human cognition and subsequently can be affected by 
variations in cognitive reliability; (ii) define the circumstances under which the cognition 
reliability can be reduced and in turn where tasks or actions may constitute a source of risk; 
(iii) provide an evaluation of the consequences of human performance on the safety of the 
system; and (iv) develop and specify countermeasures to improve the conditions that affect 
human performance, increase human reliability and subsequently reduce risk.  
CREAM uses a model of cognition called Contextual Control Mode (COCOM), which 
analyses how operators choose their actions. It assumes that the degree of operators’ 
control on their choices varies, and thus their performance reliability varies. The model relies 
on the fundamental distinction between competence and control, where competence can be 
defined in terms of individuals’ skills and knowledge. On the other hand, control can be 
described by “a continuum, going from a situation where a person has little or no control 
over events to conditions where events are under complete control” (Hollnagel, 1998, 
p.154). The performance reliability of operators is expressed by four control modes, 
including scrambled, opportunistic, tactical and strategic. The higher level of control 
indicates higher operators’ performance reliability, as shown in Figure 4-12. 
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Figure 4-12 Proposed relation between control mode and reliability (Hollnagel, 1998) 
 
Within the CREAM context, human errors are the result of degraded human performance 
which is affected by a set of factors, referred to as Common Performance Conditions 
(CPCs). CREAM introduces nine CPCs with specifically assigned levels of effect on human 
performance. The sum of the performance reliability for each CPC delivers a total CPC 
score and subsequently the reliability range as shown in Figure 4-13. 
 
Figure 4-13 Relations between CPC score and control modes (Hollnagel, 1998) 
For the purpose of HRA, Stanton et al. (2005a) summarise CREAM’s main steps as follows: 
1. Conduct the task analysis. 
2. Describe the context of the scenario under analysis, define and assess the relevant 
CPCs. 
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3. Specify the initiating events that will be subject to the error predictions. 
4. Predict errors by defining how an initiating event could potentially lead to an error.  
5. Select the task steps to be quantified.  
6. Quantitative performance prediction. 
CREAM is a well-structured and -documented, schematic and systematic technique to 
identify and quantify human errors. It can be implemented proactively and retrospectively in 
several domains. It is one of the very few techniques that accounts for dependencies 
between PSFs. While it can be extensive, it provides detailed insights of how human actions 
affect the safety of a system. In addition, its detailed classification scheme enhances the 
error identification by taking into account the environmental and systemic causes of an error. 
Although a generic technique, CREAM has not been used extensively, in part because of 
questions as to its credibility and reliability, especially with respect to how assessors 
perceive the cognition mechanisms of tasks. Moreover, depending on its level of 
comprehensiveness, CREAM can be extremely complex and resource-intensive especially 
for novice researchers. In addition, it does not introduce any remedial measures for the 
recovery from the human errors, and even for very simple scenarios the required time to 
apply CREAM is high. Finally, due to its complex nature, its analytical application is 
presumably limited to researchers with knowledge of human factors and cognitive 
ergonomics.  
4.10.2.7 HRMS (Human Reliability Management System) 
The HRMS technique was developed by Kirwan (1997) to provide a comprehensive and 
accurate approach to assess human contribution to risk in the nuclear industry. The 
technique comprises three main parts: (i) a detailed task and error analysis, (ii) the 
quantification of error probabilities and (iii) the error reduction scheme. Kirwan (1997) 
acknowledged that the HRMS can be resource-intensive, therefore he subsequently 
introduced a simplified version, referred to as Justification of Human Error Data Information 
(JHEDI).  
HRMS uses a set of six PSFs to describe the factors that affect human performance. For its 
implementation, an audit document, which includes fifty questions, is used. For each 
question, experts provide their input (‘yes, ‘no’, ‘not applicable’) to represent the impact of 
each PSF on human performance. Subsequently, a profile of each PSF is generated for 
every task and further related to the known value of human error probability for that 
particular task, which is derived from existing databases. However, Everdij and Blom (as 
Chapter 4     HUMAN ERROR – HUMAN PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
140 
cited in Bell and Holroyd, 2009) note that HRMS is currently not in use or it is used rarely. 
Based on its limited use, its complexity and the required extensive resources, HRMS is not a 
practical model.  
4.10.2.8 HEPI (Human Error Probability Index)  
HEPI was introduced by Khan et al. (2006), to provide a methodology for the identification, 
assessment and mitigation of risk caused by human errors during offshore platform 
emergency musters. HEPI is built upon the concept of SLIM methodology, and therefore, 
comprises similar steps, including:  
1. Establish criteria to choose the assessors. 
2. Define the muster scenario parameters. 
3. Elicit the data. 
4. Calculate HEPs through SLIM procedure. 
5. Develop the PSF weight and rating reference graphs. 
6. Develop the conversion curves between SLI values and the probability of success 
(POS). 
7. Develop the consequence and risk tables. 
8. Develop risk mitigation measures (RMMs) for each muster action based on training, 
procedures, management systems and equipment. 
while it also uses Equations 4-4 and 4-5 as described in Section 4.10.2.2. 
HEPI enhances assessors’ understanding of human errors, the mechanisms that cause 
such errors, the modes under which human failures occur, and the factors that affect human 
performance. However, the methodology fails to tackle any of the disadvantages of the SLIM 
methodology with its main weakness being that it does not consider dependencies and 
interactions amongst PSFs. In addition, HEPI has been applied to only three muster 
scenarios, and although the findings were promising, its limited use reduces its credibility 
and validity. Finally, the creators of HEPI acknowledge that the approach to ranking the risk 
level is subjective and depends strongly on the experience and perception of the assessors.  
4.10.2.9 SPAR-H (Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability Analysis) 
SPAR-H was introduced by Gertman et al. (2004) as a simplified method to estimate human 
error probabilities associated with operators’ actions and decisions in nuclear power plants. 
According to its authors the SPAR-H approach contains five steps: 
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1. Define the model of human behaviour. 
2. Describe the details of the model in behavioural terms, into action and diagnosis 
tasks. 
3. Identify the PSFs that characterise behaviour with the operational context  
4. Refine and assess the list of PSFs an. 
5. Develop the quantification scheme. 
The methodology incorporates PSFs capable of influencing human performance. All PSFs 
are considered to be significant contributors to human error and dependencies are taken into 
account. The final human error probability is calculated by multiplying the influence of PSFs, 
with the nominal error probability for the two different types of tasks, action and diagnosis. 
The mathematical expression is given by Equation 4-9: 
!"# ! !"#$!!"#!"#$"%&'(!"#$! !"#!"#$"%&'(!! !!     (4-9) 
where, the NHEP is the nominal error probabilities for the two types of tasks, 0.01 for 
diagnosis and 0.001 for action and PSFcomposite the multiplicative calculation of PSFs that 
are involved in the particular tasks.  
SPAR-H is a flexible technique, which gives analysts the ability to implement the 
methodology beyond specific tasks and to assess human error probability based on the 
context of specific PSFs. On the other hand, this great dependency of the methodology on 
PSFs is probably its main weakness. SPAR-H does not provide explicit guidance to address 
a wider range of PSFs when needed. Therefore, SPAR-H encourages analysts to use more 
recent context in developing methods when more detail about the application of PSFs is 
required. Finally, although it addresses the issue of PSFs dependency and despite the 
detailed discussion of their potential interaction effects, it treats PSFs as independent 
entities. 
4.10.2.10 Summary of cross – industry HPA techniques limitations 
The previous section described in detail nine quantitative performance analysis techniques 
which have been broadly applied to several domains. All the techniques have several 
limitations, which reduce their accuracy and degrade their effectiveness and contribution to 
overall risk identification. In addition, in many cases such limitations render the techniques 
cumbersome and difficult to apply. The main collective drawbacks of the existing techniques 
can be summarised as: 
Chapter 4     HUMAN ERROR – HUMAN PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
142 
1. Adequacy of data: It is acknowledged in the literature that one of the main problems 
of all human performance analysis techniques is the lack of empirical data for model 
development and validation. Furthermore, even in the cases where empirical data 
exists, e.g. THERP methodology, the data have been collected for a particular 
industry and operation and are therefore not universally applicable. Finally, even 
when data allow the estimation of error probabilities, there is no agreed methodology 
of how to interpret the probabilities in terms of safety.  
2. Lack of data: This, again, has led to the exploration of alternative including subject 
matter experts (SMEs) and simulators. However, as mentioned in Section 4.10.1.5, 
both may provide misleading results if not specified appropriately.  
2a. With respect to SMEs, there is currently no agreement either on the criteria or the 
characteristics that SMEs should fulfil (Salmon et al., 2011). Although a generic 
common practice indicates that the more experienced the SMEs the better (Kirwan, 
1994), this does not provide any insights with regard to their characteristics. The 
differences on the selected panel of experts, within the context of the scenario under 
consideration, may lead to inconsistent and misleading outcomes due to the biased 
judgements of SMEs, e.g. frontline vs. managerial personnel. Therefore the SMEs 
should be selected based on the defined problem, the scope of the analysis and the 
domain of applicability. For instance, if the scenario assesses train drivers 
performance, the panel of experts should at least consist of professionals familiar 
with the tasks of train drivers. In addition the panel should also include professionals 
familiar with the terms of PSFs and the analysis of train accidents, i.e. human factors 
experts.  
2b. On the other hand, concerning data derived from simulations, there are two main 
areas of concern. Firstly, it is debatable whether simulation data can replicate 
empirical data sufficiently. Secondly, simulator observations have limited capabilities 
concerning the measurement of the factors that affect human performance. For 
example, the levels of fatigue or workload can be measured with the evolution of 
technology (Hammerl et al., 2009). However, factors such as motivation of 
employees or the incentives that organisations provide for their personnel are difficult 
to be covered. Subsequently, simulators can only assess human performance based 
on a limited number of measurable factors. 
3. Inadequate proof of the accuracy of techniques: Due to the lack of empirical data 
confirmation regarding the validation and accuracy of the techniques is limited (Bell 
and Holroyd, 2009). Additionally, most of the recent techniques are still under further 
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development and they are often tailored to a very specific context. Therefore, it is 
difficult to apply them to a large matrix of scenarios and consequently the process of 
their validation delays (Kyriakidis, 2009). 
4. Dependencies of PSFs: Only few of the techniques account for dependencies 
between PSFs. Therefore, in most of the cases the assessment of performance is 
based on the direct influence of PSFs, e.g. how fatigue affects performance, without 
taking into account any indirect contribution of one PSF on another PSF, e.g. how 
training may influence workload. 
5. Repetitive errors are not taken into account: The techniques assume that the same 
human error can happen only once while a task is executed. However, this is not 
always the case. Very often the same errors are repeated until the occurrence. For 
instance, a train driver may repeatedly exceed speed limits and manage to avoid 
SPADs, until the SPAD eventually occurs.  
6. Application of techniques: Several methods or models can be found in the literature, 
however only few of them have been cross-industry applied including SLIM, THERP 
and HEART. Subsequently, the transferability of the techniques to other domains is 
not widely assessed.  
Due to the limitations of the existing cross-industry HPA techniques no single approach will 
be used per se for the purposes of this thesis. However, the features of the SLIM 
methodology will be employed as they meet most of the criteria of the suggested 
methodology, as described in Section 4.10. However, for the implementation of SLIM, the 
relevant set of PSFs should be first identified. This is thoroughly described in the following 
chapter.  
4.11 Summary 
This chapter presented the fundamental attributes of human error and human performance. 
First, the concept of human error in railway operations was determined. Based on this, 
different approaches used to indicate the origins of human error were reviewed. The results 
of this review showed that errors should not be treated as isolated events, but rather as 
results of a sequence of actions and interactions between human and systemic factors. 
Within this context, it was also shown that human error is associated with degraded human 
performance, which in turn is affected by a large number of contextual factors, broadly 
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known as Performance Shaping Factors. Therefore, the human performance should be 
considered as function of various factors that can affect it.  
In view of that, the relevant railway and cross-industry Human Performance Analysis 
techniques were examined to indicate whether any of the existing approaches could be per 
se used to study the influence of the PSFs on railway operators’ performance. Despite the 
continuous improvement of these techniques, significant limitations with respect to their 
accuracy, validity, and included PSFs, were observed, and therefore none of the existing 
approaches was deemed appropriate to be applied to this thesis. 
Therefore, a new approach is proposed, which will allow researchers to overcome the 
identified limitations. This approach is based on a set of PSFs tailored specifically to railway 
operations, and accounts for factors that not only affect train drivers’ but also signallers’ and 
controllers’ performance. This set of factors, referred to as Railway-Performance Shaping 
Factors (R-PSFs) taxonomy, is introduced in the next chapter. The R-PSFs taxonomy will be 
then used in Chapter 7 for the development of an approach to study and analyse the impact 
of the relevant R-PSFs on the performance of railway operators.  
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Chapter 5 THE RAILWAY PERFORMANCE SHAPING 
FACTORS TAXONOMY – LITERATURE REVIEW AND INITIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
The thesis has so far discussed and justified the significant role humans play in railway 
operations, and the need for a new method for the assessment of human performance. The 
remainder of this thesis develops this new method using a new list (or taxonomy) of 
contextual factors established for the railway domain, referred to as the Railway 
Performance Shaping Factors (R-PSFs) taxonomy. This chapter initiates this process by 
presenting the process for the development of this taxonomy. 
5.1 The characteristics of R-PSFs taxonomy  
In the previous chapter (Section 4.9) the limitations of the existing PSFs taxonomies were 
identified, including: (i) a lack of clear and precise definitions, (ii) poor assessment of the 
impact of PSFs on human performance, and (iii) assumption of PSFs independency. On 
account of these limitations, and considering the lack of an agreed taxonomy within the 
context of the HPA techniques, this thesis develops a new, simple and detailed PSFs 
taxonomy that focuses on the railway domain. This taxonomy, referred to as the Railway 
Performance Shaping Factors (R-PSFs), has the aim to enable researchers, irrespective of 
experience in the field of human factors, to better examine and study human performance in 
railway operations. Therefore, the main objectives of the R-PSFs taxonomy are to: 
• identify the PSFs that influence the performance of railway operators; 
• classify PSFs based on their common characteristics and provide precise definitions; 
• investigate and account for the dependencies amongst PSFs; 
• account for the distinction between dynamic and static PSFs; 
• quantify the contribution of each PSF on the performance of operators; 
• direct resources more efficiently to develop of effective ways to improve operator 
performance; 
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• provide the means to develop a tool for the assessment of human performance in 
railway operations; and 
• account for transferability. 
5.2 Methodology to develop the R-PSFs taxonomy 
The holistic approach captured in Figure 5-1 has been used to determine the set of R-PSFs 
relevant to railway operations and develop the corresponding taxonomy. In addition, Figure 
5-2 illustrates the detailed framework for the development of this taxonomy.  
The approach starts with a review of the contextual factors from the most relevant current 
railway PSFs taxonomies. Due to the limited number of taxonomies for the railway industry, 
they are augmented with the relevant ones from the other domains to realize a full set of 
PSFs. Many of these taxonomies are included in the HPA techniques presented in the 
Chapter 4.  
Further to the literature review, 479 complete and detailed worldwide accident and incident 
investigation reports were analysed. The reports were obtained from 14 different National 
Transport Safety Boards (NTSBs), National Investigations Bodies (NIBs), Railway 
Undertakings (RUs) and Infrastructure Managers (IMs). The aim of the analysis was twofold. 
Firstly, to consolidate the results from the literature in order to identify if any factors should 
be added, replaced or removed. 192 reports were reviewed to consolidate the results from 
the literature and the findings were verified by Subject Expert Matters (SMEs). The SMEs 
were also employed to, indicate the dependencies between R-PSFs. Secondly, the analysis 
had the aim to introduce a transferable list of R-PSFs that could be applied to more than one 
country or type of network. Therefore, 287 additional reports were gathered and combined 
with the first set of reports, and analysed to generate the transferable list of R-PSFs. 
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Figure 5-1 Methodology to develop the R-PSFs Taxonomy 
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Figure 5-2 Detailed framework of the R-PSFs taxonomy development 
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5.3 Review of existing PSFs taxonomies 
The methodology for the selection of the relevant PSFs to railway operators, starts with a 
review of the factors as identified in the most relevant taxonomies and HPA techniques.  
5.3.1 Human Factors in the Railway System (TRACEr-Rail) 
The TRACEr-Rail (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b), was introduced by the U.K. 
RSSB as a part of research aimed at developing a rail-specific technique to assess train 
drivers performance. This technique was not introduced in the previous chapter, as it is a 
part of the process for the development of the RARA technique. The TRACER-Rail is 
developed based on the list of factors included in the Technique for the Retrospective 
Analysis of Cognitive Errors (TRACEr) (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002), which was established 
to gain a better understanding of the errors caused by air traffic controllers. Therefore, the 
starting point for the creation of the TRACEr-Rail was to review the factors included in the 
TRACEr and exclude those irrelevant to railway operations.  
The second step was to re-categorise and rename, when necessary, the remainder of the 
factors. The original version of TRACEr contains a list of nine main PSF categories: traffic 
and airspace (e.g. traffic complexity), pilot/controller communications (e.g. workload), 
procedures (e.g. accuracy), training and experience (e.g. task familiarity), workplace design, 
Human Machine Interface (HMI) and equipment factors (e.g. radar display), ambient 
environment (e.g. noise), personal factors (e.g. alertness/fatigue), social and team factors 
(e.g. handover/takeover) and organisational factors (e.g. conditions of work). After the 
assessment of the original factors, the TRACEr-Rail taxonomy was derived, and comprises 
the following nine categories of PSFs: infrastructure and traffic factors; communication 
factors; procedures and documentation; information; training, knowledge and experience; 
workplace design, HMI and quality of equipment; in-cab environment; personal factors; and 
social and team factors. Finally, each of the categories was sub-divided resulting in 29 
individual PSFs. Examples of these are distraction, job clarity, procedures clarity, risk 
perception, unfamiliarity and time availability. 
5.3.2 The Railway Action Reliability Assessment (RARA) 
The RARA (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012b, Gibson et al., 2013a) taxonomy was 
developed primarily to identify the factors that affect the performance of train drivers. It can 
also be used for other railway personnel as well, e.g. signallers. It introduces a group of six 
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key categories of PSFs (EPCs6): (i) task design, i.e. how a task occurs in practice and the 
types of demands it places on personnel; (ii) interface design, i.e. the human-machine 
interface used for completing a task including tools, controls and displays; (iii) competence 
management, i.e. the quality of training and selection processes which support the task; (iv) 
procedures, i.e. the quality of procedures and documentation relevant to a task; (v) person, 
i.e. population of users for the task, and how their perceptions of the task or their 
mental/physical characteristics might influence their reliability and (vi) environment, i.e. the 
physical environment (heating, lighting, noise) which may influence human performance. 
Each of the six categories is broken down further, resulting in 27 individual elements 
including: unfamiliarity with situation, time availability, unclear allocation of responsibility, 
operators inexperience, ambiguity of given procedures, fatigue, stress and physical 
environment. Finally, besides the six categories, the RARA also acknowledges four 
additional factors, workload, distraction, task complexity and unavailability of staff, not been 
included in the initial list because they are associated with more than one of the existing 
EPCs.  
5.3.3 Human Factors Analysis Classification System Railways       
(HFACS-RR) 
The HFACS-RR (Reinach and Viale, 2006) was developed on the principles of HFACS 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000) to systematically examine underlying human causal factors 
and to improve railway accident investigations. The approach is similar to the Swiss Cheese 
model, hence it identifies human error as a sequence of events which is expressed by the 
unsafe actions of the frontline personnel. However, in contrast to the Swiss Cheese model, 
the HFACS-RR introduces a set of contributing factors that affect the performance of 
operators and subsequently increase the likelihood of the occurrence of errors. This set of 
factors consists of five main categories: conditions of operators (physical and psychological 
limitations); environmental factors (physical and technological environment); personal factors 
(training, staffing), organisational factors (supervision, safety culture, procedures, rules and 
regulations), and outside factors (regulatory oversight and political/social environment). 
However, by definition outside factors are considered exceptional and rare. Therefore, they 
are excluded from the set of candidate R-PSFs.  
                                                
6 As stated in Chapter 4, RARA approach uses the term Error Performance Conditions (EPCs) 
when referring to PSFs. 
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5.3.4 Human Error Risk Management for Engineering Systems (HERMES) 
The HERMES (Cacciabue, 2004a) is a qualitative generic approach to enhance the 
identification of potential human errors, and is strongly influenced by the THERP 
methodology. Within its concept the HERMES provides a set of Performance Influencing 
Factors (PIFs), which have been successfully applied to the railway domain. The PIFs are: 
communication within organisation, communication means, technological interfaces, 
maintenance of trains/railway, comfort of working contexts, roster and shifts planning, 
regulations/rules, training methods and simulators. These are further sub-divided into 
indicators of safety, including amongst workload, stress, training, quality of equipment and 
supervision.  
Due to the fact that this thesis does not account for occurrences related to maintenance, 
only the factor maintenance of trains/railway is excluded from the candidate set of PSFs.  
5.3.5 Human Factors in the Railway System Safety Analysis Process  
The model of Hammerl and Vanderhaegen (2009) provides a list of PSFs that was derived 
and restructured on the basis of the PSFs included in the THERP and TRACE-Rail 
taxonomies. As shown in the Chapter 4, the model addresses three main categories of 
factors: physical, personal and organisational. The physical factors are sub-divided into: (i) 
anthropometry, i.e. basic layout of working environment; (ii) working conditions, i.e. physical 
conditions as temperature, humidity, light, noise; and (iii) design of HMI, e.g. layout of HMI, 
quality of feedback. The personal factors comprise individual and dependent factors, with 
the former including stress, age, gender and health, and the latter including experience, 
motivation, safety awareness and fatigue. Finally, the organisational factors are classified 
into: (i) employee related factors, e.g. roster planning, training, safety culture and (ii) 
standard factors, e.g. rules and guidelines. Although, this list is not exhaustive, the model 
allows researchers to enhance the taxonomy by adding any factors relevant to a given task 
or scenario. 
The five contextual factors taxonomies presented above (TRACEr-Rail, RARA, HFACS-RR, 
HERMES, HFs in Railways) were either modified or developed for the railway environment. 
In general, they consider PSFs as a set of factors that can either enhance or degrade 
human performance and subsequently affect the likelihood of errors occurrence. The 
assessment of the five models results in a total of twelve PSFs categories, as shown in the 
Table 5-1, and more than 75 individual elements (exhaustive list in Appendix III). 
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The PSFs categories are: personal factors; team factors; task factors; organisational factors; 
environmental factors; infrastructure and traffic; procedures and documentation; training and 
experience; communication and information; roster and shift patterns; interfaces and finally 
working environment. On the other hand, the individual contextual factors include amongst 
others stress, training, safety culture, design of workplace, supervision, familiarity, 
experience, quality of equipment, fitness to duty and fatigue. 
Table 5-1 Review of railway contextual factors taxonomies 
Taxonomy Terminology of contextual factors 
High-level 
contextual factors 
Elements of  
contextual factors  
(not exhaustive list) 
TRACEr-
Rail 
! Performance Shaping 
Factors (PSFs) 
! Infrastructure and traffic 
! Communication 
! Procedures and 
documentation 
! Information 
! Training, knowledge and 
experience 
! Workplace design, HMI 
! In-cab environment 
! Personal 
! Social and team 
! Distraction 
! Time availability 
! Workload 
! Risk perception 
! Experience 
! Procedures clarity 
! Quality of information 
! Stress 
! Health 
! Fatigue 
! Team relations 
RARA ! Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) 
! Task design 
! Interface design 
! Competence management 
! Procedures 
! Person 
! Environment 
! Unfamiliarity 
! Time availability 
! Quality of information 
! Poor system feedback 
! Experience 
! Quality of information 
! Fatigue due to shift pattern 
! Workforce morale 
HFACS-
RR ! No terminology 
! Conditions of operators  
! Personal factors  
! Organisational factors 
! Environmental factors  
! Mental state 
! Physiological state 
! Crew resource 
management 
! Technological environment 
! Supervision 
! Planning of operations 
! Organisational climate 
HERMES 
! Performance 
Influencing Factors 
(PIFs) 
! Communication within 
organisation 
! Communication means 
! Technological interfaces  
! Comfort of work context 
! Roster/shifts planning 
! Regulations/rules 
! Training methods and 
simulators 
! Unwritten rules 
! Mental conditions  
! Quality of tools/actuators  
! Workplace design  
! Stress 
! Physical conditions  
! Training  
! Supervision 
! Procedures  
HFs in 
Railways 
! Performance Shaping 
Factors (PSFs) 
! Physical 
! Personal 
! Organisational 
! Emotional tension 
! Training 
! Safety culture 
! Task design 
! Experience 
! Physical conditions 
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However, as can be seen in the Table 5-1, the reviewed taxonomies do not include 
categories of factors at the same level of detail. For instance, the HFACS-RR and HFs in 
Railways taxonomies include categories that in general refer to individuals, organisations 
and working conditions, while the remaining are more specific, containing categories such as 
procedures, communication and technological interfaces. Subsequently, the categories of 
the reviewed taxonomies have a certain degree of overlap. The factors category procedures 
and documentations for example, is related and could be included within organisational 
factors, while conditions of operators can be accommodated within personal factors. 
Therefore, this thesis introduces an alternative classification of the PSFs categories to 
bridge the gap due to the different perspectives amongst existing taxonomies. This list 
includes six categories of factors, which embrace all the identified categories according to 
their common characteristics. The suggested classification consists of:  
(i) personal factors, which includes the factors that characterise and affect the 
performance of individuals, e.g. individual characteristics, conditions of operators, 
training and experience; 
(ii) task factors, that characterise the features of an executed task e.g. task design;  
(iii) team factors, e.g. communication between team and social climate;  
(iv) organisational factors, which include the factors defined and controlled by a 
railway organisation. Such factors embrace the characteristics and attitudes of an 
organisation, as well as certain organisational behaviours that influence the 
performance of employees (Groth, 2009); e.g. procedures and documentation, 
training methods, roster and staffing; 
(v) system factors, which characterise the attributes of the railway system and how 
the interactions between operators and system characteristics may affect 
operator performance at, e.g. interfaces, infrastructure layout and working 
environment; 
(vi) environmental factors, that refer to weather conditions at the time the task is 
executed. 
The review of railway related PSFs taxonomies provides a large set of high-level and 
detailed contextual factors relevant to railway operations. Nevertheless, it is worth exploring 
whether other factors exist within relevant approaches and methods developed for non-
railways operations. The following sections present an overview of the relevant findings. 
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5.3.6 Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
The THERP taxonomy was developed to identify the factors that influence the performance 
of operators in the control rooms of nuclear power plants (Swain and Guttmann, 1983). It is 
acknowledged as the first and most detailed taxonomy including more than 60 PSFs 
(Kirwan, 1994). The taxonomy classifies all factors into external, internal, and those that act 
as psychological and physiological stressors. Further to the initial classification, the THERP 
sub-divides external PSFs into situational characteristics, task and equipment 
characteristics, and work and task instructions. The situational characteristics describe 
generic PSFs that can be found in more than one job in a work situation. The task and 
equipment characteristics describe all PSFs that are specific to tasks in a given work, while 
the task instructions involve the PSFs, which are important tools for most of the tasks. The 
internal factors are defined as those related to the individual, i.e. characteristics of people 
resulting from internal and external influences. Finally the two types of stressors refer to 
those PSFs that directly affect mental and physical stress. The PSFs included in the THERP 
taxonomy are presented in Table 5-2.  
Table 5-2 Factors influencing human actions in THERP (Kirwan, 1994) 
Category of PSFs Performance Shaping Factors 
External PSFs 
Situational 
characteristics 
Architectural features; Quality of environment (temperature, air humidity, air quality, 
radiation exposure, lighting, noise, vibration, cleanliness); Working hours; Work 
breaks; Availability of special work resources; Manning; Organisational structure 
(authority, responsibility, communication channels); Actions by supervisors, co-
workers, union representatives; Remuneration incentives (recognition, rewards, 
benefits) 
Work and task 
instructions  
Required procedures (written, non-written); Written and verbal communication; 
Cautions and warnings; Work-methods; Plant policy 
Task and 
equipment 
characteristics 
Perceptual requirements; Requirements for motor system (speed, power 
expenditure, accuracy); Relationship between operators and display; Anticipatory 
requirements; Interpretation; Decision making; Complexity (information loading); 
Narrow nature of task; Short term and long term memory; Frequency and 
repetitiveness; Task criticality; Calculations; Feedback (knowledge regarding results 
of an action); Dynamic of gradual actions; Team structure and communications; 
Man-machine interface factors (design of work resources, test instruments, 
maintenance equipment, work aids, tools, accessories) 
Internal PSFs 
Organismic 
factors 
Previous training / experience; State of current practice or abilities; Personality and 
intelligence variables; Motivation and attitudes; Emotional states Stress (mental or 
physical); Knowledge of required performance standards; Gender differences; 
Physical conditions; Attitudes deriving from family, social environment; Group 
identifications 
Stressors  
Psychological Suddenness of occurrence; Duration of stress; Task speed; Task load; High hazard 
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Category of PSFs Performance Shaping Factors 
stressors risks; Threats (fear of failure, loss of job); Monotony, degrading or meaningless work; 
Duration of uneventful vigilance periods; conflicts or motives about work performance; 
Reinforcement absent; Distractions (noise, glare, movement, flicker, coloration); 
Inconsistent cues 
Physiological 
stressors 
Duration of stress; Fatigue; Pain or discomfort; Hunger or thirst; Extreme 
temperatures; Radiation; Extreme gravitational forces; Extreme atmospheric pressure 
conditions; Oxygen insufficiency; Vibration; Restricted movements; Absence of 
physical exercise; Disruption of circadian rhythm 
A review of the PSFs within the THERP taxonomy reveals that most can be allocated to the 
factors identified by the first five railway related approaches. Several other factors, such as 
decision-making may be classified as personal, while monotony could be characterised as 
related to the executed task. However, factors such as extreme G-forces, extreme 
atmospheric conditions, oxygen insufficiency and extreme gravitational forces, by nature, 
cannot be identified within the factors that affect railway operators performance. Therefore, 
they are excluded from the set of relevant to railways PSFs. 
5.3.7 Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
The HEART taxonomy (Williams, 1986) is considered generic and has been extensively 
used in the nuclear, chemical and petrochemical industries. The approach defines a set of 
Error Producing Conditions (EPC) including ergonomic, task and environmental factors that 
could negatively affect human performance. It identifies 38 different EPCs (Rail Safety and 
Standards Board, 2012b), which can be classified into two main groups, directly transferable 
to railways and non-transferable. The EPCs relevant to the railway industry are those 
already introduced in the RARA taxonomy. The EPCs not relevant to railways include 
several factors. For example, the factor “inconsistency of meaning of displays procedures” is 
not applicable in railway operations. Furthermore, the EPC ”incentive to use other more 
dangerous procedures” is also not applicable to railways as “dangerous procedures” imply 
direct violations of the rules. Such factors are excluded and not taken into account in the 
candidate set of R-PSFs. 
5.3.8 Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA) 
The HERA (Hallbert et al., 2007) taxonomy was developed within the HERA project to 
analyse and gather information about human performance from commercial nuclear power 
plants. The taxonomy introduces eleven PSFs, which were obtained by merging the PSFs 
included in the SPAR-H taxonomy and in the study “Good practices for Implementing 
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Human Reliability Analysis“ (Kolaczkowski et al., 2005). The eleven PSFs are: available 
time, stress and stressors, experience and training, complexity, procedures and reference 
documents, ergonomics and HMI, work processes, fitness for duty/fatigue, environment, and 
team dynamics/characteristics, and communication. These categories are transferable to 
railways, and therefore, included in the list of candidate R-PSFs. 
5.3.9 A Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA) 
The ATHEANA (Cooper et al., 1996) provides a list of factors that have an impact on the 
performance of operators in nuclear power plants. Similar to other approaches, ATHEANA 
introduces a generic set of factors, such as: training and experience; procedures; availability 
and clarity of instrumentation; time pressure; workload and stress; complexity of required 
actions and familiarity with the situation; dynamics and characteristics of team; staffing; 
ergonomics, quality and human-machine interface; communications; environmental and 
working conditions; and personal fitness level. All the PSFs within ATHEANA are relevant to 
railway operators and operations, and therefore, included in the list of the R-PSFs taxonomy. 
5.3.10 Controller Action Reliability Assessment (CARA) 
The CARA taxonomy (Gibson and Kirwan, 2008a) was developed for the assessment of 
human performance in the aviation industry and in particular in Air Traffic Management 
(ATM), based on the principles of HEART. It introduces 22 EPCs obtained from the review of 
several existing taxonomies, including amongst others the HEART, the SPAR-H and the 
CREAM. Similar to the EPCs in the HEART taxonomy, the EPCs included in CARA are 
again classified into the two main groups of transferable and non-transferable. The EPCs 
relevant to railways are the same as in the HEART and RARA taxonomies, and are included 
in the candidate R-PSFs. 
5.3.11 Human Error in Air Traffic Management (HERA-JANUS) 
HERA-JANUS (EUROCONTROL, 2003) represents another approach for the analysis of 
human error in the ATM. It was developed from an extensive literature review and 
operational engagement of air traffic controllers, incident investigators, and safety managers 
(Subotic, 2007). It has a set of eleven categories of factors, referred to as Contextual 
Conditions (CCs). These are: pilot-controller communications, pilot actions, traffic & 
airspace, weather, documentation & procedures, training & experience, workplace design & 
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HMI, environment, personal factors, team factors, and organisational factors. Each of the CC 
groups is sub-divided, resulting in more than 200 individual contextual factors.  
All, but one of the CCs defined in the taxonomy are relevant to railway operators and 
operations. Most are directly transferable to railways, while others, i.e. pilot/controller 
communication and traffic & airspace require renaming and redefinition. The category pilot 
actions is removed as non-relevant. All the remaining factors (including where modification is 
required) are included in the set of candidate R-PSFs.  
5.3.12 Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) 
The CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998) taxonomy provides a generic list of factors applicable to any 
industry. Based on prior research (i.e. THERP), it has the goal of delivering a more 
structured taxonomy where related categories of contextual factors are assembled together. 
It has a small set of factors, referred to as Common Performance Conditions (CPCs), that 
include the general determinants of performance, such as (Hollnagel, 1998):  
! adequacy of organisation, e.g. the quality of the roles and responsibilities of team 
members, additional support, communication systems, Safety management 
Systems; 
! working conditions, e.g. the nature of physical working conditions such as ambient 
lighting, glare on screens, noise from alarms; 
! adequacy of Man-Machine Interface (MMI) and operational support, e.g. the MMI in 
general, available information on control panels, computerised workstations; 
! availability of procedures/plans, e.g. operating and emergency procedures, familiar 
patterns of response, routines; 
! number of simultaneous goals, e.g. the number of tasks a person is required to 
pursue or attend to at the same time;  
! available time, e.g. the time available to carry out a task; 
! time of day (circadian rhythm), e.g. the time at which the task is carried out;  
! adequacy of training and preparation, e.g. level and quality of training provided to 
operators and operational experience; 
! crew collaboration, e.g. teamwork, level of trust, social climate.  
All the CPCs are transferable to railways, and are therefore, included in the development of 
the R-PSFs taxonomy. 
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5.3.13 Human Reliability Management System (HRMS) 
The taxonomy included in the HRMS approach (Kirwan, 1997) was developed to study the 
factors that affect human performance in the nuclear industry. Six PSFs, derived based on 
the assessment of existing taxonomies (Kirwan, 1997), are provided. These are: procedures, 
time, quality of information and interface, training/expertise/experience/competence, task 
organisation and task complexity.  
The PSFs are all relevant to railways, and are included to the candidate set of R-PSFs for 
the railway taxonomy. 
5.3.14 Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability Assessment  
(SPAR-H) 
The SPAR-H (Gertman et al., 2004), introduces a list of contextual factors for the estimation 
of human performance in nuclear power plants. Nine PSFs are identified, derived from an 
extensive literature review in the field of behavioural sciences (Gertman et al., 2004). These 
PSFs are: available time; stress and stressors; training and experience; task complexity; 
ergonomics - Human Machine Interface; procedures; fitness for duty; and work processes, 
i.e. organisational factors, safety culture, work planning, communication.  
All the factors are relevant to railway operators and operations and thus are included in to 
the candidate set of R-PSFs for the railway taxonomy. 
5.3.15 Success Likelihood Index Methodology (SLIM) 
The SLIM (Embrey, 1983) approach was developed to quantify the PSFs that affect human 
performance in nuclear power plants. In contrast to the other taxonomies, SLIM does not 
provide a fixed set of PSFs. It allows analysts to identify the factors related to individuals, 
environment and task, which are considered most important to the scenario under 
investigation. Nevertheless, the literature (Forester et al., 2006) indicates that there are at 
least 14 PSFs within the SLIM approach that could be used as template by the researchers. 
These are: training and experience; procedures and administrative controls; availability and 
clarity of instrumentation; time available and time required to complete the task; complexity 
of the required diagnosis and response; workload, time pressure and stress; team dynamics 
and characteristics; staffing; quality of the human-system interface; environmental factors; 
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accessibility and operability of the equipment to be manipulated; need for special tools; 
communication within organisation and special fitness needs. 
All but three of the PSFs are directly transferable to railways. From the remaining three, two, 
i.e. the “need for special tools” and “accessibility and operability of the equipment to be 
manipulated“ are not related to railway operations. The third, i.e. “complexity of the required 
diagnosis and response”, is primarily related to the cases of emergency, hence it is 
incorporated within existing factors, e.g. workload and time to response to a task.  
5.3.16 Human Error Probability Index (HEPI) 
The HEPI taxonomy provides a set of PSFs for the petrochemical industry. It is built upon 
the principles of SLIM, and allows researchers to define the factors related to individuals, 
environment and task, which are considered to the most important for the scenario under 
investigation. HEPI has a list of nine PSFs: procedures, stress, complexity, time pressure, 
teamwork, training, experience, distraction and environmental factors. All the HEPI factors 
are directly transferable to railway operations. 
5.3.17 Summary of findings 
The candidate set of Railway Performance Shaping Factors (R-PSFs) has been selected on 
the basis of several sources of information. In general, the contextual factors throughout the 
assessed taxonomies show strong similarities, where contextual factors are considered as 
conditions or factors that influence human performance. The process followed to select the 
relevant R-PSFs started with an initial selection based on the review of contextual factors 
identified in five railway related taxonomies (Table 5-1). As a result, six PSFs categories 
were determined as relevant: personal, task, team, organisational, system and 
environmental factors, which embrace all the generic categories of factors as identified by 
the existing taxonomies. In addition, more than 75 individual PSFs relevant to railway 
operations were identified.  
The initial findings were augmented with a review of non-railway related taxonomies. This 
phase involved the review of eleven well-documented and widely implemented taxonomies 
designed primarily to analyse human errors in the nuclear, aviation and process industries 
(Kirwan, 1994, Forester et al., 2006, Bell and Holroyd, 2009). The literature shows that 
taxonomies have a tendency to be repetitive, i.e. include the same PSFs (Wilson et al., 
2007a). Therefore, although the selected taxonomies may not be exhaustive, it can 
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reasonably be argued that they contain the majority of the factors that influence human 
performance in every working environment.  
The assessed taxonomies and their related factors are presented in tabular form in 
Appendices II and III. Due to the fact that there is no agreed taxonomy for the railway 
industry, taxonomies from other domains were analysed and compared with those within the 
railway domain. The comparisons were conducted on two levels, firstly between the 
categories of PSFs and secondly, amongst the individual PSFs. The comparisons were 
mostly straightforward as particular factors were identified in almost all taxonomies, e.g. the 
factors “procedures” and “training”. The comparison on the first level did not reveal any 
categories that should be added to the six categories as obtained from the railway 
taxonomies. However, this was not the case for the comparison on the second level, as six 
R-PSFs elements could not be directly identified as belonging to any of the railway related 
taxonomies. These factors are: routine, expectation, vigilance, interpretation, decision-
making skills and Safety Management Systems (SMS). However, routine is indicated as an 
underlying factor within the RARA taxonomy. In addition, the factors vigilance, interpretation, 
decision-making skills and expectation are defined within the TRACEr-Rail approach as 
operational error types. Finally, although not identified in any railway relevant taxonomy the 
factor SMS is clearly included within the CREAM taxonomy. Therefore, they are all retained 
within the set of candidate R-PSFs due to their relevance. The final list of candidate R-PSFs 
contains more than 250 elements, as shown in the Appendix III.  
5.4 Identification of dynamic R-PSFs 
In Chapter 4 it was stated that the relationship between PSFs and time has not been 
addressed adequately. This is confirmed from the results in Section 5.3 where no taxonomy 
refers directly to the dynamic perspective of PSFs. However, many factors may gradually or 
rapidly change while a task is executed, e.g. distraction, stress or fatigue. These factors can 
be claimed to have a direct impact on human performance just before an error is made and 
subsequently an accident or incident occurs. To address this issue, this thesis introduces an 
additional R-PSFs category, referred to as dynamic personal factors. It describes all the 
factors that characterise and affect the individuals and are strongly related to the precise 
moment of operation/occurrence, e.g. distraction. In addition, environmental R-PSFs are 
considered as dynamic factors.  
The remaining categories are considered as static factors, i.e. the PSFs that have less 
association with the time of the occurrence. However, under certain conditions, e.g. an 
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accident on the network, factors such as the workload and time pressure may be affected 
significantly by the precise moment of the operation/occurrence. For these conditions the 
factors are considered dynamic. 
5.5 Augmentation with operators hierarchical task analysis 
After the identification of the R-PSFs, as derived from the relevant literature, the task 
analysis of operators was again reviewed. The purpose of this review is twofold. First, to 
map each of the factors with the duties of operators so as to confirm that the extracted R-
PSFs may indeed potentially affect operators’ performance. Second, to identify whether any 
factors have been either ignored, neglected or do not match to the operational concept of 
railways. The review focused particularly on the factors that affect the signallers and 
controllers performance as the majority of the railway approaches are built on train drivers’ 
performance. 
The mapping showed that all identified R-PSFs are relevant to the railway operational 
concept. Furthermore, no factors were conspicuously identified as missing or ignored. For 
train drivers this outcome was rather expected since the majority of relevant taxonomies 
were developed on their tasks. On the other hand, with respect to signallers, two are the 
most likely reasons for such observation. The first is that the number of PSFs is limited 
regardless of the task or operational procedures (Kirwan, 1994). The second is that within a 
generic operational concept it can be claimed that the duties of operators in control rooms of 
industries other than railways, e.g. aviation, have many similarities to the duties of train 
signallers and controllers. For instance, both air traffic controllers and railway signallers are 
responsible to: maintain the scheduling of services, contact with either pilots or train drivers 
when necessary, and prevent any type of conflicts. Subsequently, it is assumed that the 
majority of the identified factors from the review of relevant non-railway taxonomies cover 
sufficiently the factors that affect the performance of railway signallers and controllers.  
5.6 Presentation of the R-PSFs taxonomy  
Having reviewed sixteen PSFs taxonomies and the tasks of railway operators, the R-PSFs 
taxonomy was finally created. The review revealed seven R-PSFs categories and more than 
250 R-PSFs elements. However, many of the individual elements are either identical or 
overlap. Therefore, they have been combined based on their common characteristics and 
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when necessary renamed and redefined, e.g. the R-PSFs “Railway communication means”, 
instead of “Communication equipment” as indicated in the HERA taxonomy.  
Finally, 43 R-PSFs were identified and allocated to each one of the seven R-PSFs 
categories as displayed in the Table 5-3. Furthermore, detailed definitions (Appendix IV) to 
both categories of factors and the elements are provided in order not only for the taxonomy 
to be implemented by researchers with different backgrounds and perspectives, but also for 
the derived results to be comparable. Definitions aim to be short and transparent, so as to 
be easily applied from both academic researchers and practitioners. Unless otherwise 
stated, definitions were derived from the Collins English Dictionary (2009). Finally, 
constructive examples are also given (Appendix IV), which aim at supporting researchers to 
better understand the context within each of the R-PSFs should be used.  
Table 5-3 The complete R-PSFs taxonomy 
Category of R- PSFs Railway Performance Shaping Factors 
Personal Factors 
! Experience 
! Familiarity  
! Fit to work (health) 
! Individual characteristics  
! Motivation 
! Training - competence  
Dynamic Personal Factors 
! Decision making skills 
! Distraction-loss of concentration 
! Expectation 
! Fatigue 
! Interpretation 
! Perception 
! Situational awareness 
! Stress 
! Vigilance 
Task Factors 
! Monotony 
! Routine 
! Task complexity 
! Task instructions  
! Time pressure - time to respond 
! Workload 
Team Factors 
! Communication between employees 
! Relations within team 
! Teamwork 
! Trust in information 
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Category of R- PSFs Railway Performance Shaping Factors 
Organisational Factors 
! Communication within organisation  
! Fit to work aspect 
! Incentives for employees 
! Leadership  
! Quality of procedures, standards and regulations  
! Relations within organisation  
! Safety culture (disregard procedures) 
! Safety Management Systems 
! Shift pattern (working hours, breaks, manning) 
! Supervision 
! Training / training methods 
System Factors  
! Human Machine Interface (HMI) 
! Railway Communication Means (RCMs) 
! System design 
! Trust in equipment 
! Working environment 
Environmental Factors ! Visibility  
! Weather conditions 
In addition, Figure 5-3 illustrates the structure of the taxonomy by showing the interactions 
between operators and R-PSFs.  
 
Figure 5-3 The structure of R-PSFs taxonomy 
The structure displays the engineering and psychologists perspectives of the system and 
has been established on the generic model introduced by Hammerl and Vanderhaegen 
(2009) (Section 4.10.1.3). The structure clearly indicates how the performance of operators 
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is influenced by the different R-PSFs as well as how the R-PSFs interact with each other. As 
shown in Figure 5-3, blue factors reflect the dynamic R-PSFs, while orange represent the 
static. Although the structure was developed for the railway industry, it can be claimed 
generic, as it stems from the review of taxonomies from several domains. Therefore, it can 
be argued that both the structure model of the R-PSF taxonomy as well as the included R-
PSFs categories are transferable to any other transport mode or industry. However, the 
individual R-PSFs might change according to the attributes and features of the domain 
or/and industry in which they will be implemented.  
Finally, it is clear from the taxonomy’s structure and the provided definitions that R-PSFs not 
only directly but also indirectly affect human performance. That is when a factor A may 
influence a factor B and subsequently affects operators level of competence. For instance, 
unclear procedures may increase operators’ levels of workload and stress and consequently 
indirectly influence their performance. The interdependencies among R-PSFs are in detail 
described in Section 6.3.3. 
Having identified the suggested R-PSFs taxonomy and its constituents, a validation process 
based on real data and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) consultation was than conducted as 
described in the remainder of this chapter and Chapter 6.  
5.7 Consolidation of taxonomy with real data 
To consolidate the taxonomy, that is, crosscheck, verify, and confirm literature findings with 
real data, worldwide human error related accident and incident investigation reports were 
analysed. The literature shows that up to 80-90% of all serious railway accidents are 
attributed to human error due to degraded human performance (Rail Safety and Standards 
Board, 2004b). Thus, this thesis focuses on the study of factors that affect the performance 
of operators resulting in major accidents or high-risk incidents. Therefore the selected 
reports describe events that by legislation should be investigated. In Chapter 3 it was shown 
that different definitions are used to describe occurrences internationally. The European 
(European Commission, 2004) definitions are deemed to be more comprehensive, hence 
are adopted for the purposes of this thesis. Subsequently, all reports are classified into 
serious accidents, accidents and incidents. The reports describe occurrences relevant to 
operational errors caused by train drivers, signallers or controllers while trains move from 
origin to destination (including shunting operations). Railway occurrences caused by 
maintenance personnel are not included in the analysis.  
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5.8 Data characteristics 
In total 2278 publicly available and 418 confidential reports were gathered from several 
worldwide stakeholders. Reports were studied and only those describing human error 
related operational occurrences were finally retained. Subsequently, 479 reports were 
selected and classified according to the EU Directive 2004/49/EC (European Commission, 
2009), with 70 serious accidents, 189 accidents and 220 incidents. The reports describe 
events that occurred in the period 1997-2011 in 24 different countries includings 21 
European countries such as U.K., Norway, Germany and Switzerland; U.S.A; Canada and 
Australia. The timeframe was decided upon consulting summaries of railway activities issued 
by institutions of national and international reach, e.g. the International Union of Railways 
(International Union of Railways, 2007), the Federal Railroad Administration (Federal 
Railroad Administration, 2012) and the European Railway Agency (European Railway 
Agency, 2008). Data represent occurrences only from countries with highly developed 
railway systems. Undoubtedly, it would be beneficial if data from developing countries could 
also be gathered; however, this was not possible due to access and resources limitations. 
5.9 Data requirements 
In Chapter 4 was highlighted the importance of examining human error by accounting for the 
overall context within which an error occurs, including any underlying or hidden factors that 
may affect operators performance. Hence, the selected reports should contain a limited 
amount of information that allows researchers to analyse in detail the causes of a human 
error. Such information contains the:  
! description of the event; 
! involved personnel (responsibility), e.g. individual characteristics; 
! type of railway operation, e.g. passenger (intercity or regional), freight or metro; 
! features of system, e.g. type of train, on-board and infrastructure equipment; 
! severity of event, e.g. accident or incident; 
! type of occurrence, ,e.g. train derailment or trains collision; 
! location and time of event, e.g. open line, station; 
! immediate cause, e.g. train unable to stop;  
! causal factors, e.g. train driver falls asleep; 
! contributing factors (R-PSFs) that affect operators performance, e.g. adverse 
weather conditions, inadequate training, communication errors, and 
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! number of casualties or material damages, which defines the severity of events.  
To capture such level of information, the analysis presented in this thesis is based on 
detailed official railway investigation reports, as descriptive reports contain limited amounts 
of information (particularly with respect to the human factors aspect). The importance of 
analysing detailed reports also arose from the author’s personal communication with two 
railway organisations, i.e. the Swiss Federal Railways (SBB) and the UK Network Rail. Both 
the SBB (Swiss Federal Railways, 2010) and Network Rail (Gibson et al., 2013b), have 
acknowledged the need to collect specific information with respect to human factors as 
significant contributors to railway occurrences.  
Although the selected reports are official documents completed by authorised and eligible 
personnel, their quality was verified to ensure the reliability and robustness of the analyses. 
Therefore certain quality criteria were considered and examined, as presented in the 
following section.  
5.10 Data quality criteria 
The literature (Wang and Strong, 1996, Brackstone, 1999, Dupuy, 2011) identifies up to 
eight criteria (dimensions) that can be used to test the quality of collected data. These are: 
accessibility, accuracy, completeness, consistency, credentials, interpretability, relevance, 
and timeliness. All eight criteria are described in more detail in this section, while their 
summary is shown in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4 Data quality dimensions review (Dupuy, 2011) 
Quality 
dimension Characteristics Related notions 
Accessibility Availability of data to the user Cost, availability 
Accuracy Extent to which data values are correct, close to reality and free from error Correctness 
Completeness Quantity of reported data for each unique record Missing values 
Consistency 
Extent to which data values are coherent and compatible 
with one another within their corresponding framework and 
consistent with the framework definition 
Coherence, regularity, 
definitions, validity 
conformance  
Credential Extent to which data are obtained from reliable sources Reliability 
Interpretability Extent to which data are completed or perceived in an unambiguous manner Clarity 
Relevance Suitability of the reported data for a specific domain and absence or essential data  
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Quality 
dimension Characteristics Related notions 
Timeliness Currentness of the data in terms of the delay in providing and processing the information Up-to date 
5.10.1 Accessibility 
Accessibility refers to the ease with which data are obtained by any user. This encompasses 
the extent of ease to which the existence of this data can be ascertained and the suitability 
of mediums through which the data can be retrieved (Dupuy, 2011). The cost of the 
information may also be an aspect of accessibility for a number of users (Brackstone, 1999). 
Regarding railway investigation reports, accessibility is associated with confidentiality 
considerations. That is the willingness of railway organisations to share and allow access to 
their data (Dupuy, 2011). For this research, all collected investigation reports refer to 
occurrences that railway organisations are obliged to report according to the relevant safety 
regulations. Subsequently the majority of reports are publicly available and railway 
organisations, i.e. train operators, infrastructure managers, national investigation bodies, 
were not involved in the collection process. In addition, two of the databases were collected 
directly from an infrastructure manager and an integrated company (train operator also being 
an infrastructure manager) on a confidentiality agreement. Thus, accessibility is not relevant 
as quality dimension for the reports collected for this research. However, accessibility should 
be considered as quality criterion if access to data of developing countries was tested.   
5.10.2 Accuracy 
Data accuracy accounts for the degree to which data correctly describe the elements they 
are aimed to measure (Dupuy, 2011). Accuracy is often expressed in terms of error in 
statistical estimates and is classified into bias (systematic error) and variance (random error) 
components (Brackstone, 1999). It may also be defined in terms of the main sources of error 
that could potentially lead to inaccuracy (e.g., coverage, sampling). For this research, due to 
the format of data, accuracy is not considered as quality dimension, since all investigation 
reports correctly describe the elements they are aimed to measure. 
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5.10.3 Completeness 
Completeness is the degree to which a database provides information for all data fields that 
are supposed to contain information (Dupuy, 2011). This dimension is directly related to the 
predefined minimum requirements. Therefore, for this thesis, completeness is measured by 
the degree to which investigation reports satisfy the expectations of the predefined minimum 
requirements. Any report that did not include the minimum requirements was no analysed, 
therefore completeness, for this study, does not account for quality criterion.  
5.10.4 Consistency 
Consistency of data indicates the degree to which data could be considered coherent and 
compatible with one another within a broad analytic framework and over time (Brackstone, 
1999, Dupuy, 2011). Coherence is enhanced by using standard concepts, classifications, 
methodology and practices, target populations and common procedures across surveys. 
Within the context of this research, all investigation reports included demonstrate high levels 
of consistency, as their format and detail of information are identical. However, depending 
on the severity of events the quantity of included information may vary. Therefore, reports 
were classified and analysed according to their classification. Subsequently, consistency is 
not considered a quality dimension for this research.  
5.10.5 Interpretability 
Interpretability reflects to which extent data are presented in a clear manner and indicates 
the availability of a common and shared definition for the collected data (Dupuy, 2011). For 
investigation reports, this typically implies any underlying concepts, classification and 
collection methodologies (Brackstone, 1999), where similar responses demonstrate well-
interpreted collected data. Interpretability was selected as quality dimension, since many 
reports do not clearly indicate the contributing factors that influence the performance of 
operators. Subsequently, the author, while reviewing the selected reports, was extracting the 
implied information. Therefore, a level of bias, subjectivity and uncertainty may arise 
concerning the extracted information and the final findings could be questioned. To account 
for this, three final year PhD students in transport safety, familiar with analysis of safety 
reports, reviewed a random sample of the 479 reports to identify the contributing factors 
included in them based on the given definitions (Appendix IV). The findings of the PhD 
students confirm those of the author, and therefore the author concludes that whilst bias or 
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subjectivity issues cannot be eliminated, these do not compromise the quality of the findings. 
Secondly, SMEs verified the final findings, as described later in the Section 6.3.2. 
5.10.6 Relevance 
The relevance dimension represents the degree to which the reported data are suitable for a 
specific domain or study (Dupuy, 2011). For this thesis, relevant investigation reports are 
considered those that refer to railway accidents and incidents due to human errors. In 
particular, as stated earlier, this thesis accounts only for occurrences caused by train drivers, 
signallers and controllers while trains operate from origin to destination, including shunting 
operations. Therefore, all other reports were considered irrelevant for the purposes of this 
research. Subsequently relevance is not considered as quality criterion. 
5.10.7 Timeliness 
Timeliness reflects the delay between a reference point to which an information refers to, 
and the date when that information becomes accessible (Brackstone, 1999). In some cases, 
such delay may have an impact on the accuracy and completeness quality of a database, 
since the memory of interviewees may have weakened. However, time delay for reporting 
railway occurrences is mandated and necessary (Dupuy, 2011), therefore timeliness is not 
considered as quality dimension within the context of this research. 
5.10.8 Credential 
Finally, credential reflects the overall quality of the provided information (Dupuy, 2011). 
Credential is strongly associated with the trust factor that can be put into the data. That is, to 
what extent data are obtained from reliable (well-reputed) sources and whether researchers 
are confident in using the specific data for their analysis. Currently credential is measured 
qualitatively through surveys or audit of the organisation that owns the data (Dupuy, 2011). 
There is no known method for quantifying the credential of data. This thesis thus proposes 
such a method (described below) based on the concept of safety maturity.  
In this research, credential is considered as relevant quality criterion only for data obtained 
from railway undertakings (RUs) and infrastructure managers (IMs). It is not the aim of this 
thesis to challenge NTSBs and NIBs trust in their data management and reporting reliability 
in particular, since the selected reports describe occurrences that by legislation should be 
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extensively reported and investigated. On the other hand, the reliability of data derived from 
RUs and IMs may be disputed; although such reports are again referred to occurrences that 
by law should be investigated, they constitute outcomes usually obtained from internal 
investigation processes. However, since it is not possible to assess directly the investigation 
processes of RUs and IMs, the reliability of reports is deductively measured by evaluating 
the level of trust in these organisations. Such assessment is based on the concept of 
organisations’ safety maturity, as described in the next section. 
5.11 Background of safety maturity  
Safety maturity is the term used to describe organisations ability to achieve excellence in 
risk control. To assess such ability several approaches have been introduced over the years. 
One of the most widely recognised approaches, referred to as the Capability Maturity Model 
(CMM), has been introduced by Humphrey (1989). The CMM encompasses all the major 
aspects of process maturity, including behavioural and cultural issues. Although originally 
developed for software effectiveness, the CMM has been extended to cover a range of 
business processes including project management, asset management and human capital 
management (Paulk et al., 1995). It covers key practices and process areas or elements as 
well as behavioural differences and includes such aspects as process and technology 
change management, which are highly relevant to the safety and reliability of railways. 
These elements should ideally be included in any safety maturity model adopted by 
technology-dependent organisations such as railways. Therefore, it can be claimed that the 
appropriate way to translate the CMM is by a multi-faceted approach which accounts for all 
the major elements important to safety such as, human behaviour, hazards identification and 
quantification, explicit management and mitigation of all types of risk, including those 
involving equipment. However, the original CMM does not account for risks due to 
equipment inconsistencies; while by nature the model does not provide or support any 
quantitative features to assess safety maturity.  
Further to the CMM, but partially based on it, the U.K. Keil Centre, in a report for the UK 
Health and Safety Executive (Fleming, 2000), developed a Safety Culture Maturity Model 
(SCMM) which focuses exclusively on the assessment of organisational behavioural and 
cultural issues. It expresses the maturity of an organisation in terms of safety as consisting 
of the following ten elements: communication; management commitment and visibility; 
productivity versus safety; learning organisation; safety resources; participation; shared 
perceptions about safety; trust; industrial relations and job satisfaction; and training. It can 
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be observed that these ten elements have great similarities with the individual organisational 
R-PSFs, as listed in the R-PSFs taxonomy. However, although the SCMM may seem 
suitable to the railway industry, its inventor admitted that in its current format it should be 
used as framework to facilitate discussion of safety culture issues rather than as assessment 
tool for organisations’ safety maturity (Fleming, 2000). To date no further evolution of the 
model could be found in the literature. Moreover, the literature (Guldenmund, 2000, 
Sorensen, 2002, Gunderson, 2005, Choudhry et al., 2007) identifies that a consensus has 
yet to be reached on the different aspects of safety maturity. For instance, the United 
Kingdom’s railway safety regulator, the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR), demonstrated their 
belief that a new safety maturity model was needed when they developed their own 
qualitative model, referred to as the Railway Management Maturity Model (RM3) (Ferguson 
and Anderson, 2010). The RM3 assesses safety maturity by evaluating organisations 
management arrangements such as the quality of policies, control and communication, 
planning and implementation, monitoring, audit and review and finally cooperation and 
competence (Office of Rail Regulation, 2011a). However, although highly elegant, the RM3 
is very complex and thus far purely qualitative. On account of those limitations a new 
approach is suggested to assess safety maturity referred to as the safety maturity model 
(SMM).  
5.11.1 The Safety Maturity Model (SMM) 
The Safety Maturity Model is a framework developed for the evaluation of the safety maturity 
of railway organisations. At the time of its development, the model was initially based on 
information and data received by metro organisations, and subsequently adapted to the 
aims of this research. Given the lack of railway specific data, this adaptation is reasonable, 
as the SMM’s main focus is on organisations of safety standards, and not specific types of 
operations. The SMM’s main aim is to introduce railway stakeholders to aspects of 
organisational structures which they may not have  addressed adequately in the past 
(Guldenmund, 2000). Therefore, the SMM aims to address not only the behavioural and/or 
attitudinal culture of organisations, as the SCMM, but also technical, operational and 
methodological elements and actual achievements in terms of safety outcomes. Moreover, 
compared to both the RM3 and SCMM, the SMM supports the quantitative assessment of 
safety maturity.  
The SMM has been developed on the concept of the CMM; hence where possible the level 
definitions of the CMM have been incorporated. However, this was not always found to fit 
Chapter 5     THE RAILWAY PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS TAXONOMY – LITERATURE  
     REVIEW AND INITIAL DEVELOPMENT 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
172 
logically with the overall safety maturity levels in the new model. The new model consists of 
five levels of maturity as illustrated in the Figure 5-4. Its detailed features are described in 
the Appendix V. 
 The SMM aims to assess, on a numerical scale, organisations maturity on the following 
criteria: (i) publication of safety reports, (ii) periodicity of safety monitoring, (iii) prioritisation 
of safety related incidents, (iv) efforts to mitigate risks and avoid incidents, (v) description of 
safety procedures including the registration of hazards and finally, (vi) monitoring of residual 
risks. For its development, a questionnaire (Appendix V) was created based on certain 
factors that have proved to reduce risk, as highlighted by the CMM, SCMM and RM3 
models. The questionnaire was distributed to eleven metro organisations, with the aim of 
testing metros’ safety maturity against their actual performance, as measured by the 
reported number of fatalities and injuries. By definition it is assumed that high safety maturity 
scores if negatively related to actual achievements in terms of safety, would indicate 
organisations with high standards of risk control and safety performance, hence highly 
reliable organisations. 
 
Figure 5-4 The proposed safety maturity model 
For the actual performance of railway organisations, data for precursors7, top events, injuries 
and fatalities from 18 metro organisations were analysed for the period 2002-2009. The 
                                                
7 Precursors refer to events or conditions that may cause top events or indicate that higher levels 
of risk exist (e.g. near misses). Top events indicate serious incidents that may result in injury or 
death (Hirsch, 2006). 
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questions constitute a representative sample testing the characteristics contained in the 
SMM. Functional experts involved in risk management, namely those in the company who 
know most about the reporting procedures, hazard evaluation and development of safety 
policies completed the questionnaires. At this stage of the model’s development, it is 
assumed that the differences in answers to the questions relate primarily to real differences 
in procedures and only in very few cases to variances arising from national cultures or from 
the expert’s imperfect knowledge of their own organisation or attempt to give the 
“appropriate” answer. However, it is yet to be investigated and identified whether such an 
assumption can be reliably tested.  
Each of the questions has the same “weight”, i.e. the same importance. For every question a 
score between 0 and 4 is allotted, where 0 is the "worst" and 4 the "best" scenario. The 
values for assessing the scale are congruent with the levels of the model, as shown in the 
Appendix V. The responses of each participating metro are then scored to determine the 
metro’s aggregate safety maturity level on a scale between 0 and 40. This score is then 
monitored against the metros’ levels of actual performance. That is, the monitored and 
recorded number of precursors, top events, injuries and deaths per million passenger 
journeys. However, due to the fact that not all participants were monitoring the same number 
of precursors, a second test measured whether there is a correlation between safety 
maturity and the numbers of precursors adjusted for the number of missing observations. 
5.11.2 The SMM results for metro organisations 
Initial findings show that the safest railway organisations in terms of safety outputs (low 
injuries and fatalities) achieve the highest maturity scores, while organisations with a 
significant number of injuries are assessed with lower maturity scores. Maturity scores equal 
or higher than 26 indicate organisations that tend to manage risk efficiently. Moreover, 
scores higher than 33 indicate organisations that tend to optimise both their safety standards 
and risk management. On the other hand, safety maturity scores lower than 26 represent 
organisations that should improve their safety standards.  
To define any relationships between safety maturity and organisations safety performance, 
correlation tests were performed. To determine the appropriate test, first the distribution of 
the four variables that express organisations actual performance - precursors, top events, 
injuries and fatalities - was investigated. Data showed that none of the variables satisfy the 
criteria of normality. Therefore, non-parametric correlation tests should be conducted. For 
this, the Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho statistics, which both use the ranking of data to 
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calculate correlation coefficients, could be applied. However, although the two coefficients 
are equivalent, there is much reason to indicate that Kendall’s statistic is a better estimate of 
the correlation in relative small samples (Field, 2009, p.186); hence, it was chosen in this 
case8.  
The value of Kendall’s tau, !, coefficient lies between -1 and 1. Its sign represents the 
direction of the relationship between the two variables (either positive or negative) whilst its 
absolute value reflects the strength of the relationship. The higher the value of ! the stronger 
the agreement between the two variables, while 0 value indicates that the two variables are 
completely independent (Field, 2009). Kendall tau is expressed by: 
! ! !! !!!!!! ! !!! ! ! !!! !!!       (5-1) 
where, S represents the number c of concordant pairs minus the number d of discordant 
pairs within the n sample of observations. For a pair of bivariate observations (Xi,Yi) and 
(Xj,Yj), if (Xj -Xi) and (Yj - Yi) have the same sign (i.e. both positive), then that pair is 
concordant, while if they have opposite signs the pair is considered discordant (Nelsen, 
n.d.). 
The performed statistical test showed only one significant correlation (Table 5-5, Figure 5-5). 
The significant relationship is found between the maturity score and the number of recorded 
injuries. In the surveyed sample, the maturity score was appreciably negatively correlated 
(! ! -.357, p<.01) with the total number of injuries. This indicates that the higher the maturity 
score of metros, the lower the number of the recorded injuries.  
                                                
8 Results in Table 5-5, however, show that similar findings are derived even if Spearman’s rho 
correlation coefficient was used.  
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Figure 5-5 Maturity score versus reported injuries 
Although correlation is not causality, it may be postulated that the characteristics that lead to 
a higher maturity index would be likely also to lead to a safer metro performance. It is 
noteworthy that data for the number of injuries is more likely to be accurate than for 
precursors or top events. This is explained because monitoring injuries is a legal 
requirement in most countries, as noted in Chapter 3.  
On the other hand, data show that no correlation is identified between the maturity score and 
precursors, top events or fatalities. For the precursors and top events, this is explained due 
to the fact that not all metros monitor the same number of precursors and top events. 
Regarding fatalities, the very small number of observations across all metros could not lead 
to any useful findings. However, observations of metro behaviour over the years indicate 
that the more safety-conscious metros tend to record more accident precursors and top 
events and do so more rigorously, compared to less mature organisations. 
To adjust for metros that did not provide a full set of precursors data, the number of 
precursors that metros could observe was calculated based on the Equation 5-2:  
!! ! !! !!"#     (5-2) 
where, PA is the adjusted number of precursors, P is the number of precursors observed for 
a specific year, O is the number of observations (including months with zero incidents) and 
Omax is the number of maximum observations (listed precursors ! 12) for that year. 
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Table 5-5 Correlations between maturity score and recorded variables 
Maturity Score 
Variables 
Kendall’s tau 
correlation 
coefficient 
Statistical 
significance at 99% 
confidence level 
Spearman’s 
rho correlation 
coefficient 
Statistical 
significance at 99% 
confidence level 
Precursors -.156 .146 -.210 .157 
Adjusted Precursors -.130 .234 -.173 .256 
Top Events .092 .425 .076 .638 
Injuries -.357 .001 -.492 .001 
Fatalities .002 .987 .002 .992 
where, precursors sample equals to 45, top events sample equals to 41,  
injuries sample equals to 43, fatalities sample equals to 30,  
However, even after the adjustment, results indicate no significant correlation between 
maturity score and adjusted precursors. Subsequently, for both the monitoring of precursors 
and top events reliability considerations arose. Despite many efforts made to collect data 
with a similar degree of rigour across all metros, results verify that the safety-conscious 
metros are more objective than others in monitoring and registering them. Subsequently, 
having reviewed the relationships between safety maturity and organisations actual safety 
performance, it can be claimed that if an organisation has high safety maturity score then 
any data, which have been by law reported, derived by this organisation can be considered 
trustable and reliable for further analysis.  
5.12 Summary 
This chapter has presented the framework for the development of the R-PSFs taxonomy. To 
do so, a literature review of five existing railway PSF taxonomies was first conducted. The 
findings of the review were then augmented with the results of eleven additional PSF 
taxonomies from well-known and widely implemented techniques. These identified factors 
were tested for overlap and then compared with the hierarchical task analysis of railway 
operators outlined in Chapter 2. This resulted in a list of 43 factors divided into seven main 
categories, based upon their common characteristics. For each category and factor, specific 
definitions have been provided and examples are given. This R-PSF taxonomy will be 
validated using the analysis of 479 accident and incident reports gathered from several 
railway stakeholders worldwide. Therefore this chapter has addressed a major limitation of 
existing railway PSF taxonomies. 
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The latter part of this chapter also introduced a safety maturity model (SMM), which provides 
a novel approach to assessing (i) the safety levels of railway organisations and (ii) the 
quality of their reporting systems. This SMM was tested using safety data from a number of 
metro railways around the world. It is also implemented for the purposes of this thesis to 
assess the safety maturity of the organisations that provided data to this research, and 
subsequently the quality of such data.   
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Chapter 6 THE RAILWAY PERFORMANCE SHAPING 
FACTORS TAXONOMY – CONSOLIDATION, RESULTS AND 
ANALYSIS 
The previous chapter presented the process for the development and validation of the 
Railway-Performance Shaping Factors (R-PSFs) taxonomy. This chapter consolidates this 
taxonomy by analysing 479 accident and incident reports. The credibility of the organisations 
that provided this accident and incident data is first examined using the SMM, as presented 
in the previous chapter. This is followed by the demonstration of data extraction from the 
investigation reports using the R-PSF taxonomy. The review of the initial dataset is then 
presented, while the validation of the results with subject matter experts is also detailed. The 
rest of the chapter presents the analysis of the accident and incident data and interprets the 
findings. 
6.1 Credential assessment of railway organisations 
As described in Section 5.10.8, credential in this thesis is considered as relevant quality 
criterion only for data obtained from railway undertakings and infrastructure managers. In 
this research only two data sets were not derived from NTSBs or NIBs. One of them was 
derived from an integrated company and the other from an infrastructure manager. To 
assess the reliability of the obtained data, the SMM framework is used. In the previous 
section it was stated that if data, which have been by legislation recorded, were derived by 
highly mature organisations, then this data can be considered reliable. The reports obtained 
from both organisations meet the requirements of mandatory reporting. Thus, the estimation 
of their maturity score would, or not, provide confidence with respect to the reliability of data. 
As it is shown in the Figure 6-1, both organisations maturity score is higher than 30. This 
suggests that the level of trust for those railway companies should be considered high. 
Hence, the derived data can be claimed to be reliable and expedient for further analysis.  
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Figure 6-1 Maturity scores of the integrated company and infrastructure manager 
In addition to the SMM findings, the literature (Valonen, 2000) also confirms the reliability of 
the collected reports. In his study, Valonen (2000) shows that the reporting system in the 
countries where the selected reports were completed, despite any limitations, is effective; 
hence it can be further suggested that those reports contain reliable information, sufficient to 
extract accurate outcomes.  
Having determined the quality of selected reports, before presenting any data analysis, it is 
shown in the next section how the minimum requirements of a typical report were extracted.  
6.2 Extracting information from investigation reports 
The report presented in this section describes an occurrence at Hanger Lane junction 
investigated by the Rail Accident Investigation Board (RAIB). Part of the report is provided in 
the Appendix VI, while the full report is accessible online (Rail Accident Investigation Board, 
2009). The report comprises four main parts: (i) executive summary, (ii) factual information 
of the event, (iii) detailed analysis and (iv) conclusions and recommendations.  
Firstly, the executive summary describes briefly the sequence of events that led to the 
occurrence, while it also indicates the immediate cause, the causal and contributory factors 
and any underlying causes. For each of the reports, the author firstly reviewed the executive 
summary, to confirm whether the report is relevant to the research and if this was the case, 
to obtain substantial information regarding the event, e.g. location, time of event, involved 
personnel.  
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For this particular case, a potential collision between two trains is described, which was 
caused by the wrong instructions given by the responsible signaller. The event took place 
within the area of responsibility of Earls Court Control Room, which supervises the services 
of the west end of Piccadilly and District lines operations. After a District Line train passed a 
signal at danger (SPAD), the responsible signaller while trying to resolve the incident as 
soon as possible to avoid any severe delays on the network, authorised the train to proceed 
towards a junction; however, he overlooked the presence of another train resulting to a near 
miss and potential collision between the two trains. 
The immediate cause of the event was the signaller’s wrong authorisation to the train to 
proceed towards a junction before ensuring that the move is safe. Two were the causal 
factors for such occurrence. The first, that the District Line train had a SPAD. However this 
event, if isolated, would not have caused any safety concerns apart from potential delays on 
the network, therefore was not in detail investigated in the report (§99-102, Appendix VI). 
The second and most important causal factor was that the signaller did not halt all trains in 
the vicinity before giving to the District Line train authorisation to proceed.  
In addition to the immediate cause and causal factors, the executive summary clearly states 
a number of factors that contributed to the occurrence. That is, signaller’s workload, time 
pressure and fitness for duty, communication arrangements, design of the system, quality of 
procedures and training methods (highlighted in Appendix VI). Subsequently, seven R-PSFs 
were identified, covering almost all R-PSFs categories listed in the Table 5-3. 
However, although the executive summary provides a constructive illustration of the event, if 
researchers had only reviewed the summary section, they would have missed at least three 
additional factors that significantly contributed to the occurrence. As stated, signaller’s 
workload was identified as contributing factor to the event. In the summary, it is also written 
that this caused “as he was operating two control desks during the incident”, but no further 
information is provided. However, in the analysis part of the report it is mentioned that the 
signaller was operating on two control desks, as it was common process within the control 
centre in order for two signallers to take their meal breaks at the same time (§33, in 
Appendix VI). According to the given definitions for the R-PSFs, this is an issue of 
compromised safety culture, since it directly affects the safety of the operations. In addition, 
it is clearly indicated in the report that signaller was distracted since he was in charge of two 
control desks (§109) and subsequently forgot that a second train was moving towards the 
junction. Finally, the analysis indicates limitations concerning the context of the course that 
the signaller attended to refresh his skills. This, again based on the given definitions, is 
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related to the supervision provided to the signallers. Table 6-1 demonstrates the extracted 
from the report information for the analysis.  
Table 6-1 Information extracted from investigation reports (refer to Appendix VI) 
Occurrence type Type of railway Year Date  
! Near miss (title) ! Metros (§6,7) ! 2009 (§6) ! 27 March (§6) 
Location Area Time Responsibility 
! Hanger Lane junction (§6, 
20,21) ! London (§6)  
! 5:26 pm, (§7)  
! (sunset 6:26pm) 
! Signaller (§8), 
! 10 years of experience, 
instructor for new 
signallers (§80) 
Description  Immediate cause Causal factors PSFs (contributing factors) 
! Eastbound District Line 
train 103 passed signal 
WM1 at danger at low 
speed (§6) 
! Signaller authorised train 
operator to proceed across 
junction (§7) 
! The same time westbound 
Piccadilly train crossed the 
junction creating potential 
for collision. Signaller 
overlooked the presence of 
this train and been unable 
to contact train operator of 
103 train once became 
aware of the situation (§7) 
! Signaller gave 
approval to train 
103 to proceed 
towards Hanger 
Lane junction 
before it was safe to 
do so (§8) 
! Wrong track 
authorisation 
! Signaller did not 
bring all trains to 
a halt (§9) 
! Signaller was 
taking 
prescribed 
medication (§9) 
! Time pressure (§11) 
! Workload (§11,33) 
! Communication 
(§11,103) 
! System design (§12, 
116,117) 
! Quality of procedures 
(§12) 
! Supervision (§81,123) 
! Fit to work (§10,110) 
! Distraction (§109) 
! Safety culture (§33) 
! Training (§12,14,81) 
Feature of the system Consequences 
! Signalling information (§25-27) 
! Train information (§23,24) 
! System design further information (§116,117) 
! No injuries or material damage  
Recommendations 
! Guidance should be provided to assist signallers in 
dealing with similar incidents 
! Use of simulation techniques during training  
! Training of safety critical communication skills 
! Issuing of medical advice to managers 
Having presented how the necessary information were extracted from the relevant 
investigation reports, the next sections detail the validation of the R-PSFs taxonomy based 
on real data and the consultation with SMEs. 
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6.3 Review of initial dataset 
As shown in Figure 5-2, initially, 192 accident and incident railway reports were reviewed, 
gathered from the European Railway Agency Database of Interoperability and Safety 
(ERADIS), the Swiss Federal Railways (SBB) and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
(ATSB). The aim of the analysis is to enhance the results from the literature, to identify 
whether any factors should be added, replaced or removed, and to indicate the 
dependencies between the factors including in the R-PSFs taxonomy. Therefore the 
analysis focused primarily on extracting the relevant to the occurrences R-PSFs. To further 
verify the findings an expert’s elicitation assessment was then conducted in collaboration 
with the Swiss Federal Railways (SBB). 
6.3.1 Identification of R-PSFs from reports  
The first set of data includes 105 reports (23 serious accidents, 46 accidents, 36 incidents) 
from the ERADIS database, 69 reports (6 serious accidents, 45 accidents, 18 incidents) from 
the SBB, and 18 reports (2 serious accidents, 6 accidents, 10 incidents) from the ATSB for 
the period 1997-2011. The sources of the reports represent many of the situations 
experienced in railway operations, for example, different types of networks, varying 
geography (Australia and Switzerland), different regulations, and different staffing (two 
drivers on the Australian trains instead of one on most European trains). Therefore, it can be 
argued that the sampled data are representative of the population of interest, to confirm the 
completeness of the identified from the literature R-PSFs taxonomy. Based on the given 
definitions (Appendix IV), 597 R-PSFs were finally extracted, as follows: 172 R-PSFs refer to 
incidents, 272 to accidents and 153 to serious accidents. That is approximately 1.5 R-PSFs 
per incident report, 3 per accident and 5 per serious accident report. The identified R-PSFs 
per type of event are illustrated in the Figure 6-2.  
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Figure 6-2 The identified R- PSFs per type of event from the initial set of reports 
At first glance it is observed that no additional R-PSFs compared to those identified from the 
literature were either extracted or implied in the reports. Therefore, confidence is gained that 
the suggested list of 43 R-PSFs is representative for railway operations. However, it can be 
also observed that the extracted factors do not include all the factors that are contained in 
the R-PSFs taxonomy. In particular, 11 out of 43 factors were not found within the reports. 
These are: (i) individual characteristics and motivation (personal factors); (ii) monotony, task 
complexity and task instructions (task factors); (iii) relations within the team (team factors); 
and (iv) communication within organisation, fit to work aspect, incentives for employees, 
leadership and relation within organisation (organisational factors). The non-identified factors 
could be further classified into two main categories. The first includes the factors: individual 
characteristics, leadership, task complexity, task instructions and monotony. This category 
can be assumed to represent those factors that were not identified simply because no 
occurrence was related to them. For the remainder non-observed factors, however, such 
assumption may not be accurate. In contrast, it is likely to represent cases that are difficult to 
be identified within the investigation process as these factors are, by nature, implied or 
hidden; therefore it is not straightforward for them to be identified either by inexperienced 
investigators or by an investigation process that does not consider for such factors. On 
account of this, the author instigated further whether the unidentified factors were reported in 
the additional reports and secondly pointed out the significance of those factors to railway 
organisations.  
In addition, findings show that not all factors have been equally identified within the reports. 
In other words, it is rather likely that not all factors have the same significance with respect 
to their influence on human performance and subsequently to safety of railway operations. 
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Therefore, the Pareto principle (Backbaus, 1980), which shows that the majority of the 
results come from a minority of inputs on an 80-20 basis, was applied to determine those R-
PSFs that most frequently occur considering the severity of their consequences. For this, 
factors with common characteristics were first combined, in order to capture as many cases 
as possible. Subsequently, 17 combined R-PSFs (Table 6-2) were identified as responsible 
for more than 85% of the occurrences. In addition to them, stress was also incorporated as it 
was identified in most of the reviewed taxonomies. 
Table 6-2 The most frequent identified R-PSFs from the first set of reports 
R-PSF Category R-PSF Category 
Distraction – Loss of Concentration DP Experience – Familiarity P 
Expectation – Routine DP, T Time pressure (time to respond) T 
Communication  Te Fit to work – Health P, O 
Safety culture – SMS O Workload  T 
Training – Competence P, O Supervision O 
Perception DP Teamwork  Te 
Quality of procedures O Weather conditions – Visibility E 
System design – HMI  S Stress  DP 
Fatigue (sleep lack, shift pattern) DP, O Situational awareness DP 
DP: Dynamic personal, E: Environmental, P: Personal, T: Task,  
Te: Team, O: Organisational, S: System 
This shorter list of factors was then compared against the complete list of R-PSFS by SMEs 
to indicate if any modifications are required, regarding the factors considered of higher 
importance for human performance.  
6.3.2 Validation and assessment with SMEs  
To confirm that no significant R-PSF is missing from the suggested list of factors, a study 
was conducted in collaboration with a widely recognised European railway organisation, the 
Swiss Federal Railways (SBB).  
In the study, 18 SBB employees participated including 2 risk analysts, 3 passenger train 
drivers, 6 freight train drivers and 6 signallers. All employees have at least seven years of 
operational experience in their current position (µ=9.35, sd=7.09) and eight within the SBB 
organisation (µ=18.76, sd=9.18), while their average age is 42 years old (sd=9.45). It should 
be also noted that train drivers are dedicated either to passenger or freight trains. The SMEs 
were asked to mark if any of the 18 identified factors should either be replaced by any of the 
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remainder R-PSFs or removed from the list. None of the SMEs replaced any of the R-PSFs 
in the list; on the contrary they underpinned that these are the factors that predominantly 
affect their performance. However, recommendations were given for removing factors, as 
well as for changing some of the fusions of factors on the list. For instance, it was suggested 
to incorporate the factor experience with training instead of familiarity as, based on the 
definitions, such a combination was deemed more compatible. Similar, it was proposed that 
the factor familiarity should be combined with the factors expectation and routine. 
Furthermore, it was recommended to unite the factors workload and stress, as well as the 
factors fatigue and fit to work. It was suggested, finally, to remove the factor weather 
conditions; nevertheless, it was highlighted the importance of asking operators to express 
their general opinion of the influence of adverse and intermediate weather conditions on 
their performance.  
Having confirmed that the majority of the most significant R-PSFs were captured, the study 
was also used to indicate whether the frequency of the extracted from the reports R-PSFs 
matches to how SMEs rank those factors with respect to how they influence their 
performance. As such influence may change for different tasks or operational scenarios; the 
assessment was associated with particular tasks and operational scenarios. Hence, a 
preliminary analysis based on the gathered reports was conducted. The analysis focused on 
identifying the factors that affect the types of operators, to test the hypothesis of 
independency between the factors and operators and finally to determine the most frequent 
and severe events with respect to responsible personnel. The Figure 6-3 shows the 
identified factors per type of employee, as extracted from the reports.  
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Figure 6-3 Most frequently identified R- PSFs per type of operator 
If the hypothesis of independency is true, the difference {nij - µij} should be small. In contrast, 
the larger the difference  {nij - µij}, the stronger the evidence against the null hypothesis, in 
which case the two variables are deemed “associated” with each other (Agresti, 2007). The 
Pearson’s chi-squared statistic is calculated as: 
!! ! !!"!!!" !!!!       (6-1) 
where, nij and µij are the observed and expected frequencies, and i and j represent rows and 
columns in the contingency tables respectively (Field, 2009). The test requires that less than 
20% of the cells in such tables should have expected frequencies below 5, while no single 
expected frequency should be lower than unity. However, if expected frequencies are too 
low, usually the case when samples are small, Fisher’s exact test is used (Field, 2009). This 
is a method for computing the exact probability based on the hypergeometric distribution of 
cell counts (Agresti, 2007).  
To run the tests, as well as any statistical tests in this research, the statistical package IBM 
SPSS Statistics 19.0.0 has been used. For both variables, the type of operators and the 
identified R-PSFs, clustering of categories was needed to avoid cell frequencies less than 
five and/or null. For instance, the signallers-controllers category was formed from the union 
of signallers and controllers. Similarly, the category locomotive running solo drivers and 
engineering train drivers formed the category locomotive-engineering drivers. Metro and 
tram drivers were neglected due to their limited representation. Regarding the R-PSFs the 
eighteen most common factors were used to satisfy both requirements of Pearson’s chi-
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squared test. Within those factors, workload and stress were united, as well as fatigue, fit to 
work and shift pattern. In contrast, weather conditions were not taken into account.  
Results indicate that there is a significant association between the type of identified R-PSFs 
and the types of operators, if these are divided into train drivers and signallers-controllers 
(!2(14)9=81.671, p<.001), e.g. communication related errors are more typical for signallers. 
Furthermore, association was observed between the different types of drivers (passenger, 
freight and locomotive) and R-PSFs (!2(28)=28.503, p<.05), e.g. fatigue affects primarily the 
freight train drivers. However, no association was identified between the different types of 
passenger (long-distance and regional) train drivers and R-PSFs (!2(14)=48.624, p>.05). 
Therefore, the category passenger train drives was also formed, including those two types of 
drivers. Finally, from the collected reports no variation was identified concerning the 
frequency of the severity of events.  
Based on the outcomes, it was decided in cooperation with the SBB risk analysts to define 
four scenarios deemed to be of great importance for the railway industry. Three of them are 
related to train drivers, while the remaining to signallers, as follows:  
1. Scenario 1: Long-distance passenger train derails due to excessive speed. 
2. Scenario 2: Regional passenger train passes a signal at danger although the driver 
was aware of it. 
3. Scenario 3: Freight train passes signal at danger because of the wrong interpretation 
by the driver. 
4. Scenario 4: During a shunting operation a shunter engine collides with a commercial 
train as the result of a signaller error. 
The scenarios contain information, such as the type of train and occurrence; responsible and 
involved personnel; system information, for instance, technical failures; weather conditions; 
operator’s level of experience; location and time of the event. All scenarios were then refined 
and checked for their simplicity, clarity and accuracy with the SBB risk analysts and the 
Organisation, Work and Technology Group of ETH Zurich and subsequently a questionnaire 
was created, which can be found in Appendix VII. For the R-PSFs assessment no alterations 
with respect to the initial list of 18 factors was made. Subsequently, the questionnaire was 
distributed to the SMEs, who assessed the factors on a scale of 1 to 18, ranging from most 
                                                
9 The number in parenthesis indicates the degrees of freedom for the statistic, which is 
calculated as (i-1)!(j-1), where i is the number of rows and j is the number of columns in the 
contingency table. 
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(indicated with 1) to least (indicated with 18) important for each factor. The assessment was 
conducted on an individual basis, apart from one case in which two participants completed 
one ranking assessment together. Participants ranked the R-PSFs by employee and primary 
cause, as included in the four scenarios. The author’s physical presence when 10 out of 18 
participants assessed the ranking, together with videocall contact with the rest, assured the 
validity of the responses in relation to any misunderstandings or vagueness experienced by 
the participants. 
Due to the ordinal nature of responses, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test (McCrum-
Gardner, 2008) was applied to test the null hypothesis whereby the distributions of R-PSFs 
ranking across k experimental conditions (i.e. types of operators) were the same for each of 
the scenarios. For this test, observations for all groups are jointly sorted, ranked and then 
scored from lowest to highest, while the group to which each score belongs is ignored. The 
sum of ranks Ri and the number of observations ni for each group is then derived. For a 
sample of size N, the test statistic, H, is calculated as: 
! ! !"! !!! !!!!!!!!! ! ! ! ! !     (6-2) 
where H satisfies the chi-square distribution with (k-1) degrees of freedom (Field, 2009). 
Results for all scenarios (Table 6-3), show that the types of operators do not affect the 
ranking of R-PSFs, since p>.05 (Field, 2009).  
Table 6-3 Test for differences between different types of operators for R-PSFs rankings  
R-PSFs 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
H(3) p H(3) p H(3) p H(3) p 
Communication 3.944 .268 3.297 .348 0.199 .978 0.927 .819 
Distraction - Loss of 
concentration 
2.189 .534 1.720 .632 0.165 .983 1.193 .755 
Expectation - Routine 1.970 .579 4.051 .256 0.939 .816 2.748 .432 
Experience - Familiarity 1.192 .755 3.534 .316 1.380 .710 1.390 .708 
Fatigue (sleep lack, shift 
pattern) 
0.897 .826 5.212 .157 4.623 .202 3.301 .347 
Fit to work - Health 3.006 .391 3.154 .369 1.441 .696 0.984 .805 
Perception 1.640 .650 3.633 .304 7.854 .049 6.447 .092 
Quality of procedures 5.905 .116 2.557 .465 4.213 .239 2.517 .472 
Safety culture - SMS 4.553 .208 2.978 .395 5.943 .114 3.872 .276 
Situational awareness 4.659 .199 2.794 .424 3.967 .265 8.954 .065 
Stress 0.479 .923 0.660 .883 0.924 .820 5.921 .116 
Supervision 1.944 .584 0.415 .937 2.040 .564 2.397 .494 
System design - HMI 1.004 .800 6.663 .083 4.989 .173 5.423 .143 
Teamwork 4.256 .246 4.471 .215 3.873 .275 5.280 .152 
Time pressure  (time to 
respond) 
0.812 .847 4.829 .185 0.420 .936 6.569 .087 
Traini g - Competence 4.400 .221 4.257 .235 2.060 .560 4.423 .219 
Weather conditions - 
Visibility 
3.824 .281 4.149 .246 4.012 .260 1.506 .681 
Workload 5.132 .162 3.275 .351 3.336 .343 3.656 .301 
Grouping variable: Types of operators 
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As R-PSFs rankings do not differ per group data were aggregated. A four-scale range was 
then created to indicate the importance of R-PSFs on human performance, as follows: (i) 1-
4, very important, (ii) 5-9, important, (iii) 10-14, relatively important and (iv) 15-18, less 
important. Results from assessment confirm in most of the cases the findings from reports, 
as shown in Table 6-4. Five of the presented R-PSFs were identified from reports as too 
frequent (Figure 6-2), while workload and stress illustrate a noticeable contradiction between 
reports and assessment results. Table 6-4 contains the following information: the four 
scenarios, findings for seven R-PSFs, and their rankings as identified from the reports, the 
percentage of SBB employees’ common responses (first figure in column), and the 
corresponding range of these responses (in parentheses). 
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Table 6-4 R-PSFs assessment per scenario 
R-PSFs assessment 
 
2*. Distraction 
 
1. Safety culture –
SMS  4. Communication  
9. Expectation – 
Routine 18. Workload 7. Training 30. Stress 
 
Scenario 1 
86.4% (1)  1-4 (2) 24.63%  1-4 
6.25%  1-4  
52.94%  1-5 70.59% >6 52.94%  10-14 35.3%  2-5 
75.00% 15-18 
Scenario 2 
76.47%  1-4 35.29%  1-4 
11.76%  1-4 
52.94%  1-5 70.51% >6 58.82%  10-14 29.4%  2-5 
52.94%  15-18 
Scenario 3 
76.47%  1-4 11.76%  1-4 
11.76%  1-4 
52.94%  1-5 76.47% >6 64.71%  10-14 29.4%  2-5 
70.59% 15-18 
Scenario 4 
52.94%  1-4 52.94%  1-4 
52.94%  1-4 
47.06%  1-5 70.59%  3-6 52.94%  10-14 70.6%  2-5 
17.65% 15-18 
* indicates the ranking of R-PSFs based on the reports findings 
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Considering the example of distraction - loss of concentration, which was identified as the 
second most frequent R-PSF from the reports. The assessment of SBB employees shows 
that for the train driver scenarios, more than 75% of employees identify this particular R-PSF 
as the most significant (range 1–4) and at least 50% believe the same for the fourth 
scenario. The rest of the R-PSFs are illustrated accordingly, in particular, as follows: 
• Regardless the network or the operation, distraction–loss of concentration has been 
determined to be very significant, which strongly justifies the findings from reports. 
• Safety culture - SMS is found a significant factor for signallers but not equally 
important for drivers, which strongly contradicts the results from the reports, as 
shown in Figure 6-3. Although safety culture should be equally important for all types 
of employees and operations, it is possible that the observed difference is due to the 
given definition, which includes the cases of disregarded procedures. For the 
selected scenarios, SMEs believe that it is extremely important for signallers to 
comply with given procedures in order to keep the operation safe and secure; whilst 
they did not seem to consider that train drivers may disregard relevant procedures.  
• Communication between employees was assessed as important contributor R-PSF 
for signallers, which confirms the analysis findings. 
• Workload is an essential PSF for signallers but not for train drivers, which again 
justifies the results in Figure 6-3. 
• Although training (lack of or inadequate) was identified as a fairly substantial R-PSF 
from the analysis, this was not confirmed from the assessors. It is possible that the 
participants assumed or considered that rail operators have sufficient training to 
execute their tasks, whereas it cannot be neglected the fact that within the 
investigation reports it is very often mentioned the factor training, as considered a 
tangible factor to assess performance.   
• Finally, stress was identified from assessors as a serious R-PSF contributor for 
signallers, but not for drivers. However, within the reports stress was barely 
identified. Subsequently, it is likely that, again, the reporting system does not provide 
direct information about this R-PSF, so researchers have to assume its existence. 
6.3.3 Dependencies amongst the R-PSFs 
Further to the validation of factors included in the R-PSFs taxonomy, the dependencies 
amongst factors were also investigated. At first glance, the identified factors reveal possible 
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interactions as indicated by the R-PSFs structure in Figure 5-3. A poorly designed display 
(i.e. HMI), for instance, as well as inadequate knowledge of system modes (i.e. inadequate 
training) in addition to a preoccupied operator (i.e. distraction) may lead to delayed failure 
detection, e.g. signal failure or braking failure and subsequently increase the likelihood of an 
occurrence due to an operational error. Similarly, stress as a dynamic personal factor cannot 
be independent of workload. If an operator deals with increased levels of traffic or delays, it 
is reasonable to assume that stress levels will be higher (Subotic, 2007). The analysis of 
interactions makes it possible to gain a more accurate picture of the context and thus a 
better understanding of the operational errors due to degraded human performance.  
The problem of interactions between PSFs has been addressed in the literature, but not 
extensively. Sträter (2000) tackles the issue by looking at the common appearance of 
different factors. The analysis is based on capturing the observed interactions between the 
reported PSFs. The availability of a detailed database is, however, a requirement for this 
approach. Hollnagel (1998), in contrast, establishes the interactions between the contextual 
conditions in CREAM by considering each one with respect to how it generally influences the 
others (there is no information however whether expert judgment or operational expertise 
have been used) (Subotic, 2007). Finally, Gertman et al. (2004), address the problem by 
adapting the existing THERP dependency assignment using a zero to compete dependency 
rating system.  
In this research, the dependencies amongst R-PSFs were investigated and determined in 
three stages. In the first, the interactions were identified based on known relationships from 
operational experience, as indicated in railway operational manuals (Network Rail, 2008a, 
Network Rail, 2008b, Network Rail, 2008c) and task analyses (presented in Chapter 2). The 
determined interactions are marked with the symbol “!” in Table 6-5. They represent the 
irreversible influence between two R-PSFs or how R-PSFs in the left hand column affect the 
R-PSFs in the row. The reason for irreversible influence lies in the characteristics of the 
railway system where one factor may influence the other one without any reverse effect. For 
example, complex traffic, simultaneous train manoeuvres and authorisations to trains to 
proceed could affect signallers’ capabilities in terms of increased stress, and workload; 
whilst the opposite influence (impact of stress on traffic complexity) is simply not logical.  
The second and third stages were performed to validate the identified dependencies. In the 
second stage, the dependencies were specified as found from the reports analysis and 
marked with “(a)”, whilst in the third stage the SBB SMEs were asked to indicate on a blank 
matrix sheet (part two of Appendix VII) how they perceive the interactions between factors. 
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Their input was then incorporated in Table 6-5 and marked with “(b)”. However, as the 
complete list of 43 R-PSFs creates a complex matrix of dependencies, which requires 
extensive time to be completed, it was decided to ask SMEs to indicate only the 
dependencies amongst the most frequent identified R-PSFs. These dependencies are 
illustrated in Table 6-5, where 95.23% (220/231) of the interactions have been validated by 
SMEs and 62.77% (145/231) from the reports. 
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Table 6-5 Dependencies amongst R-PSFs  
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Based on the dependencies between R-PSFs, the network of dependencies amongst the R-
PSFs categories is developed, as illustrated in Figure 6-4. Dependency between two 
categories is established when at least one R-PSF included in one of the two categories has 
an influence or is influenced by at least one factor of the second category, e.g. familiarity on 
distraction. These types of dependencies are considered outer. In addition to them, also a 
number of inner dependencies are also established. Inner dependencies indicate that within 
the same category at least one factor has an influence or is influenced by another factor, 
e.g. fatigue on distraction. 
 
Figure 6-4 The network of interdependences between the categories of R-PSFs 
6.3.4 Discussion of findings 
The review of the first set of reports was conducted primarily to confirm that the list of the R-
PSFs identified from the literature is complete and represents the majority of factors that 
affect the performance of railway operators. The results give confidence with respect to the 
completeness of the taxonomy; however they also show that factors are not equally 
identified on railway occurrences. Thus, based on the severity of occurrences, a set of 18 R-
PSFs was established which includes those factors that mostly affect the performance of 
operators and subsequently the network in terms of safety. In turn, SMEs were asked to 
indicate the importance of those R-PSFs on human performance so as to compare (justify) 
the findings from reports with the opinion of specialists. Findings indicate that although for 
many R-PSFs the responses of SMEs were different, the range of such difference was 
marginal; subsequently in most of the cases the findings from reports are in general 
agreement with the perception of operators. In addition, the SMEs provided 
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recommendations with regard to how the list of the 18 factors could be changed so as to be 
more representative, capture additional occurrences and become more flexible. Finally, the 
problem of R-PSFs interactions was addressed and the dependencies between them 
established. 
However, although the factors and their dependencies were validated, the analysis did not 
take into account certain variables that may be associated with the existence of particular R-
PSFs. Such variables include, amongst others, the location of events, e.g. open line, the 
operational conditions, e.g. normal or degraded, the on board and infrastructure safety and 
protection systems, e.g. TPWS or the time of the event. Additionally, the immediate causes 
and associated events of the occurrences, e.g. signal passed at a danger, should be 
considered. Especially, since it is likely that specific causes are to be associated with certain 
R-PSFs (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b).  
The aim of this thesis is to introduce a R-PSFs taxonomy that represents and can be 
implemented within a broader context of operations. Therefore, additional reports were 
gathered and incorporated to the first set of reports. Analysis of all reports was performed 
aiming at: (i) extracting those R-PSFs that most frequently are involved in railway 
occurrences in a broader operational context, (ii) defining any relationships between the 
factors identified in (i) and the different types of events, (iii) indicating associations between 
the factors found in (i) and the variables that constitute the overall context of railway 
occurrences, (iii) determining any higher-order interactions amongst more than two 
associated variables, where the two of them are always the type of event and R-PSFs, e.g. 
type of event – R-PSFs – variable 1, and (iv) generating predictions for the types of events 
with respect to the contributing R-PSFs, as found in (i). Figure 6-5 shows the framework for 
the analysis.  
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Figure 6-5 The methodology for the analysis of the occurrences  
6.4 Analysis of the complete dataset  
The complete review embraces 479 reports (287 in addition to the initial 192). Similar to the 
first set of analysis, the sources of the reports represent the majority of the situations 
experienced in railway operations. These include the different operations, for example, in the 
US where the majority of operations is freight, varying geography, e.g. the U.K. and 
Switzerland, and different regulations or staffing. In addition to the databases of Section 6.3, 
the supplementary reports have been obtained from the: French Land Transport Accident 
Investigation Bureau (BEA-TT), Canadian Transport Safety Board (CTSB), Dutch Safety 
Board (DSB), Finnish Safety Investigation Authority (SIA), U.K. Network Rail, Norwegian 
Accident Investigation Board (AIBN), U.K. Rail Accident Investigation Branch, Irish Railway 
Accident Investigation Unit (RAIU), Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK) and U.S. 
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National Transport Safety Board (NTSB). Therefore, the sampled data can be argued to be 
representative of the population of interest and thus, suitable for a detailed analysis of the 
variables that affect railway safety in developed countries with well-established railway 
networks. The purpose of the analysis is to deliver information that can be used within a 
more generic context, incorporating all possible sources of information. Hence, as all reports 
satisfy the quality criteria, it is assumed that all have been derived from the same source and 
are treated accordingly. It does not compare the safety levels of the countries the reports 
originate from. 
The analysis consists of 5 steps. In the first, the necessary information is extracted from 
reports, as described in Section 6.2. For this a master file, which contains all the data, is 
created. Based on the extracted information, step two involves a preliminary descriptive 
analysis of the data. This includes the frequencies of the different types of accidents, R-
PSFs and all relevant variables that are associated with railway accidents. However, due to 
the unequal representation of several variables, clustering of the variables (except the R-
PSFs) is performed in step two to enable further analysis. 
The clustering of the R-PSFs is undertaken in step 3, based on the findings from the first set 
of analysis and the recommendations of the SMEs. Subsequently, the most important R-
PSFs that affect human performance in railway operations are established, which account 
for more than 90% of railway occurrences, regardless the severity of the event. Step four 
examines the associations between the variables that describe railway occurrences. The 
predictions based on past data are generated in step 5. Based on the findings, the broad 
applicability of the R-PSFs taxonomy is confirmed. The factors that should be acknowledged 
within the investigation process are determined. And the most significant factors that should 
be further studied in order to assess human performance in railway operations are 
established. 
6.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The reports, as shown in Figure 6-6, were initially classified into 70 serious accidents (47 
fatal), 189 accidents and 220 incidents, based on the ERA definitions (Section 3.2.1). Since 
raw data were categorised by each source, when migrated according to the EU definitions, 
changes in the classification are observed, e.g. US incident reports are now indicated as 
accidents. Subsequently, the lack of events for particular data sources is explained by such 
migration.  
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Figure 6-6 Type of collected reports per country of origin 
Based on the information extracted from the reports (see Table 6-1) the set of relevant 
variables for the reference database was determined. Such variables are in agreement with 
the type of safety data collected by the FRA, ERA, CTSB, ATSB and the majority of railway 
national safety and investigation bodies, e.g. the U.K. RSSB and the Norwegian JBV. 
Subsequently, the events were also classified based on the: time and month of occurrence, 
responsible personnel, involved type of train, location and type of occurrence, immediate 
cause, contributing factors (R-PSFs), shunting operation, degraded operations, number of 
operators in train cabin and the installed protection systems.  
Starting with the time of day, reports were divided into events that occurred during the day, 
night, at dawn and dusk, based on the local timing of events. However, as data on events at 
dawn and dusk was limited, these two day-periods were combined. 
On rolling stock (type of trains), as displayed in Figure 6-7, the classes include: passenger 
trains, i.e. long-distance, regional; freight trains; metros; trams; engineering trains; 
engineering vehicles and locomotives running solo, with the majority of events to refer to 
passenger trains. However, due to the limited representation of particular types of trains 
within the selected reports, clustering of the rolling stock types was performed as follows: (i) 
passenger trains, (ii) freight trains, (iii) engineering trains, vehicles and locomotives running 
solo, and (iv) metros and trams. 
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Figure 6-7 Type of train involved per type of event  
With respect to the personnel involved (responsibility), as shown in the Figure 6-8, this was 
distinguished into passenger train drivers, i.e. long-distance and regional; freight train 
drivers; locomotive (solo) drivers, engineering train drivers, metro drivers, tram drivers, 
signallers and controllers. Again as some of the categories are limited, a new classification 
was generated based on the commonalities of the personnel as follows: (i) passenger train 
drivers; (ii) freight train drivers; (iii) locomotive (solo) drivers - engineering train drivers; (iv) 
metro - tram drivers; (v) signallers - controllers and (vi) more than one employees.  
 
Figure 6-8 Type of responsible personnel per type of event 
Concerning the location of events, reports revealed at least twenty different places that 
accidents may happen, such as: bridges, depots, depot points, junctions, level crossings, 
monorail lines, open lines, curvatures on open lines, open lines with gradient, points on open 
lines, run rounds, station platforms, stations (entrances and exits), points at stations, street 
overpasses, tunnels, underground lines, yards and viaducts. Similar to above variables, 
location was grouped based on common characteristics, in two different ways (Figure 6-9). 
In the first, location types were merged into: open lines (including curves, points or gradient), 
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stations (including station points, platforms, depots or depot points), yards, junctions, bridges 
or viaducts, tunnels (including entrance or the exit) and level crossings. In the second, a new 
category referred to as points was created, which comprises all cases of points and 
junctions. All other categories, not embraced within this new category, remained the same 
with the categories of location described in the first categorisation. 
   
Figure 6-9 Type of location per type of event 
The type of occurrences (Figure 6-10), similarly to ERADIS (2012) is classified according to 
the type of events: (i) for accidents and serious accidents are train collisions, train 
derailments, train collisions with obstacles and persons hit by train; (ii) whilst for incidents, 
are signals passed at danger (SPADs), SPADs (ground signal) and operational irregularities.  
 
Figure 6-10 Type of occurrence per type of event 
 
Operational irregularities include any type of irregularity caused by signallers or drivers, 
including possession irregularities or level crossing irregularities, which are not described as 
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SPADs and lead to an incident, e.g. wrong track authorisation by signaller. SPADs and 
operational irregularities are also used to describe the associated events to the types of 
occurrences for accidents and serious accidents, as displayed in the Figure 6-11. 
 
Figure 6-11 Associated events to types of occurrences 
Subsequently, immediate causes (Figure 6-12) were distinguished into cases related to 
signalling (including no signal observation, wrong signal interpretation, disregard signal etc.), 
excessive speed, braking, distance estimation, routing, points setting and information. This 
classification is in general agreement with previous studies, e.g. (Evans, 2011).  
 
Figure 6-12 Type of immediate causes per type of event 
With respect to the railway protection systems (Figure 6-13), these include the types of 
trains control used worldwide. However, as protection systems are implemented primarily on 
national level and their operational systems may, for this research their classification is 
based on their similar features to the:  Automatic Warning System (AWS), Automatic Train 
Protection (ATP) and Train Protection Warning System (TPWS), as briefly described in 
Chapter 2.  
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Figure 6-13 Type of railway protection system per type of event 
In turn, operational conditions (degraded operations), describe any type of emergency or 
special conditions applied at the time of an event, such as: rolling stock failure, lines 
blockage, infrastructure failures, technical communication failures, signalling failures, no 
signalling in the territory and speed restrictions. Possessions and maintenance work, 
although they can be characterised as degraded operations, they are not considered as 
such because they take place on daily basis and operators are familiar with operations 
under those conditions. Finally, the number of operators refers to train drivers and is 
distinguished into one or more than one drivers in the train cabin, while shunting operations 
describe any “operation of moving a railway vehicle or set of railway vehicles inside a railway 
station or other railway installations (depot, workshop, marshalling yard, etc.) controlled by 
shunting signals” (European Railway Agency, 2009, Eurostat et al., 2009). 
Table 6-6 shows the reference database, which presents the findings after they were re-
coded in order to reduce the subcategories of each variable to the relevant minimum 
number, when either were too many or their data was not sufficiently or applicable for further 
analysis.  
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Table 6-6 Descriptive statistics of reference database 
 
   Type of event 
 
Incidents 
(220) 
Accidents 
(189) 
Serious 
Accidents 
(70) 
 Valid cases 
Year 1997 – 2005 
2006 – 2011 
25 
195 
55 
133 
30 
40 
(110) 
(368) 99.8% 
Month Dec – Feb 
Mar – May 
Jun – Aug 
Sep – Nov 
52 
42 
74 
52 
53 
48 
47 
40 
17 
15 
19 
19 
(122) 
(105) 
(140) 
(111) 
99.8% 
Time of day Day 
Night 
Dawn – Dusk 
136 
9 
25 
121 
52 
16 
48 
19 
3 
(305) 
(130) 
(44) 
100.0% 
Responsibility Passenger train driver 
Freight train driver 
Loco – Engineering train driver 
Metro – Tram driver 
Signaller – Controller 
More than one employee 
91 
28 
12 
4 
68 
17 
60 
40 
24 
10 
36 
19 
22 
22 
8 
4 
8 
6 
(173) 
(90) 
(44) 
(18) 
(112) 
(42) 
100.0% 
Type of train Passenger train 
Freight train 
Engineering – Locomotive 
Metro – Tram 
156 
40 
15 
6 
84 
59 
35 
11 
29 
28 
9 
4 
(269) 
(127) 
(59) 
(21) 
99.4% 
Location Open line (curves, gradient, points) 
Station (platform, points, depots) 
Yard 
Junction 
89 
70 
10 
32 
45 
89 
21 
26 
32 
15 
7 
9 
(166) 
(174) 
(38) 
(67) 
92.9% 
Location 2 Open line (curves, gradient) 
Station (platform, depots) 
Points (points, yards, junctions) 
88 
58 
55 
43 
59 
79 
32 
21 
10 
(163) 
(138) 
(144) 
92.9% 
Type of occurrence Train collisions 
Train derailments 
Train collision with obstacle 
Person hit by train 
SPAD 
SPAD (ground) 
Operational irregularities 
- 
- 
- 
1 
118 
21 
78 
97 
55 
32 
5 
- 
- 
- 
46 
13 
7 
4 
- 
- 
- 
(143) 
(68) 
(39) 
(10) 
(118) 
(21) 
(78) 
99.6% 
Associated  
event 
SPAD 
SPAD (ground) 
Operational irregularity 
- 
- 
- 
52 
15 
122 
33 
2 
35 
(85) 
(17) 
(157) 
54.1% 
Immediate  
cause 
Signalling 
Excessive speed 
Braking 
Routing 
Points 
Information 
108 
15 
10 
35 
5 
15 
61 
26 
22 
27 
19 
10 
29 
13 
4 
6 
3 
4 
(198) 
(54) 
(36) 
(68) 
(27) 
(29) 
86.0% 
Operational 
conditions 
Normal 
Special conditions 
144 
76 
170 
19 
58 
12 
(372) 
(107) 100.0% 
Shunting  
operation 
Yes 
No 
21 
199 
38 
151 
9 
61 
(68) 
(411) 100.0% 
Number of  
operators  
One 
More than one 
217 
3 
164 
25 
47 
23 
(428) 
(51) 100.0% 
Railway protection 
systems 
AWS 
TPWS 
ATP 
102 
112 
6 
103 
85 
1 
51 
18 
1 
(256) 
(215) 
(8) 
100.0% 
In addition to variables above, the contributing factors were also classified based on the R-
PSFs taxonomy, where all R-PSFs categories and elements were taken into account. In total 
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1820 contributing factors were identified. From these, 1815 were allotted to the defined R-
PSFs, while 5 were not classified; 800 reflect incidents, 668 accidents and the remainder 
serious accidents. That is about 3.7 R-PSFs per incident, 3.5 per accident and 5 per serious 
accident report. Figure 6-14 shows the complete R-PSFs frequencies per type of severity. It 
can be seen that in average the extracted R-PSFs compare to those displayed in Figure 6-2 
and determined by the SMEs are same for almost 87.73%. That is, the predominant factors 
as indicated in Table 6-2 remain the same, e.g. safety culture is again the most frequent 
identified R-PSFs, while the increase in number of observations is proportional to the 
additional number of reports (varies from 1 to 35%).  
 
Figure 6-14 The complete list of the identified R-PSFs per type of event 
In contrast, there are not anymore eleven non-identified R-PSFs, as shown in Section 6.3.1, 
but four. These are: relations within the team, task instructions, and communication within 
organization and incentives for employees. All but task instructions are hidden or implied 
factors and their constant absence from findings sustains the assumption of the gap in the 
investigation schemes concerning these types of factors. On the other hand, although 
individual characteristics, motivation, monotony, task complexity, leadership, fit to work 
aspect and relation within organisation were identified within the additional reports, they 
constitute only 1% of total identified R-PSFs (19 out of 1815). Moreover none of them was 
extracted more than four times, while all except monotony refer to incidents. However, even 
though monotony reflects two serious accidents, both of them were neither fatal or provoked 
material nor financial losses higher than 200,000 euros. Similar to the other relevant 
variables, due to the limited representation of particular R-PSFs elements, the clustering of 
factors was required for conducting any further analysis and excluding accurate results. 
Such clustering is described in the next sub-section. 
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6.4.2 The R-PSFs lite – combination of R-PSFs for further analysis 
As the R-PSFs were again unequally identified, confidence is gained that the majority of 
railway occurrences it could be associated primarily with a limited number of factors that 
influence the performance of operators. Therefore, the Pareto principle (Backbaus, 1980) 
was re-applied to determine those factors that were most frequently indicated within the 
investigation reports considering the severity of events. Hence, starting with the list of factors 
as shown in Table 6-2, the 43 R-PSFs are re-combined based on the: given definitions, 
SMEs recommendations and frequency of observations. By merging the factors is aimed to 
(i) provide a simpler more flexible version of the R-PSFs taxonomy for both investigation 
purposes and statistical analyses, (ii) highlight the factors that primarily affect operators 
performance and keep both operators and investigators alert about these factors, and (iii) be 
used to quantify (“weight”) the contribution of each significant R-PSF on the performance of 
operators. 
Therefore, first, the R-PSFs were classified according to their frequency within the serious 
accidents then the accidents and finally the incident reports. In turn, the factors with higher 
frequencies and common characteristics were combined. For instance, with respect to 
organisational factors, it can be seen from Figure 6-14 that safety culture is the most often 
identified R-PSF related to serious accidents. Moreover, safety culture is by definition 
strongly linked to organisations Safety Management Systems (European Railway Agency, 
2010), hence the union of these factors is not only suggested but also represents a large 
number of railway accidents. With respect to organisational factors no other factors were 
united, as either the factors were not frequently identified or their characteristics are not 
common. Moving towards system factors, railway communication means, human machine 
interface and visibility (due to system design) are absorbed by the predominant system 
design. Furthermore, for team factors, teamwork and communication between employees 
were migrated, whilst within dynamic personal factors, the primary distraction-loss of 
concentration embraces situational awareness and vigilance and perception is united with 
interpretation (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b). Finally, accepting SMEs’ 
recommendation (Section 6.3.2) experience is merged with training.  
In addition to above combinations, which all refer to cases within same R-PSFs categories, 
factors from different categories were combined. For example, again based on SMEs’ 
recommendations workload is united with time pressure and they both absorb stress, whilst 
fatigue includes shift pattern and fit to work. Similarly, familiarity is merged with expectation 
and routine and is integrated to a factor that primarily belongs to the personal category, as 
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familiarity is considered the most dominant factor among them. The combined factors 
represent 1460 out of 1815 or 80.4% of the identified R-PSFs.  
Furthermore, the R-PSFs elements that were mostly extracted from reports were also 
determined, including quality of procedures, quality of information and supervision. Having 
added them to the combined list of factors, a list of 12 factors is established (Table 6-7) 
which represents in average 92.3% of total R-PSFs. In particular that list reflects 91.75% of 
R-PSFs related to incidents (Figure 6-15), 92.23% related to accidents (Figure 6-16) and 
93.37 related to serious accidents (Figure 6-17). The 12 R-PSFs represent the most 
frequent identified contributing factors, regardless the severity of railway occurrences. 
Hereafter the list will be referred to as the R-PSFs lite taxonomy. 
Table 6-7 The combined most frequent identified R-PSFs per type of event 
 The R-PSFs lite 
R-PSFs elements Categories Incidents Accidents Serious Accidents Total 
Safety culture – SMS Organisational 89 115 80 284 
System design – HMI – RCM – 
Visibility System 71 71 45 187 
Fatigue – Shift pattern – Fit to work Dynamic personal 37 34 38 109 
Communication – Teamwork Team 103 90 35 228 
Quality of procedures Organisational 58 43 28 129 
Distraction – Loss of concentration 
– Vigilance – Situational awareness 
Dynamic 
Personal 117 93 33 243 
Perception – Interpretation Dynamic Personal 48 56 15 119 
Training – Experience Personal 77 42 13 132 
Familiarity – Expectation– Routine Personal 60 28 12 100 
Quality of information Team 27 17 12 56 
Supervision Organisational 17 7 7 31 
Workload – Time pressure – Stress Task 30 22 6 58 
   734 / 800 (803) 
618 / 668 
(670) 324 / 347 
1676 / 1815 
(1820) 
italics indicate clustering of factors that belong to different R-PSFs categories,  
parentheses show the total number of R-PSFs 
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Figure 6-15 The identified R-PSFs for incidents 
 
Figure 6-16 The identified R-PSFs for accidents 
 
Figure 6-17 The identified R-PSFs for serious accidents 
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The R-PSFs lite taxonomy confirms entirely the Pareto principle (Backbaus, 1980) for all 
types of occurrences, while no one of the excluded factors is related to a fatal occurrence or 
material damage more than 200,000 !; this justifies why no more factors are included in the 
shorter version of the taxonomy. In turn, the R-PSFs lite was verified by two SMEs with 
profound knowledge in the field of Human Factors. The purpose of verification was to ensure 
that the combined factors constitute rational and acceptable (based on the given definitions) 
integrations that can be further used to describe and investigate railway accidents 
sufficiently and to study human performance within the context of such accidents. For this, 
two sessions with the HF experts, i.e. the Head of RSSB HFs group and the Chair of OWT 
group of ETH Zurich, were conducted, where the author presented the concept, suggestions 
and findings for the construction of the R-PSFs lite. Feedback from both experts verified that 
the combination of factors is rational and well justified, thus the R-PSFs lite can be used, to 
study the contribution and influence of each of the most significant R-PSFs on human 
performance. The R-PSFs lite is currently being implemented by the LUL (Appendix I), while 
it can be also used to define the impact of ERTMS technology on the performance of 
operators (Smith et al., 2013).  
Having confirmed that the set of R-PSFs suggested in this thesis is representative for the 
railway industry and having also defined those factors that mostly contribute to railway 
occurrences by influencing the performance of operators, it is yet to be defined whether such 
list and factors can be broadly used in a variety of contexts, including different types of 
accidents, networks and involved personnel. Therefore, the examination of relationships 
between the variables that characterise the railway occurrences with the factors included in 
the R-PSFs lite is examined, as described in the next sections.  
6.4.3 Examination of relationships between two variables 
This section presents a series of statistical tests performed to explore associations between 
the factors that included in the R-PSFs lite and the variables that characterise railway 
events.  
As variables are categorical, Pearson’s chi-squared tests of independence are conducted, 
as described in Section 6.3.2. Once statistical significance is established, the Cramer’s V 
test is used to measure the importance (strength) of the association. This test is applicable 
across contingency tables of size greater than 2x2 (Field, 2009) and calculated as: 
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! ! ! !!!!!       (6-3) 
where !2 is the Pearson’s chi-square statistic, N the sample size and m the smaller value 
between the number of rows reduced by one and number of columns reduced by one in the 
contingency table. Cramer's V varies between 0 and 1, where values close to 0 indicate little 
association and closer to 1 strong association. In particular, Cohen (1988) states that for 
m=1, Cramer’s V"0.1 indicates weak association, whilst V"0.3 and V"0.5 medium and 
strong respectively; as m increases, associations are considered stronger for smaller V 
values. Table 6-8 includes the summary of findings, where the established associations are 
indicated in addition to Pearson’s and Cramer’s V statistics and their values of significance, 
whilst the complete results can be found in Appendix VIII. 
 Table 6-8 Chi-square associations between R-PSFs lite and other variables 
Two-paired associations Association Pearson’s test statistic 
Cramer’s V 
test statistic Significance 
Type of event – R-PSFs lite ! !2(22) = 89.612 V = .164, m = 2 p < .001 
Fatal-Non fatal – R-PSFs lite ! !2(11) = 27.306 V = .128, m = 1 p < .01 
Year – R-PSFs lite ! !2(11) = 45.152 V = .164, m = 1 p < .001 
Month quarters – R-PSFs lite ! !2(33) = 46.202 V = .093, m = 3 p > .05 
Time of day – R-PSFs lite ! !2(22) = 47.976 V = .121, m = 2 p < .05 
Responsibility – R-PSFs lite ! !2(44) = 263.323 V = .188, m = 4 p < .001 
Location – R-PSFs lite ! !2(33) = 58.198 V = .111, m = 3 p < .05 
Location 2 – R-PSFs lite ! !2(22) = 35.265 V = .106, m = 2 p < .05 
Type of occurrence – R-PSFs lite ! !2(66) = 179.213 V = .135, m = 6 p < .001 
Associated events – R-PSFs lite ! !2(22) = 58.669 V = .178, m = 2 p < .001 
Immediate causes – R-PSFs lite ! !2(55) = 175.141 V = .156, m = 5 p < .001 
Operational conditions – R-PSFs lite ! !2(11) = 38.654 V = .152, m = 1 p < .001 
Shunting operation – R-PSFs lite ! !2(11) = 39.074 V = .153, m = 1 p < .001 
Number of operators – R-PSFs lite ! !2(11) = 53.658 V = .179, m = 1 p < .001 
Protection systems – R-PSFs lite 
(excluding ATP) 
! !2(11) = 46.570 V = .168, m = 1 p < .001 
Protection systems 2 – R-PSFs lite 
(incorporating ATP with TPWS) 
! !2(11) = 42.330 V = .159, m = 1 p < .001 
However, although the nature of an established association in a 2x2 contingency table can 
be easily interpreted by observing the cell percentages or counts, in large contingency tables 
such interpretation is not always straightforward. Thus, a cell-by-cell comparison of observed 
and expected frequencies helps to better understand the nature of the association (Agresti, 
2007). For this purpose, the standardised residuals for each cell are computed. Residuals 
are the errors between the model’s expected frequencies and the observed frequencies. The 
standardised residual is then derived by dividing the residual with the square root of the 
expected frequencies as: 
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!"#$%#&%'!(%!!"#$%&'( ! !"#$%&$'!"!!"#!$%!&!"!"#!$%!&!"    (6-4) 
where i and j are again the rows and columns in the contingency table. By computing the 
standardised residuals one can determine which cells within the contingency table are the 
major contributors to the significant chi-square value. If the value of the standardised 
residual lies outside ±1.96 then it is significant at p<.05, while if it lies outside ±2.58 and 
±3.29 it is significant at p<.01 and p<.001 respectively. Finally, a positive or negative value 
shows whether the observed counts in a cell are above (+) or below (-) the expected 
(Sheskin, 2007, Field, 2009). 
Starting with the pair of R-PSFs lite and type of events, Table 6-9 shows that the confirmed 
association is primarily driven by seven cells (shown in light grey). These are: (a) safety 
culture10 – incident, (b) safety culture – serious accident, (c) fatigue – serious accident, (d) 
distraction – serious accident, (e) training – incident, (f) training – serious accident and (g) 
familiarity – incident.  
Table 6-9 Chi-square summary table for R-PSFs lite and Type of events  
 
Type of event 
Total Incident Accident 
Serious 
Accident 
R-PSFs 
lite 
Safety culture – 
SMS 
Count 89 115 80 284 
Expected Count 124.4 104.7 54.9 284.0 
Std. Residual -3.2 1.0 3.4  
Fatigue – Shift 
pattern – Fit to 
work 
Count 37 34 38 109 
Expected Count 47.7 40.2 21.1 109.0 
Std. Residual -1.6 -1.0 3.7  
Distraction – Loss 
of concentration – 
Vigilance –  
Situat. awareness  
Count 117 93 33 243 
Expected Count 106.4 89.6 47.0 243.0 
Std. Residual 1.0 .4 -2.0  
Training – 
Experience 
Count 77 42 13 132 
Expected Count 57.8 48.7 25.5 132.0 
Std. Residual 2.5 -1.0 -2.5  
Familiarity –
Expectation – 
Routine 
Count 60 28 12 100 
Expected Count 43.8 36.9 19.3 100.0 
Std. Residual 2.4 -1.5 -1.7  
For the first cell, the value of the standardised residual suggests that among the survey 
reports refer to incidents, there were fewer reports than expected (z=-3.2, p<.01) that 
indicate safety culture as contributor factor to railway incidents. In contrast, there were more 
reports than expected (z=3.4, p<.001) among those describe serious accidents that indicate 
                                                
10 For the sake of brevity only the first R-PSFs of each combination included in the R-PSFs lite is 
written. 
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safety culture as contributor factor for railway serious accidents. Similarly, within the serious 
accidents reports there were more than anticipated (z=3.7, p<.001) that imply fatigue as 
major contributor to serious accidents. Moreover, distraction was identified to contribute 
significantly less than expected to serious accidents, whilst familiarity to more than predicted 
incidents. Finally, training found to participate in significantly less than expected serious 
accidents and significantly more than expected incidents. In other words, results indicate 
that safety culture and fatigue are significant contributors for serious accidents, while training 
and familiarity for incidents. However the strength of the association for this sample, which 
expresses the influence of one variable on the other, is considered weak. The complete 
Table 6-9, as well as all relevant contingency tables can be found in Appendix VIII. In turn, if 
one classifies the types of events into fatal and non-fatal, then the established association 
stems primarily from the significant contribution of fatigue (z=2.6, p<.01) in fatal accidents 
(Table VIII-2). However, again this association is found weak. 
Moving to the association between R-PSFs lite and the years of events (Table VIII-3), this is 
primarily driven by the relation between the factors system design, fatigue, perception and 
training with the period prior 2006. In particular, within the reports refer to 1997-2005, 
system design (z=2.5, p<.05), fatigue (z=2.4, p<.05) and perception (z=2.6, p<.01) were 
found significantly more times than expected to affect human performance and lead to 
railway events11. In contrast, results suggest that for the same period training (z=-3.0, 
p<.01), was identified in significantly less reports that one would predict. Findings also imply 
improvements on the design of the system along the years, which subsequently explains the 
identified improvement on the perception of operators. In addition, better scheduling of shift 
patterns as well as the investment on studies related to fatigue, e.g. (Härmä et al., 2002, Rail 
Safety and Standards Board, 2006), have undoubtedly decreased the incidents caused by 
fatigued operators. However, similar to the type of events, the strength of the association 
between R-PSFs lite and the period of those occurrences is weak. Moreover, regarding the 
time of railway events (Table VIII-5), the established association is almost exclusively driven, 
as probably expected, by the role of fatigue on human performance at night operations. 
Specifically, it was found that fatigue is involved to significantly more events (z=3.2, p<.01) 
than anticipated amongst the reports that describe night operations. On the contrary, within 
the reports that refer to events during the day, fatigue was indicated significantly less times 
                                                
11 Unless otherwise stated, hereafter the term event will be using to describe all types of railway 
occurrences, i.e. incidents, accidents and serious accidents.  
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(z=-2.2, p<.05) as contributing factor than expected. However, again the strength of the 
association is weak. 
Concerning the determined association between the responsible personnel and R-PSFs lite, 
Table VIII-6 indicates that nineteen cells are primarily responsible for this relationship. 
Firstly, clear association is observed between R-PSFs and types of operators, i.e. signallers 
and train drivers. For instance, within the reports that refer to events caused by signallers or 
controllers, workload (z=4.1, p<.001), communication (z=5.5, p<.001), supervision (z=2.3, 
p<.05) and quality of procedures (z=2.0, p<.05) were found to contribute to significantly more 
events than expected. On the contrary, the factors system design (z=-3.6, p<.001), fatigue 
(z=-2.0, p<.05), distraction (z=-2.9, p<.01) and familiarity (z=-2.9, p<.01) were significantly 
less identified within the same reports. In contrast, among the reports refer to train drivers’ 
errors; it is now distraction, familiarity, system design, fatigue and perception that found to 
contribute to railway events significantly more than expected. Moreover, association was 
again found between R-PSFs lite and the different type of drivers. That is, distraction (z=3.2, 
p<.05), familiarity (z=2.2, p<.05) and perception (z=2.1, p<.05) were involved to significantly 
more events than expected for passenger train drivers. Fatigue in contrast was found in 
significantly more reports (z=5.7, p<.001) refer to freight train drivers, but also in significantly 
less (z=-2.0, p<.05) reports involve passenger train drivers. In turn, system design, which 
primarily expresses the location of signals along the route, was almost equally identified to 
contribute to significantly more than expected to events involve passenger and freight train 
drivers. Finally, safety culture was found to be a significant (z=2.1, p<.05) contributor factor 
for locomotive-engineering train drivers. This may imply that when drivers operate without 
either transferring people or goods may be more prone to disobey rules and procedures. 
The strength of the association, between the two variables, is considered medium as the 
equivalent to 0.188 Cramer’s V for m=4 is circa 0.33 for m=1 (Cohen, 1988, p.222).  
With respect to the locations of events and their relationship with the factors that affect 
human performance, results show that for both classifications, i.e. Location and Location 2, 
the established associations are primarily driven by very few cells (Tables VIII-7 and VIII-8). 
In particular, for Location 2 was found that for only one cell, system design – open line, the 
extracted frequencies were significantly more than the expected. This is explained by the 
fact that this classification includes all areas with points within one group and subsequently, 
information for specific areas that involve points cannot be revealed. On the other hand, 
using the classification Location, it was found that the association is mainly driven by the 
relationship between system design, familiarity (routine) and training with specific areas. In 
particular, system design was found involved in significantly more (z=2.0, p<.05) reports 
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about open lines than expected, which is in general agreement with the association of 
system design with passenger and freight train drivers. In addition, routine was extracted 
from significantly more (z=2.7, p<.01) reports than anticipated amongst events at yards, 
which is explained by the fact that the processes on those areas are standard while 
operators repeatedly execute the same tasks several times per hour. Training, finally, was 
derived from significantly more (z=2.2, p<.05) investigation reports, within those describe 
events in stations, than predicted; primarily this observation refers to events caused by new 
train drivers who miss signals within a complex station layout. However, again, results 
indicate that the strength of the association between the area of events and the relevant R-
PSFs is weak.  
On the contrary, the association between R-PSFs lite and types of railway occurrences is 
considered medium (Cohen, 1988, p.222), while results suggest that there are fourteen cells 
primarily responsible for this association (Table VIII-9). In particular, it is shown that within 
the reports that refer to train collisions, safety culture (z=2.8, p<.01), system design (z=2.5, 
p<.05), and fatigue (z=2.2, p<.05) were identified as contributing factors in significantly more 
reports than predicted. On the contrary, safety culture (z=-3.5, p<.001) was found to 
contribute to significant less SPAD events than expected. Furthermore, communication 
(z=2.4, p<.05) and supervision (z=3.9, p<.001) were both found to largely contribute to 
possession irregularities, justifying the association between operators and R-PSFs. 
Moreover, results show that among the survey reports refer to SPADs, distraction (z=2.0, 
p<.05), familiarity (z=4.7, p<.001) and training (z=2.5, p<.05) were identified as contributing 
factors significantly more times than expected. Finally, it is worth mentioning that no large 
discrepancies between observed and expected frequencies for any R-PSF lite amongst the 
reports that describe train derailments were identified.  
Regarding the relationship between R-PSFs lite and associated events (Table VIII-10), it is 
the cells fatigue – SPAD, communication – SPAD and perception – SPAD (ground) that 
primarily suggest the established association. Specifically it was found that within the reports 
that describe train collisions, which were associated with SPADs, fatigue (z=3.0, p<.01) was 
indicated as contributing factor to significantly more cases that one could predict. 
Nevertheless, this association, opposite to the one between the type of occurrences and R-
PSFs, is considered weak.  
The association between R-PSFs lite and immediate causes was then examined (Table VIII-
11), indicating an association with medium strength (Cohen, 1988, p.222). Fourteen cells 
mainly drive the association; in particular, within the reports refer to signalling, familiarity 
Chapter 6     THE RAILWAY PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS TAXONOMY – CONSOLIDATION,
     RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
215 
(z=3.6, p<.001) and system design (z=2.1, p<.05) were indicated significantly more times 
than expected as contributing factors. Furthermore, supervision was extracted significantly 
more times (z=2.6, p<.01) than predicted amongst reports refer to excessive speed events, 
whilst workload amongst reports describe routing (z=2.3, p<.05) and setting of points (z=2.4, 
p<.05) occurrences. Especially with respect to routing, it is noticed that safety culture is 
indicated as significant contributor in significantly more (z=2.1, p<.05) cases than expected; 
this in conjunction with the established association between workload and routing and the 
fact that it is the signallers responsible for routing, implies that signallers under increased 
workload, may tend to not follow and obey (not necessarily intentionally) the relevant 
procedures and rules as required.  
With respect to operational conditions (Table VIII-12), a weak association has been found, 
stemmed mostly from the relation between quality of procedures, information and level of 
workload under degraded operations. It was found that amongst reports that refer to 
degraded operations all three factors have been encountered significantly more than 
expected, at p<.05, to affect human performance. As regards shunting operations (Table 
VIII-13), on the other hand, results indicate that the established weak association is driven 
by four cells which all refer to occurrences during shunting operations. Specifically, it was 
found that safety culture (z=2.1, p<.05) and communication (z=3.3, p<.001) have been 
identified in significantly more reports than expected to negatively contribute to human 
performance, whilst fatigue (z=-2.5, p<.05) and system design (z=-2.0, p<.05) in significantly 
less.  
Furthermore, concerning the number of operators (Table VIII-14), the association is derived 
mainly due to the relationship between system design, fatigue, distraction and training when 
two operators are on board, however is again considered weak. Results are complimentary 
and show that on operations with two train drivers, which usually refer to long haul freight 
train journeys, fatigue (z=4.5, p<.001) due to long and repetitive shift patterns was 
discovered to contribute significantly more than expected. In addition, as these types of 
operations include territories characterised by sections not controlled by signals, known as 
dark, system design (z=2.9, p<.01) was also encountered to contribute to significantly more 
reports than one would expect. On the other hand, operations with two drivers on board can 
be claimed to overcome and prevent occurrences due to distraction (z=-2.1, p<.05) or lack of 
training (z=-2.5, p<.05).  
Finally, with respect to the railway protection systems, the ATP related cases, due to their 
limited representation were incorporated with the TPWS reports. Findings (Table VIII-16) 
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indicate that five cells are primarily responsible for the significant chi-square value. 
Particularly, it was observed that quality of procedures (z=-2.2, p<.05), fatigue (z=-2.4, 
p<.05) and supervision (z=-2.1, p<.05) were significantly less than expected identified as 
contributing factors within those events that involve either the TPWS or ATP systems. 
Although no direct explanation is possible for this finding, it could be only speculated that 
organisations which have installed ATP and TPWS systems, being more aware about the 
dangers during the operations, provide better supervision to their employees, while they also 
monitor and schedule more efficient shift patterns. On the other hand, findings show that 
perception was contributed to significantly more (z=2.5, p<.05) events related to ATP or 
TPWs and to significantly less (z=-2.1, p<.05) relevant to AWS. This can be explained by the 
fact that drivers feel safer, more confident and secure knowing that even if they make an 
error the consequences will not be severe, as the protection system will automatically stop 
their train. Nevertheless, again the determined association is classified weak.  
In addition to the above tests, similar tests were performed to identify any associations 
between the type of events and the remainder variables, as shown in the Table 6-10.  
Table 6-10 Chi-square associations between Type of event and other variables 
Two-paired associations Association Pearson’s test statistic 
Cramer’s V test 
statistic Significance 
Type of event – Year  ! !2(2) = 35.495 V = .273, m = 1 p < .001 
Type of event – Month  ! !2(22) = 18.786 V = .140, m = 2 p > .05 
Type of event – Time of day ! !2(4) = 3.477 V = .060, m = 2 p > .05 
Type of event – Responsibility ! !2(10) = 36.036 V = .194, m = 2 p < .001 
Type of event – Type of train ! !2(6) = 41.858 V = .210, m = 2 p < .001 
Type of event – Location ! !2(6) = 28.256 V = .178, m = 2 p < .001 
Type of event – Location 2 ! !2(4) = 26.335 V = .172, m = 2 p < .001 
Type of event – Type of occurrence ! !2(12) = 477.718 V = .715, m = 2 p < .001 
Type of event – Type of occurrence 
(excluding incidents) ! !
2(3) = 7.087 V = .165, m = 1 p > .05 
Type of event – Associated events ! !2(2) = 9.789 V = .194, m = 2 p < .01 
Type of event – Immediate causes ! !2(10) = 42.517 V = .234, m = 2 p < .001 
Type of event – Operational 
conditions 
! !2(2) = 11.105 V = .152, m = 1 p < .01 
Type of event – Shunting operation ! !2(11) = 9.428 V = .140, m = 1 p < .01 
Type of event – Number of 
operators 
! !2(11) = 57.548 V = .347, m = 1 p < .001 
Type of event – Protection systems  
(excluding ATP) 
! !2(2) = 14.514 V = .176, m = 1 p < .01 
Type of event – Protection systems 
2 
(incorporating ATP with TPWS) 
! 
!2(2) = 15.039 V = .177, m = 1 p < .01 
Results show that the type of event is associated to all relevant variables except month and 
time of day. However, not all of associations provide useful outcomes. For instance, the 
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majority of the selected incident reports are referred to the period post 2005, therefore 
association between the type of event and year of event is rather expected, while by 
definition is expected association between the types of occurrences and the type of events.  
Findings indicate association between responsible personnel and type of event, with freight 
train drivers to get involved to significantly more (z=2.4, p<.05) serious accidents than 
expected. In addition, signallers were found to be both, significantly more (z=2.3, p<.05) 
responsible for incidents and significantly less responsible for serious accidents (z=-2.1, 
p<.05) than predicted. Similar findings were derived also when the association between the 
type of event and type of trains is examined. It was then found that incidents reports involve 
significantly more (z=2.9, p<.01) than expected passenger trains, while accident reports 
significant less (z=-2.4, p<.05). In addition, it was observed that freight trains were involved 
in significantly more (z=2.2, p<.5) than anticipated serious accidents and significant less (z=-
2.4, p<.5) incidents. Finally, amongst the events involve locomotives-engineering trains, it 
was found that this category of trains was involved in significantly more (z=2.4, p<.5) 
accidents and significantly less incidents (z=-2.3, p<.5) than predicted.  
With respect to location, the association is primarily driven by significant more cases than 
expected of accidents in stations (z=2.4, p<.5), less than expected incidents on open lines 
(z=-2.6, p<.1) and less than expected serious accidents in stations (z=-2.1, p<.5). Findings 
also show that 45% of accidents in stations take place at points, while only 15% occur at the 
platforms.  
As already stated, by definition, association was expected between the type of occurrences 
and type of events. However, when incidents are excluded from the equation, then no 
association is observed between the different types of accidents and the severity of 
accidents. Nevertheless, train collisions provoke 67% of accidents and at least 30% of 
serious accidents, while derailments lead to less than 20% of serious accidents and almost 
50% of accidents. SPADs and operational irregularities on the other hand, are responsible 
for 62% and 27% of the incidents respectively. Furthermore with respect to the associated 
events, it is the SPADs, which were found in significantly more (z=2.1, p<.05) than expected 
reports related to serious accidents, the prime reason of the established association.  
Although only few of events occurred under degraded operations clear association between 
them and the type of events is observed. This association is driven by the significantly more 
(z=2.2, p<.05) than expected incidents and significant less (z=-2.1, p<.05) than excepted 
accidents under those conditions. This could be explained firstly by the fact that when one 
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operates under special conditions, strict restrictions are applied, e.g. speed restrictions, 
therefore the time and capability to react and/or correct errors increases. Secondly operators 
tend be more vigilant and alert, therefore the number of incidents that convert into accidents 
or serious accidents remains low. Finally, the established association between shunting 
operations and type of events, is forced primarily by the fact that within accidents reports, 
more shunting operations related events than expected (z=2.2, p<.05) were identified. 
6.4.4 Examination of relationships between more than two variables 
In the previous section it was shown that R-PSFs lite are associated with the different types 
of events, as well as with the majority of variables that describe the overall context of 
accidents. This section explores the simultaneous association of more than two variables, 
i.e. higher-order interactions. Therefore, loglinear analysis is used, which is an extension of 
the chi-square technique for multi-way contingency tables (Agresti, 2007, Field, 2009). In 
loglinear models all variables are treated as responses, i.e. no variable is selected as the 
independent, while only the associations between them are analysed. The term loglinear 
stems from the model’s formation, where the natural logarithm of cell counts in the 
contingency table is expressed by the linear function of the effects of categorical variables 
as well as their interactions (Dupuy, 2011). For example, for three categorical variables, X, Y 
and Z, with i, j and k categories respectively the full (saturated) loglinear model, which 
describes all possible interactions is: 
!"# !!!!"#! ! ! ! !!! !! !!! ! !!! ! !!"!" ! !!"!" ! !!!!" ! !!"#!"#  (6-5) 
where, log(µijk) is the log of expected cell frequency in cell ijk, " is the overall mean of the log 
of expected frequencies and the " terms represent the effects which the variables have on 
the cell frequencies. For example, the second term on the right hand side of the equation, !!!, is the main effect for variable X, while a high value of !!! translates into a high value of 
the expected frequency is in row i. (Agresti, 2007).  
Simpler models, containing a subset of the parameters involved in the saturated model are 
displayed in Table 6-11 (Dupuy, 2011). 
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Table 6-11 Examples of loglinear models for three-way contingency tables (Dupuy, 2011) 
Loglinear model Description of model !"# !!"# ! !! ! !!!! ! !!!! ! !!!!!! all three categorical variables are mutually independent (X, Y, Z) !"# !!"# ! !! ! !!!! ! !!!! ! !!!! ! !!!"!"!!!! X and Y are associated but both are independent of Z (XY, Z) !"# !!"# ! !! ! !!!! ! !!!! ! !!!! ! !!!"!" ! !!"!"!!! X and Y are conditionally independent, given Z (XZ, YZ) !"# !!"# ! !! ! !!!! ! !!!! ! !!!! ! !!!"!" ! !!"!" ! !!"!"!!! there is no three-way interaction (XY, XZ,YZ) 
To apply loglinear analysis, all possible meaningful pair associations between variables were 
investigated. This is to define which of those variables could be further involved into higher 
associations, as shown in Table 6-12. Subsequently, higher-order associations for the 
following set of variables were examined: type of events and R-PSFs lite with time of day, 
responsibility, location, immediate causes, degraded operations, shunting operation, railway 
protection systems and number of operators. The excluded variables were not taken into 
account, as (i) they are redundant variables, i.e. type of occurrences – associated events, 
and (ii) would provide expected outcomes, e.g. type of occurrences classification by 
definition distinguishes accidents and incidents cases. 
Table 6-12 Pair-wise associations amongst variables 
Associated variables R ToT L L2 ToO AE IC OC SO NoO RPC 
Time of day (ToD) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Responsibility (R)  d ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Type of train (ToT)   ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Location (L)    d ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Location 2 (L2)     ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Type of occurrence (ToO)      d ! ! ! ! ! 
Associated events (AE)       ! ! ! ! ! 
Immediate cause (IC)        ! ! ! ! 
Operational conditions (OC)         ! ! ! 
Shunting operation (SO)          ! - 
Number of operators (NoO)           ! 
Railway protection systems 
(RPC)            
!: association, ! : indicates no association, d: dependency 
The analysis focused on defining whether the established pair association between R-PSFs 
and types of events can be simultaneously related to one or more of the remaining variables. 
Within this context, seven tests were run to identify any three-way associations between the 
R-PSFs lite, the type of event and each one of the remainder variables. For any established 
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associations, four-way associations were then explored amongst the variables. For all tests, 
the goodness-of-fit statistic was calculated, to examine the hypothesis that the frequencies 
predicted by the model are significantly different from the observed frequencies. Results 
show that the difference between the expected and observed frequencies for all tests is not 
significant, i.e. p>.05, thus the hypothesis is rejected and the model accepted as a good fit 
good to the sample data.  
Table 6-13 presents a typical output example of the K-Way and Higher-Order Effects, as 
derived by the IBM SPSS Statistics 19.0.0, for three variables. This table provides 
substantial information about which, if any, components of the model could be removed 
without having a significant impact on its ability to predict the observed data. The table has 
two parts. The first shows whether removing the K-Way, i.e. main effects, two-way 
interactions, three-way interactions, and higher-order effects will compromise the fit of the 
model. The second expresses the same, without however accounting for the removal of the 
higher-order effects (Field, 2009). 
Table 6-13 K-Way and Higher-Order Effects for three variables 
 K df Likelihood Ratio Pearson Number of Iterations  Chi-Square Sig. Chi-Square Sig. 
K-way and Higher 
Order Effectsa 
1 155 1659.762 .000 1900.639 .000 0 
2 138 322.441 .000 317.821 .000 2 
3 72 111.980 .002 106.838 .005 4 
K-way Effectsb 1 17 1337.321 .000 1582.818 .000 0 
2 66 210.461 .000 210.983 .000 0 
3 72 111.980 .002 106.838 .005 0 
a. Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero. b. Tests that k-way effects are zero. 
Each row in Table 6-13 represents the influence of a particular effect on the model. For each 
row the Pearson chi-square statistics are calculated. When statistically significant, i.e. p<.05, 
then any removal of the effects that represent that row affects the fit of the model.  
In this particular example, the first row of the first part of the table (K = 1) shows whether the 
removal of the one-way effects and any higher-order effects, i.e. everything is removed from 
the model, will significantly affect the fit of the model. Similarly, the second row (K = 2) 
indicates whether removing the two-way interactions and any higher-order effects will affect 
the model. Finally, the third row (K = 3) examines whether the removal of the three-way 
effect will influence model’s fit. Since, the chi-square test for the first row is significant, the 
removal of everything from the model would significantly compromise its ability to predict the 
observed data. Similarly, if the statistic for the second row is significant, then removal of any 
two-way and three-way interactions would have a significant detrimental effect on the model. 
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Finally, if the statistic for the third row is significant, removal of the three-way interaction 
would affect the fit of the model.  
The first row of the second part of the table examines whether removing the main effects 
from the model would have a significant effect on it. As can be seen in the table, the 
statistics for this row is significant with p<.05. Hence, if the main effects are removed the 
model will be significantly affected. The finding indicates that one or more of the effects are 
significant predictors of the data. Likewise, the statistic for the second row indicate that one 
or more of the two-way interactions is significant predictor of the data, and hence should not 
be removed from the model. Finally, the statistic for the third row provides evidence that the 
interaction between the three variables is a significant predictor for the data. Therefore, its 
removal would have a significant detrimental on the model. 
Results of all loglinear tests can be found in the Appendix IX (Tables IX-1 to IX-7), whilst 
they are summarised in Table 6-14. Findings show that three tests indicate three-way 
interactions amongst variables. These are: (i) type of event – R-PSFs lite – location, (ii) type 
of event – R-PSFs lite – shunting operations and (iii) type of event – R-PSFs lite – railway 
protection systems. For those variables, four-way interactions were investigated, however 
for none of the combinations of variables such interactions were confirmed (K=4, p>.05) 
(Tables IX-8 to IX-10, Appendix IX). As a result, no higher-order interactions were explored. 
Table 6-14 Three-way associations amongst variables  
Model  Three-way association df 
Chi-square 
for K=3 Significance 
Valid 
cases 
Type of event – R-PSFs lite 
Responsibility  ! 
120 106.878 p>.05 1676 
Type of event – R-PSFs lite 
Location ! 
72 106.838 p<.05 1563 
Type of event – R-PSFs lite 
Immediate causes ! 
168 128.823 p>.05 1446 
Type of event – R-PSFs lite 
Shunting operations ! 
24 57.150 p<.05 1676 
Type of event – R-PSFs lite 
Special operational conditions ! 
24 20.872 p>.05 1676 
Type of event – R-PSFs lite 
Number of operators ! 
24 28.266 p>.05 1767 
Type of event – R-PSFs lite 
Railway Protection Systems ! 
24 55.975 p<.05 1676 
: association : indicates no association 
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6.4.5 Multivariate analysis  
In the previous two sections the associations between the variables that characterize the 
different railway accidents were explored. Moving towards, this section examines further 
relationships between variables in a more structured manner. In particular, this section aims 
at generating predictions for the types of events (i.e. fatal – non-fatal, incidents – accidents – 
serious accidents) based on the involved R-PSFs. Thus, regression analysis is used to 
identify relationship between an outcome variable (the dependent variable, DV) and an 
independent variable (IV). 
Multivariate logistic regression is broadly used in transport safety studies when the 
dependent variable is categorical and describes mutually exclusive states, e.g. 
incident/accident. The multivariate logistic regression is applied to model the linear 
relationship between the natural logarithm of the odds of the dependent variable and the 
independent variables (Dupuy, 2011). For a # probability of event, the odds are defined as 
the ratio between the probability of occurrence and non-occurrence, i.e. !!! !!, while the 
logistic regression model is expressed as: 
!"# ! !!!! ! ! ! ! !! !!!!!!!      (6-6) 
where # is the probability of the event of interest of the dependent variable, # is the 
constant, Xi are the independent variables and bi their corresponding logistic regression 
coefficients (Agresti, 2007). The model uses the maximum likelihood method for the 
estimation of the parameters. This method maximises the probability of obtaining the 
observed values given the fitted regression coefficients (instead of the least square deviation 
criterion in linear regression analysis) (Field, 2009, p.267). In general, when a DV has only 
two categories the binomial logistic regression analysis is applied. On the other hand, if the 
DV has more than two response categories the multinomial logistic regression is used. 
Finally, in the cases where the DV is multi-categorical and ordinal, the ordinal logistic 
regression is used. 
Two regression tests were conducted to generate predictions. In the first, the dependent 
variable is classified into fatal – non-fatal accidents, whilst the independent variable is the 
multi-categorical R-PSFs lite variable. For this test the binomial logistic regression is used. In 
the second test the DV is classified into incidents - accidents - serious accidents, while the 
IV is again the R-PSFs lite multi-categorical variable. Since this classification is not only 
nominal but also ordinal, the ordinal logistic regression is implemented.  
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6.4.5.1 Binomial logistic regression 
Using the factors that affect operator performance predictions for fatal – non-fatal accidents 
were generated. Therefore, a test of the model that includes the predictors against the 
model that contains only the constant was performed. The test was found to be statistically 
significant ($2(11)=28.810, p<.01), providing evidence that overall, the predictors can reliably 
distinguish whether an accident is fatal or not within the 479 reports. The overall percentage 
of the model’s prediction was 87.1 (100 per cent for non-fatal and zero for fatal accidents), 
and the number of observations 1,676.  
Table 6-15 shows the typical output for the predictors included in the model. The outcome 
variable is coded from 0 to 1, where DV(0) and DV(1) indicate the non-fatal and fatal 
accidents respectively. Similarly, each of the factors included in the IV is coded from 0 to 11, 
with IV(0) defining the reference category. Since safety culture was identified in the previous 
section as the most frequent contributing factor to both fatal and non-fatal accidents, it was 
chosen as the IV reference category.  
Table 6-15 Variables in the equation for binary logistic regression  
 
The results in Table 6-15 are interpreted as follows. Firstly, the Wald statistics indicate the 
importance of the contribution of each factor to the prediction of the outcome, considering 
the statistical significance (p-value given in the Sig. column). The larger the deviation of the 
Wald value from zero, the greater the importance of the factor in predicting the outcome. In 
this case, only workload, communication and perception are significant predictors (p<.05). 
The Exp(B) column provides the odds ratios (OR). This column indicates the change in the 
 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
DV(1) IV   25.295 11 .008    
Workload - Time pressure - Stress -1.740 .737 5.574 1 .018 .176 .041 .744 
System design - Visibility - HMI - RCM -.062 .255 .060 1 .806 .939 .571 1.547 
Fatigue - Shift pattern - Fit to work .328 .280 1.371 1 .242 1.388 .802 2.404 
Communication - Teamwork -.547 .268 4.183 1 .041 .578 .342 .977 
Quality of procedures -.163 .295 .308 1 .579 .849 .477 1.513 
Distraction - Loss of concentration - 
Vigilance - Situational awareness -.487 .258 3.551 1 .060 .615 .370 1.020 
Perception - Interpretation -1.180 .421 7.872 1 .005 .307 .135 .701 
Training - Experience -.319 .304 1.100 1 .294 .727 .400 1.320 
Familiarity - Expectation - Routine -.721 .384 3.532 1 .060 .486 .229 1.031 
Quality of information -.528 .460 1.315 1 .252 .590 .239 1.454 
Supervision -.317 .559 .322 1 .571 .728 .244 2.177 
Constant -1.593 .158 101.173 1 .000 .203   
DV(1): Fatal, DV(0): Non fatal,  
IV(0): Safety culture 
 
 
 
 
Compared to reference 
category DV(0) 
Odds ratio 
Importance of the contribution 
of each predictor in the model b coefficients 
Compared to reference 
category IV(0) 
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odds resulting from a unit change in the predictor. If OR>1 then as the predictor increases 
the odds of the outcome also increase. In contrast, if OR<1 then as the predictor increases 
the odds of the outcome to occur decrease. Subsequently, compared to the reference 
category of safety culture, workload is 82.4% less likely to contribute to a fatal accident than 
non-fatal. Similarly, communication and perception are 42.2 and 69.3% respectively less 
likely, to contribute to a fatal accident than non-fatal.  
However, although the model can be reliably used to predict fatal – non-fatal accidents, the 
contributing factors explain only a very small proportion, i.e. R2Nagelkerke = 3.0% of the 
variation between the accidents. Given the fact that the model predicts more accurately non-
fatal rather than fatal railway events, a limitation in the application of regression analysis to 
accident data might have been revealed. Fatal events along the years have become 
significantly more rare than non-fatal occurrences. Therefore, sample size might be too low 
to support such analysis, especially with respect to the factors that affect human 
performance.  
6.4.5.2 Ordinal logistic regression 
To generate predictions for incidents – accidents – serious accidents using the R-PSFs lite, 
again a test of the model that includes the predictors against the model that contains only 
the intercept was performed. This test was statistically significant ($2(11)=70.182, p<.01), 
indicating that overall, the predictors can reliably determine the severity of each of the 
railway accidents within the 479 collected events. The number of observations was again 
1,676. In addition, the goodness-of-fit statistics was calculated (Section 6.4.4). The test was 
not significant, ($2(11)=18.573, p=.069), and therefore, the predicted values do not 
significantly differ from the expected. Table 6-16 presents the output of the parameter 
estimates for ordinal logistic regression. The outcome DV is coded from 1 to 3, where DV(1), 
DV(2) and DV(3) represent the incidents, accidents and reference category respectively. 
Serious accidents were used as reference category for the DV since they constitute the most 
severe and critical events in terms of prevention. On the other hand, safety culture was 
again the reference category for the IV.  
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Table 6-16 Parameter estimates for ordinal regression analysis 
 
The results in Table 6-16 are read in a similar manner to those of binary regression. 
However, as the OR column is absent, it is the estimate column that is of interest in this 
case. In addition, threshold coefficients represent the intercepts, which are the points (in 
terms of a logit12) where factors might be predicted into the higher categories. For 
categorical IVs, when estimates are positive, the relevant IV category has a greater 
likelihood of higher score on the ordinal dependent compared to its reference level, i.e. the 
highest IV score.  
In this test, all the factors except system design and fatigue are significant predictors for the 
model, and all the factors negative coefficients. With respect to workload, for example, the 
negative coefficient means that workload is more likely than safety culture to have lower 
dependent scores, i.e. to be involved in accident or incidents. However, coefficients do not 
directly provide information on the odds of each contributing factor. To derive the odds, exp-b 
is calculated which in the case of workload is exp-(-.925) = 2.52. In other words, workload is 
2.52 times more likely to have answer of accidents or incidents compared to safety culture. 
In addition, it is also possible to calculate the likelihood of factors to be in a specific outcome 
                                                
12 A cumulative probability for Y is the probability that Y falls at or below a particular point. For an 
outcome category j, the cumulative probability is expressed by ! ! ! ! ! !! !!! !!, j=1,..,J. It is 
also ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! The logits of the cumulative probabilities are then defined as: !"#!!! !!!! !!! ! ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (Agresti, 2007, p.180). 
 
 
Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Threshold Incident -.790 .113 48.533 1 .000 -1.013 -.568 
Accident .943 .114 67.955 1 .000 .719 1.167 
Location Workload - Time pressure - Stress -.925 .276 11.223 1 .001 -1.466 -.384 
System design - Visibility - HMI - RCM -.264 .174 2.285 1 .131 -.605 .078 
Fatigue - Shift pattern - Fit to work .100 .208 .230 1 .631 -.308 .508 
Communication - Teamwork -.641 .166 14.814 1 .000 -.967 -.314 
Quality of procedures -.510 .198 6.631 1 .010 -.898 -.122 
Distraction - Loss of concentration - 
Vigilance - Situational awareness -.760 .164 21.369 1 .000 -1.083 -.438 
Perception - Interpretation -.557 .204 7.450 1 .006 -.957 -.157 
Training - Experience -1.149 .205 31.410 1 .000 -1.550 -.747 
Familiarity - Expectation - Routine -1.173 .228 26.563 1 .000 -1.618 -.727 
Quality of information -.613 .274 4.995 1 .025 -1.151 -.075 
Supervision -.804 .360 4.996 1 .025 -1.508 -.099 
Safety culture - SMS 0a . . 0 . . . 
Link function: Logit 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant 
DV(3)=Serious Accident, IV(12)=Safety culture 
 
 
 
Compared to reference 
category DV(3) 
Importance of the contribution 
of each predictor in the model Coefficients 
Compared to reference 
category IV(12) 
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category using the category probabilities as derived after calculating the cumulative 
probabilities. The cumulative probability for workload, for example, to belong to the category 
serious accident is computed as: 
! ! ! !""#$%&' ! ! !!!!"# !!!!" ! !!!!"# !!!"#!!!"# ! !!!""   (6-7) 
where %j is the coefficient for the intercept where factors might be predicted in serious 
accidents and b the coefficient of workload.  
In turn, the cumulative probability of workload to belong to “accident +” category is: 
! ! ! !"#!$%"& ! !!!!"# !!!!"!!!!"# ! !!!""   (6-8) 
where the sign “+” indicates that the probability refers also to events with severity higher 
than accidents. Subsequently the category probability of workload to be exactly at the level 
of accidents is: 
!! ! ! !""#$%&' ! ! ! ! !"#!$%"& ! !!! ! !""#$%&'! ! !!!!!  (6-9) 
Following the same rationale, the odds and probabilities of the rest factors can be derived.  
However, although the model can be used to generate predictions for the three different 
types of accidents, similar to the case of fatal – non-fatal accidents, the used predictors 
explain only a relatively small proportion, i.e. R2Nagelkerke = 4.7%, of the variation between the 
accidents. Although the proportion of events under the second classification is more equally 
distributed, the finding is rather expected, as the current investigation schemes are primarily 
focused on exploring the direct factors that lead to an accident rather the contributing and in 
particular those related to human factors and human errors.  
6.4.6 Discussion of findings - Recommendations 
The review of the complete set of reports aimed to confirm that the suggested taxonomy of 
43 R-PSFs represents and can be implemented within a broader context of operations. 
Descriptive statistics show similarities with the analysis of the first set of data in terms of the 
identified R-PSFs and the frequency of their extraction for the different type of railway 
accidents. Thus, confidence is gained that the proposed taxonomy and the factors included 
in it capture the majority of operational railway accidents caused by human errors.   
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In addition, it was found that if the 43 factors are combined based on the given definitions 
and their common characteristics, 12 account for more than 90% of all railway events, 
regardless of their severity. These factors are: distraction, perception, fatigue, training, 
familiarity, workload, communication, safety culture, system design, supervision, quality of 
procedures and quality of information. A series of tests was performed to identify potential 
associations between those factors and the variables that characterise the different types of 
occurrences, including the location of events or the immediate cause if such events. Results 
show associations between almost all combinations of variables. For example, safety culture 
is mostly associated with serious accidents and fatigue primarily affects freight train drivers. 
The associations are however weak, supporting the concept that R-PSFs can be used for a 
broad context of operational accidents caused by human errors as indicators of the need for 
the development of effective solutions for improving operator performance.  
In addition, predictions were generated in terms of the contribution of each R-PSF to a 
specific event type. Although R-PSFs can be efficiently applied to generate predictions, they 
explain only a very limited variance of the difference between the types of events. This 
finding was expected, as most of the current investigations schemes, apart from limited 
cases as implemented by Network Rail and SBB, do not contain a standard format in order 
to capture those factors that have contributed to accidents. Therefore, a simple check list 
(Smith et al., 2013) is introduced in this thesis. Such a list, should be included in the 
investigation schemes to capture and identify the most common contributing factors in a 
structured and consisted manner, as illustrated in the Table 6-17.  
The list, due to its simplicity can be used by investigators even with limited experience in the 
field of human factors. However, all potential users should read first and understand the 
definitions of factors and what each represents. This will enable less biased data to be 
gathered, as all investigators will use the same list of factors, in a consistent format, using 
the same definitions and examples. Overall, the list will enhance the quality of collected data 
and reduce the biases amongst investigators and researchers. In addition it will improve the 
understanding and accuracy of the factors that affect human performance and may lead to 
railway incidents/accidents. 
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Table 6-17 The R-PSFs lite table to assist investigation reporting schemes 
Contributor factors  
Level I 
Main Contributing factors  
Level II 
Involved 
personnel 
Personal 
factors Yes  No  
Training – Experience Yes     
No  
 
 Familiarity – Expectation Yes     
No  Other (please indicate) 
Dynamic 
Personal 
factors 
Yes  No  
Distraction – Loss of concentration Yes     
No  
 
Perception – Interpretation Yes     
No  Fatigue – Shift pattern Yes     
No  Other (please indicate)  
Task factors Yes  No  
Workload – Time pressure – Stress Yes     
No   Other (please indicate) 
Team factors Yes  No  
Communication – Teamwork Yes     
No   Quality of Information Yes     
No  Other (please indicate) 
Organisational 
factors Yes  No  
Safety culture – SMS Yes     
No  
 
Supervision Yes     
No  Quality of procedures Yes     
No  Other (please indicate) 
System factors Yes  No  
System design – HMI Yes     
No   Other (please indicate) 
Environmental 
factors Yes  No   Please indicate  
SMS: Safety Management Systems, HMI: Human Machine Interface 
6.5 Summary 
This Chapter presented validation of the Railway Performance Shaping Factors (R-PSFs) 
taxonomy. For this, 479 railway accident and incident reports were analysed while the 
findings were also verified by SMEs. Results indicate that no additional R-PSFs compared to 
those identified from the literature were either extracted or implied in the reports. Therefore, 
confidence is gained that the list of the 43 R-PSFs is representative for railway operations. 
However, it was also seen that the extracted factors do not include all the factors that are 
contained in the R-PSFs taxonomy. This could be explained either because no occurrence 
was related to such factors, or because they represent cases that are difficult to be identified 
within the investigation process.  
In addition, the dependencies and interactions between the R-PSFs were determined, whilst, 
a comprehensive list of 12 factors was also defined, accounting for more than 90% of 
railway occurrences regardless the level of their severity. For the 12 factors, a series of 
statistical tests were conducted showing particular associations between the R-PSFs and 
the variables that characterise railway occurrences. However, such associations are weak, 
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and therefore, it can be claimed that the factors can be used for a broader context of railway 
operations. 
There are possible uses of the 12 R-PSFs. The first is to incorporate them into the current 
investigation schemes to help inspectors define and describe the elements that contribute to 
railway accidents. Subsequently, the derived factors can be used to analyse accidents 
trends and determine safety critical areas and develop appropriate countermeasures. The 
second use is to estimate the proportional contribution of each R-PSF on human 
performance. For this, due to the lack of data and limitations of existing techniques, a new 
framework is developed and presented in the next Chapter. This framework, referred to as 
Human Performance Railway Operational Index (HuPeROI) allows researchers to assess 
the impact of the R-PSFs on the performance of the operators. 
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Chapter 7 THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE RAILWAY 
OPERATIONAL INDEX  
The previous chapter presented the Railway Performance Shaping Factors (R-PSFs) 
taxonomy and the twelve most important factors that affect the performance of railway 
operators. Based on these factors, this chapter introduces a new approach, referred to as 
the Human Performance Railway Operational Index (HuPeROI), which can be used to: (i) 
assess the impact of each of the R-PSFs on human performance and (ii) to estimate the 
relative likelihood of human error for several operational scenarios.  
The chapter starts by presenting the background to the HuPeROI. This is followed by 
justifying the significance of the Analytic Network Process (ANP) in the development of 
HuPeROI. The ANP methodology is then detailed, and the calculation of the HuPeROI 
demonstrated. Finally, the implementation of the HuPeROI for a scenario of significant 
interest to the railway industry is presented, and discussed in detail. 
7.1 The HuPeROI background 
The previous chapters described the substantial role and significance of the R-PSFs on the 
performance of railway operators. It has also been shown that the factors do not equally 
affect human performance. In addition, as there is no complete taxonomy tailored to the 
railway industry, it has not been possible to date to quantify the influence of the contributing 
factors on human performance. Therefore, this thesis proposes a framework to quantify the 
influence of each of the R-PSFs on human performance. In contrast to existing analytical 
approaches (see chapters 4 and 5), this new framework accounts for interdependencies 
amongst factors. 
HuPeROI identifies two types of dependencies, the direct and indirect. The former describes 
the impact that a particular R-PSF has on human performance without taking into account 
the presence of other R-PSFs. The indirect dependencies represent the gradual influence of 
a particular R-PSF on human performance due to its relationship with other R-PSFs. Due to 
the lack of empirical data, subject matter experts (SMEs) are employed to assess the 
influence of the R-PSFs on human performance. Based on their assessments, a dataset is 
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generated to support researchers and railway stakeholders to gain a better understanding of 
how the R-PSFs influence railway operators. In addition, the approach supports researchers 
to estimate the relative likelihoods of different human operational errors. This should help to 
direct resources more efficiently to the development of solutions that enhance the safety of 
operations by mitigating the influence of the contributing factors on human performance. 
HuPeROI is based on the integration of two techniques, the Analytic Network Process 
(Saaty and Vargas, 2006) and the Success Likelihood Index Methodology (Embrey et al., 
1984). The former is one of the most well-known and widely used multi-criteria decision 
making (MCDM) techniques. It is used to assess the contribution of each R-PSF to 
operators’ performance. The latter is a widely cited and broadly used HPA technique. It is 
applied to rate the quality of each R-PSF for different operational actions. In turn, it used to 
determine the relative likelihoods of the different human errors for those actions, as function 
of the R-PSFs. The following section explains why one of the MCDM methodologies is used 
to assess the R-PSFs. In addition, justifies why the ANP methodology is the most 
appropriate to be applied to this research. Finally, although the justification for choosing the 
SLIM methodology was provided in chapter 4, additional explanation is given in the section 
7.4.  
7.2 An overview of the multi-criteria decision making methods 
Multiple-criteria decision making (MCDM) analysis deals with problems where decision 
makers are asked to choose amongst a set of alternatives on the basis of an evaluation 
according to several criteria. Belton and Stewart (2002, p.2) define MCDM as “a term to 
describe a collection of formal approaches which seek to take explicit account of multiple 
criteria in helping individuals or groups to explore decisions that matter”. Thus, within the 
context of this research the decision makers, i.e. the SMEs, are asked to indicate the weight 
of each of the R-PSFs on human performance.  
The MCDM approaches were initially developed for the business sector. However, they have 
subsequently been widely applied to several domains including engineering, energy, air 
traffic management, transportation, and natural resources management (Triantaphyllou, 
2000). Different classifications of the methodologies have been used. Triantaphyllou (2000), 
for example, distinguishes them according to: (i) the type of data, and (ii) the number of 
decision makers involved in the process. The first classification includes the deterministic, 
stochastic and fuzzy methodologies, whilst the second divides MCDM into single and group 
decision makers. However, recent literature, e.g. (Mendoza and Martins, 2006, Pirdashti et 
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al., 2011), shows that one of the most precise and well-defined categorisations for the 
MCDM approaches was given by Hwang and Yoon (1981). This classification suggests two 
main concepts of methodologies based on the different problems settings. One works with 
an infinite set of possible continuous alternative13 solutions, whilst the other with a finite set 
of discrete alternatives (Xu and Yang, 2001, Buchholz et al., 2009). The first concept is used 
to identify an optimal solution, which satisfies the decision-making constraints and 
preferences priorities. Its relevant techniques referred to as multi-objective decision making 
(MODM) (Triantaphyllou, 2000). The second concept supports the decision maker to 
understand the complex judgments assists them towards an acceptable solution (Roy and 
Bouyssou, 1986, as cited in Pirdashti et al., 2011). These problems represent selection and 
assessment questions with the related techniques referred to as multi-attribute decision 
making (MADM). 
Based on Hwang and Yoon (1981), Belton and Stewart (2002) later classified the MCDM 
approaches into: (i) value measurement, (ii) goal, aspiration or reference level and (iii) 
outranking models (Figure 7-1). This categorisation has been widely adopted and cited in 
the literature, e.g. (Mendoza and Martins, 2006, Løken, 2007, Buchholz et al., 2009, 
Gervásio and Simões da Silva, 2012). It is also considered appropriate to justify why the 
MCDM approach is chosen for this research. Thus, the main features of each model are 
described below. 
 
Figure 7-1 Classification of the MCDM methodologies (based on Belton and Stewart, 2002) 
 
                                                
13 Alternatives represent the different choices of action available to the decision maker. They are 
characterised by a set of attributes (or decision criteria) based on which decision makers evaluate or 
assess them Triantaphyllou (2000). 
Multi Criteria Decision Making Analysis 
MADM MODM 
Value measurement 
models 
Goal, 
aspiration, 
reference 
models  
Outranking 
models 
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7.2.1 Value measurement models 
The value measurement models use “numerical scores that are constructed in order to 
represent the degree to which one decision option may be preferred to another ” (Belton and 
Stewart, 2002, p.9). The scores (values, V) show an order of preference for the alternatives 
according to a list of criteria. That is, alternative A is preferred to alternative B (A>B), if 
V(A)>V(B). Moreover, weights (w) are assigned to the criteria, representing their partial 
contribution to the overall score. They are based on the decision makers perception of the 
importance of each criterion (Løken, 2007).  
The main properties of these models are that they: (i) provide clear guidance on how the 
preference models should be built; (ii) support decision makers to gain better understanding 
of the values they appoint to each alternative and to explain their decisions when required; 
and (iii) require comparisons between and within criteria and encourage explicit or implicit 
trade-offs (Mendoza and Martins, 2006, Pirdashti et al., 2011). Typical examples of value 
measurement models are the Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) (Keeney and Raiffa, 
1976) and Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1980). 
7.2.2 Goal, aspiration or reference level models 
The goal, aspiration or reference level models describe cases where ‘‘desirable or 
satisfactory levels of achievement are established for each criterion and options which are 
closest to achieving these desirable goals or aspirations are sought’’ (Belton and Stewart, 
2002, p.9). These models are recommended when a theoretically infinite number of 
continuous alternatives are defined by a set of constraints on a vector of decision variables 
(Mendoza and Martins, 2006, p.2). They are goal programming (GP) methods where ‘‘a 
mathematical programming algorithm is used to approach these goals as closely as 
possible“ (Belton and Stewart, 2002, p.105) and are used when it is cumbersome for the 
decision makers to indicate tradeoffs or importance weights.  
7.2.3 Outranking models 
The outranking models are applied to the cases where “alternative courses of action are 
pairwise compared, initially in terms of each criterion, in order to identify the extent to which 
a preference for one over the other can be asserted” (Belton and Stewart, 2002, p.9). Similar 
to value measurement, they deal with evaluation problems and have a finite number of 
alternative solutions. Outranking models aim to identify which of the pairwise compared 
alternatives is preferred with regard to each criterion, by aggregating decision makers 
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preferences (Løken, 2007, Gervásio and Simões da Silva, 2012). An alternative A outranks 
alternative B when all criteria have been taken into account and there is enough evidence to 
justify that A is at least equally good to B.  
However, Greening and Bernow suggest (2004) that outranking methods should not be used 
for the actual selection of alternatives. However, they should better be applied to the initial 
screening process, e.g. to categorise alternatives into acceptable or unacceptable. In this 
case after the screening process another method should be used, i.e. from the value 
measurement models, to get the full ranking amongst alternatives. The ELECTRE 
(Benayoun et al., 1966) and PROMETHEE (Brans et al., 1986) are the most frequently used 
amongst the outranking models. 
7.2.4 Characteristics of the appropriate MCDM approach 
As stated in Section 7.1, the HuPeROI is established on a finite and determined set of R-
PSFs. This immediately rules out the use of the “goal, aspiration or reference level” models 
as they address problems with an infinite number of continuous alternatives. Subsequently, 
the choice of the appropriate MCDM approach is between the MADM categories. However, 
the requirement for the consideration of dependencies amongst the R-PSFs almost 
eliminates the choices. In particular,! Öztürk (2006), Taslicali and Ercan (2006) and more 
recently Lee (2010), indicate that only the Analytic Network Process (ANP) introduced by 
Saaty (1996) provides the mathematical theory that makes it possible to deal systematically 
with all kinds of dependence. Furthermore, De Ambroggi and Trucco (2011) and De 
Ambroggi (2010) recently introduced an approach, based on the ANP methodology, to 
model and assess dependent PSFs that affect the performance of air traffic controllers. This 
provides additional confidence that the ANP is the most appropriate approach to be used for 
the development of the HuPeROI. 
7.3 The Analytic Network Process 
The Analytic Network Process (ANP) (Saaty, 1996) supports decision making and allows 
researchers to systematically study all types of dependencies within the elements of a 
system. It has been used in several problems that involve the interaction and dependence of 
higher-level elements on lower-level elements (Saaty and Vargas, 2006). These include the 
decision of research and development projects (Meade and Presley, 2002), selection of 
product planning alternatives (Karsak et al., 2003), evaluation of the environmental impact of 
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various project alternatives (Chen et al., 2005), and quantification of the contributing factors 
that affect the performance of air traffic controllers (De Ambroggi and Trucco, 2011).  
The ANP is a theory of relative measurement used to obtain priority scales from individual 
judgements that represent relative influence of factors which interact with respect to clearly 
established control criteria (Saaty, 2004). The methodology is developed on the concept of 
pairwise comparisons. In addition, it introduces the notion of supermatrix, a square matrix 
whose elements are themselves matrices of column priorities. The supermatrix represents 
the result of dependence within and between the elements of the system. In this research, 
the ANP is used to define the contribution (priorities) of each one of the identified R-PSFs 
lite on human performance. The underpinning theory and the steps for the implementation of 
the ANP are described in the next subsections.  
7.3.1 The ANP framework - Developing the structure of the decision model  
To structure the ANP model, first the objective of the decision process is defined (Lombardi 
et al., 2007). This objective is then decomposed into elements which, based on their 
common characteristics, are grouped into clusters (components). To achieve the objective of 
the decision process, the established elements and clusters are assessed (weighted) with 
respect to a control criterion. Within the context of this research, the 12 identified factors 
represent the elements and the six categories the clusters (the environmental factors are 
excluded), whilst human performance is the control criterion. Hence, to identify how each of 
the R-PSFs influences the railway operators, i.e. the goal of the decision process, the factors 
are judged and compared themselves with respect to how they affect human performance.  
The generic structure of an ANP model is developed on a network of clusters, their 
constituent elements and interdependencies, as shown in Figure 7-2. In general, for a 
system of N clusters, with n elements that interact, there are three types of clusters: (i) the 
source, which are considered as origins of influence, hence arrows originate them only, (ii) 
the sink, which are destinations of influence, hence arrows can only enter to them, and (iii) 
the transient, whose arrows can both enter and leave from (Saaty and Vargas, 2006). 
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Figure 7-2 Types of components in the network scheme (Saaty and Vargas, 2006) 
Once classified, the dependencies between clusters are identified also. That is, when 
elements of one cluster are either connected with other elements within the same cluster 
(inner dependence) or with elements of another cluster (outer dependence) (Saaty and 
Vargas, 2006). For example, in the network scheme shown in the Figure 7-2, the clusters C2, 
C4 and C5 indicate loops that connect them to themselves. These loops demonstrate inner 
dependencies, whilst all the remaining connections, e.g. from C1 to C3, represent outer 
dependencies. Moreover, the clusters C3 and C4 illustrate a mutual dependency, which is 
described as cycle of the two clusters. In this research, the inner and outer dependencies 
are defined based on the Table 6-5 and Figure 6-4 in the Section 6.3.3. Finally, a cluster (or 
element) is influenced by one or more other clusters (or elements) is called a parent, while 
those (or elements) that influence the parent are known as children. Pairwise comparisons 
are conducted based on the relationships between the parent and children clusters (or 
elements) of the system.  
7.3.2 The ANP pairwise comparisons and relative weight estimation 
The pairwise comparisons are conducted for those elements and clusters that indicate 
dependencies and share a common parent with respect to the control criterion (Saaty and 
Vargas, 2006). Such comparisons are performed by answering the question: ”given a control 
criterion, a parent cluster (element) of the network and a pair of clusters (or elements) that 
both are linked to the parent cluster (element), how much more does a given member of the 
pair influence that parent cluster (element) with respect to the control criterion than the other 
member?” (Saaty and Vargas, 2006). To indicate such a relationship, the Fundamental 
Scale in Table 7-1 is used (Saaty, 1980).  
outer  
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Table 7-1 The Saaty’s fundamental scale  
Intensity of 
importance Definition Explanation 
1 Equal importance Two factors contribute equally to the objective 
2 Weak Compromise between values 1 & 3 
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgment slightly favour one factor 
over another 
4 Moderate plus Compromise between values 3 & 5 
5 Strong importance Experience and judgment strongly favour one factor 
over another 
6 Strong plus Compromise between values 5 & 7 
7 Very strong or demonstrated importance 
A factor is favoured very strongly over another; its 
dominance demonstrated in practice 
8 Very very strong Compromise between values 7 & 9 
9 Extreme importance The evidence favouring one factor over another is of highest possible order of affirmation 
Judgments are first given verbally and then each is assigned a corresponding number. The 
numerical assessments established at each level of the network are used to construct the 
pairwise matrices, as illustrated in Table 7-2. Such matrices display the strength of dominance 
of an element in the column on the left over an element in the row on top. For example, in Table 
7-2 it is shown that Element 1 influences the Parent Element 3 times more than Element 3. 
If the element on the left is less important than the one at the top of the matrix, then the 
reciprocal value in the corresponding position in the matrix is entered. The approach takes as 
input the pairwise comparisons and use them to produce the relative weights of the 
elements as output, using the eigenvalue approach (Lombardi et al., 2007). For this, the 
following eigenvalue formulation is used: 
!" ! !!"#!! !!! ! !    (7-1) 
in order to obtain the desired ratio-scale priority vector (or weights) w of n elements, where 
A=aij is the positive reciprocal pairwise comparison matrix, &max is the principal eigenvalue of 
the matrix A and eT = 1,1,..,1 is a unit row (or summation) vector (Promentilla et al., 
2008).This output is the priority vector and corresponds to the main eigenvector of the 
comparison matrix. The calculation of the priority vectors is described in detail in Section 
7.5.7. 
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Table 7-2 Pairwise comparison matrix for Elements 1-3   
Parent element Element 1 Element 2 Element 3 
Element 1 1 1 3 
Element 2 1 1 6 
Element 3 1/3 1/6 1 
However, associated with these judgments is a level of inconsistency. For example, it is 
assumed that for the comparison of the three elements in Table 7-2, one compared Element 
1 with Elements 2 and 3, with the derived judgements to be 1 and 3 respectively (bold red 
font). It is clear that !"!! ! !!!"#!! ! !!!!!!"!! ! !!. Thus, if the assessor was consistent, 
Element 2 when compared to Element 3 would be assigned the value 3 instead of 6. 
Inconsistent matrices may significantly affect the reliability of the derived results. Hence, the 
acceptable level of their inconsistency must be determined. The consistency of a matrix is 
expressed by its consistency index, which is derived from Equation 7-2: 
!" ! !!"#!!!!!       (7-2) 
where, "max is the principal eignevalue of the pairwise square matrix and n the order of this 
matrix. Once the consistency index is calculated, the result is compared with an average 
consistency index generated by Saaty (1987) for a very large sample of randomly filled 
matrices. This is called the Random Index (RI) and its values for n'10 are given in Table 7-
3. 
Table 7-3 The Random Index 
The Random Index 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0 0 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 
The ratio of the CI to the average RI for the same order matrix is called the consistency ratio 
(CR). According to Saaty (2008) a matrix is considered consistent when CR' 0.10 for any 
matrix larger than 5x5. If the CR is larger than 0.1, then the following three steps should be 
followed: (i) define the most inconsistent (larger) assessment in the matrix, (ii) determine the 
range of values to which that assessment can be changed to improve inconsistency, (iii) ask 
assessor to change their assessment to a plausible value in that range (Saaty, 2008). The 
matrix is rejected if remains inconsistent.  
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7.3.3 The ANP supermatrices 
To estimate the final priorities (importance) of the elements against the control criterion, the 
initial ANP supermatrix is created. This supermatrix is developed by entering in its columns 
the priorities derived from the set of pairwise comparisons. The elements within this matrix 
allow for a resolution of the interdependencies that exist between the elements of the system 
(Bottero et al., 2007). It is a portioned matrix where each of the sub-matrices shows the 
relationships between and within the clusters and elements as defined by the decision 
making model. The generic form of a supermatrix is illustrated in Table 7-4. The CN refers to 
the Nth cluster, while eNn indicates the nth element in the Nth cluster. In addition, the Wij block 
sub-matrix comprises the priority vectors (w) of the influence of the elements in the ith cluster 
with respect to the jth cluster. Finally, when no influence exists between elements, the 
corresponding entries in the supermatrix become zero (De Ambroggi and Trucco, 2011). 
The initial supermatrix is commonly referred to as unweighted. 
Table 7-4 The generic structure of an unweighted supermatrix 
 
C1 C2 ( CN 
e11 e12 (. e1n e21 e22 (. e2n  eN1 eN2 (
. 
eNn 
C1 
e11 
W11 W12 (.. W1N e12 
 
e1n 
C2 
e21 
W21 W22 (.. W2N e22 
 
e2n 
      
CN 
eN1 
WN1 WN2 (.. WNN eN2 
 
eNn 
The priority entries in the unweighted supermatrix do not indicate the priority of the elements 
in the entire set of clusters. This is explained by the fact that each of the clusters should 
have a highest ranked element and by definition not all elements can be first in the system 
(Saaty and Vargas, 2006). In addition, in many cases the clusters in a network may not be 
equally important (Saaty, 2003), which in turn affects the importance of their elements. Thus, 
the clusters themselves are compared to establish their relative influence with respect to the 
control criterion.  
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A cluster has an impact on another cluster when at least one element in the source cluster is 
linked to one or more elements in the target cluster (Saaty, 2008). The children clusters 
connected to a parent cluster are pairwise compared resulting in a new matrix, known as 
cluster matrix. The priorities of the cluster matrix are then multiplied with those of the 
corresponding elements in the unweighted supermatrix in order to weight the block of 
matrices of the eigenvector columns under that cluster (Saaty, 2004). The first entry of the 
vector is multiplied by all the elements in the first block of that column, the second by all the 
elements in the second block of the column and so forth. This process results in a stochastic 
supermatrix i.e. all its columns are equal to one which is called weighted. Based on the 
weighted matrix, the desired priorities of elements are estimated. 
7.3.4 The ANP final priorities 
The entries of the weighted supermatrix illustrate only the direct influence of an element on 
any other element. However, due to the dependencies, an element A can influence (or be 
influenced by) a second element B indirectly through its influence on a third element C which 
also affects the second element B. In this case all indirect influences of pairs of elements are 
derived by squaring the weighted supermatrix (Saaty and Vargas, 2006, Saaty, 2008). 
Similarly, the influence of one element on a second may also be established due to a third 
element that influences a fourth element, which in turn affects the second element. All such 
influences are derived from the cubic power of the weighted supermatrix. Following the 
same rationale, the weighted supermatrix is raised to limiting powers, where each power of 
the matrix represents all transitivities of an order that is equal to that power (Saaty, 2008). 
Since the weighted supermatrix is stochastic, the process of raising to powers stops when all 
the columns of the new matrix are identical (Saaty and Vargas, 2006). The values of this 
new matrix, referred to as the limit supermatrix, constitute the desired final priority vectors, 
known as limit priorities. These priorities represent the relative measurement of the elements 
after capturing the transmission of influence along all possible paths of the weighted 
supermatrix (Saaty and Vargas, 2006). The values of the limit supermatrix in this research 
represent the weights of the R-PSFs lite. 
7.4 The integration of ANP and SLIM methodologies – the HuPeROI 
calculation 
As mentioned in Section 7.1, in addition to the assessment of the influence of the R-PSFs on 
human performance, the HuPeROI framework is designed also to enable researchers to 
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estimate the relative likelihoods of actions caused by human error for a variety of operational 
scenarios. For this reason, the values derived from the ANP approach are integrated with 
the SLIM methodology (Embrey, 1983). 
The main features of SLIM were addressed in the Section 4.10.2.2. In summary, the 
methodology is a decision-analytic approach that uses expert judgement to assess human 
performance. The basic rationale of the approach lies in the assumption that the occurrence 
of an error during the execution of a task in a particular situation depends on the combined 
effects of a set of contributing factors. Thus, it is assumed that a panel of experts are able to 
indicate the relative importance of each PSF on the performance of the operator for that 
task. It is also assumed that the same panel can rate those PSFs with respect to how good 
or bad they are in the task under consideration. Within this context, “good” or “bad” refers to 
whether the PSFs will either enhance or degrade the ability of the operator to perform the 
task respectively (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). Subsequently, a success likelihood index (SLI) 
for the particular task is calculated, as a function of the relevant set of factors. This index 
represents the overall belief of the panel concerning the effect of each PSF on the likelihood 
of success for the task under consideration. One of the main attributes of the SLIM approach 
is that, unlike other HPA techniques, it allows researchers to decide which PSFs are the 
most important and should be used in every case. This feature is of great importance for this 
research, as it enables the implementation of the R-PSFs for the computation of the success 
indices known as HuPeROIs. The HuPeROI is derived from the equation: !"#$%&'! ! !!!!!! !!!"     (7-3) 
where, wi is the weighting for the ith R-PSF and rij the rating of task j on the ith R-PSF. As 
shown in the previous section, the weighted values are derived from the implementation of 
the ANP.  
For the ratings the SMEs are asked to indicate to what extent the identified factors assist the 
operators to accomplish a certain action. For each of the actions, the SMEs rated each of 
the R-PSFs on a scale of 0 to 100 (Gertman and Blackman, 1993). The closer a rating is to 
zero for a factor, the more suboptimal the condition for the action under examination. 
However, for factors such as workload, since it can be claimed that both extreme workload 
and no workload may have an impact on the performance of the operators, it is assumed 
that a zero workload value indicates normal conditions. The Table 7-15 in Section 7.5.8 
illustrates the summary of the R-PSF scales used to rate each of the actions in the question. 
For the R-PSFs ratings, in a manner similar to the ANP approach, the following question 
was distributed to the SMEs: “considering that each R-PSFs affects the ability of the 
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operator to conduct a certain action, please rate how good or bad do you think that each R-
PSFs is with respect to the action required”, where actions refer to potential errors. Having 
obtained the R-PSFs weightings and ratings and by implementing Equation 7-3, the 
HuPeROI for each action was then calculated, and the greater the HuPeROI value the 
greater the probability of success of the task under consideration. The framework for the 
development of the HuPeROI is illustrated in Figure 7-3.  
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Figure 7-3 The framework to develop and calculate the HuPeROI 
As shown in Figure 7-3 the first step in the process is to identify and define the scenario for 
which human performance should be assessed. This is followed by the selection of experts 
who review the scenario and assess human performance. The potential human errors for the 
scenario are determined and the R-PSFs are applied to compute the HuPeROI for each 
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human error. Once the HuPeROIs are determined, results are internally and externally 
validated. For the former, the reports related to the scenario under investigation are 
reviewed and the findings compared with those of the HuPeROI. For external validation, 
additional reports, which describe the same human errors as the ones to be assessed, 
should be collected and analysed. The findings of the additional reports are again compared 
with the HuPeROI. In addition, simulation observations could be also used to validate and 
consolidate the accuracy of findings. 
The integration of the ANP and SLIM methodologies has been cited in the literature in at 
least two different studies. Park and Lee (2008) first introduced the AHP-SLIM, as a novel 
approach to estimate the probabilities of the occurrence of car driver related human errors. 
The AHP-SLIM is developed on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), a special case of the 
ANP where elements are considered to be independent. Although the AHP-SLIM is 
unsuitable for this research, as it does not account for dependencies amongst PSFs, it 
indicates that the integration of the two approaches can be successfully performed. 
The second study, introduced by De Ambroggi (2010) is used to model and assess the 
factors that affect the performance of air traffic controllers (ATCOs). The approach combines 
the ANP and SLIM methodologies, where the former is applied to quantify the impact of 
particular PSFs on the performance of ATCOs. SLIM is then used to determine the success 
likelihood index of certain human errors. Despite the fact that De Ambroggi (2010) improves 
Park and Lee’s (2008) methodology by taking into account the dependencies amongst the 
PSFs, the technique has two main limitations. The first is related to the fact that for the 
assessment of the factors that affect human performance, only the main categories of 
factors are taken into account, whilst the PSFs elements are disregarded. De Ambroggi 
justifies the choice to use only the categories of factors due to the large number of elements 
within the taxonomy used in the study, i.e. the HERA taxonomy. In particular, De Ambroggi 
argues that if the PSF elements were used, this would lead to a rather large and complex set 
of relationships between the PSFs, making the approach cumbersome and user-unfriendly. 
However, by using only the categories of PSFs this approach fails to determine how each of 
the elements affects human performance, which is essential for organisations to direct 
resources more efficiently towards the mitigation of those factors. The second limitation of 
the approach, an issue tackled by Park and Lee, is related to the numerical rating of the 
PSFs for the tasks under consideration. Instead of asking SMEs to rate the PSFs, De 
Ambroggi considers three operational scenarios where all or some of the PSFs categories, 
in a Boolean logic scheme, play a negative role on the task. However, this simplification 
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provides only limited insights with respect to how the SMEs consider a PSF to be in reality 
(Kirwan, 1994). 
The HuPeROI addresses both limitations. Regarding the weighting of the R-PSFs, it 
assesses both the categories and elements of the R-PSFs lite with respect to their 
importance on human performance. In rating the R-PSFs, the SMEs indicate how good or 
bad the R-PSFs are for certain operational tasks. Based on the judgements, the success 
indices of the tasks are then calculated, with the results indicating which of the tasks is more 
prone to fail. In the remainder of the thesis, the implementation of the HuPeROI for a 
scenario of significant interest for the railway operations is presented. 
7.5 The implementation of the HuPeROI 
This section presents a case study developed for the purposes of this research to 
demonstrate the application of HuPeROI to the railway operations. In particular, the selected 
scenario and the sampling of the SMEs are introduced, and the design of the survey and the 
relevant calculations are demonstrated. Finally, this section it addresses also the HuPeROI’s 
limitations and potential sources of error. 
7.5.1 Signals passed at danger (SPADs) scenario 
The first step requires the identification of a scenario and for this a signal passed at danger 
(SPAD) scenario was selected. SPADs occur when trains pass a signal displaying a stop 
aspect without authority (Office of Rail Regulation, 2011c) and whilst they may occur due to 
a failure in infrastructure, e.g. signal failure, unexpected events, e.g. failure of train in block 
ahead, or a train out of control, they are primarily related to operational errors caused by 
train drivers (Rail Accident Investigation Board, 2003, Independent Transport Safety 
Regulator, 2011). Thus, the main human error of interest in this situation is “failure of the 
operator to stop the train before passes a stop signal”. 
Chapter 3 highlighted the Ladbroke Grove multi-fatal railway accident, probably the most 
cited SPAD in recent years. The accident, which caused 31 fatalities and 523 injuries, 
occurred because the driver of a passenger train passed a red signal without authority. This 
action caused a near head-on collision with a train heading to opposite direction (Cullen, 
2001). The inquiry concluded that the accident occurred due to a combination of contributing 
factors including driver inexperience, training limitations, complexity of the layout and 
location of the signal (Health and Safety Executive, 2000). It was stated clearly that if the 
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rolling stock and infrastructure were equipped with more sophisticated protection systems, 
e.g. TPWS, the accident would have been prevented.  
With the continuous evolution of technology and the implementation of more advanced 
railway protection systems, such as the TPWS and ATP, it could be argued that SPADs 
would not be a priority for the railway industry. However, such an argument is flawed 
because SPADs today are a significant precursor of risk due to their ability to still cause fatal 
accidents especially in the cases where advanced protection systems are not installed. 
Typical examples of recent SPAD accidents, as mentioned in Chapter 3, are: (i) the multi-
fatal trains collision in California in 2008 where a train driver missed a red signal because he 
was using inappropriately his mobile phone (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010) 
and (ii) the multi-fatal trains collision in Hordrof of Germany in 2011 (EUB, 2011). In addition, 
one could also refer to the fatal accident in Granges-pres-Marnand of Switzerland in July 
2013, where evidence indicate that was caused due to a SPAD (Swissinfo, 2013). 
Furthermore, the literature identifies the significant role of SPADs in the safety of railway 
operations (Wilson et al., 2005, Wilson and Norris, 2005, Wilson and Norris, 2006, Dhillon, 
2007, Wilson et al., 2007a, Wilson et al., 2007b), where numerous studies have been 
conducted over the years (Rail Accident Investigation Board, 2003, Pasquini et al., 2004, 
Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004a, Hamilton and Clarke, 2005, Blanchard and Lowe, 
2009, Independent Transport Safety Regulator, 2011, Wright et al., n.d.). In addition, 
worldwide statistics, e.g. (European Railway Agency, 2012c), as well as the review of 
accident and incident reports presented in the previous chapter, indicate SPADs as the main 
cause of railway incidents and the primary cause of most of the severe train collisions.  
Finally, five European train operating companies (TOCs) and an infrastructure manager (IM) 
were also asked to indicate the type of error that involves human performance and 
considered of great interest to their organisations. Three scenarios were distributed, 
including occurrences of the same severity caused by SPAD, excessive speed and wrong 
routing. Respondents suggested that the SPAD scenario is the most critical, for the following 
reasons:  
(i) the consequences of SPADs nowadays are usually not severe, i.e. due to 
protection systems; hence, although train drivers claim to acknowledge the 
importance of SPADs prevention, in reality they do not consider them as serious 
occurrences; 
(ii) subsequently SPADs constitute a large proportion of railway incidents, which may 
lead to catastrophic events; 
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(iii) although they usually result in minor consequences, SPADs may cause: (a) 
significant disruptions on the network, especially in the cases of metro services, 
(b) inconvenience to passengers and (c) financial losses for the organisations as 
each SPAD requires official investigation; 
(iv) TOCs claim that, cope more efficiently with incidents due to excessive speed or 
routing; however, the respondents did not provide any justification with respect to 
this statement.  
Taking into account the literature, worldwide statistics, review of investigation reports and 
feedback from the railway stakeholders, a SPAD scenario was created for the purposes of 
this research (see Appendix XI). The scenario describes a SPAD incident within a specific 
operational context, commonly seen in current railway operations.  
7.5.2 Sampling of experts  
The next step in implementing the HuPeROI, is to determine the group of experts that weight 
and rate the influence of the R-PSFs on human performance. The population of experts 
should primarily include train drivers, who are likely to be involved, or may have already 
been involved, in a SPAD. However, if only train drivers are selected as SMEs, the 
possibility of biased results, which may indicate specific factors, e.g. fatigue or workload, as 
the most significant contributors to human performance could not be disregarded. Thus, a 
wider population was targeted including operations managers and human factors (HFs) 
experts. The main reason for this is to indicate whether the collected responses are related 
to a particular type of SMEs and to identify if any differences are established between 
frontline and regional management staff. The responses of HFs experts are complementary 
and used to highlight similarities or differences between operational and non-operational 
experts.  
To obtain results that represent the majority of railway operations, the targeted population 
should be formed of randomly selected SMEs with a range of operational experience, i.e. 
years in service, position in the organization, from various TOCs worldwide. The operating 
companies should also reflect different types of service, levels of traffic, network 
characteristics and protection systems. However, collecting representative data (responses) 
from many countries would pose a significant challenge due to time and resource 
constraints. Moreover, railways operate primarily on national regulations and standards, as 
well as on signalling and controlling systems. Thus, it is likely that responses collected from 
several countries to be biased given national differences. In addition, responses from 
several countries may also be biased due to cultural, social and financial differences. Given 
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these limitations, it was decided that the target population would consist of SMEs operating 
in the same country. Furthermore, this country was the UK and its network was selected for 
three reasons: (i) the broad network of railway services, including freight, intercity, regional 
and metro passenger services; (ii) despite the fact that it is considered one the safest railway 
networks in Europe, a substantial number of SPADs is reported every year on both its main 
line (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2013) and underground operations, and (iii) direct 
accessibility to train operating companies (TOCs).  
The UK railway network comprises 28(14) passenger and seven freight train operating 
companies (National Rail Enquiries, 2012, Network Rail, 2012a, ATOC, 2013). Contact was 
established with 22 companies (6 freight and 16 passenger) with the aim of including SMEs 
from all types of services. Six companies expressed an interest in participating in the 
research, satisfying the criterion of incorporating all types of services in the target 
population. Eventually, three TOCs agreed to contribute to the survey, while the remainder 
were unable to do so due to time and resources constraints. The three participating TOCs 
are: the First Hull Trains (intercity services), the First ScotRail (regional and commuter 
services) and the Piccadilly Line of the London Underground (underground services). This 
population represents 10.7% of U.K. passenger train companies. The First ScotRail reflects 
95% of Scottish passenger railway services and the Piccadilly Line is the longest and fourth 
busiest manually operated line of London Underground. The population is completed with 
the HFs experts from the RSSB. 
Having described the target population, it is important to define the size of the sample. The 
number of potential SMEs from the population is approximately 800. However, due to 
resource and scheduling constraints each TOC could support the study with up to 20 
volunteers, while the HFs groups could provide maximum 5. Salant and Dillman (1994) 
indicate that for a population with 800 members, a sample size of at least 57 responses is 
required to obtain results with an error of no more than ± 10% at 95% level of confidence. 
Thus, the total sample of 65 participants satisfies Salant and Dillman (1994), while it is 
considerably larger compared to samples generally used in similar studies, e.g. Khan et al., 
(2006), De Ambroggi and Trucco (2011). However, as the target population is not 
homogeneous, i.e. the types of employees are not equally represented in the organisations, 
a random selection of experts could potentially lead to a non-representative sample (Hinkle 
et al., 1979). Hence, based on the proportion of train drivers and regional management staff 
                                                
14 Including the 24 train companies of the Association of Train Operating Companies and the 
London Underground Limited, Heathrow Connect, Gatwick Express and Stansted Express.  
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in the population of interest, the aim was to achieve the following allocation: 70% train 
drivers and 30% regional; that is 42 train drivers and 18 regional management staff. Finally, 
acknowledging that due to limited resources obtaining statistically representative sample at 
large was not achievable, representative diversity was sought, as shown in Section 8.1. 
7.5.3 Survey methodology – Responses collection 
Surveys are widely acknowledged as an accurate methodology to measure attitudes, beliefs 
or facts. In particular, one of the most common uses of surveys, is to quantify the 
behavioural past experiences of individuals (Weisberg et al., 1996). For the purposes of this 
research, a questionnaire survey was conducted to collect information on the influence of 
particular R-PSFs on the performance of railway operators.  
To conduct the survey, two approaches could be used: either to gather information from 
face-to-face interviews with the SMEs, or remotely by self-completion. The first approach is 
more time consuming, requiring visits to railway organisations and direct access to the 
SMEs. However, it is considered more reliable since it supports the clarification of any 
ambiguous issues in person, either prior to or during the interview (Subotic, 2007). 
Furthermore, since the schedule of interviews can be set up in advance, this approach 
facilitates representative sampling within railway organisations. However, apart from the time 
limitations, a main weakness of the in-person interviews is the financial requirements for the 
visits to railway organisations.  
In contrast, a remote survey enables the online distribution of questionnaires. Compared to 
in person interviews, this approach saves time and supports the increase of the sample, 
since the physically presence of the moderator is not required. However, it has three main 
drawbacks. Firstly, the remote surveys are strongly dependent on the response rate. In 
particular, Subotic (2007) states that for the collection of 100 samples, between 200 to 1000 
questionnaires should be distributed, which renders the approach rather cumbersome. 
Secondly, it relies entirely on the willingness and motivation of respondents to participate in 
the survey. Finally, as the physical presence of the moderator is not necessary, the quality of 
answers cannot be monitored, and participants may either misinterpret some of the 
questions or need additional information on the subject under investigation. 
After careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, the 
face-to-face strategy was selected to facilitate the survey, for two reasons. Firstly, the 
defined sample size and location of respondents facilitated a visit to all the four railway 
organisations that agreed to participate in the survey. Secondly, it is vital for the accuracy of 
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the results to ensure that the respondents understand the context of the survey and respond 
accordingly. This would be enhanced by the presence of the interviewer.  
7.5.4 Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire was designed in a way to account for three certain criteria:  
(i) clarity and representativeness to engage respondents in the usefulness of the 
study; 
(ii) questions clarity, to prevent any ambiguities between respondents; 
(iii) R-PSFs clear and precise definitions and examples, to ensure that all respondents 
have a common understanding of the components they are asked to evaluate. 
The questionnaire consists of four parts, as shown in the Appendix XI. The first part includes 
questions that describe the profile of SMEs, i.e. years of experience, duties, and age. In 
addition, this part includes questions with respect to the previous SPAD experiences of the 
SMEs. The second part contains the questions for the assessment (weighting) of the R-
PSFs categories and elements with respect to the defined scenario. The third part 
addresses the ratings of the R-PSFs with respect to the three typical actions (human errors) 
that lead to SPADs. Such actions were defined based on literature, e.g. (Pasquini et al., 
2004, Dhillon, 2007, Wright et al., n.d.), the analysis of the investigation reports, whilst they 
were also verified by three SMEs. Finally, in the last part of the questionnaire the SMEs 
were asked to indicate how external conditions, e.g. weather conditions, may affect their 
performance.  
The questionnaire, i.e. layout, questions, scenario, was validated with a HF expert from the 
RSSB and two train drivers. Initially, the questions were found confusing, thus the SMEs 
were asked for clarifications, in particular with respect to the definitions of R-PSFs. Thus, 
cards (Appendix X) were distributed to the reviewers, which precisely describe the R-PSFs, 
provide definitions and illustrate relevant examples. Using the cards, the reviewers agreed 
that it was clear how to answer the questions in terms of weighting and rating the R-PSFs. 
Moreover, the two train drivers highlighted that the use of cards eliminates the interpretation 
of the R-PSFs based on personal experiences and perception. In addition, the reviewers 
confirmed that the scenario was clearly written, well-justified and contained sufficient 
information for its completion. Finally, they confirmed that the including human errors are 
those which most likely lead to SPADs, compared to other human errors, e.g. late signal 
observation. Subsequently, confidence was gained that the questionnaire satisfies the 
criteria of clarity, usefulness and common understanding amongst respondents. 
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7.5.5 Preliminary survey 
A trial preliminary set of interviews, before conducting the full survey, was conducted in 
order to confirm the clarity of the questionnaire, to certify that the respondents understand 
the definitions and the given examples and finally to assess the necessary time to complete 
the questionnaire. For this, one HFs expert and two train drivers were interviewed (different 
from those who validated the questionnaire). Results indicated the need of minor 
amendments with respect to the layout of the questionnaire and the way that the 
respondents should compare the R-PSFs, e.g. circling only one factor per row, while the 
duration of each session was approximately 55 minutes. The necessary alterations were 
incorporated in the final questionnaire, which is provided in the Appendix XI.  
7.5.6 Completion of survey 
For the completion of the survey, the author visited the premises of the four railway 
organisations to distribute the questionnaires and collect the responses of the randomly 
selected SMEs. Using the face-to-face interviews approach, responses were received first 
from the First ScotRail SMEs in December 2012. Then, interviews were conducted in 
February 2013 with the SMEs from FirstHull Trains. Piccadilly Line and HFs SMEs, were 
interviewed in March of the same year. All interviews were performed on an individual basis, 
where the average duration of each session was approximately 65 minutes.  
Based on sampling, 65 interviews were scheduled. However, due to a technical failure on 
the Piccadilly Line, three interviews were cancelled, because the SMEs were required to 
return on duty. In addition, six SMEs refused to answer the questionnaire. Due to time 
constraints none of the cancellations could be rescheduled. Finally, 56 SMEs took part in the 
study, and their characteristics are shown in the Section 8.1. 
Having described the layout of the survey, the next subsections present the process of 
answering the questionnaire and how such responses were transformed to data.  
7.5.7 The assessment (weightings) of the R-PSFs  
Starting with the validated network of the R-PSFs dependencies, the influence of each R-
PSF element on human performance is assessed. Based on such dependencies, the parent 
and children elements as well as clusters are firstly identified, as shown in the Table 7-5 and 
Figure 7-5. In the Table 7-5, in particular, the parent elements are listed in the left hand 
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column and the symbol (") is used to indicate the children elements who have an influence 
on the parent elements. 
Table 7-5 The parent and children R-PSFs elements 
Parent (Y axis) 
and children (X) 
elements  
T F D P Ftg W C I SC S P SD 
Training  !     ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Familiarity !  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Distraction ! !  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Perception ! ! !  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Fatigue  ! ! !  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Workload ! ! ! ! !  ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Communication ! ! ! ! ! !  ! ! ! ! ! 
Information ! ! ! ! ! ! !  ! ! ! ! 
Safety culture ! !   ! ! ! !  ! ! ! 
Supervision ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !  ! ! 
Procedures !      ! ! ! !   
System design ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !  
D: Distraction, F: Familiarity, P: Perception, Pr: Procedures, SC: Safety culture, S: Supervision, Ftg: Fatigue,      
T: Training, SD: System design, W: Workload, C: Communication, I: Information 
 
 
 
Figure 7-4 The cluster dependencies for the pairwise comparisons 
Subsequently, the pairwise comparisons between the dependent R-PSFs are designed and 
the corresponding, unweighted supermatrix is created. Likewise, the dependent clusters are 
compared in a pairwise manner, and the cluster matrix is established, while the weighted 
supermatrix is calculated afterwards. Finally, the limit supermatrix, which includes the final 
priorities of the R-PSFs is computed. The four steps of the ANP calculations for the SPAD 
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scenario are presented below, while the responses of a random SME are used to illustrate 
the process.  
7.5.7.1 Elements pairwise comparisons – the unweighted supermatrix  
For the pairwise comparisons of the R-PSFs elements, the SMEs were asked to judge all 
children elements with respect to their parents for their influence on human performance. 
For this, the following question was distributed: “considering the influence of each factor on 
the performance of the operator, of the two factors in each row which one is considered 
more important and how more important is it with respect to the influence on the parent 
factor?”. As a reminder, for each parent element, the compared children elements belong 
only to same clusters. The influence of elements amongst different clusters is derived 
indirectly by assessing the clusters themselves. 
The questionnaire layout used for the comparisons is shown in the Table 7-6. The following 
example shows the pairwise comparisons and calculation of priorities with respect to the 
communication parent element. Communication, as indicated in the Table 7-5, is influenced 
by all the remainder R-PSFs. However, workload and system design are the only R-PSFs 
within their clusters, hence their influence on communication will be indirectly derived from 
the total elements and clusters pairwise comparisons. Therefore, seven comparisons, within 
three clusters, i.e. dynamic personal, organisational, personal, can be directly performed.  
Table 7-6 Pairwise comparisons for the parent element communication 
 
The Table 1-7, in turn, illustrates the pairwise obtained matrix from the SME’s responses for 
the children elements included in the dynamic personal factors cluster. 
Table 7-7 Pairwise comparisons for elements 
Communication Distraction Fatigue Perception Priorities 1 Priorities 2 Priorities 3 
Distraction 1 1 5 0.46647 0.46633 0.46647 
Fatigue 1 1 4 0.43303 0.43300 0.43303 
Perception 1/5 1/4 1 0.10050 0.10067 0.10050 
Communication Extreme Very strong Strong Moderate Equal Moderate Strong Very strong Extreme Communication
Distraction 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Fatigue
Distraction 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Perception
Fatigue 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Perception
Procedures 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Safety culture
Procedures 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Supervision
Safety culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Supervision
Familiarity 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
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For the calculation of the priorities, the matrix is first raised to arbitrary large powers, and the 
elements of each of the rows are summed. Finally, all the rows are normalized by dividing 
each row sum by the total sum of all rows (Saaty, 2008); the derived results constitute the 
desired priorities. The process of raising to powers stops when the difference between the 
components of the obtained priority vector at the kth power and at the (k + 1)th power is less 
than some very small value. For this example, the priorities were derived from the matrix 
after having raised to the 4th power. Results are indicated in the column Priorities 1 of Table 
7-7. The entries of each priority vector add up to one and are placed in their appropriate 
location in the unweighted supermatrix, as shown in the next section.  
However, the literature identifies two more ways to calculate the priorities. The first in Lee 
(2010), describes a process of three steps. In the first the values in each column of the 
pairwise matrix are summed. In the second step the matrix is normalised by dividing the 
elements in each column by the sum of their respective column. Finally, in the third step the 
elements in each row of the normalised matrix are summed and this sum is divided by the 
number of elements in the row. These final numbers give an estimate of the relative priorities 
of the elements being compared, as shown in the column Priorities 2 of Table 7-7. Finally, a 
third approach (Paraskevopoulos, n.d.) estimates the priorities by firstly multiplying the 
entries in each row of the matrix and deriving then the nth root of each row. In turn, the nth 
roots are summed and the !!! is obtained. The priorities are finally derived by normalising 
the nth root of each row with the sum of nth roots. As shown in the Table 7-7, the column 
Priorities 3 has identical values with Saaty’s calculations. Although all approaches result in 
identical results, the approach of Saaty is used to calculate the priorities.   
Having calculated the priorities from the pairwise matrix, the next step is to define whether 
the matrix, or in other words, the respondent, is consistent. Therefore, the maximum 
eigenvalue &max, the consistency index (CI) and subsequently the consistency ratio (CR) are 
estimated, as shown in the Table 7-8. To calculate the &max, the matrix of judgments is 
multiplied on the right by the eigenvector (Priorities 1), resulting in a new eigenvector.  
Table 7-8 R-PSFs priorities calculation 
Communication Distraction Fatigue Perception Priorities 1 New eigenvector !max 
Distraction 1 1 5 0.46647 1.40199 3.00554 
Fatigue 1 1 4 0.43303 1.30149 3.00554 
Perception 1/5 1/4 1 0.10050 0.30205 3.00554 
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For the first row in the matrix, that is: 1!0.4667 + 1!0.43303 + 5!0.10050 =1.40199. 
However, the new eigenvector expresses the term Aw in the equation !" ! !!"#! (Saaty, 
2008). The &max is then calculated by dividing each component of the new eigenvector with its 
corresponding eigenvector (Priorities 1). In the case that &max differ between elements, the 
&max mean is obtained. Moreover, if any of the estimates for "max turns out to be less than n, 
or 3 in this case, then an error in the calculations has been made, which is a useful simple 
check of the overall calculations. Knowing the value of "max the consistency index and 
consistency ratio (RI=0.58, for n=3, Table 7-3) are calculated as:  
!" ! !!"#!!!!! ! ! !!!!""#!!! !!0.00277 and !" ! !"!" ! 0.00477 
Since the CR is < 0.1, the matrix is consistent and can be used for the calculation of the final 
priorities. The same process was followed for all the other pairwise matrices. Finally, the 
unweighted supermatrix was derived as shown in the Table 7-9 (in bold are indicated the 
values of the example given above, while the zero values suggest that there is no influence 
between these elements). The responses of the SME to obtain the supermatrix are included 
in the Appendix XI. 
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Table 7-9 The unweighted supermatrix  
C11 Dynamic personal Organisational Personal System Task Team 
e11 
 
W11 
D F P Pr SC S F T SD W C I 
D
yn
am
ic
 
pe
rs
on
al
 D 0.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4934 0.5469 0.0000 0.4286 0.1248 0.4665 0.3333 
F 0.8333 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3108 0.1085 0.0000 0.4286 0.7248 0.4330 0.3333 
P 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1958 0.3445 0.0000 0.1429 0.1504 0.1005 0.3333 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
na
l 
Pr 0.3333 0.3275 0.4545 0.0000 0.6667 0.5000 0.6044 0.3255 0.4330 0.6337 0.4761 0.4330 
SC 0.3333 0.4126 0.4545 0.8333 0.0000 0.5000 0.3255 0.0701 0.4665 0.1744 0.4523 0.4665 
S 0.3333 0.2599 0.0909 0.1667 0.3333 0.0000 0.0701 0.6044 0.1005 0.1919 0.0716 0.1005 
Pe
rs
on
al
 
F 0.1250 1.0000 0.1429 0.0000 0.5000 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.8333 0.5000 0.5000 
T 0.8750 0.0000 0.8571 1.0000 0.5000 0.5000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.1667 0.5000 0.5000 
Sy
st
em
 
SD 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Ta
sk
 
W 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Te
am
 C 0.8571 0.5000 0.8000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.1667 0.8750 0.5000 0.2500 0.0000 1.0000 
I 0.1429 0.5000 0.2000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.8333 0.1250 0.5000 0.7500 1.0000 0.0000 
D: Distraction, F: Fatigue, P: Perception, Pr: Procedures, SC: Safety culture, S: Supervision, F: Familiarity, T: Training, SD: System design,          
W: Workload, C: Communication, I: Information 
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7.5.7.2 Categories pairwise comparisons – the cluster supermatrix  
The relative measurement of all R-PSFs categories with respect to their influence on human 
performance is estimated in a similar way. In particular, SMEs were asked to assess the 
relative importance of one of two R-PSFs categories over the second, on influencing a third 
R-PSFs category with respect to the influence of R-PSFs on operators performance. Table 
7-10 illustrates an example of the matrix that the experts were asked to fill in. For this 
example, which refers to the Personal Factors category, participants were asked to assess 
the importance of the R-PSFs by replying to the question whether ”considering the influence 
of each factor category on the performance of the operator, of the two factor categories in 
each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it with respect 
to the influence on the personal factors?“  
Table 7-10 Example of a pairwise comparison matrix for a category of factors 
 
Again, pairwise matrices for all parent elements and their children are created, the priorities 
for each matrix are calculated and finally the consistency ratio for each matrix is obtained. 
Table 7-11 illustrates the pairwise comparison matrix for the Personal Factors cluster. 
Table 7-11 Pairwise comparisons for clusters  
Personal Dynamic Organisational Personal System Task Team 
Dynamic 1 3 1 1 1/2 3 
Organisational 1/3 1 1/2 1 1/2 2 
Personal 1 2 1 2 1 2 
System 1 1 1/2 1 1/2 2 
Task 2 2 1 2 1 1 
Team 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1 
Personal Extreme Very strong Strong Moderate Equal Moderate Strong Very strong Extreme Personal
Dynamic Personal 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Organisational
Dynamic Personal 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Personal
Dynamic Personal 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 System
Dynamic Personal 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Task
Dynamic Personal 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Team
Organisational 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Personal
Organisational 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 System
Organisational 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Task
Organisational 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Team
Personal 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 System
Personal 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Task
Personal 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Team
System 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Task
System 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Team
Task 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Team
Chapter 7     THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE RAILWAY OPERATIONAL INDEX  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
258 
Since the consistency ratio of the matrix is 0.06069, it is raised to its 5th power until the 
desired priorities are derived (indicated in bold in the Table 7-12). Once all priorities are 
obtained, the cluster matrix is designed as shown in the Table 7-12. Similar to the 
unweighted supermatrix, the responses of the SME used to obtain the cluster supermatrix 
are provided in the Appendix XI. 
Table 7-12 The cluster matrix 
 
Dynamic 
Personal Organisational Personal System Task Team 
Dynamic Personal 0.20020 0.03150 0.20627 0.23450 0.22300 0.08305 
Organisational 0.12824 0.29324 0.11616 0.13540 0.14519 0.27615 
Personal 0.14675 0.06685 0.21213 0.29556 0.22031 0.14336 
System 0.20505 0.15508 0.13772 0.00000 0.26229 0.17543 
Task 0.11659 0.19052 0.22900 0.18937 0.00000 0.09322 
Team 0.20318 0.26281 0.09872 0.14518 0.14921 0.22880 
Results indicate that the task, personal and dynamic personal R-PSFs categories almost 
equally affect the personal factors category. In contrast, according to the SME, team factors 
are considered to have a very limited impact on personal factors. In addition, the direct and 
indirect influence of one category of factors on another are derived. For example, as shown 
in the Figure 7-5, for the dynamic personal category it can be observed that only 20% is 
explained by direct influence, i.e. internal dependencies, whereas the remaining 80% is 
justified by indirect influence. On the other hand, as no internal dependencies exist amongst 
the 12 R-PSFs within the system and task clusters, the direct influence of those two 
categories is zero.  
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Figure 7-5 The direct and indirect influence of factors categories  
7.5.7.3 The weighted supermatrix 
Once the unweighted and cluster matrices are estimated, the weighed supermatrix is 
computed by multiplying each of the values in the cluster columns with the corresponding 
values in the unweighted supermatrix. To compute the values in the column communication 
(indicated in bold font), for example, the values in column team of the cluster matrix with the 
values in column communication in the unweighted matrix are multiplied. That is for the first 
three rows, which correspond to dynamic personal factors category, 
!!!"#!$!!!!""!# ! !!!"#$%! !!!"#!$!!!!""#" ! !!!"#$%! !!!"#!$!!!!""#" ! !!!!"#$ 
Following the same rational, the weighted supermatrix is derived, as shown in Table 7-13. 
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Table 7-13 The weighted supermatrix  
 
Dynamic personal Organisational Personal System Task Team 
D F P Pr SC S F T SD W C I 
D
yn
am
ic
 
pe
rs
on
al
 D 0.0000 0.2002 0.1001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0155 0.1128 0.0000 0.1005 0.0278 0.0387 0.0277 
F 0.1668 0.0000 0.1001 0.0000 0.0315 0.0098 0.0224 0.0000 0.1005 0.1616 0.0360 0.0277 
P 0.0334 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0062 0.0711 0.0000 0.0335 0.0335 0.0083 0.0277 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
na
l 
Pr 0.0427 0.0420 0.0583 0.0000 0.1955 0.1466 0.0702 0.0670 0.0586 0.0920 0.1315 0.1196 
SC 0.0427 0.0529 0.0583 0.3923 0.0000 0.1466 0.0378 0.0144 0.0632 0.0253 0.1249 0.1288 
S 0.0427 0.0333 0.0117 0.0785 0.0977 0.0000 0.0081 0.1243 0.0136 0.0279 0.0198 0.0278 
Pe
rs
on
al
 
F 0.0183 0.1467 0.0210 0.0000 0.0334 0.0334 0.0000 0.3756 0.1478 0.1836 0.0717 0.0717 
T 0.1284 0.0000 0.1258 0.1073 0.0334 0.0334 0.2121 0.0000 0.1478 0.0367 0.0717 0.0717 
Sy
st
em
 
SD 0.2051 0.2051 0.2051 0.0000 0.1551 0.1551 0.1377 0.2439 0.0000 0.2623 0.1754 0.1754 
Ta
sk
 
W 0.1166 0.1166 0.1166 0.0000 0.1905 0.1905 0.2290 0.0000 0.1894 0.0000 0.0932 0.0932 
Te
am
 C 0.1742 0.1016 0.1625 0.2110 0.1314 0.1314 0.0165 0.1530 0.0726 0.0373 0.0000 0.2288 
I 0.0290 0.1016 0.0406 0.2110 0.1314 0.1314 0.0823 0.0219 0.0726 0.1119 0.2288 0.0000 
D: Distraction, F: Fatigue, P: Perception, Pr: Procedures, SC: Safety culture, S: Supervision, F: Familiarity, T: Training, SD: System design,          
W: Workload, C: Communication, I: Information 
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7.5.7.4 The limit supermatrix – the R-PSFs final weightings 
For the calculation of the limit priorities, the weighted matrix is raised to limiting powers until 
its columns become identical. Raising the weighted matrix to its 5th power, the desired limit 
supermatrix, which contains the limit priorities, is obtained, as shown in the Table 7-14. 
Final results indicate that the respondent considers system design as the most significant 
contributor factor to the performance of operators. In turn, he identifies workload as the 
second more important factor, while communication and information as the third and fourth 
respectively. These values represent the weightings in the HuPeROI equation.  
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Table 7-14 The limit supermatrix – final priorities 
 
Dynamic personal Organisational Personal System Task Team 
D F P Pr SC S F T SD W C I 
D
yn
am
ic
 
pe
rs
on
al
 D !"!#!$ !"!#!$ !"!#!$ !"!#!$ !"!#!$ !"!#!$ !"!#!$ !"!#!$ !"!#!$ !"!#!$ !"!#!$ !"!#!$ 
F !"!##% !"!##% !"!##% !"!##% !"!##% !"!##% !"!##% !"!##% !"!##% !"!##% !"!##% !"!##% 
P !"!&'( !"!&'( !"!&'( !"!&'( !"!&'( !"!&'( !"!&'( !"!&'( !"!&'( !"!&'( !"!&'( !"!&'( 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
na
l 
Pr !"!)*$ !"!)*$ !"!)*$ !"!)*$ !"!)*$ !"!)*$ !"!)*$ !"!)*$ !"!)*$ !"!)*$ !"!)*$ !"!)*$ 
SC !"!+!& !"!+!& !"!+!& !"!+!& !"!+!& !"!+!& !"!+!& !"!+!& !"!+!& !"!+!& !"!+!& !"!+!& 
S !"!%'% !"!%'% !"!%'% !"!%'% !"!%'% !"!%'% !"!%'% !"!%'% !"!%'% !"!%'% !"!%'% !"!%'% 
Pe
rs
on
al
 
F !"'!&+ !"'!$! !"'!$! !"'!$! !"'!&+ !"'!&+ !"'!$! !"'!$! !"'!$! !"'!$! !"'!$! !"'!$! 
T !"!)## !"!)## !"!)## !"!)## !"!)## !"!)## !"!)## !"!)## !"!)## !"!)## !"!)## !"!)## 
Sy
st
em
 
SD !"'%*! !"'%*! !"'%*! !"'%*! !"'%*! !"'%*! !"'%*! !"'%*! !"'%*! !"'%*! !"'%*! !"'%*! 
Ta
sk
 
W !"''!* !"''!* !"''!* !"''!* !"''!* !"''!* !"''!* !"''!* !"''!* !"''!* !"''!* !"''!* 
Te
am
 C !"'!(% !"'!(% !"'!(% !"'!(% !"'!(% !"'!(% !"'!(% !"'!(% !"'!(% !"'!(% !"'!(% !"'!(% 
I !"'!'% !"'!'% !"'!'% !"'!'% !"'!'% !"'!'% !"'!'% !"'!'% !"'!'% !"'!'% !"'!'% !"'!'% 
D: Distraction, F: Fatigue, P: Perception, Pr: Procedures, SC: Safety culture, S: Supervision, F: Familiarity, T: Training, SD: System design,          
W: Workload, C: Communication, I: Information 
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7.5.8 The ratings of the R-PSFs 
For the rating of the R-PSFs the concept of the SLIM methodology is adopted. Thus, the 
SMEs are asked to consider the quality of the identified factors for each of the operational 
erroneous actions. According to the scenario, a train driver fails to stop the train before 
passes a signal that displays red aspect (SPAD). In this situation, the three operational 
errors are related to the: (i) signal detection, (ii) signal interpretation and finally (iii) executed 
action, which are in absolute agreement with the concept of the railway operational errors, 
as described in the Section 4.1. 
For each of the errors, the SMEs were asked to rate to what extent each of the R-PSFs were 
good or bad in the action under consideration. The participants indicated their responses in 
the Table 7-15, which here illustrates the answers of the SME who was also used as 
example for the assessment of the R-PSFs.   
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Table 7-15 The rating of R-PSFs for the three type of actions (potential errors) 
 Rating of Railway Performance Shaping Factors 
Scenario - Errors R-PSFs 
SPAD 
Train driver, open 
line (not tunnel), 
day operation, 
good weather 
conditions, good 
visibility  
Tr
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ng
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(in
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. H
M
I) 
Job at time of 
SPAD 
Train driver fails 
to stop the train 
before passes 
signal at danger 
0 
= 
no
 tr
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,  
50
= 
so
m
e 
tra
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g,
  
10
0=
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od
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es
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1. Signal 
detection 80 80 10 30 20 60 70 70 70 80 80 50 
2. Signal 
interpretation 80 60 20 40 10 60 70 70 70 80 80 50 
3. Action 
executed 70 40 10 30 20 50 60 40 70 50 50 50 
Chapter 7     THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE RAILWAY OPERATIONAL INDEX 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
265 
The R-PSFs rating is shown in the Figure 7-6. It can be seen, that the respondent had a 
constant perception of the extent to which each R-PSF is optimal or suboptimal with respect 
to each action.  
 In particular, it is shown that for the tasks signal detection and signal interpretation only the 
dynamic personal factors are account for as being strongly suboptimal, while the majority of 
remainder factors can be claimed to be positive. On the other hand, it is clear that the SME 
considers that the R-PSFs tend to be much more suboptimal in the case of the action 
executed correctly. For this action, the dynamic R-PSFs have a negative impact on the task, 
team and organisational factors. 
 
Figure 7-6 The rating of R-PSFs per type of error 
7.5.9 The HuPeROI calculations 
Having assessed (weighted) the contribution of each R-PSF to human performance and 
rated to what extent every factor is positive or negative with respect to an erroneous action 
for the defined scenario, the HuPeROI for each action is then calculated using the equation: 
!"#$%&'! ! !!!!!! !!!"     (7-3) 
Based on the derived responses the HuPeROI for the first action, the signal detection, is 
computed as: 
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!"#$%&'!"#$%&!!"#"$#"!!! !!"#$%&'$"()!!!"#$%&'$"()!!!!!"#$%&!!"#"$#"!! ! !!"#$%&'!!!"#$%&'!!!!!"#$%&!!"#"$#"! !!! ! !!"#$%&'(!$"!!!"#$%&'(!$"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#"$#"! ! !"!!""#!
Similarly, the other two indexes are found !"#$%&'!"#$%&!!!"#$%&%$#$' ! !"!!"#$ !"#$%&'!"#$%&!!"!#$%!&!!"##$!%&' ! !"!!""! 
The HuPeROI, based on the concept of SLIM, reflects the overall belief of the SMEs, 
regarding the positive or negative effects of the R-PSFs on the likelihood of success for the 
task under consideration.  Braking down the results, it can be observed that for all types of 
errors, distraction and fatigue are considered the most suboptimal factors; that is, they 
degraded the performance of the operator the most. In addition, the ratings for the three 
different errors can be compared. It can then be seen that from the ratings of the factors that 
the quality of information, quality of procedures and supervision contributed significantly to 
the final outcome, which indicates the action executed correctly as the least successful 
action. This is explained firstly, by the fact that all the three R-PSFs were assigned with 
much lower scores for this action. Secondly, by the fact that the factors’ quality of 
information and quality of procedures were weighted with relatively high scores amongst the 
R-PSFs, and thus contributed to the final calculations respectively.  
In summary, as described in the Section 7.4, the HuPeROIs indicate the relative likelihoods 
of different erroneous actions, where the greater the HuPeROI the greater the probability of 
success for the task (action) under consideration. Within this context, the HuPeROI should 
be used as an indicator to define the most prone error amongst a series of actions. It should 
also be used to highlight the most significant contributing factors for such an error.  
Subsequently, it can be claimed that the HuPeROI results can be used prospectively in 
order to identify the most likely human errors, between a set of errors. In addition, the 
findings can be used to explore how the defined R-PSFs (i) have been assessed to 
contribute to the performance of the operators, and (ii) have been rated regarding their 
influence on the reliability of operators to perform their tasks.  
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7.5.10 The change of overall performance under certain conditions 
As mentioned in the Section 7.5.4 in the last part of the questionnaire, the SMEs were also 
asked to indicate the influence of specific external conditions on their performance for the 
SPAD scenario. These include: adverse and intermediate weather conditions, night 
operations, degraded operations, i.e. speed restrictions, and finally operations in tunnels 
(only for the underground services). For this, a 0 to 100 scale was used, where 0 indicates 
no influence on performance, while 100 expresses the maximum of influence (either 
improving or reducing), as shown in the Appendix XI. Again, the purpose of those questions 
was to indicate whether the SMEs consider any special conditions as factors that may affect 
their overall performance. 
7.5.11 Possible sources of errors and limitations of the HuPeROI 
The HuPeROI framework presented in this thesis addresses particular weaknesses 
concerning the modelling of factors that affect human performance. In particular, compared 
to the traditional HPA techniques, it determines the influence of the R-PSFs on the 
performance of railway operators accounting for both direct and indirect dependencies 
amongst the relevant factors. Additionally, it allows researchers to identify the relative 
likelihoods of different errors for a certain task. However, the approach has limitations and 
possible sources of errors. The latter refer primarily to the shortcomings of the survey, while 
the former to the shortcomings of the methodology and its outcomes. 
7.5.11.1 Possible sources of errors  
There are two main potential sources of errors in the survey, respondent and data pre-
processing. The respondent errors may primarily occur due to the imprecision in the 
formulation of questions and the inconsistent interpretation of the factors to be assessed. 
The former was addressed by the validation of the questionnaire and the preliminary study, 
as described in the Section 7.5.4 and 7.5.5. The case of inconsistent interpretation was also 
tackled by the validation of the questionnaire, while the distribution of the definitions and 
examples of the factors should have mitigated the creation of such errors. Finally, the 
possibility of errors arising from the pre-processing of the responses was reduced by due 
diligence at the data completion and input stage of data for the calculations. The former was 
ensured by the physical presence of the author during the completion of questionnaires, 
while the latter with double-checking of each input by an independent, third assessor.  
Chapter 7     THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE RAILWAY OPERATIONAL INDEX 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
268 
7.5.11.2 Limitations of the HuPeROI  
There are two principal limitations related to the HuPeROI framework. The first is the 
complex approach to weighting the R-PSFs. The second reflects the SMEs’ understanding 
of the fundamental scale and the translation of a person’s judgment into a number. 
Furthermore, HuPeROI does not calculate error probabilities for the different types of 
actions. 
For the R-PSFs weightings, a large number of pairwise comparisons is required, to 
represent all the factor dependencies and subsequently, to determine their final contribution 
to human performance. For example, in the survey presented in this thesis each of the 
SMEs was asked to complete 18 matrices and to conduct 148 pairwise comparisons. This 
makes the methodology cumbersome especially for those participants with no previous 
experience in similar studies, e.g. train drivers.  
In addition, the large number of matrices is problematic for both the respondents and 
researchers. In particular, for this research the author transformed 52 questionnaires, and 
entries from 936 matrices and in total almost 140,000 pairwise comparisons into data that 
could be analysed further. This is time consuming, and requires extra care at the input stage 
of the data for the calculations.  
The second limitation is also related to the conventional ANP model and reflects on its 
inefficiency to capture any inherent fuzziness or uncertainty in the SMEs judgments during 
the process of the pairwise comparisons. Although the simplicity of the fundamental 1-9 
scale makes it easily understandable by the assessors (Zhang et al., 2009), it fails to 
account for any potential uncertainties related to the mapping of one’s perception or 
judgment to a number. Thus, HuPeROI is developed on the assumption that all the SMEs 
perceive in the same way the importance of each number compared to the other numbers in 
the scale.  
In addition to the limitations above, a third weakness of HuPeROI is the fact that it does not 
provide error probabilities for the different types of erroneous actions. In other words, 
although HuPeROI allows researchers to identify the ranking of the likelihoods of the 
erroneous actions, it does not express the different likelihoods in terms of probabilities.  
Despite its limitations, HuPeROI is the first complete framework tailored to the railway 
industry, which allows researchers to:  
(i) determine the factors that affect the performance of the railway operators for a 
broad variety of scenarios; 
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(ii) assess the importance of the factors that affect human performance, accounting 
for all the dependencies amongst the factors; 
(iii) define the quality of the factors for several erroneous actions for a task under 
consideration and finally; 
(iv) indicate the most erroneous action among a series of actions.  
HuPeROI’s results can be used to provide insights on operator performance for several 
railway operational tasks. This should enable railway organisations to develop sound 
solutions to enhance human performance, firstly by improving the quality of the factors that 
affect railway operators and, secondly, by mitigating the impact of those factors on human 
performance. 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter presented the development of a new approach referred to as the Human 
Performance Railway Operational Index (HuPeROI) and its underlying theory. The HuPeROI 
aims firstly to assess the influence of each of the most significant contributing factors on the 
performance of railway operators. Secondly to rate how good or bad each of the factors is 
considered for different human errors and, thirdly, to provide insights on operators’ 
performance by comparing the success likelihood indexes of different human actions.  
The chapter started with the introduction of the different Multi Criteria Decision Making 
(MCDM) methodologies, which could be applied to assess the contribution of each of the R-
PSFs on human performance. This was followed by the justification of the relevance of the 
Analytic Network Process (ANP) as the most appropriate approach to be used for the 
development of the HuPeROI. The ANP methodology was then detailed and the integration 
of the ANP and SLIM approaches demonstrated. Furthermore, the steps to weight and rate 
each of the R-PSFs as well as to calculate the HuPeROI were explained in detail. This was 
followed by the implementation of the HuPeROI based on a case study. The analysis and 
results of the case study are presented thoroughly in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF THE HUPEROI 
CASE STUDY 
The previous chapter developed the HuPeROI framework and presented the background to 
the case study for this thesis. This chapter applies the HuPeROI framework to the case 
study, and discusses the results.   
The chapter starts by describing the profiles of the SMEs, followed by the presentation of the 
weightings for categories and elements of the Railway Performance Shaping Factors (R-
PSFs). The ratings of the R-PSF elements are then specified and the indexes for the three 
different erroneous actions are calculated. The chapter concludes with the validation of the 
results and summary of the findings.  
8.1 The sample characteristics 
In was highlighted in the Section 7.5.6 that a total of 56 responses were collected throughout 
the survey from SMEs belonging to three UK train operator companies (Piccadilly Line, LUL, 
First Hull Trains, and FirstScot Rail) and one HFs (RSSB) experts group. The responses for 
the weighting of the factors, i.e. the assessment of factors impact on human performance, 
were transformed into pairwise matrices. The matrices represent the strength of dominance 
of one element over another element. For each matrix the consistency ratio of each 
determined. This resulted in 45 acceptable responses. For the remaining 11, the process 
described in the Section 7.3.2 was followed. Firstly, the most inconsistent (larger) 
assessment in the matrix was defined. Secondly, the range of values to which that 
assessment can be changed to improve inconsistency were determined. Finally, the 
respondents were asked to change their assessments to a plausible value in that range. 
Four sets of matrices were rejected, as the respondents refused to modify their answers. 
This resulted eventually in 52 questionnaires and usable responses from 35 train drivers, 14 
operations managers and 3 HFs experts. The survey captured interesting information on the 
demographics of the SMEs, i.e. age groups, gender, and operational experience. Firstly, the 
results confirm the general belief and published studies, e.g. (Robison, 2012), that UK 
railway operations are run mainly by male professionals. In particular, only 8.6% of the train 
drivers are female. In addition, results show that about 60% of the train drivers have more 
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than 11 years of experience, while 64.3% of the operations managers have more than 20. 
Furthermore, about 30% of the train drivers have been involved in the occurrence of at least 
one SPAD. The design to capture the representative diversity of the SMEs was based on 
previous studies in the field, e.g. (Ryan et al., 2009). The main characteristics of the sample 
are presented in Table 8-1. 
Table 8-1 Characteristics of the sample 
Characteristics of sample 
Type of employees Frequency Percent 
Train drivers 35 67.3 
Operations managers 14 26.9 
HFs experts 
 
 
3 5.8 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Male 47 90.4 
Female 5 9.6 
Age group Frequency Percent 
Under 25 1 3.8 
25-34 7 13.5 
35-44 17 32.69 
45-56 22  40.38 
Over 56 5 9.6 
Operational experience Frequency Percent 
Less than a year 7 13.5 
1 to 5  1 3.8 
6 to 10  10 19.2 
11 to 19  13 19.2 
20 or more 21 42.3 
Involved to a SPAD before Frequency Percent 
Yes 15 28.8 
No 37 71.2 
It can be seen from Table 8-1 that the frequencies within the classification subgroups of age 
and operational experience vary considerably. Therefore, a second classification was 
performed to minimise such variations and to facilitate the analysis and interpretation of 
results. Firstly, for the age group, it was found that the youngest SME was older than 23 
years at the time of the survey. Therefore, this SME was moved to the next group, renamed 
24-35 years old. Similarly, one SME within the original group with 1-5 years of operational 
experience was also moved to the next group, renamed 5-10 years of experience. This was 
because this SME had more than 3 years of service. In addition, the groups less than a year 
and 1-4 years of operational experience were not merged, as no SME was identified to 
represent the second range of years of operational experience. Table 8-2 shows the 
characteristics of the sample after re-grouping. 
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Table 8-2 Characteristics of the sample after regrouping 
Characteristics of sample 
 Train Driver Operations Manager 
Age group Age group 
24-34 35-44 45-56 Over 56 24-34 35-44 45-56 Over 56 
Gender 
Male 6 7 15 4 ! 
"  
6 7 1 
Female 1 2 ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Operational experience 
< 1 year 5 1 1 ! ! ! ! ! 
1 to 4 yrs ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
5 to 10 yrs 2 4 1 ! ! ! 2 ! 
11 to 19 yrs ! 4 3 2 ! 2 ! 1 
!20 yrs ! ! 10 2 ! 4 5 ! 
SPAD involvement 
No 6 8 9 2 ! 3 6 ! 
Yes 1 1 6 2 ! 3 1 1 
From the characteristics, and although there are a number of empty cells, the sample could 
be argued to be reasonably representative of the population. For example, it is not surprising 
that none of the operations managers was under 34 years of age or with less than 5 years 
operational experience. This is because they tend to be ex-train drivers who move to 
operational support roles, including training, instruction and management. On the other 
hand, it is a limitation that no train drivers with 1-4 years of experience are included in the 
sample. This should be addressed in future research. Therefore, generalisation of the 
substantive findings from the analysis of the resulting dataset to passenger TOCs at large 
requires caution, statistical weighting and the exercise of judgment. Moreover, any attempt 
to generalise the results should also account for substantial differences amongst the 
operations systems; e.g. the Piccadilly Line services operate on a manual basis, whilst the 
Jubilee Line services are automated. Finally, although the demographics of the HFs experts 
cannot be considered representative, the HFs review team consists of two females and one 
male, between 35-44 years old, with at least 5 years of experience in the railway industry 
(but more than 10 years in the field of HFs).  
Having defined the groups of interest for the analysis, the next section presents the results 
from the pairwise comparisons for the weightings of the R-PSFs categories. The analysis 
explores whether the derived data are related to the different types of the SMEs, i.e. train 
drivers, operations managers, and HFs experts. Therefore, comparison of the responses 
determined by the members of each subgroup is performed to identify if the results of any 
subgroup vary significantly. In addition, for the train drivers, it is examined whether the 
responses are affected by gender, age, level and type of experience. 
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8.2 The weightings of the R-PSFs lite categories  
This section presents the findings of the weightings for the R-PSFs categories, which result 
in the cluster supermatrix for each participant. The normality of data was first tested using 
the Shapiro-Wilk test, which compares the scores in the sample to a normally distributed set 
of scores with the same mean and standard deviation. If the test is significant, (p<.05), the 
distribution of the sample is significantly different from a normal distribution and vice versa 
(Field, 2009). The Shapiro-Wilk test was used, as it is more powerful to detect differences 
from normality, compared, for example, to Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Anderson-Darling and 
Lilliefors tests (Field, 2009, Razali and Wah, 2011). Results show that the majority of the 
data are not normally distributed, therfore necessitating the use of the relevant non-
parametric tests, i.e. Kruskal-Wallis, Mann-Whitney and Friedman’s, and ANOVA tests. 
Data were afterwards tested for homogeneity, to indicate whether the responses collected 
from the different subgroups vary significantly. For this, Kruskal-Wallis tests were applied, as 
described in the Section 6.3.2. When results indicate significant differences, post hoc tests 
were used to identify which particular participants are responsible for such differences. 
Therefore, the Mann-Whitney with Bonferroni correction (MW/B) non-parametric test was 
applied. Similar to Kruskal-Wallis, MW/B is based on the ranking and grouping of data. The 
Mann-Whitney U statistic is calculated as: 
! ! !!!! ! !!!!!!!!! ! !!     (8-1) 
where n1 and n2 are the samples sizes of groups 1 and 2 respectively, and R1 is the sum of 
ranks for group 1. The test is applied to each pairwise combination of variables to examine 
the null hypothesis whereby the two samples are not significantly different. In practice, the 
test statistic U represents the difference between the two rank totals, where the smaller the 
U (considering the number of participants in each group), the less likely it is that such a 
difference occurred by chance. In turn, the Bonferroni correction is used to avoid 
accidentally rejecting the null hypothesis by using more rigid rejection criteria derived from 
the initial significance level divided by the number of pairs being analysed (Field, 2009). 
Finally, Field (2009) suggests that when the sample sizes are less than 25 per group, then 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z (KS-Z) test should be applied. It should be noted that where the 
results from the KS-Z test are not presented, there are no significant differences compared 
to the Mann-Whitney results.  
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Table 8-3 Descriptive statistics for the R-PSFs lite categories weighting  
 Variable N* Mean SD SE 
95% confidence 
interval Min Max Normality** Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
D
yn
am
ic
 
Dynamic 52 0.3059 0.1459 0.0202 0.2653 0.3466 0.0506 0.588
4 
✓ 
Personal  52 0.1464 0.0930 0.0129 0.1205 0.1723 0.0415 0.390
3 
! 
Organisational 52 0.1707 0.0864 0.0119 0.1466 0.1947 0.0502 0.387
1 
! 
Team 52 0.0753 0.0518 0.0072 0.0609 0.0898 0.0225 0.203
8 
! 
Task 52 0.1937 0.1213 0.0168 0.1599 0.2275 0.0325 0.561
1 
! 
System 52 0.1077 0.0636 0.0088 0.0900 0.1255 0.0313 0.294
4 
! 
P
er
so
na
l 
Dynamic 52 0.2832 0.1384 0.0192 0.2446 0.3217 0.0252 0.534
4 
✓ 
Personal  52 0.1900 0.1030 0.0143 0.1613 0.2187 0.0620 0.506
2 
! 
Organisational 52 0.1349 0.0670 0.0092 0.1162 0.1535 0.3222 0.395
4 
! 
Team 52 0.0812 0.0550 0.0076 0.0658 0.0965 0.0249 0.277
8 
! 
Task 52 0.1979 0.0987 0.0137 0.1705 0.2255 0.0438 0.460
3 
✓ 
System 52 0.1126 0.0642 0.0089 0.0948 0.1305 0.0271 0.372
3 
! 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
na
l Dynamic 52 0.2112 0.1451 0.0129 0.1708 0.2516 0.0251 0.583
4 
! 
Personal  52 0.1560 0.0862 0.0119 0.1320 0.1800 0.0351 0.410
6 
! 
Organisational 52 0.2038 0.1317 0.0182 0.1671 0.2404 0.0445 0.597
4 
! 
Team 52 0.1159 0.0720 0.0099 0.0958 0.1359 0.0310 0.323
4 
! 
Task 52 0.1721 0.1109 0.0153 0.1412 0.2030 0.0317 0.552
2 
! 
System 52 0.1408 0.0841 0.0116 0.1174 0.1643 0.0229 0.362
8 
! 
Te
am
 
Dynamic 52 0.2106 0.1367 0.0189 0.1725 0.2487 0.0227 0.519
2 
! 
Personal  52 0.1641 0.0784 0.1088 0.1422 0.1859 0.0472 0.384
9 
! 
Organisational 52 0.1952 0.1119 0.0155 0.1640 0.2263 0.0393 0.521
4 
! 
Team 52 0.1548 0.1422 0.0197 0.1152 0.1944 0.0266 0.618
0 
! 
Task 52 0.1583 0.1004 0.0139 0.1303 0.1863 0.0353 0.449
0 
! 
System 52 0.1168 0.0544 0.0075 0.1016 0.1319 0.0248 0.275
4 
✓ 
Ta
sk
 
Dynamic 52 0.3255 0.1656 0.0229 0.2794 0.3716 0.0319 0.640
6 
✓ 
Personal  52 0.2022 0.1001 0.0138 0.1744 0.2301 0.0730 0.545
4 
! 
Organisational 52 0.2269 0.1375 0.0190 0.1886 0.2652 0.0471 0.616
7 
! 
Team 52 0.1010 0.0589 0.0081 0.0846 0.1174 0.0266 0.286
1 
! 
System 52 0.1441 0.0837 0.0116 0.1208 0.1674 0.0363 0.426
3 
! 
S
ys
te
m
 Dynamic 52 0.2451 0.1595 0.0221 0.2007 0.2896 0.0282 0.6004 
! 
Personal  52 0.1997 0.1068 0.0148 0.1700 0.2295 0.0463 0.516
5 
! 
Organisational 52 0.2150 0.1309 0.0181 0.1785 0.2514 0.0410 0.536
4 
! 
Team 52 0.1252 0.0827 0.0114 0.1021 0.1482 0.0292 0.347
9 
! 
Task 52 0.2148 0.1345 0.0186 0.1773 0.2522 0.0521 0.649
6 
! 
*the mean, SE and SD when HFs responses are excluded change after the 3rd decimal 
** normality at 95% level of confidence  
In addition, findings were tested for outliers, i.e. data points that are not consistent with the 
others within a sample from the same population (Field, 2009). For this, boxplots were 
created for each of the variables. When outliers were identified, two datasets were created, 
with and without, and the statistical tests performed on both datasets. The test results 
showed no significant difference between the two datasets. Therefore, the following sections 
present the results for the complete dataset.  
Chapter 8     ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF THE HUPEROI CASE STUDY 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
275 
8.2.1 Influence of the R-PSFs categories on dynamic personal factors  
Starting with the weightings of the R-PSFs categories with respect to the dynamic personal 
factors, results as shown in Table 8-4, indicate significant differences in the responses 
between the subgroups of the review team for two combinations of factors. The influence of 
the system and organisational factors on dynamic personal factors.  
Table 8-4 Effect of R-PSFs categories on Dynamic Personal Factors for the SMEs subgroups 
Dynamic 
personal Dynamic personal Organisational Personal System Task Team 
H 2.998 6.089 3.110 8.586 1.168 .581 
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Sig. p>.05 p<.05 p>.05 p<.05 p>.05 p>.05 
For the former, the Mann-Whitney test suggests that the train drivers weightings were higher 
compared to those of operations managers and HFs experts, (U=147, r=-.309) and (U=11, 
r=-.364) respectively. That is, train drivers consider that the factors related to the system 
(e.g. system design and HMI) affect the factors related to the operator at the time of the 
occurrence (e.g. distraction, and loss of concentration), more compared to the judgements of 
the operations managers and HFs experts.  
For the latter, post hoc tests fail to show the origin of such a difference. However, it could be 
assumed that the difference is justified by the judgements of trains drivers compared to 
those of operations managers and HFs experts, where the train drivers weight the influence 
of organisational factors, e.g. safety culture, on dynamic personal factors with higher scores. 
Subsequently, it can be claimed that the characteristics of the subgroups have an impact on 
the SMEs weightings. Nevertheless, in the case of the HFs experts, it should be noted that 
the small size of the group permits the mean value of weightings to be influenced more 
readily by any one judge that varies significantly from the rest of the group. 
Finally, between the train drivers in particular, the results do not indicate any significant 
differences for any combination of factors with respect to the control groups operational 
experience, gender, age or previous SPAD experience. In contrast, significant difference on 
the weightings of organisational factors on dynamic personal factors is identified between 
the responses for the different types of operations (H(2)=7.062, p<.05). This may imply 
different levels of organisational support amongst organisations, and therefore, further 
research is recommended.  
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8.2.2 Influence of the R-PSFs categories on personal factors 
Table 8-5 shows the results from the Kruskal-Wallis test for the influence of the R-PSFs 
caegories on personal factors, as derived from the responses of the different types of SMEs.  
Table 8-5 Effect of R-PSFs categories on Personal Factors for the SMEs subgroups 
Personal Dynamic personal Organisational Personal System Task Team 
H 8.230 4.280 2.290 1.768 1.097 3.801 
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Sig. p<.05 p>.05 p>.05 p>.05 p>.05 p>.05 
Results show significant differences in the responses only for the influence of dynamic 
personal factors on personal factors. In particular, post hoc tests suggest that the weightings 
of the train drivers are lower compared to those of operations managers (U=138, r=-.338). In 
addition, significant difference amongst the responses of HFs experts and operations 
managers was identified for the influence of dynamic personal factors on personal factors 
(U=4, z=-2.016, p<.05, r=-.488).  
Amongst train drivers, statistics indicate significant differences in the responses with respect 
to type of operation, operational experience and gender. Concerning the influence of gender, 
male train drivers suggest that the influence of personal factors on personal factors is higher 
compared to the judgments given by the female personnel (U=12, z=-2.121, p<.05, r=-.358). 
However, no specific explanation could be identified for this observation.  
For the operational experience, significant differences were identified in the influence of 
organisational factors on personal factors (H(3)=9.921, p<.05). In particular, the least 
experienced personnel consider such an influence less important compared to personnel 
with 11-19 years (U=10, r=-.569) and 20 or more (U=18, r=-.465) of operational experience. 
This can be explained by the fact that the least experienced personnel have just completed 
their training program, where the importance of organisational principles and factors are 
highlighted. Subsequently, the operators feel confident about this factor and they do not 
consider them as highly important.  
Finally, with respect to the type of operation, the difference (H(2)=14.787, p<.05) reflects the 
impact of the organisational factors on personal factors, which is similar to the one found for 
the dynamic personal factors and can be interpreted accordingly. Subsequently, it can be 
concluded that the weightings for the influence of the R-PSFs categories on personal factors 
is linked to the duties and characteristics of the SMEs.  
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8.2.3 Influence of the R-PSFs categories on organisational factors 
The Kruskal-Wallis tests in Table 8-6 show significant differences in the responses between 
the SMEs for the influence of organisational factors and task factors on organisational 
factors. 
Table 8-6 Effect of R-PSFs categories on Organisational Factors for the SMEs subgroups 
 
Dynamic personal Organisational Personal System Task Team 
H 2.154 6.602 .724 1.444 5.279 .751 
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Sig. p>.05 p<.05 p>.05 p>.05 p<.05 p>.05 
The difference in the responses for the influence of organisational factors on organisational 
factors  is explained due to the higher scores that the HFs experts have assigned compared 
to train drivers (U=11, r=-.364) and operations managers (U=4, r=-.519). On the other hand, 
the difference of task on organisational factors is justified by the higher scores given by the 
operations managers compared to train drivers (U=145, r=-.316) and HFs experts (U=14, r=-
435). 
For the case of train drivers, significant differences in the data were found due to the type of 
operations, operational experience and previous SPAD experience. In particular, drivers with 
previous SPAD experience suggest that the task factors affect the organisational factors 
significantly more than those with no SPAD history (U=57, z=-2.483, p<.05, r=-.419,). In 
other words such a finding may indicate that due to the task characteristics, the operator 
overlooked the required organisational factors, resulting in a SPAD.  
In addition, with respect to operational experience, statistics show differences in the 
responses on the influence of dynamic personal factors (H(3)=8.841, p<.05) and system 
factors (H(3)=14.097, p<.05) on organisational factors. Breaking down the results for the 
differences on the impact of the dynamic personal factors on organisational factors, post hoc 
tests identify the two pairs involved. Firstly, the least experienced personnel have assigned 
higher scores compared to the employees with 5-10 years of operational experience (U=7, 
r=-.597). Secondly, train drivers with 5-10 years of experience have given lower scores to 
the impact of dynamic personal factors on organisational factors, compared to those with 11-
19 years of experience (U=5, r=-.70). On the other hand, for the differences in the responses 
on the impact of system factors on organisational factors, three pairs involved were found. 
The first is between the least experienced personnel and the personnel with 5-10 years of 
experience, with the latter assigning higher scores compared to the former (U=2, r=-.768). 
Chapter 8     ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF THE HUPEROI CASE STUDY 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
278 
The second, between personnel with 5-10 years of experience and those with 11-19 years, 
with the former giving higher scores compared to the latter (U=2, r=-.834). Furthermore, the 
employees with 5-10 years of operational experience assigned higher scores to the impact 
of system factors on organisational factors compared to the most experienced personnel, 
(U=8, r=-.659). Finally, significant differences, were identified for the assessments of train 
drivers on the influence of organisational factors (H(2)=7.872, p<.05) and task factors 
(H(2)=6.657, p<.05) on organisational factors. Consequently, similar to all the previous R-
PSFs categories, it is clear that the characteristics and duties of the SMEs affect their 
assessments.  
8.2.4 Influence of the R-PSFs categories on team factors 
Table 8-7 presents the Kruskal-Wallis results for the influence of the R-PSFs categories on 
team factors as derived from the responses of the SMEs subgroups. 
Table 8-7 Effect of R-PSFs categories on Team Factors for the SMEs subgroups 
 
Dynamic personal Organisational Personal System Task Team 
H 3.217 10.059 1.884 4.170 5.689 3.042 
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Sig. p>.05 p<.05 p>.05 p>.05 p<.05 p>.05 
Results show that the SMEs judgements differ significantly with respect to how they assess 
the influence of the organisational factors and task factors on team factors. In particular, for 
the first pair of factors, train drivers indicate such an influence with higher scores compared 
to the operations managers (U=104, r=-.446). For the second pair of factors, the judgments 
of train drivers differ with those of operations managers. However, this time the latter 
suggests that task factors are significantly more influential than team factors (U=159, r=-
.272). 
Amongst train drivers, the significant differences identified are explained by the gender and 
operational experience of the SMEs. In particular, it was found that in contrast to their male 
colleagues, female train drivers consider that the system factors have a higher effect on 
team factors (U=4, z=-2.593, r=-.438, p<.05). Regarding operational experience, significant 
differences were identified for the importance of dynamic personal factors on team factors 
(H(3)=3.034, p<.05) and team factors on themselves (H(3)=8.549, p<.05). Again, if the 
results are broken down, it is seen that the least experienced train drivers indicate that the 
dynamic personal factors have a higher effect, compared to the indications of employees 
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with 5-10 years of operational experience (U=8, r=-.563). In contrast, for the influence of 
team factors on themselves, the more experienced train drivers from the same pair, 
indicates a higher effect compared to the indications of the least experienced drivers (U=5, 
r=-.666). Finally, the drivers with 11-19 years of experience assigned higher scores to the 
influence of dynamic personal factors on team factors, compared to their colleagues with 5-
10 years of experience (U=6, r=-.674). 
8.2.5 Influence of the R-PSFs categories on task factors 
This section presents the results of the assessments by the SMEs of the influence of the R-
PSFs categories on task factors. Table 8-8 demonstrates the findings for the different types 
of SMEs. However, it should be reminded here that the task factors within the R-PSFs lite 
taxonomy do not indicate any inner dependencies. Therefore, the corresponding cell has 
zero value. 
Table 8-8 Effect of R-PSFs categories on Task Factors for the SMEs subgroups 
 
Dynamic personal Organisational Personal System Task Team 
H 15.364 7.194 1.114 4.794 .000 3.795 
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Sig. p<.05 p<.05 p>.05 p>.05 1.000 p>.05 
As can be seen in Table 8-8 the SMEs judgements differ significantly regarding the influence 
of dynamic personal and organisational factors on task factors. Specifically, for the first pair 
of factors, train drivers (U=72, r=-.547) and HFs experts (U=4, r=-.519) assigned lower 
scores than the operations managers. However, for the second pair, the operations 
managers rate the influence of organisational factors on task factors as significantly higher 
(U=128, r=-.369) compared to train drivers. For all the remaining combinations of factors, no 
significant differences amongst the respondents were identified.  
Furthermore, for the train drivers, analysis identified differences for several pairs of factors. 
These are explained by the different types of operation, age, and operational experience. 
Firstly, it was found that the responses of train drivers are significantly different with respect 
to the influence of team factors on task factors (H(2)=6.383, p<.05). In particular, results 
indicate that the train drivers belonging to one of the three TOCs indicated significantly 
higher scores than the train drivers of the remainder two TOCs. Thus, further research has 
been recommended to the relevant TOC to investigate whether their working groups operate 
in an efficient manner. 
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On experience, differences in the assessments were found with respect to the influence of 
personal factors on task factors (H(3)=8.103, p<.05). However, both the Mann-Whitney and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z tests failed to identify the origin of this difference. On the age of train 
drivers, the identified differences reflect the assessments of the organisational (H(3)=12.882, 
p<.05) and personal factors (H(3)=13.898, p<.05) on task factors. For the impact of 
organisational factors on task factors, post hoc tests showed that train drivers between 35-
44 years old assessed such an impact with significant higher values compared to the drivers 
between 24-34 years old (U=1, r=-.807). In addition, 35-44 year old drivers assigned 
significantly higher scores to the influence of organisational factors on task factors compared 
to the drivers between 45-56 years old (U=27, r=-.493). On the other hand, for the same 
pairs of age groups, the opposite findings were identified for the influence of personal factors 
on task factors. Firstly, the younger train drivers evaluated the influence of organisational 
factors on task factors with lower scores compared to their elder colleagues (U=3, r=-.754), 
while again the younger operators assigned significantly lower scores to the impact of 
personal factors on task factors compared to the elder drivers (U=16, r=-.627). 
8.2.6 Influence of the R-PSFs categories on system factors 
This section illustrates the findings regarding the influence of the R-PSFs on system factors. 
Firstly, Table 8-9 indicates significant differences in the responses of the SMEs subgroups 
only with respect to the importance of task factors on system factors. Post hoc tests show 
that train drivers evaluate such an importance with significantly lower scores, compared to 
operations managers (U=142, r=-.325). 
Table 8-9 Effect of R-PSFs categories on Task Factors for the SMEs subgroups 
 
Dynamic personal Organisational Personal System Task Team 
H .577 2.837 .394 .000 7.128 .583 
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Sig. p>.05 p>.05 p>.05 1.000 p<.05 p>.05 
For train drivers, differences were identified with regard to how drivers assess the influence 
of task factors on system factors for the different types of operations (H(2)=6.192, p<.05). 
Moreover, differences were also found on the assessments of drivers with different levels of 
operational experience regarding the impact of dynamic personal factors (H(3)=15.828, 
p<.05) and task factors (H(3)=9.993, p<.05) on system factors. Specifically, it was identified 
that train drivers with 5-10 years of experience consider the influence of dynamic personal 
factors on system factors as significantly lower compared to the least experienced personnel 
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(U=.00, r=-.88) and those with 11-19 years of experience (U=1, r=-.807). On the other hand, 
results indicate also that the least experienced personnel compared to those with 5-10 and 
20 or more years of operational experience, consider the influence of task factors on system 
factors as significantly lower, with (U= 3, r=-.734) and (U=5, r=-.717), respectively.  
Finally, the assessments of the impact of task factors on system factors are also affected by 
the train drivers’ previous SPAD experiences. It was found that drivers with no SPAD 
experience assigned significantly lower values to the impact of task factors on system 
factors, compared to those who were involved in at least one SPAD in the past (U=67, z=-
2.118, p<.05, r=-.358). 
The previous sections presented the results on the weighting of the R-PSFs categories, as 
derived from the SMEs assessments. In general, the findings indicate limited significant 
differences in the responses amongst the SMEs, primarily for the dynamic personal and 
organisational factors. This could be explained by the different backgrounds of the SMEs, 
i.e. duties, responsibilities and positions, of the SMEs. Therefore, regardless of the fact that 
the sizes of the SME subgroups vary substantially, and such generalisations of the findings 
require caution, it can be seen that the perspective of the SMEs of the influence of the R-
PSFs on human performance can be influenced by the characteristics of the SMEs. 
Moreover, for train drivers in particular, it is apparent that their responses are, to a certain 
extent, explained by their individual characteristics, which are influenced primarily by the 
type of operation and their operational experience. 
The results also showed that all the SMEs acknowledge the significant influence of the 
dynamic personal factors on all R-PSFs categories. Furthermore, it was found that the 
dynamic personal factors and personal factors display similarities with respect to how they 
are influenced by the other R-PSFs categories. Similarities are also observed for the 
categories of organisational and team factors, as well as task and system factors. In 
addition, review can be undertaken and the similarities and differences between the 
responses of the SMEs with respect to their weightings on the R-PSFs elements identified.  
The following section presents the final weightings for the R-PSFs elements with respect to 
their influence on human performance as derived from the limit supermatrices (see Section 
7.5.7.3 and 7.5.7.4).  
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8.3 The final priorities of the R-PSFs elements 
This section demonstrates the final results of the R-PSFs elements weightings, as obtained 
from the corresponding limit supermatrices (Section 7.5.7.4). These results present the 
contribution of each factor to operator performance, where the larger the weight value, the 
more important the R-PSF is in successfully completing a task. The normality of data was 
first tested for using the Shapiro-Wilk test. The results (Table 8-10) show that nine variables 
are not normally distributed.  For these, the Kruskal-Wallis and when necessary the Mann-
Whitney tests, were used to test whether the responses could be assumed to belong to the 
same population.  
Table 8-10 Descriptive statistics for the R-PSFs lite elements weighting 
Variable N* Mean SE SD 
95% 
confidence 
interval Min Max Normality**  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Distraction  52 0.0864 0.0067 0.0486 0.0728 0.0999 0.0142 0.2102 ✓ 
Fatigue 52 0.0958 0.0066 0.0477 0.0825 0.1091 0.0225 0.1929 ! 
Perception 52 0.0425 0.0034 0.0247 0.0356 0.0494 0.0061 0.1165 ! 
Procedures 52 0.0704 0.0041 0.0296 0.0621 0.0786 0.0189 0.1468 ✓ 
Safety culture 52 0.0794 0.0053 0.0387 0.0686 0.0902 0.0205 0.1781 ! 
Supervision 52 0.0597 0.0048 0.0349 0.0500 0.0695 0.0122 0.1949 ! 
Familiarity 52 0.1124 0.0069 0.0497 0.0986 0.1263 0.0271 0.2789 ! 
Training 52 0.0982 0.0058 0.0421 0.0865 0.1099 0.0206 0.2369 ! 
System design 52 0.1074 0.0054 0.0388 0.0966 0.1182 0.0327 0.2102 ✓ 
Workload 52 0.1264 0.0084 0.0607 0.1095 0.1433 0.0364 0.3044 ! 
Communication 52 0.0627 0.0038 0.0277 0.0550 0.0705 0.0224 0.1257 ! 
Information 52 0.0582 0.0041 0.0295 0.4998 0.0664 0.0140 0.1159 ! 
*the mean, SE and SD when HFs responses are excluded change after the 3rd decimal 
**normality at 95% level of confidence 
For the remaining three normally distributed variables, the independent t-test and analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) were applied. The former is used to test the null hypothesis whereby the 
means collected from two different groups are equal. The t-statistics is expressed as:  
! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!       (8-2) 
where  and  are the means of  the samples 1 and 2 of sizes n1 and n2 respectively, 
and sp is the pooled variance, i.e. the variance weighted by the size of sample on which it is 
based (Field, 2009). If the t-statistic is significant, p<.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected 
and the means of the two groups are considered significantly different. The ANOVA, on the 
other hand, is used to test whether the means of more than two independent groups are 
significantly different. ANOVA is developed on the F-statistic, which is a measure of the ratio 
X1 X 2
X1 X 2
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of the variations explained by the model and unsystematic (extraneous) factors (Field, 
2009). It is computed by dividing the model mean squares (MSM) by the residual mean 
squares (MSR). Again, if the F-statistic is significant then the null hypothesis is rejected and 
the means of the groups are considered significantly different. Then, post hoc tests (using 
the Bonferroni correction) were applied to compare the different combinations of the groups 
and to identify which particular means significantly differ (Field, 2009, pp.373-375). 
The findings were tested for outliers and when such cases were identified, two datasets 
were created. However, as no significant difference was identified, the following sections 
present the results for the complete dataset. For brevity, only the first component of the 12 
R-PSFs elements is given. The main relevant means for the classification groups are given 
in the Table 8-11. 
Table 8-11 The final R-PSFs weightings means per classification group 
Final weightings (means) of  
R-PSFs elements 
Train 
Drivers 
Operation 
managers 
HFs 
experts 
Train 
Drivers  
TOC 1 
Train 
Drivers  
TOC 2 
Train 
Drivers  
TOC 3 
Dynamic 
Personal 
Factors 
Distraction .0770 .1163 .0569 .0880 .0532 .0879 
Fatigue .0926 .1117 .0587 .1023 .0737 .1000 
Perception .0376 .0571 .0420 .0488 .0253 .0354 
Organisational 
Factors 
Procedures .0730 .0617 .0805 .0530 .0856 .0872 
Safety culture .0857 .0566 .1119 .0657 .0928 .1060 
Supervision .0617 .0517 .0753 .0481 .0601 .0826 
Personal 
Factors 
Familiarity .1157 .1060 .1052 .1475 .1017 .0866 
Training .1021 .0874 .1050 .1268 .0890 .0817 
System 
Factors System design .1131 .0969 .0905 .1097 .1197 .1106 
Task Factors Workload .1187 .1479 .1168 .1128 .1495 .0932 
Team Factors 
Communication .0632 .0566 .0869 .0503 .0753 .0679 
Information .0595 .0502 .0803 .0470 .0742 .0609 
8.3.1 Distraction – Loss of concentration 
For distraction, as shown in the Table 8-12 a significant difference was found amongst the 
responses of the different types of the SMEs. In particular, post hoc tests provide evidence 
that the difference is caused by the weightings of train drivers and HFs experts compared to 
operations managers. The later assigned higher scores compared to the former.  
For train drivers, the mean weightings were tested against the type of operation, gender, 
age, operational experience and previous SPAD experience. However, no significant 
differences were identified for any subgroups. However, it is important to note the fact that 
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the train drivers of TOC1 and TOC3 assessed the importance of distraction on their 
performance with higher values compared to those of TOC2. This finding could be used to 
investigate any similarities and differences of the services, their networks and operational 
features.   
Table 8-12 Effect of classification groups on weighting distraction 
Distraction F or t-statistic* df Sig. 
Type of SMEs 4.354 2 p<.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 2.122 2 p>.05 
Gender (train drivers only) -0.400 33 p>.05 
Age (train drivers only) 0.424 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 1.007 3 p>.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) 0.983 33 p>.05 
*t-statistic for binary variables 
8.3.2 Fatigue 
For fatigue, the Kruskal-Wallis tests in Table 8-13, did not indicate any significant difference 
between the mean weightings determined from the responses of the SMEs. However, at first 
glance the values as shown in the Table 8-11 may imply such a difference. Thus, Mann-
Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z (KS-Z) tests were performed for each pair of SMEs. 
While the Mann-Whitney test confirms the initial findings, the KS-Z indicates a significant 
difference between the weightings of the operations managers and HFs experts (z=-1.572, 
p<.05), with the former assigning higher scores to the contribution of fatigue.  
Table 8-13 Effect of classification groups on weighting fatigue 
Fatigue H or U* df Sig. 
Type of SMEs 4.561 2 p>.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 2.130 2 p>.05 
Gender (train drivers only) 36 (z=-.707) - p>.05 
Age (train drivers only) 0.448 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 8.989 3 p<.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) 122 (z=-110) - p>.05 
*U statistic for binary variables 
Comparison of the weightings derived from the train drivers was also performed. Firstly, the 
responses were analysed against the different types of operations. However, the results did 
not provide evidence of significant differences. Furthermore, it was found that neither 
gender, age, nor previous SPAD experience has a significant effect on the assessments of 
train drivers. On the other hand, a significant difference was revealed with respect to the 
train drivers’ experience. In particular, post hoc tests indicate that train drivers with 11-19 
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years of experience consider that fatigue affects the performance of the operators, more 
than the operators with 5-10 of experience (U=6, z=-2.699, p<.05, r=-674) and those with 
more than 20 years of experience (U=25, z=-2.061, p<.05, r=-.449).  
8.3.3 Perception 
In terms of perception results in Table 8-14 indicate a significant difference only between the 
weightings as derived from the different types of SMEs. Specifically, operations managers 
weighted the impact of perception on the performance with higher scores compared to train 
drivers (U=111, r=-.424).  
In contrast, no significant differences were identified for any of the remaining control groups. 
Furthermore, it is also clear that general perception, as shown in Table 8-10, is not 
considered from any of the SMEs groups to have a high impact on the performance of the 
operators. 
Table 8-14 Effect of classification groups on weighting perception 
Perception H or U* df Sig. 
Type of SMEs 9.234 2 p<.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 5.543 2 p>.05 
Gender (train drivers only) 45 (z=-177) - p>.05 
Age (train drivers only) 2.326 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 2.301 3 p>.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) 91 (z=-1.242) - p>.05 
*U statistic for binary variables 
8.3.4 Quality of procedures  
Regarding the weightings of procedure quality results in Table 8-15 do not reveal a 
significant difference between the responses of the different types of the SMEs. In contrast, 
a significant difference was identified between the responses of train drivers, when 
compared against the type of operation. It should be noted that for the organisational R-
PSFs, the type of operation, reflects the railway organisation. Subsequently, the difference in 
weightings represents the differences between the TOCs. In particular, results show that the 
train drivers of two TOCs assess the quality of procedures with higher scores compared to 
the third TOC. Such a finding may imply that those train drivers have faced SPAD 
occurrences in the past, whilst the necessary written or oral procedures were not clear or 
available. However, it may also imply that those train drivers are more aware of the 
important role of the procedures in safe and undisturbed operations. Therefore, further 
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investigation is recommended on the role of procedures on operator performance and how 
the latter perceive such a role. 
Table 8-15 Effect of classification groups on weighting of quality procedures 
Quality of procedures F or t-statistic* df Sig. 
Type of employees 0.913 2 p>.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 6.417 2 p<.05 
Gender (train drivers only) 0.333 33 p>.05 
Age (train drivers only) 1.234 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 1.165 3 p>.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) -0.238 33 p>.05 
*t-statistic for binary variables 
8.3.5 Safety culture 
With respect to safety culture, findings, as shown in Table 8-16, show significant differences 
amongst the responses of the different types of SMEs. In particular, Mann-Whitney tests 
revealed that train drivers (U=122, r=-.388) and HFs experts (U=4, r=-.519) consider the 
contribution of the safety culture on the performance of operators as more important, 
compared to the judgments derived from the operations managers. 
Table 8-16 Effect of classification groups on weighting safety culture 
Safety culture H or U* df Sig. 
Type of SMEs 10.001 2 p<.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 8.393 2 p<.05 
Gender (train drivers only) 35 (z=-.766)  p>.05 
Age (train drivers only) 3.863 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 4.038 3 p>.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) 95 (z=-1.095)  p>.05 
*U statistic for binary variables 
The survey revealed two main reasons that explain these results. The first, justifies the 
judgements of the HFs experts, which due to their experience and background support the 
importance of safety culture on all organisations activities. The substantial role of safety 
culture on the operations was discussed in chapter 5, where it was shown that organisations 
with positive maturity scores have less occurrences that lead to severe consequences; while 
it is also widely addressed in the literature, e.g. (Guldenmund, 2000, Sorensen, 2002, 
Choudhry et al., 2007, Luther and Johnson, 2008). On the other hand, it was found that the 
operations managers do not consider safety culture as major contributor factor to SPAD 
occurrences.  Although they acknowledge its importance on the safety of services, they 
highlight instead the significant role of personal (including the dynamic) factors.   
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For train drivers, significant differences in the data were identified only with respect to the 
different types of operations. Operators of TOC1 assessed the influence of safety culture on 
their performance with lower scores compared to those of TOC2 (U=33, r=-.482) and TOC3 
(U=29, r=-.49). Comparing the results, discussions within the organisations are currently 
being held to identify whether such responses are explained by any previous occurrences, 
where the safety culture of organisations significantly contributed to the occurrence.  
8.3.6 Supervision 
Regarding supervision, results in Table 8-17 do not indicate any significant differences in the 
responses either between the types of SMEs or the types of train drivers. Considering its 
relatively low mean scores (Table 8-10) it could be claimed that the SMEs do not consider 
supervision as important performance factor within the context of the described scenario.  
Table 8-17 Effect of classification groups on weighting supervision 
Supervision H or U* df Sig. 
Type of SMEs 2.892 2 p>.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 5.453 2 p>.05 
Gender (train drivers only) 35 (z=-.766)  p>.05 
Age (train drivers only) 4.933 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 2.661 3 p>.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) 95 (z=-1.095)  p>.05 
*U statistic for binary variables 
8.3.7 Familiarity 
Considering familiarity, it was found, as shown in Table 8-18, that the characteristics of the 
SMEs do not significantly affect their judgements. Moreover, given the high scores of 
familiarity it is reasonable to claim that all the experts consider familiarity as a substantial 
factor for SPAD occurrences. The impact of familiarity on the performance of the operators 
can be expressed in two ways. Firstly, high levels of familiarity may reduce the vigilance of 
the operators and subsequently increase the likelihood of a SPAD. Secondly, low levels of 
familiarity may indicate employees with poor knowledge of a route. Hence, the likelihood of a 
passed signal could increase, mainly within complex layouts where operators may not be 
aware of the exact signals’ location.  
In addition, for the train drivers in particular, differences in the weightings were found for the 
classification groups’ type of operation and operational experience. For the former, however, 
post hoc tests failed to indicate the origin of such differences. On the other hand, the results 
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for operational experience showed that the least experienced personnel assessed the 
influence of familiarity with higher scores compared to the more experienced personnel, i.e. 
11-19 (U=12, r=-.516) and 20 or more (U=17, r=.-512) years of experience. 
Table 8-18 Effect of classification groups on weighting familiarity 
Familiarity H or U* df Sig. 
Type of SMEs 0.124 2 p>.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 6.197 2 p<.05 
Gender (train drivers only) 28 (z=-1.179)  p>.05 
Age (train drivers only) 5.660 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 6.272 3 p<.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) 77 (z=-1.753)  p>.05 
*U statistic for binary variables 
8.3.8 Training 
Similar to familiarity, results in Table 8-19 for training provide evidence that the types of the 
SMEs do not have an impact on their responses. Moreover, results for the train drivers 
indicate that their responses differ significantly when compared with the types of operation 
(which reflects also the TOC) and operational experience. However, for the former post hoc 
tests again fail to indicate the origin of the difference. For the latter, it was found that the 
least experienced personnel consider the impact of training on human performance more 
important compared to the more experienced personnel, i.e.11-19 years of experience (U=8, 
r=-.622).  
Table 8-19 Effect of classification groups on weighting training 
Training H or U* df Sig. 
Type of SMEs 0.124 2 p>.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 6.233 2 p<.05 
Gender (train drivers only) 25 (z=-1.355)  p>.05 
Age (train drivers only) 5.700 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 9.580 3 p<.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) 85 (z=-1.461)  p>.05 
*U statistic for binary variables 
The similarities in the results for familiarity and training, as expressed and underpinned by 
the level of experience of the operators, confirm the strong dependency between the two 
variables.  
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8.3.9 System design 
Similar to the majority of the previous R-PSFs, the characteristics of the SMEs were not 
found to affect the weightings of system design, as results in Table 8-20 indicate. In addition, 
due to the relatively high scores, it is apparent that all the SMEs acknowledge the important 
role of system design. This is primarily expressed by the location of the signals, on the 
prevention of SPADs.  
With respect to train drivers, it was identified that the type of operation does not affect their 
assessments. However, a significant difference was found between the female and male 
train drivers. In particular, female employees weighted the impact of system design with 
higher scores compared to their male colleagues. Finally, a significant difference was also 
identified for the different levels of operational experience. Results show that train drivers 
with 11-19 years of experience assessed the importance of system design considerably less 
than all the remaining employees.  
Table 8-20 Effect of classification groups on weighting system design 
System design F or t-statistic df Sig. 
Type of employees 1.177 2 p>.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 0.196 2 p>.05 
Gender (train drivers only) -2.328 33 p<.05 
Age (train drivers only) 0.285 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 3.065 3 p<.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) -0.174 33 p>.05 
*t-statistic for binary variables 
8.3.10 Workload 
With respect to workload, statistics in Table 8-21 show that the profession of the SMEs does 
not have a significant effect on their responses. It is notable that for all the SMEs, workload 
is considered as the most significant contributing factor for the SPAD scenario. Moreover, 
train drivers with at least one SPAD experience account for the impact of workload on their 
performance considerably higher compared to those with no SPAD records. Finally, it was 
also found that the responses between train drivers from the different TOCs are not 
significantly different. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the operators of the TOC2 
assigned higher workload scores, which probably reflects the type of service.  
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Table 8-21 Effect of classification groups on weighting workload 
Workload H or U* df Sig. 
Type of employees 4.345 2 p>.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 3.704 2 p>.05 
Gender (train drivers only) 41 (z=-.412)  p>.05 
Age (train drivers only) 3.865 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 5.313 3 p>.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) 61 (z=-2.337)  p<.05 
*U statistic for binary variables 
8.3.11 Communication between employees 
For the influence of communication on the performance of operators, results in Table 8-22 
show strong evidence that the responses do not significantly differ for any classification 
group.  
Table 8-22 Effect of classification groups on weighting communication 
Communication H or U* df Sig. 
Type of employees 2.829 2 p>.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 2.976 2 p>.05 
Gender (train drivers only) 37 (z=-.648)  p>.05 
Age (train drivers only) 1.775 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 5.199 3 p>.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) 115 (z=-.365)  p>.05 
*U statistic for binary variables 
8.3.12 Quality of information  
Finally, regarding the weightings for information quality, results in Table 8-23 indicate no 
significant difference for any classification group.  
Table 8-23 Effect of classification groups on weighting quality of information 
Information H or U* df Sig. 
Type of employees 2.550 2 p>.05 
Type of operation (train drivers only) 4.163 2 p>.05 
Gender (train drivers only) 24 (z=-1.414)  p>.05 
Age (train drivers only) 0.937 3 p>.05 
Operational experience (train drivers only) 4.301 3 p>.05 
Involvement in SPAD (train drivers only) 122 (z=-.110)  p>.05 
*U statistic for binary variables 
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8.3.13 Review of the R-PSFs elements weightings 
In the previous subsections the results for the weighting of the R-PSFs elements were 
presented. The final findings indicate that the duties of the SMEs do not significantly affect 
their judgements for the majority of the R-PSFs. However, as illustrated in the Figure 8-1, 
this is not the case for the R-PSFs distraction, perception and safety culture. This is in 
agreement with the weightings of the R-PSFs categories, where significant differences were 
found between the SMEs responses for the dynamic personal and organisational factors. 
Whereas such a difference could be ignored for perception as its overall assigned scores 
are relatively low, this is not recommended for the remaining factors.  
 
Figure 8-1 Comparison of R-PSFs elements weighting by SMEs  
It was also found that workload is considered the most important R-PSF with respect to its 
influence on human performance for all the types of SMEs. In addition, familiarity was 
assessed a substantial contributor to operators performance. As mentioned in the Section 
8.3.7 the less experienced personnel assigned higher scores to familiarity. This implies that 
operators unfamiliar with a route are likely to miss a signal, as they may not be aware of its 
exact location or function. However, this contradicts the opinion of those who believe that a 
high level of familiarity increases an operator’s level of expectation, in particular with respect 
to the signal aspects ahead. Subsequently, if a signal does not indicate the usual aspect, it 
is often the case that the train drivers do not have sufficient time to stop the train. In addition, 
system design is considered a substantial factor, which primarily reflects on the location of 
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the signals. This is expressed by the ability of train drivers to identify and acknowledge their 
aspects.  
In turn, with respect to the dynamic personal factors, fatigue is deemed to be the most 
influential factor on human performance. In addition, distraction is only considered to be 
highly important by the operations managers. This could be explained by the fact that train 
drivers may be reluctant to admit that they have been distracted and therefore passed a 
signal at danger. In addition, it is worth commenting on the assessments of HFs experts with 
respect to distraction as well as the dynamic personal factors. It can be seen that the HFs 
experts account the impact of the three dynamic personal factors on human performance 
relatively low compared to the other two types of SMEs. This is also in agreement with the 
assessment of the SMEs for the R-PSFs categories. Such an observation is related to the 
main belief of the HFs experts that the organisational factors are those that mostly affect the 
performance of the operators. Therefore, although the dynamic personal factors are not 
underestimated, the organisational factors are considered to be more important. It is also 
assumed, that if the organisational factors were improved, then the consequences of the 
factors related directly to frontline personnel would be mitigated. On the other hand, 
operations managers assessed organisational factors with relatively low weightings. This 
may suggest that they believe that their institutions provide all the necessary support to their 
personnel to avoid SPAD occurrences.  
Finally, it should be also stated that for the analysis of the drivers’ assessments, any 
substantial differences among the operational system should not be neglected. For instance, 
it cannot not be ignored that while the London Underground services are equipped with the 
ATP protection system, the mainline operations are fitted with the TPWS.  The results in this 
study do not provide any evidence that such differences affected the way that the train 
drivers have weighted the different R-PSFs. However, for any future studies researchers 
should be aware and take into consideration any systemic differences in the interpretation of 
their results.  
These results were used to identify whether the SMEs assessments are in agreement with 
the factors that in reality have led to past SPAD occurrences. In other words, it was 
investigated whether the perception of the SMEs regarding the impact of the factors that 
affect the performance of the operators corresponds with the findings of the investigation 
reports. To do so, the SMEs judgments were compared with data extracted from 58 UK 
SPAD investigations reports, which were included in the 479 reports dataset described in 
chapter 6. The frequency of the identified R-PSFs is shown in the Figure 8-2. The 
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comparison illustrates only the similarities and differences for the different types of the 
SMEs. 
For example, it can be seen that although all the SMEs have acknowledged workload to be 
the most important contributing factor with respect to the described scenario, this is not 
congruent with the information extracted from the reports. It should also be noted that 
although the train drivers and operations managers assess fatigue as a highly important 
factor, the investigation reports do not confirm this. Nevertheless, the comparison shows that 
for familiarity, training and system design, the SMEs judgements and the reports’ findings 
are generally in agreement. 
 
Figure 8-2 Frequency of the R-PSFs elements in the UK SPAD occurrences 
Thus, the identified differences indicate that the SMEs have an established perspective with 
respect to the influence of particulars factors on the performance of the operators. However, 
such a perspective does not always reflect the actual contribution of the factors. Therefore, a 
series of workshops is recommended with the different railway stakeholders, primarily the 
frontline and managerial personnel. Such workshops will aim to highlight the differences and 
to further inform operators for the actual role that the R-PSFs play in the occurrence of 
SPADs, as well as other types of occurrences.  
To this point, the weightings of the R-PSFs categories and elements with respect to their 
contribution to the performance of railway operators were thoroughly presented. It is 
recommended that the results should be interpreted and used only for the specific scenario. 
Nevertheless, it can be claimed that both the framework and methodology could be broadly 
applied to several operational scenarios. Hence, support is provided to railway organisations 
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to gain a more comprehensive perspective on the way that their employees perceive the 
impact of the R-PSFs on human performance. Subsequently, resources could be used more 
efficiently towards the development of sound solutions to mitigate both the appearance of 
such factors and their consequences. 
As described in the previous chapter, further to the weighting of the R-PSFS, the HuPeROI 
aims also to indicate the relative likelihoods of different erroneous actions. The next section 
presents the ratings of such factors for three human errors that could lead to a SPAD.  
8.4 The ratings of the R-PSFs elements  
This section reviews the results from the elicitation process of the R-PSFs ratings. As a 
reminder, the rating represents how good or bad the R-PSFs are considered for the action 
under assessment, where good or bad mean that the factors either enhance or degrade the 
ability of the operator to conduct the action.  
8.4.1 The SMEs ratings for “signal detection”  
The first operational failure is the inability of the operator to appropriately perform the action 
of signal detection. The ratings of the R-PSFs are non-parametric data. Therefore, Kruskal-
Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests are applied to indicate whether the SMEs judgments were 
affected by the characteristics of the classification groups. As can be seen in Table 8-24 no 
significant differences were identified between the ratings of the different SMEs. Therefore, it 
could be stated that the characteristics of the SMEs do not have an impact on the ratings of 
the R-PSFs.  
Table 8-24 Effect of classification groups on the R-PSFs rating for “signal not detected” 
R-PSFs 
Type of SMEs Type of operations (train drivers) Gender (train drivers) 
H df Sig. H df Sig. U r Sig. 
Distraction  1.911 2 p>.05 0.081 2 p>.05 44.5 -0.035 p>.05 
Fatigue 0.381 2 p>.05 0.004 2 p>.05 42.0 -0.061 p>.05 
Perception 5.855 2 p>.05 0.837 2 p>.05 43.5 -0.045 p>.05 
Procedures 0.044 2 p>.05 0.432 2 p>.05 25.5 -0.045 p>.05 
Safety culture 1.579 2 p>.05 1.948 2 p>.05 41.0 -0.226 p>.05 
Supervision 0.843 2 p>.05 0.651 2 p>.05 35.5 -0.070 p>.05 
Familiarity 0.236 2 p>.05 5.368 2 p>.05 47.0 -0.126 p>.05 
Training 1.608 2 p>.05 0.145 2 p>.05 44.5 -0.035 p>.05 
System design 4.519 2 p>.05 2.357 2 p>.05 35.5 -0.190 p>.05 
Workload 0.102 2 p>.05 4.059 2 p>.05 42.5 -0.126 p>.05 
Communication 1.894 2 p>.05 0.227 2 p>.05 44.5 -0.055 p>.05 
Information 1.609 2 p>.05 0.074 2 p>.05 39.5 -0.035 p>.05 
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Table 8-24 (cont.) Effect of classification groups on the R-PSFs rating for “signal not detected” 
R-PSFs Age (train drivers) 
Ops. Experience 
(train drivers) 
Involvement in SPAD 
(train drivers) 
H df df H df Sig. U r Sig. 
Distraction  4.997 3 p>.05 4.037 3 p>.05 122.5 -0.016 p>.05 
Fatigue 5.997 3 p>.05 3.110 3 p>.05 125.0 0.000 p>.05 
Perception 6.333 3 p>.05 0.936 3 p>.05 123.5 -0.009 p>.05 
Procedures 1.411 3 p>.05 2.896 3 p>.05 115.5 -0.059 p>.05 
Safety culture 2.277 3 p>.05 3.542 3 p>.05 120.5 -0.028 p>.05 
Supervision 1.897 3 p>.05 0.443 3 p>.05 87.0 -0.237 p>.05 
Familiarity 10.132 3 p<.05 8.818 3 p<.05 85.0 -0.250 p>.05 
Training 2.357 3 p>.05 1.895 3 p>.05 92.5 -0.205 p>.05 
System design 1.998 3 p>.05 0.161 3 p>.05 97.0 -0.175 p>.05 
Workload 3.352 3 p>.05 0.979 3 p>.05 87.5 -0.233 p>.05 
Communication 5.287 3 p>.05 4.221 3 p>.05 121.5 -0.022 p>.05 
Information 6.592 3 p>.05 5.988 3 p>.05 117 -0.050 p>.05 
A comparison of the ratings, as obtained from the train drivers, was also performed. Results 
indicate significant differences only for familiarity. This difference is established for the 
classification groups, age and operational experience. For the former, post hoc tests show 
that train drivers between 24-34 years old assigned to familiarity lower scores compared to 
the drivers between 45-56 years old (U=9, z=-3.091, p<.05, r=-.659). For operational 
experience, the difference is originated from the responses of the least experienced train 
drivers and those with more than 20 years of experience. The latter rated familiarity with 
higher scores (U=12, z=-2.527, p<.05, r=-.579).  
However, since ratings of the majority of classification groups are not significantly different, 
data are combined. Figure 8-3 (left) illustrates the final results. In addition, Figure 8-3 (right) 
displays the ratings as given by the three different SMEs subgroups. At first glance, it can be 
seen that all the SMEs consider distraction, fatigue and perception as the most suboptimal 
factors. They also consider that the training of the SMEs was above average. Moreover, the 
majority of the R-SPFs have been rated poor, with the scores to lie in the 40-50 range.  
Subsequently, total ratings are also low, i.e. do not exceed the value of 550.  
Finally, it can be seen that the HFs experts, compared to train drivers and operations 
managers, rated the factor system design as highly suboptimal for the specific error. This is 
explained by the fact that the HFs experts have analysed many SPADs where the location or 
sighting of the signal was a leading contributor to the event.   
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Figure 8-3 R-PSFs ratings for signal not detected 
8.4.2 The SMEs ratings for “signal interpretation” 
The second identified human error is the operators’ failure to interpret the aspect of the 
signal.. Results (Table 8-25), indicate no significant differences for the ratings of most of the 
R-PSFs. In fact, the only significant difference was identified for the contributing factor 
system design. In particular, it was found that male train drivers assigned higher values 
compared to the female drivers. Nevertheless, no profound reason to explain this result was 
identified.   
Table 8-25 Effect of classification groups on the R-PSFs rating for “signal wrongly interpreted” 
R-PSFs 
Type of SMEs Type of operations (train drivers) Gender (train drivers) 
H df Sig. H df Sig. U r Sig. 
Distraction  0.124 2 p>.05 0.214 2 p>.05 36.5 -0.115 p>.05 
Fatigue 2.033 2 p>.05 1.842 2 p>.05 47.5 -0.005 p>.05 
Perception 3.234 2 p>.05 5.702 2 p>.05 30.0 -0.184 p>.05 
Procedures 0.171 2 p>.05 0.490 2 p>.05 43.0 -0.050 p>.05 
Safety culture 0.434 2 p>.05 1.194 2 p>.05 43.0 -0.050 p>.05 
Supervision 0.768 2 p>.05 2.109 2 p>.05 46.0 -0.020 p>.05 
Familiarity 5.745 2 p>.05 5.051 2 p>.05 34.5 -0.136 p>.05 
Training 1.611 2 p>.05 4.452 2 p>.05 40.0 -0.081 p>.05 
System design 5.016 2 p>.05 5.812 2 p>.05 9.5 -0.391 p<.05 
Workload 1.910 2 p>.05 0.854 2 p>.05 43.5 -0.045 p>.05 
Communication 1.297 2 p>.05 0.376 2 p>.05 37.0 -0.110 p>.05 
Information 1.985 2 p>.05 0.709 2 p>.05 31.0 -0.173 p>.05 
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Table 8-25 (cont.) Effect of classification groups on the R-PSFs rating for “signal wrongly 
interpreted” 
R-PSFs Age (train drivers) 
Ops. Experience 
(train drivers) 
Involvement in SPAD 
(train drivers) 
H df df H df Sig. U r Sig. 
Distraction  5.011 3 p>.05 2.021 3 p>.05 120.0 -0.031 p>.05 
Fatigue 3.642 3 p>.05 3.380 3 p>.05 98.0 -0.169 p>.05 
Perception 1.855 3 p>.05 1.796 3 p>.05 101.0 -0.152 p>.05 
Procedures 4.700 3 p>.05 2.288 3 p>.05 121.5 -0.022 p>.05 
Safety culture 2.080 3 p>.05 2.299 3 p>.05 115.0 -0.062 p>.05 
Supervision 4.342 3 p>.05 0.217 3 p>.05 92.0 -0.207 p>.05 
Familiarity 0.389 3 p>.05 2.777 3 p>.05 118.0 -0.044 p>.05 
Training 6.640 3 p>.05 6.091 3 p>.05 98.5 -0.165 p>.05 
System design 0.931 3 p>.05 1.012 3 p>.05 104.0 -0.132 p>.05 
Workload 5.370 3 p>.05 1.309 3 p>.05 93.0 -0.199 p>.05 
Communication 3.629 3 p>.05 3.379 3 p>.05 121.0 -0.025 p>.05 
Information 4.621 3 p>.05 1.159 3 p>.05 102.0 -0.145 p>.05 
Again, as the ratings for most of the classification groups are not significantly different, data 
are combined. Figure 8-4 (left) displays the final results, while Figure 8-4 (right) shows the 
ratings as given by the three different SMEs subgroups. Distraction was characterized as the 
most suboptimal factor, although it is not indicated as such from all the subgroups. In 
addition, it can be seen that the total R-PSFs ratings are higher, compared to those for the 
first human error. 
 
Figure 8-4 R-PSFs ratings for signal wrongly interpreted 
8.4.3 The SMEs ratings for “executed action” 
Finally, the third erroneous action is the failure of the operator to correctly execute the 
required action, e.g. apply braking strategy. Results (Table 8-26) show that no significant 
differences were found for the scores given for most of the R-PSFs. 
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However, it was found, that male train drivers consider less suboptimal the design of the 
system for that specific action, compared to the female train drivers. In addition, a difference 
was also identified for distraction, where younger (35-44) train drivers assigned lower scores 
compared to older (45-56) drivers. 
Data are combined, and final results are displayed in Figure 8-5 (left). Figure 8-5 (right), in 
addition, displays the ratings as given by the three different SMEs subgroups. Three 
important findings can be observed in the two figures. Firstly, distraction is again indicated 
as the most suboptimal factor amongst the factors. Secondly, five factors have been 
assigned with scores less than 40. Thirdly, the total given ratings for the train drivers are the 
lowest amongst the three erroneous actions.  
Due to the differences in the responses amongst the types of errors, the next section 
examines whether the characteristics of the actions have affected the ratings of the SMEs.  
Table 8-26 Effect of classification groups on the R-PSFs rating for “action not executed correctly” 
R-PSFs 
Type of SMEs Type of operations (train drivers) Gender (train drivers) 
H df Sig. H df Sig. U r Sig. 
Distraction  1.403 2 p>.05 0.542 2 p>.05 44.0 -0.041 p>.05 
Fatigue 1.885 2 p>.05 0.618 2 p>.05 33.0 -0.151 p>.05 
Perception 1.643 2 p>.05 2.079 2 p>.05 27.0 -0.216 p>.05 
Procedures 1.839 2 p>.05 1.091 2 p>.05 41.0 -0.071 p>.05 
Safety culture 0.839 2 p>.05 2.095 2 p>.05 40.5 -0.076 p>.05 
Supervision 2.264 2 p>.05 3.758 2 p>.05 33.5 -0.147 p>.05 
Familiarity 0.626 2 p>.05 5.118 2 p>.05 38.5 -0.096 p>.05 
Training 1.010 2 p>.05 1.448 2 p>.05 33.5 -0.146 p>.05 
System design 4.966 2 p>.05 2.146 2 p>.05 7.0 -0.423 p<.05 
Workload 2.852 2 p>.05 2.307 2 p>.05 27.0 -0.211 p>.05 
Communication 2.219 2 p>.05 0.024 2 p>.05 38.5 -0.096 p>.05 
Information 2.360 2 p>.05 0.429 2 p>.05 33.5 -0.147 p>.05 
R-PSFs Age (train drivers) 
Ops. Experience 
(train drivers) 
Involvement in SPAD 
(train drivers) 
H df df H df Sig. U r Sig. 
Distraction  10.974 3 p<.05 3.284 3 p>.05 121.5 -0.022 p>.05 
Fatigue 7.215 3 p>.05 2.690 3 p>.05 124.0 -0.006 p>.05 
Perception 2.219 3 p>.05 0.423 3 p>.05 109.0 -0.102 p>.05 
Procedures 3.259 3 p>.05 3.664 3 p>.05 91.0 -0.214 p>.05 
Safety culture 1.169 3 p>.05 1.100 3 p>.05 112.0 -0.081 p>.05 
Supervision 5.191 3 p>.05 1.569 3 p>.05 112.5 -0.078 p>.05 
Familiarity 0.661 3 p>.05 5.622 3 p>.05 89.0 -0.225 p>.05 
Training 1.023 3 p>.05 1.714 3 p>.05 118.0 -0.043 p>.05 
System design 2.282 3 p>.05 0.596 3 p>.05 121.5 -0.022 p>.05 
Workload 3.268 3 p>.05 0.490 3 p>.05 89.5 -0.222 p>.05 
Communication 6.462 3 p>.05 4.358 3 p>.05 116.5 -0.053 p>.05 
Information 4.614 3 p>.05 3.131 3 p>.05 91.5 -0.210 p>.05 
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Figure 8-5 R-PSFs ratings for action not executed correctly 
8.4.4 Effect of actions on the SMEs ratings 
In order to indicate if operational actions have an impact on the SMEs ratings the Friedman’s 
ANOVA test is used. This test examines differences between more than two conditions 
when same participants have been used in all conditions. In this study, the same participants 
were employed to indicate the quality of the contributing factors for the three actions. 
Friedman’s test, is based on ranked data, while its test statistic, Fr, is calculated as: 
     (8-3) 
where Ri is the sum of ranks for each group, N is the total sample size and k the number of 
conditions. For more than ten participants the test statistic has a chi-square distribution; 
again when the test is significant, (p<.05), it is assumed that the conditions are significantly 
different. Hence, it is accepted that the characteristics of the actions have an impact on the 
rating of factors. For those cases post hoc tests, i.e. the Wilcoxon signed-rank test with the 
Bonferroni correction, are performed to identify the origins of the differences (Field, 2009). 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is based on the differences between the scores in the two 
compared conditions. Once the differences are calculated, they are ranked and the sign of 
the difference (+ or -) is assigned to the rank. The test statistic is obtained by the smaller of 
the two values between the sum of the positive and negative ranks. The statistics for the R-
PSFs ratings are illustrated in the Table 8-27. 
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Table 8-27 Friedman’s ANOVA statistics for the R-PSFs ratings  
 Distraction Fatigue Perception Procedures Safety Culture Supervision 
Fr 8.218 9.750 3.871 12.500 3.622 2.725 
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Sig. <.05 <.01 >.05 <.01 >.05 >.05 
 Familiarity Training System Design Workload Communication Information 
Fr 1.450 24.476 0.441 6.117 6.756 0.970 
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Sig. >.05 <.01 >.05 <.05 <.05 >.05 
As can be seen significant differences amongst the SMEs responses were identified for six 
factors. For these factors post hoc tests indicate that: 
(i) although the very low ratings of distraction, as shown in the previous sections, the 
assigned values for signal interpretation were significantly higher compared to 
those for signal detection, z=-2.620, p<.01, r= -.273; 
(ii) the assigned ratings of fatigue with respect to signal interpretation were 
significantly higher compared to signal detection, z=-2.757, p<.01, r= -.259 and 
action executed, z=-2.735, p<.01, r= -.270. In other words, the SMEs deem that 
the train operators are probably more tired when SPADs occur either due to signal 
not detection or actions not executed correctly; 
(iii) the origin of the significant differences for the ratings of procedures could not be 
established; 
(iv) the values for training were significantly lower when the SMEs rated the third 
action, i.e. action executed correctly, compared to signal detection, z=-3.395, 
p<.01, r=- .336 and signal interpretation, z=-4.190 p<.001, r=- .415; 
(v) the significant difference in the ratings of workload is established due to the higher 
values assigned to signal interpretation compared to action executed correctly, z=-
2.501, p<.05, r=- .247; 
(vi) the ratings of communication indicate significant difference between the  
operational actions signal interpretation and action executed correctly, with the 
former to be assigned with higher values, z=-2.480, p<.05, r=- .245.  
The above results indicate that the characteristics of the operational erroneous actions have 
an impact on the SMEs ratings. In particular, the SMEs have generally assigned lower 
values, to the majority of the factors when SPADs are caused due to operators failure to act 
as required.  
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Having presented the analysis of the weightings and ratings of the R-PSFs, the next section 
discusses the calculations of the HuPeROIs for the three operational actions. 
8.5 The HuPeROI calculations – the relative likelihoods of errors  
The last part of the thesis presents the HuPeROI calculations. As a reminder, the HuPeROI 
indicates the ordering of the likelihoods of the different actions under investigation. Hence, 
once it is determined, it could be then related to the success probability of an action that 
would be observed in the long run in the situation of interest.  
The index for each of the actions was calculated, as shown in Section 7.5.9. Results were 
again tested for outliers. One outlier was found amongst the results and excluded from the 
analysis. Moreover, the normality of data was examined, using the Shapiro-Wilk test. All 
tests were found non-significant, (p<.05), thus confidence is gained that data is normally 
distributed. The HuPeROI results for each operational action are illustrated in the Figure 8-6. 
 
Figure 8-6 The HuPeROI calculations per type of action 
Findings in the Figure 8-6 suggest that overall signal interpretation was assigned with the 
highest HuPeROIs amongst the three actions. Subsequently, it can be considered the least 
likely erroneous action. In addition, comparing the HuPeROIs per action and SME, it can be 
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seen that the majority of the SMEs were consistent on the way that they have assigned their 
scores.  
To compare the results, ANOVA was applied to test whether the means of the different types 
of the SMEs, for each action, are significantly different. Results, as shown in the Table 8-28, 
indicate no significant differences between the groups of respondents.  
Table 8-28 Comparison of HuPeROIs means between different SMEs groups  
Operational action F-statistic df Sig. 
Signal detection 0.163 2 p>.05 
Signal interpretation 0.730 2 p>.05 
Action executed 0.855 2 p>.05 
Therefore, it is assumed that data belong to the same population. The final results are 
summarised in Table 8-29. Based on them, it is extracted that the most likely error is the 
failure of operators to execute the required action correctly in order to stop the train in time. 
On the other hand, the least likely error is the signal’s wrong interpretation.  
Table 8-29 The HuPeROI results per type of SME and operational action 
 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Min. Max. Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
HuPeROI 
signal 
detection 
Train Driver 34 46.6603 17.0003 2.9155 40.7286 52.5920 16.0508 78.5344 
Operations Manager 14 43.8982 12.2273 3.2679 36.8384 50.9580 23.0325 62.4113 
HFs expert 3 46.7718 3.4724 2.0048 38.1458 55.3978 43.2878 50.2326 
Total 51 45.9086 15.2204 2.1313 41.6278 50.1894 16.0508 78.5344 
HuPeROI 
signal 
interpretation 
Train Driver 34 49.0766 13.0443 2.2371 44.5252 53.6280 23.4137 77.5124 
Operations Manager 14 49.1045 11.5242 3.0800 42.4506 55.7584 31.5390 67.8134 
HFs expert 3 58.2026 13.7110 7.9161 24.1425 92.2626 48.1374 73.8187 
Total 51 49.6211 12.6113 1.7659 46.0741 53.1681 23.4137 77.5124 
HuPeROI 
action 
executed 
Train Driver 34 40.9721 13.4339 2.3039 36.2848 45.6594 12.6227 65.9363 
Operations Manager 14 44.2281 12.6978 3.3936 36.8967 51.5596 22.3827 67.0106 
HFs expert 3 50.2642 14.3512 8.2857 14.6139 85.9145 39.5895 66.5786 
Total 51 42.4125 13.2401 1.8540 38.6887 46.1364 12.6227 67.0106 
Results in Table 8-29 may also imply a significant difference in the responses of train 
drivers. Since the weightings of the factors are constant, such a difference is explained by 
the differences in the ratings of the R-PSFs. Finally, it can be seen that the standard error in 
the responses of the HFs experts for the last two actions can be considered large, compared 
to the sample mean. This is explained by the size of the group. Its small size permits the 
indices to be influenced more by any judge who varies significantly from the rest of the 
group, as shown in Figure 8-7.  
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Figure 8-7 The HuPeROI calculations per type of SME and type of action 
Finally, results have been tested also for significant differences amongst the different types 
of train drivers. Table 8-30 shows that there is no significant difference amongst the 
respondents. 
Table 8-30 Comparison of HuPeROIs means between train drivers from different TOCs  
Operational action F-statistic df Sig. 
Signal detection 0.371 2 p>.05 
Signal interpretation 0.293 2 p>.05 
Action executed 1.021 2 p>.05 
Subsequently, it can be assumed that neither the types of operations, nor the characteristics 
of the railway organisation have a significant impact on the perception of train drivers with 
respect to the most likely error that could lead to a SPAD. The Figure 8-8 illustrates the 
responses of the train drivers for the three TOCs.  
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Figure 8-8 The HuPeROI calculations per train driver, TOC and type of action 
Taking all the responses into account, it can be seen that all the SMEs, regardless their 
duties or type of operation, indicate that the least likely error to occur is the failure of the train 
drivers to interpret the signal. In addition, it can be also seen that the most likely error is 
considered the failure of the operator to execute the required action correctly. In addition, 
only for the train drivers, differences amongst the classification groups were also examined. 
Results indicate that the responses between the personnel with different operational 
experience significantly vary. In particular, it was found that for signal detection the least 
experienced personnel (< 1 year) have assigned lower scores compared to all the remainder 
groups of employees, as shown in the Table 8-31. 
Table 8-31 The HuPeROI of signal detection for the classification group operational experience 
 Operational experience N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean t-statistic Sig. 
HuPeROI not 
signal detection 
< 1 year 6 30.8598 11.5886 4.7310 
-2.807 p<.05 
6-10 yrs 6 55.8616 18.4839 7.5460 
HuPeROI not 
signal detection 
< 1 year 6 30.8598 11.5886 4.7310 
-2.027 p".05 
11-19 yrs 9 46.1959 15.8362 5.2787 
HuPeROI not 
signal detection 
< 1 year 6 30.8598 11.5886 4.7310 
-3.580 p<.01 
! 20 yrs 12 52.8589 12.5963 3.6362 
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8.6 Validation of the HuPeROI findings 
Having defined the HuPeROI values the next step in the process is to validate the findings. 
Ideally, such a validation would be performed by comparing the calculations with (i) results 
from previous studies, and (ii) simulation observations where train drivers would be asked to 
operate according to the scenario guidelines. However, due to the lack of similar studies, 
there are no data available to directly compare the HuPeROI findings. In addition, due to 
resource constraints, simulation observations could not be performed within the scope of this 
research.  
Therefore, results are compared against information obtained from relevant investigation 
reports and information collected from the questionnaire survey. The validation comprises 
two phases, the internal and external. In the internal phase, the relevant UK SPAD reports 
from the set of the 479 reports are reviewed. In addition, the responses of the SMEs 
concerning their previous SPAD experiences are also examined. In the external phase, 
additional SPAD reports are collected and reviewed. The findings from both phases are then 
compared to the HuPeROI results.  
8.6.1 Internal validation 
For the internal validation, 58 UK SPADs (see Section 8.3.13) were reviewed and the 
immediate causes defined. The results are summarized in the Figure 8-9.  
 
Figure 8-9 SPADs immediate causes based on UK reports  
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According to the data, train drivers who failed to detect a signal caused the majority of the 
occurrences. In addition, SPADs due to wrong signal interpretation do not account for more 
than 15% of total SPAD events. Finally, data suggest that SPADs caused by train drivers 
who fail to execute an appropriate action as required, account for less than 9% of the 
occurrences.  
It was mentioned in the previous section that the HuPeROI values indicate the ordering of 
the likelihoods of different erroneous actions. Thus, the calculated values do not reflect the 
percentage differences found in real data. However, comparing the extracted data with the 
HuPeROI results, it is clear that the former can only partially confirm the latter.  
In particular, there is agreement between the HuPeROI likelihoods ordering for the SPADs 
caused due to wrong signal interpretation or failure on signal detection and real data. Such 
agreement confirms that the most likely error, between the two potential errors, is the failure 
of train drivers to detect the signal. In contrast, disagreement is found for the SPAD 
occurrences caused by train drivers who did not execute the action correctly. Although, the 
HuPeROI calculations indicate this type of error as the most likely, real data suggest that 
only few occurrences were caused by an action that has not been executed as required. 
That means, that the performance of the operators, as expressed by the R-PSFs rating and 
weighing, does not necessarily reflects the likelihood of an error.   
In addition, the HuPeROI results were compared to the SMEs responses, as collected from 
the survey (Question 1.10 in the Appendix XI). In total 15 SMEs, including 10 train drivers 
and 5 operations managers, stated that they had been involved to at least one SPAD in the 
past. Eight respondents claimed that such event occurred due to their failure to detect the 
signal. In addition, two respondents said that they did not interpret the signal correctly, while 
only 1 stated that he did not applied braking as required. Again, findings reveal a gap 
between the determined likelihood ordering of task execution and the proportion of this error 
in SPAD occurrences. 
8.6.2 External validation 
For the external validation, 43 additional SPAD events were collected, which refer to events 
that occurred on the UK mainline after 2011. The immediate causes were again extracted 
and the results are shown in the Figure 8-10.  
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Figure 8-10 SPADs immediate causes based on UK initial reports post 2011  
Data show that the failure of train drivers to detect a signal remains the prime reason for 
SPAD occurrences. Additionally, it is confirmed that train drivers’ inability to interpret a signal 
lead to less SPADs compared to those caused by non-signal detection. Finally, the number 
of occurrences due to wrongly executed actions was found to be almost two times higher 
compared to the initial reports. Nevertheless, this is again lower than the events that occur 
due to non-signal detection. Subsequently, the HuPeROI do not reflect the likelihood of the 
error. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that the performed validation is not optimal, it can be claimed that 
the HuPeROI can be used by the railway industry in order to indicate the ordering of 
likelihoods for different erroneous actions. Results could be also used to assess the 
performance of the operators, where the higher the HuPeROI value the better the 
performance of the operator. On the other hand, however, it was also found that the 
HuPeROI values do not necessarily reflect the proportion of causes. In other words, it is not 
always the case that the lowest assessed performance, i.e. the lowest HuPeROI value, 
would describe the majority of occurrences.  
8.7 The influence of external conditions on performance 
As described in the Section 7.5.10, in the last part of the questionnaire the SMEs were 
asked to indicate whether their performance may change when operating under certain 
conditions. In particular, they were asked to assess the change in their performance, when 
operating under (i) intermediate weather conditions, (ii) adverse weather conditions, (iii) 
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degraded operations, (iv) night, and (v) in a tunnel (for the underground operators only). The 
Table 8-32 illustrates the main findings.  
Table 8-32 Change in performance under certain conditions 
 Change in performance N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean F-statistic Sig. 
Intermediate 
weather conditions 
Improved 12 67.92 24.630 7.110 0.118 
p<.05 
Reduced 24 47.08 27.104 5.532 3.741 
Adverse weather 
conditions 
Improved 18 71.11 27.842 6.562 0.775 
p<.05 
Reduced 25 50.00 30.822 6.164 0.932 
Night operation 
Improved 12 49.17 30.833 8.915 1.781 
p<.05 
Reduced 11 38.18 32.502 9.800 1.902 
Degraded 
operations 
Improved 19 61.05 33.976 7.795 2.037 
p<.05 
Reduced 14 48.57 35.270 9.426 0.576 
Tunnel operation 
Improved 9 35.56 36.094 12.031 3.909 
p<.05 
Reduced 3 30.00 34.641 20.000 2.000 
As can be seen from this table, for all but adverse weather conditions, at least one third of 
the SMEs state that such conditions would not affect the operator performance. However, it 
is also found that when operating under degraded or night operations, slightly more SMEs 
indicate that the performance of the operators would be improved. This is explained by the 
fact that the SMEs declare that when operating under those conditions, they are more alert 
and vigilant.  
For the impact of weather conditions on the operator performance, it can be seen that most 
of the SMEs consider such an impact negative. However, the SMEs who indicate that 
adverse or intermediate weather conditions would improve their performance have given 
higher scores to such change. Again, the levels of vigilance and alertness due to the difficult 
external conditions is claimed to positively affect the performance of the operators. On the 
other hand, such conditions may increase fatigue and stress levels. Overall, however, 
weather conditions negatively affect performance.  
8.8 Summary 
This chapter presented the analysis and results of the case study for the implementation of 
the HuPeROI. Although generalising the substantive findings from analysis at large will 
require caution, there are a number of significant achievements and findings. Firstly, it was 
shown how the methodology could be implemented by the railway industry to quantify the 
factors that affect the performance of the operators. For example, for the case study used, it 
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was found that the dynamic personal factors category has the highest impact on operator 
performance. Moreover, with respect to the R-PSFs elements, it was shown that all the 
SMEs consider workload as the most important contributing factor to human performance. 
In addition, the HuPeROI framework  allows analysts to extract information on the quality of 
the factors at the time of the occurrence for different operational errors. This is achieved by 
the rating of factors. Moreover, the approach provides a useful tool to determine similarities 
and differences amongst the responses of the different types of employees. In this case 
study the majority of responses are not significantly different. Nevertheless, it was clearly 
stated that the types of the SMEs may consider the impact of the R-PSFs on human 
performance differently. Thus, the collection of additional data is recommended to confirm 
and consolidate the initial results, as well as to provide generic statements for the railway 
industry. 
Finally, the findings indicate that HuPeROI can be efficiently used to assess the 
performance of operators as function of the quality of the relevant R-PSFs. However, initial 
results failed to associate the performance of the operators, as expressed by the ordering of 
relative error likelihoods, with the results as observed by the investigation reports. Thus, the 
integration of the HuPeROI framework with simulation observations is recommended. The 
SMEs would first assess and rate the factors that affect their performance, as described in 
this thesis. They would then operate under the conditions of the described scenario and their 
behavior would be recorded. Subsequently, the industry would be able to compare the 
theoretical responses with real observations and finally associate the performance with 
types of actions and relative likelihoods. 
Having presented the results of the analysis, and showing the substantial role that the 
HuPeROI framework can play in the enhancement of the safety on railway operation, the 
next chapter discusses the main findings of this research and suggests avenues for future 
work.  
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Chapter 9 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents the main findings of the research on performance shaping factors and 
human performance in railway operations and suggests avenues for further work. The 
approach taken for the former is to address each of the research objectives formulated in 
Chapter 1 (repeated below for ease of reference) and to present the corresponding findings 
and main contributions of this thesis. The chapter concludes with a series of research ideas 
for future work and a list of publications from this thesis. 
9.1 Revisiting the research objectives  
The aim and objectives of this thesis are re-stated to facilitate the full understanding and 
impact of the main findings of this thesis. The aim of this thesis was to develop a novel 
approach to assess human performance and Chapter 1 defined a set of four objectives for 
this thesis. These are: 
Chapter 1 defined a set of research objectives for this thesis. These are to: 
1. Identify the modern railway system, categorise and describe its components and finally 
define its operational architecture. 
2. Understand the operational concept of human errors and review the models to define 
their origins. In turn, identify the state-of-the-art for the existing Human Performance 
Analysis (HPA) techniques, review and capture their limitations. 
3. Determine the contextual factors that affect railway operators performance and based 
on a holistic framework suggest a novel taxonomy, referred to as the Railway 
Performance Shaping Factors taxonomy, previously lacking in the railway domain.  
4. Develop a Human Performance Railway Operational Index (HuPeROI) to:  
(i) assess the influence of each identified R-PSF on the performance of railway 
operators accounting for all the dependencies between the R-PSFs, and in turn to  
(ii) assess the performance of operators for several railway operational scenarios, by 
comparing the likelihoods of different human errors. 
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9.2 Conclusions  
This section outlines the major achievements of this thesis with respect to the objectives.  
9.2.1 The modern railway system and its operational architecture 
To study and enhance the performance of railway operators and to identify the contextual 
factors that have an impact on their performance, first the railway system and its operational 
framework should be defined. This was undertaken in Chapter 2 which: 
! Reviews the various definitions of the railway system, addresses their differences 
and similarities and introduces a new detailed definition. In particular, this definitions 
accounts for those parties of the system that do not belong to railway organisations, 
i.e. passengers, trespassers. Based on that definition, a comprehensive description 
of the constituents of the system in provided. 
! Details the operational architecture of the railway system, referred to as Railway 
Operational System Architecture, which illustrates the dependencies and interactions 
amongst operators, equipment and infrastructure. Experts of different types of 
railways services and countries have validated ROSA. Thus, it can be broadly used 
from the railway industry from academics and practitioners for gaining understanding 
of the operational concept and the potential failures.  
 
Furthermore, in Chapter 3, the following issues were analysed: 
! Alternative definitions of accident and incident from major organisations in railway 
safety, including the definitions given by the ERA, FRA ATSB, CTSB and UIC. The 
differences and similarities of those definitions explained and it showed why the ERA 
definitions are considered the most comprehensive,  
! Historic accident trends, were analysed and results apart from the continuous 
improvements of railway safety, revealed that humans are those who mostly affect 
the system in terms of safety. 
!  In particular data showed that within the controlled components of the railway 
system the great majority of serious accidents occur due to human error.  
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9.2.2 Human Error – Human Performance Analysis Techniques  
The understanding of human error, the origins of human error, and their relations to human 
performance were substantial parts of this research in order to conceptualise operational 
errors. Chapter 4 contributed to this objective by: 
! Providing a consolidated literature review of human error definitions, human error 
classifications and the existing models to analyse and investigate the origins of 
human errors.  
! Providing critical review of the state-of-the-art literature in the filed of Human 
Performance Analysis and the associated techniques that examine and assess 
human performance. 
9.2.3 The Railway Performance Shaping Factors taxonomy 
In order to assess the performance of railway operators and to identify the causes of their 
operational errors, the factors that affect their performance should be defined. With respect 
to this, Chapter 5: 
! Introduces a novel and comprehensive taxonomy for railway operations, referred to 
as the Railway Performance Shaping Factors (R-PSFs) taxonomy. The R-PSFs is 
the first taxonomy developed on a holistic approach including: a detailed literature 
review, on-site observations, analysis of worldwide accidents and incidents report 
and SMEs validation; 
! Provides detailed and clear definitions for all the included factors within the R-PSFs 
taxonomy, so it could be easily implemented by researchers and analysts regardless 
of their level of expertise in the field of human factors; 
! Accounts for the dependencies amongst the factors and thus supports researchers to 
gain a better understanding of the influence of one factor on another. 
In addition within the R-PSFs concept, in Chapter 6: 
! A smaller list of factors is introduced that account for the majority of the occurrences 
regardless of their severity; 
! Such a list of factors can be used by railway stakeholders as part of the current 
investigation schemes in order to consistently record data regarding occurrences due 
to human failure. 
To date the R-PSFs taxonomy is being implemented by London Underground Limited, as 
part of their operational training module (Appendix I). In addition, it has been reviewed and 
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judged applicable to capture the impact of the ERTMS implementation on human 
performance (Section 9.4.3) 
9.2.4 The Safety Maturity Model 
To consolidate the taxonomy, safety data collected from railway organisations were used. To 
assess the extent to which data were obtained from reliable sources, this thesis (Chapters 5&6) 
developed a novel approach referred to as Safety Maturity Model (SMM). The SMM: 
! Unlike similar models, addresses not only the behavioural and/or attitudinal culture 
of organisations, but also technical, operational and methodological elements and 
actual achievements in terms of safety outcomes. In addition it quantifies the level of 
safety maturity. 
! Although initially applied to metro services, clearly the SMM is transferable to main 
line operations as its main focus is on an organisation’s safety standards, and not 
specific types of operations.  
9.2.5 The Human Performance Railway Operational Index (HuPeROI) 
The framework to assess the performance of railway operators as function of the most 
influential R-PSFs was developed (Chapter 7 and 8).  
! The HuPeROI allows researchers to quantify the impact of each of the R-PSFs on 
the performance of the operators, considering all the dependencies amongst those 
factors; 
! The framework, for first time fully integrates the SLIM with the ANP methodologies; 
! The framework was tested and validates by three UK train operators and the findings 
indicate that it can be broadly applied in order not only to assess the performance of 
the operators but also to indicate the differences between the different types of 
networks, organisations and employees. 
! Finally, the HuPeROI can be also used to identify the relationship between the 
assessed performance of the operators and the quality of the R-PSFs for particular 
errors. 
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9.3 Future work and recommendations 
The research presented in this thesis introduces a framework to evaluate the factors that 
influence the performance of railway operators and to assess operators’ performance for 
several operational scenarios. Such an assessment is expressed in terms of the  relative 
likelihood of errors. However, the findings also suggest a number of directions for further 
research. These include: 
! The transformation of the HuPeROI values into a range of probabilities. Although the 
comparison of the indices indicates which type of error is more likely to happen, it 
does not clearly define how much more likely this is.  
! The conventional ANP-based decision model seems to be ineffective in dealing with 
the inherent fuzziness or uncertainty in judgment during the pairwise comparison 
process. Although the use of the discrete scale of 1-9 to represent the verbal 
judgment in pairwise comparisons has the advantage of simplicity, it does not take 
into account the uncertainty associated with the mapping of one’s perception or 
judgment to a number. In real-life decision-making situations, the decision makers or 
stakeholders may be uncertain about their own level of preference, Therefore, it is 
worth exploring the applicability of fuzzy logic as an optimisation tool, as also 
indicated in the literature e.g. (Promentilla et al., 2008, Zhou, 2012). 
! The ANP approach allows researcher to quantify the different R-PSFs by account for 
dependences between both the categories and individual elements. However, the 
technique assumes that no hidden or unused factors within a category exists, thus 
the residual influence of those factors not included in the elements within a category 
is not estimated. The indirect influence on performance that caused by the remaining 
8 factors not included in the analysis, is yet to be identified. 
! The measurement of the dynamic personnel factors. No real assessment of such 
factors was conducted due to resources constraints, i.e. simulators.  
! Future research should explore the trade-offs required in mitigating the 12 R-PSFs 
with respect to safety, financial and social (reputation) consequences for railway 
industry. For instance, a change on the design of the system may not only be 
significantly more expensive than a change in the roster or shift pattern but also 
result in less improvement in the number of occurrences. 
! As railways move towards 24/7 operations, apart from operators’ performance the 
maintenance of railway networks becomes important. Therefore, there is a need to 
research the factors that affect maintenance. The R-PSFs taxonomy can provide the 
basis for such research. 
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9.4 Publications – conference presentations relating to this work 
The following publications and conference presentations have been produced to support this 
research. In particular, publications are consist of book chapters, journal publications and 
conference proceedings.  
9.4.1 Publication format: book chapters 
Kyriakidis, M., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2012). A human performance operational 
railway index to estimate operator's error probability. In: Stanton, Neville A. (ed.) Advances 
in Human Aspects of Road and Rail Transportation. CRC Press, pp.832-841. 
Kyriakidis, M. (2011). Human Reliability Analysis. In: Kröger, Wolfgang and Zio, Enrico 
(eds.) Vulnerable Systems. Springer, pp.157-187. 
9.4.2 Publication format: journals – published 
Kyriakidis, M., Majumdar, A., Grote, G. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2012). Development and 
Assessment of Performance Shaping Factors Taxonomy for Railway Operations, 
Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, vol. 2289, 
pp.145-153. 
Kyriakidis, M., Hirsch, R. and Majumdar, A. (2012). Metro railway safety: An analysis of 
accident precursors, Safety Science, vol. 50, pp.1535-1548,. 
Kyriakidis, M., Hirsch, R. and Majumdar, A. (2012). A global safety analysis and best 
practice for metro railways, Proceedings of the ICE - Transport, doi 10.1680/tran.11.00005. 
9.4.3 Publication format: journals – in press 
Kyriakidis, M., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2014). A data-based framework to identify 
the most significant Performance Shaping Factors in railway operations, Transportation 
Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, (reccommended for 
publication). 
Smith, P., Kyriakidis, M., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2013). The Impact of ERTMS 
on Human Performance in Railway Operations - European Findings, Transportation 
Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board (Best Paper Award for the 
Chapter 9     CONCLUSIONS 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
316 
2013 Young Member Scholarship of the TRB Railroad Operational Safety Committee 
AR070). 
9.4.4 Publication format: conference proceedings  
Kyriakidis, M., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2013). Developing a Human Performance 
Railway Operational Index to enhance safety of railway operations in the 10th World 
Congress on Railway Research, Sydney, Australia (accepted for publication). 
Kyriakidis, M., Smith, P., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2012), The influence of human 
performance on railways’ technological changes in the 1st RRUKA Annual Conference. 
London, U.K., http://rruka.org.uk/rruka-annual-conference-2012-conference-proceedings/. 
Kyriakidis, M. A., Hirsch, R. and Majumdar, A. (2010), Improving Railway Safety: Global 
Metro Railways’ Precursor and Safety Maturity Performance in the 20th International 
Railway Safety Conference, Hong Kong, China. 
9.4.5 Conference presentations 
Kyriakidis, M., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2013), A Human Performance Railway 
Operational Index (HuPeROI) to improve railway safety in the the 4th International Human 
Factors Conference, London, U.K. 
Smith, P., Kyriakidis, M., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2013), The Impact of ERTMS 
on Human Performance in Railway Operations - European Findings in the Transportation 
Research Board 92nd Annual Meeting, Washington D.C., USA. 
Kyriakidis, M., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2012), A Human Performance Operational 
Railway Index to estimate operators' error probability, 3rd European Award in the Safety and 
Security pillar of the Young European Arena of Research 2012, Athens, Greece. 
Kyriakidis, M., Majumdar, A., Grote, G. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2012), Development and 
Assessment of Performance Shaping Factors Taxonomy for Railway Operations in 
Transportation Research Board 91st Annual Meeting, Washington D.C, USA. 
Kyriakidis, M. A., Hirsch, R. and Majumdar, A. (2010), Improving Railway Safety: Global 
Metro Railways’ Precursor and Safety Maturity Performance in the 20th International 
Railway Safety Conference, Hong Kong, China. 
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Factor 
category TRACE-RR RARA HFACS-RR HERMES HFs in Railways R-PSFs 
1 Infrastructure and traffic Environment    System 
2 Communication   Communication within organisation  Team 
3 Procedures and documentation Procedures 
Organisational 
factors Regulations/ rules Organisational  Organisational 
4 Information     Team 
5 
Training, 
knowledge and 
experience 
Competence 
management 
Personal 
factors Training methods and simulators Personal dependent 
Personal, 
Organisational 
6 Workplace design, HMI 
Interface 
design  
Technological interfaces, 
Communication means Design of HMI System 
7 In-cab environment Environment 
Environmental 
factors Comfort of work context Working conditions System 
8 Personal Person Conditions of operators Comfort of work context Personal individual 
Personal, Dynamic 
personal 
9 Social and team    Organisational employee Team 
10    Shifts planning Organisational employee Organisational 
11  
Task design, 
Complexity   Organisational standard Task 
12  Workload    Task 
13  Staffing  Roster  Organisational 
14  Distraction    Dynamic personal 
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Factor 
category THERP HERA ATHEANA CARA HERA-JANUS R-PSFs 
1     Environment Traffic System 
2 Situational characteristics Communication Communication  Communication Team 
3 Work and task instructions  
Procedures and 
reference 
documents, 
work processes 
Procedures Procedures Documentation and procedures, Organisational Organisational 
4       
5 Organismic factors 
Experience and 
training Training and experience 
Competence 
management Training and experience 
Personal, 
Organisational 
6 
Task and 
equipment 
characteristics 
Ergonomics and 
HMI 
 Ergonomics, HMI, 
Instrumentation Interface design Workplace design & HMI System 
7 Situational characteristics Environment 
Environment and working 
conditions Environment Weather, Environment Environmental, System 
8 Organismic factors  Personal fitness level Person Personal 
Personal, Dynamic 
personal 
9 Situational characteristics 
Team dynamics 
and 
characteristics 
Dynamics and 
characteristics of team   Team  
10 Work and task instructions  Available time Time pressure   Task 
11 Work and task instructions  Complexity Complexity Task design   Task 
12 
Physiological & 
Psychological 
stressors 
Stress & 
stressors Workload and stress     
Task, Dynamic 
personal 
13     Staffing     Organisational 
14        
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Factor 
category CREAM HRMS SPAR-H SLIM HEPI R-PSFs 
1       
2    Communication  Team 
3 
Availability of 
procedures/ 
plans, Adequacy 
of organisation 
Procedures Work processes 
Procedures and administrative 
controls Procedures Organisational 
4  
Quality of 
information and 
interface    
Team 
5 
Adequacy of 
training and 
experience 
Training/expertise/ 
experience/ 
competence 
Training and 
experience Training and experience 
Training and 
experience Personal, Organisational 
6 Adequacy of MMI   
Ergonomics – 
HMI Instrumentation, HMI  System 
7 Working conditions   Environmental factors 
Environmental 
factors Environmental 
8   
Fitness for 
duty Fitness level  Personal 
9 Crew collaboration      Team dynamics and characteristics Teamwork Team 
10 Available time, Time of day Time Available time Time available  Time pressure Task 
11 
Number of 
simultaneous 
goal 
Task complexity, 
Task organisation 
Task 
complexity  Complexity  Complexity Task 
12     Stress and stressors Workload and stress Stress Task, Dynamic personal 
13 Time of day    Staffing     Organisational 
14        Distraction Dynamic personal 
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Appendix III Overview of individual contextual factors 
Individual 
Factors TRACE-RR RARA HERMES HFs in Railways 
1 Unfamiliarity Unfamiliarity   
2 Time availability Time availability   
3 Ability to detect and perceive    
4 Features over-ride allowed    
5 Positioning and layout   
Positioning and 
layout of HMI 
6 High workload Workload   
7 Technique learning Technique learning   
8 Procedures clarity Procedures Regulations and rules Standards, Rules and guidelines 
9 Risk perception Mismatch between 
perceived and real risk  
Safety awareness 
10 Poor feedback Interface  Quality of feedback 
11 Delayed/ Incomplete feedback    
12 Driver experience Operator inexperience  Experience 
13 Information quality & 
availability 
Quality of information, 
Interface 
Communication  
14 Objectives conflict Objectives conflict   
15 No diversity    
16 Education and training Operator inexperience Training methods and simulators 
Training provided 
by organisation, 
Skills 
17 Trust in information    
18 Job clarity Unclear allocation and 
responsibility   
19 Physical capabilities Physical capabilities   
20 Emotional stress Emotional stress  Emotional tension 
21 Health Fitness for duty  Health 
22 Morale Morale  Motivation 
23 Consistency of displays    
24 In-cab environment Environment Comfort of working 
contexts 
Working conditions 
25 Concentration    
26 Fatigue Fatigue   
27 Distraction / 3rd parties Distraction   
28 Team relations   Social aspects 
29 No progress tracking Checking     
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Individual 
Factors TRACE-RR RARA HERMES HFs in Railways 
30   Under load task     
31   Task complexity   Task design 
32     Communication means 
33     Technological interfaces 
34     Roster/shifts planning   
35       Individual characteristics 
36       Roster planning, Tiredness 
37       Layout of work environment 
38       Leadership 
39         
40         
41         
42         
!
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Individual 
Factors THERP HEART HERA ATHEANA CARA 
1 Frequency and repetitiveness  Unfamiliarity   Unfamiliarity 
2 Task speed Time availability Available time Time pressure  
3 Perceptual 
requirements     
4      
5      
6  Low workload  Workload 
Cognitive 
overload 
7 State of current practice or skills 
Technique 
learning   
Technique 
learning 
8 Procedures Procedures Procedures and documents Procedures Procedures 
9 High jeopardy risk 
Mismatch 
between 
perceived and real 
risk 
  Risk taking 
10 Feedback, HMI Interface, Instrumentation 
Ergonomics and 
HMI 
Ergonomics, HMI, 
Instrumentation 
Poor feedback, 
HMI, 
Instrumentation 
11 Feedback     
12  
Operator 
inexperience 
Experience and 
training 
Training and 
experience 
Training and 
experience, On-
job training 
13 Communication, Complexity 
Quality of 
information, 
Interface 
Complexity, 
Communication Communication 
Trust in system, 
Hand-over 
practices 
14  Objectives conflict    
15      
16 Training and experience 
Operator 
inexperience 
Experience and 
training 
Training and 
experience 
Training and 
experience,   
On job training 
17      
18  
Unclear allocation 
and responsibility   
Team 
coordination 
19  
Physical 
capabilities  
Personal fitness 
level  
20 Stress Emotional stress Stress & stressors Stress Emotional stress 
21 Fitness for duty Fitness for duty    
22 Rewards, Threats Morale   Morale 
23 Control-display relationship 
Consistency of 
displays    
24 Working environment Environment Environment 
Environment and 
working conditions 
Working 
environment, 
Weather 
conditions 25      
26 Fatigue Fatigue    
27 Distraction Distraction    
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Individual 
Factors THERP HEART HERA ATHEANA CARA 
28 
Team Relations, 
Team structure 
and 
communication 
 
Team dynamics 
and 
characteristics 
Dynamics and 
characteristics of 
team 
Communication 
29  Checking     Checking 
30 
Task load, Task 
criticality, 
Monotony 
Under load task       
31 Task instructions   Task complexity Complexity   
32           
33 Availability/ adequacy of special equipment, tools and supplies        
34           
35 Individual characteristics         
36 
Work hours/ work 
breaks, Shift 
Rotation, Staffing 
    Staffing   
37           
38      
39 Interpretation         
40 Decision making         
41 Vigilance       Vigilance 
42   Safety culture       
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Individual 
Factors HERA-JANUS CREAM HRMS SPAR-H SLIM HEPI 
1       
2  
Available time, 
Time of day Time Available time Time available  Time pressure 
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8 Documentation and procedures 
Availability of 
procedures/ 
plans, adequacy 
of organisation 
Procedures  
Procedures and 
administrative 
controls 
Procedures 
9       
10 Workplace design & HMI 
Adequacy of 
MMI   Ergonomics – HMI 
Instrumentation, 
HMI  
11       
12 Training and 
experience  
Training/ expertise/ 
experience/ competence 
Training and 
experience 
Training and 
experience 
Training and 
experience 
13 Communication  
Quality of information and 
interface  Communication  
14       
15       
16 Training and experience 
Adequacy of 
training and 
experience 
Training/ expertise/ 
experience/ competence 
Training and 
experience 
Training and 
experience 
Training and 
experience 
17       
18       
19 Personal      
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Individual 
Factors HERA-JANUS CREAM HRMS SPAR-H SLIM HEPI 
20    
Stress and 
stressors 
Workload and 
stress Stress 
21    Fitness for duty Fitness level  
22       
23       
24 Weather, Environment 
Working 
conditions   
Environmental 
factors Environmental factors 
25       
26       
27      Distraction 
28 Team, Communication 
Crew 
collaboration   
Team dynamics 
and 
characteristics 
Teamwork 
29            
30             
31   
Number of 
simultaneous 
goals 
Task complexity, Task 
organisation Task complexity     
32             
33             
34             
35             
36   Time of day   Staffing     
37             
38         
39             
40             
41             
42             
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Appendix IV Definitions of proposed R-PSFs 
 
Personal Factors 
Personal R-PSFs encompass the factors that characterise and affect the performance of an 
individual but are not strongly related to the precise moment of operation/occurrence. 
Therefore they are considered as static factors. Personal factors embrace operators’ levels 
of training and experience, physical conditions and other intrinsic characteristics. 
Training-competence 
Training is defined as the process of bringing a person to an agreed standard of proficiency 
by practice and instruction in order to conduct a particular job or activity. Competence is then 
defined as the control of the required knowledge, skills and attitudes to perform the specific 
range of tasks according to prescribed standards (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004e).   
Well-trained and competent employees are those who are familiar and aware of new 
technologies, equipment and systems, while they regularly refresh their old skills and 
knowledge. For instance, train drivers who are adequately trained in order to use the GSM-R 
communication system.  
Experience 
Experience is defined as the skills and knowledge that operators acquire from extensive 
participation and observation that is especially gained over the years of executing their 
profession. In particular, it is described as the accumulation of information and knowledge 
gained through training and interactions with the system (Groth, 2009).  
An experienced signaller, for instance, is more likely to efficiently resolve the consequences 
of an unexpected event, such as a sudden signal failure. On the other hand, an 
inexperienced train driver may apply braking inappropriately when he/she operates on a new 
type of rolling stock (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b). However it is not only the 
inexperienced drivers prone to errors. For example, high levels of experience may reduce 
the awareness of operators, which eventually may result to hazardous events. The level of 
operators’ experience should be indicated every time that experience is identified as 
contributor R-PSF.  
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Familiarity 
Familiarity is defined as the reasonable knowledge or acquaintance of operators with 
respect to their duties or tasks.  
Familiarity may overlap with experience; however there is a clear difference between the two 
terms. For instance, although an operator may be well experienced, he/she may not 
necessarily be familiar with a particular situation, e.g. operating on a new route. Similar to 
experience, familiarity can either positively or negatively influence human performance, i.e. 
completely unfamiliar or too familiar. 
In general, familiarity is associated with the frequency of conducting a specific task, 
operating on a route, applying a procedure or equipment. For example, dedicated to a line 
drivers or signallers who every day perform their duties on the same route.  
Fit to work  
Fit to work is defined as the ability of operators to perform their duties in a safe, secure, 
productive and effective manner, without facing any health, physical or mental, problems 
(Gertman et al., 2004). Stress or fatigue related problems are not included in this definition. 
Fit to work should account for R-SPFs when people face long-term health problems or use 
any type of medication (with or without prescription) that may affect their performance. 
Motivation 
Motivation is described as the desire, interest or enthusiasm of operators to perform their 
duties.  
Motivated employees are characterised by high willingness and increased effort to complete 
their tasks and positive attitude and way of thinking concerning their work (Groth, 2009). The 
opposite, for instance, may occur when operators are paid less in relation to operators from 
other comparable train operators or infrastructure managers. 
Individual characteristics 
Individual characteristics refer to all distinctive characteristics of employees. 
The individual characteristics comprise features such as age, gender, physical capabilities, 
and cultural and behavioural characteristics, e.g. extroverted or introverted.  
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Dynamic Personal Factors 
Dynamic personal R-PSFs embrace the factors that characterise and affect individuals’ 
performance and are strongly related to the precise moment of operation/occurrence. These 
factors include, amongst others, operators’ levels of stress, distraction, fatigue and vigilance.  
Distraction-loss of concentration 
Distraction-loss of concentration refers to any internal or external causes that draw 
operators’ attention from concentrating on conducting their tasks and duties. 
Amongst others, causes of distraction can be: other people in/around the cab or the control 
room, people standing on platforms, use of mobile phones, communication with co-workers 
for relevant or irrelevant to the operation issues, preoccupation with personal issues, desire 
to finish duty (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b). 
Expectation 
Expectation is defined as the strong anticipation that something will happen or be the case. 
It can be expressed by a well-known pattern of information which leads to a strong belief or 
mind-set about the appeared information (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b). 
Expectation is associated with dedicated to specific routes train drivers who operate on the 
same line several times per day. Hence, for instance, they tend to anticipate that signals will 
show certain aspects and change according to the usual pattern. Therefore, they might miss 
a red signal due to their strong belief that the signal would have changed to green aspect 
until the time they reach it. 
Perception  
Perception is defined as the ability of operators to recognise by senses, i.e. sight, hearing, 
any external objects or phenomena. Perception should be considered as contextual factor 
when the aim is to see or hear what the information (visual or oral) or instructions (written or 
oral) say (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b). 
Operators perception failures include: misread visual information, e.g. red signal is seen as 
yellow, mishear oral information and misread written instructions (Rail Safety and Standards 
Board, 2004b). 
 
APPENDIX IV   DEFINITIONS OF THE PROPOSED R-PSFS  
 
 
 348 
Interpretation 
Interpretation is described as the ability of operators to clarify or explain the meaning of 
information, instructions, etc. Interpretation should account for R-PSF when the aim, 
opposite to perception, is to understand the meaning of information (visual or oral) or 
instructions (written or oral) (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b). 
Operational failures due to interpretation encompass: misunderstanding of signal aspects, 
e.g. flashing signals, or misunderstanding of written procedures (Rail Safety and Standards 
Board, 2004b).  
Stress 
Stress is defined as the mental, emotional or physical tension and adverse reaction of 
operators due to excessive pressure (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004e).  
Stress can be caused by excessive workload, conducting duties under adverse weather 
conditions, personal problems, e.g. financial losses, marriage problems, threat of assault, 
getting involved in accidents or being witness of suicide attempts and finally feeling insecure 
at the work place, e.g. organisational restructuring or relocation of depot. It should be noted 
that a certain level of stress is required to achieve good performance during the execution of 
a task (nominal level) (Gertman et al., 2004). The definition above, however, accounts only 
for high levels of stress.  
Fatigue  
Fatigue characterises extreme tiredness, which results from physical exhaustion due to 
exertion or prolonged activity.  
Fatigue is a very common symptom with operators who perform their duties in shifts (Rail 
Safety and Standards Board, 2004e). It can be caused, amongst others, by lack of sleep, 
shift pattern, e.g. long duration of shifts, lack of resting days, inadequate duration of breaks, 
as well as understaffing and personal life style. Fatigue should not be counted as R-PSF 
when caused by mental exhaustion, as these cases are described by Stress. In addition, 
Fatigue due to illness should be considered as Fit to work R-PSF.  
Vigilance 
Vigilance is called the action or state of keenly being alert to possible dangers during the 
execution of duties.  
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Vigilance is strongly associated with the feeling of boredom and monotony as well as with 
under-loaded tasks (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b). Therefore, more prone to low 
vigilant occurrences may be considered long distance train drivers who run the service with 
very few stops and meet mostly green signals. 
Situational awareness 
Situational awareness is described as the ability of operators to be aware of what is 
happening in their vicinity (around them) and subsequently what would be likely to happen in 
future (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012a). 
Situational awareness involves, for instance, the necessity of signallers to acknowledge the 
exact location and routes of trains in order to avoid potential conflicts. For train drivers, on 
the other hand, situational awareness may involve the opening and closing of train doors, 
acknowledging where passengers are standing (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012a). 
Decision making skills 
Decision making skills account for operators’ capability to make effective and timely 
decisions among several alternative scenarios and solve problems based on both their 
knowledge and experience (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012a).  
A relevant example involves the decision that a train driver should take concerning the 
adopted driving strategy including appropriate speed and braking when operating under 
adverse weather conditions (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012a). For signallers, this 
may include the assessment of the impact on the network of the decision to block a line in 
order to perform the separation of a train (Gibson et al., 2004). 
 
Task Factors 
Task R-PSFs simply characterise the features of an executed task (Kyriakidis et al., 2012). 
This category comprises factors such as monotony, workload, routine, time pressure, task 
complexity and task instructions.  
Workload 
Workload is generally defined as the amount of work to be done by operators in a specified 
period of time.  
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Workload could be either physical or mental, depending on the type of task. In addition it can 
be either low or extensive, while in either case the implications on operators’ performance 
may be substantial, e.g. boredom or increased limits of stress (Rail Safety and Standards 
Board, 2004e). However, this definition captures only extensive workload, as boredom is 
covered by Monotony.  
Extensive workload is likely due to sudden technical failures, e.g. signal or rolling stock, as 
well as understaffing. For instance, failure of a signal may increase the workload of 
signallers if it requires manual set up of the signals along the line, while they might also need 
to reset the routing of trains.  
Monotony 
Monotony is described as lack of variety and interest, tedious repetition of a task, which 
subsequently plausibly results in a general feeling of boredom.  
In railway operations, examples of monotony can be expressed by high-speed routes with 
only few stops, where operators run at constant speed and experience mostly green signals 
(Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b). 
Routine 
Routine is the sequence of the usual followed actions or procedures during the execution of 
a task. 
Operational routine is expressed by specific patterns followed throughout the execution of 
tasks. Therefore, any change of routines may lead to certain safety considerations. An 
example of an incident caused by such change is derived from personal communication 
between the author and a train operator. The operator claimed that in 20 years of services, 
he had only one incident of Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD). The driver said that he was 
used to prepare a cup of tea at a specific station and immediately after embarking the train, 
check the dedicated signal, then having a sip of tea and start the service. That specific day, 
the driver embarked the train without preparing his cup of tea and subsequently he forgot to 
check the signal before departing; this resulted to a SPAD as the signal was still showing a 
red aspect. 
Time pressure - Time to respond 
Time pressure is defined as the level of operators’ mental pressure to complete a task within 
a specified time period. Time to respond, on the other hand, describes the available amount 
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of time that operators have to respond to and act on an unexpected event or to correct an 
identified error (Gertman et al., 2004). 
Typical examples of performing a task under time pressure are: operators who are asked to 
perform their duties within a limited amount of time due to an unexpected delay or when they 
move from the one side of the train (cabin) to the other (rear cabin) to start a journey back. 
Task complexity 
Task complexity refers to how difficult a task is to be executed within a given context and 
environment (Gertman et al., 2004). 
Task complexity is associated with complicated station layout, where the track layout 
requires increased level of attention from train drivers (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 
2004b). It could also refer to required physical efforts, such as physical actions that are 
strenuous to be carried out due to complicated patterns or movements (Gertman et al., 
2004). 
Task Instructions 
Task instructions refer to directions, orders or recommended rules that are implemented to 
guide and support operators concerning how they should carry out their tasks or run the 
services. 
In operational terms, instructions should be clear, simple and explicit. For instance, 
signallers provide explicit instructions via radio communication to train drivers who perform 
shunting movements.  
 
Team Factors 
Team R-PSFs are the factors that characterise and affect the performance of operators as 
members of a team that works together to achieve a common goal. 
Communication between employees 
Communication between employees implies the ability of operators to exchange information 
effectively via verbal and non-verbal media and stand on their position as necessary (Rail 
Safety and Standards Board, 2012a). 
APPENDIX IV   DEFINITIONS OF THE PROPOSED R-PSFS  
 
 
 352 
Effective communication is characterised by quick, clear, explicit, justified and verified 
exchange of information. An example of ineffective communication may involve a train driver 
who mishears the number of a signal that a signaller indicated, while neither of the operators 
confirmed that the correct number was understood. The above definition does not 
encompass the cases of communication failure due to technical problems. 
Teamwork 
Teamwork refers to how operators should work together in a positive, respectful and 
supportive manner and effectively coordinate their tasks and duties including the division of 
their responsibilities (Groth, 2009, Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012a). 
Teamwork is expressed by the clear distinction of roles and responsibilities during the 
execution of a task. The definition also includes the quality of feedback between team 
members, level of trust, structure and stability of a team, consideration of needs and support 
of team members and treating each other with respect (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 
2012a). 
Team Relations 
Team relations refer to the social climate between all team members and how these 
members interact with each other (Groth, 2009). 
The relations between team members are expressed by the levels of harmony and honesty, 
the level of frictions and how any conflicts are resolved, the level of mutual confidence and 
trust, and finally the frequency and level of common activities and social events. 
Quality and trust in information 
Quality and trust in information refers to the level of trust in persons providing the information 
and the level of completeness, accuracy and relevance of the shared information (Rail 
Safety and Standards Board, 2004b, Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012a).  
Examples may involve train drivers who do not trust a particular signaller to share the 
information or train drivers who convey only part of the relevant information or irrelevant 
information to their colleagues (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b, Rail Safety and 
Standards Board, 2012a). 
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Organisational Factors  
Organisational R-PSFs include the factors defined and controlled by an organisation (Groth, 
2009). With respect to a single occurrence, they are considered as static; however they tend 
to change over a longer period of time. Organisational factors embrace the characteristics 
and attitudes of an organisation as well as certain organisational behaviours that influence 
the performance of employees. Typical examples are the safety culture and safety 
management systems. Within these two broad categories, additional organisational features 
can be identified such as the quality of relevant procedures, leadership, supervision and the 
level of trust within the organisation. Furthermore, staffing, shift pattern and the provided 
training are also assigned to organisational factors and are directly associated with the 
number and type of the assigned tasks, the composition of teams as well as the levels of 
workload and fatigue. For instance, if the driver is found tired due to long consecutive shifts, 
then the issue is related to the organisation and the way the shift patterns are set. 
Safety culture (disregard procedures) 
Safety culture expresses what emerges as a result of a concerted organisational effort to 
move all cultural elements towards the goal of safety, including its members, systems, and 
work activities (Cooper, 2000, Sorensen, 2002). It is the set of values and priorities placed 
on all aspects of safety by all employees at any level within the organisation (Rail Safety and 
Standards Board, 2004e).  
Indicators of organisations with poor safety culture include, amongst others, repeated cases 
of employees who disregard rules and procedures and management that favours results 
over safety, e.g. supports drivers to operate faster so as to increase capacity, risky driving 
behaviour, use of mobile phone or disobey procedures. On the other hand, organisations 
with positive safety culture are characterized by consciousness, evaluation and action on 
safety related matters and is supported by communications established on mutual trust 
throughout the whole organization (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004e).  
Safety Management Systems  
Safety management systems (SMS) generally refer to the set of work practices and 
procedures for monitoring and when necessary improving safety of operations. The EC 
(2004) define railways SMS as "the organisation and arrangements established by an 
infrastructure manager or a railway undertaking to ensure the safe management of its 
operations". 
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Efficient and positive SMS clearly define the roles and responsibilities within an organisation, 
set arrangements for safety mechanisms, involve operators and employees of all levels in 
the process and finally ensure constant safety improvements (Office of Rail Regulation, 
2011b). 
Training and training methods 
Training/training methods is defined as the continuous process provided by the organisation 
to its employees in order to assure that they have the appropriate knowledge, skills and 
attitudes to operate the railway according to the defined standards (Rail Safety and 
Standards Board, 2004e). 
Training methods include lectures, demonstrations and simulation sessions. They are 
targeting to keep employees familiar to new technologies, refresh their qualifications and old 
skills as well as their levels of competence. Frequency and quality of training methods, in 
addition to the level of monitoring of employees who may need additional training are also 
incorporated within this definition. 
Quality and availability of procedures, standards and regulations 
Quality and availability of procedures, standards and regulations refer to the existence and 
use of formal operating procedures for the tasks under consideration (Gertman et al., 2004)  
High quality procedures are characterised by clarity, simplicity and availability with respect to 
how they describe the actions that operators are required to perform each of their tasks. For 
instance, how a train driver should proceed after passing signal at danger or what the 
appropriate signallers’ actions are before, during and after applying an absolute possession 
on a line. Problems related to procedures, standards and regulations may arise when: (i) 
there are more than one similar procedure and it may not be clear which procedure should 
be applied in each of the cases; (ii) procedures, regulations and rules may have recently 
changed and operators are either unaware of the changes or they have not been adequately 
trained on the new procedures; (iii) there is lack of procedures; (iv) operators do not follow or 
obey the procedures (usually refer to new procedures) as they are not explicitly and clearly 
written.  
Leadership 
Leadership is described as the ability of an individual “to motivate others to forego self-
interest in the interest of a collective vision” (House and Shamir, 1993). In general, it is 
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shown as the ability of a person to lead, rule, guide and influence the behaviour and actions 
of a group of people or organisation. 
Good and effective leadership in railway organisations guarantees that “safety objectives of 
are established and prioritised, that best practices are applied to meet safety targets, that 
the effectiveness of the system is constantly checked and monitored, and that corrective 
and/or proactive countermeasures are taken when necessary” (European Railway Agency, 
2010). For instance, it can be expressed by the ability of the manager to motivate, guide and 
support operators to act towards achieving the goals of the organisation. Leadership should 
be considered as contributor R-PSF, when it refers to the higher levels of the hierarchy 
within the railway organisation.  
Supervision 
Supervision is defined as the act of “managing and monitoring employees, developing them, 
supporting them and mediating on their behalf” (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004e). 
Effective supervision is characterised by supporting operators, helping in resolving conflicts, 
gathering information about service activities and any external conditions that may affect the 
safety of operations, checking on the progress of operators and quality of service, evaluating 
objectively the performance of operators and the effectiveness of the team. 
Although supervision may overlap with leadership, for this definition it should be considered 
as relevant R-PSF, when it refers to the personnel responsible for connecting frontline 
personnel to the organisation’s leadership (Groth, 2009).  
Shift Pattern 
Shift pattern defines and includes “any organisation of working hours that differ from the 
traditional diurnal work period, while sometimes is synonymous of irregular or odd working 
hours” (Costa, 2003). 
Operational shift patterns include the: type of shift, e.g. morning or night, duration of shift, 
duration of breaks, and number of people per shift. Shift patterns affect significantly human 
performance as it is widely acknowledged that it leads to fatigue phenomena. In addition 
ineffective shift patterns can be characterized by health and family problems, stress, anxiety, 
irritability and depression (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004e) 
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Relations within organisation 
Relations within organisation refer to the quality and type of personal relationships between 
people within the organisation. Relations within organisation indicate the social climate of all 
members of the organisation and the interactions between them on all different levels of 
hierarchy.  
Relations within organisation may overlap with team relations; therefore this R-PSFs should 
be considered as contributor R-PSF only when it is identified that relations between 
employees of different levels in the hierarchy have led to operational safety irregularities.  
Incentives for employees 
Incentives for employees are all means that an organisation uses and offers to increase the 
motivation of its employees to operate and execute their tasks (Rail Safety and Standards 
Board, 2004b). 
It is apparent from its definition that incentives of employees are strongly associated with 
employees’ motivation. Incentives include amongst others: awards, e.g. financial rewards 
and extra days of holidays, promotions and public acknowledgment. The incentives that an 
organisation offers should be clearly stated and awarded without bias. For instance, it is 
equally important for employees to know that they will be rewarded for excellent 
performance but at the same that employees with a deliberate poor performance will not be 
acknowledged.  
Communication within organisation-feeling secure 
Communication within organisation refers to the quality and clarity of communication 
between the different levels in the hierarchy of employees, including the quality of feedback 
and the level of information about any organizational changes (May and Mumby, 2005). 
For instance, it includes the clarity of information during a period of re-organisation, while 
employees may be afraid of losing their positions and the feeling of safety to express a 
personal opinion related to the way the organisation operates without fear of any 
consequences. 
Fit to Work Aspect 
Fit to work aspect outlines any assessments conducted by organisation to assure that its 
employees can perform safely a specific job or task. (Canadian Centre for Occupational 
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Health and Safety, 2006). In addition this definition incorporates organisations policy to 
encourage employees to not go to work when they feel unwell.  
Fit to work aspect is expressed by the adequacy of an organisation to help its employees to: 
improve their personal fitness; reduce their fatigue and stress levels; overcome any health 
problems without the fear of any consequences, e.g. losing job. 
 
System Factors 
System R-PSFs characterise the features of the railway system and how the interactions 
between the operators and system characteristics may affect the performance of operators. 
System factors include the design of railway system, operators’ working environment, 
human machine interface, quality and trust in equipment and the railway communication 
means. 
System design 
System design is described as the process to achieve high quality, clarity, practicality, and 
efficiency architecture, components, modules, interfaces and data in order to satisfy 
specified predefined requirements for the corresponding system (Churchman, 1971). 
System design includes, amongst others, the complexity level of stations or tracks layout 
and the location of installed signals. 
Human Machine Interface 
Human Machine Interface covers how information is communicated between operators and 
equipment (Groth, 2009). It describes the usability, physical access and level of friendliness 
to users of the machines.  
HMI is characterized by the amount and clarity of available information on control panels, the 
functionality and layout of control panels and displays. It is also expressed by the train on-
board equipment and how displays convey the information to drivers, as well as how easy it 
is for operators to input data and information on the machines when required. 
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Working environment 
Working environment describes the nature of the physical working conditions such as 
lighting, noise, temperature (Hollnagel, 1998), as well as the layout and ergonomics of the 
working area. 
Working environment encompasses, for instance, the level of noise, vibrations and 
temperature within a train cabin, as well as the design of the seats and the total cabin 
interior. Respectively for control rooms it includes temperature, ventilation and design of 
work place, e.g. position of displays.  
Trust in equipment 
Trust in equipment describes the level of trust that operators show to the output of 
information from a specific equipment (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2004b).  
The level of trust is affected by the long term, i.e. history of faults, reliability of the specific 
equipment. For instance, both signallers and train drivers may not trust the aspect of a signal 
that has very often failed in the past.  
Railway Communication Systems (RCS) 
Railway communication systems outline the facilities consisting of the physical plants and 
equipment for disseminating information, between railway employees and operators.  
The railway communication systems include any radio and/or telecommunication means, 
e.g. GSM-R, used for the communication between operators. The RCS should be taken into 
account as contributor R-PSFs, when communication between operators fails due to 
technical failures or bad design, e.g. noise on the communication channels.  
 
Environmental Factors 
Environmental factors refer to weather conditions at the time of the execution of a task.  
Weather Conditions 
Weather conditions describe the day-to-day meteorological conditions as expressed by the 
state of the atmosphere in terms of temperature, wind, cloudiness and precipitation. 
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Adverse weather conditions, for instance, may affect operations negatively, as it can be 
more difficult for operators to execute their tasks, e.g. operating under heavy train or fog, or 
braking on very slippery conditions. 
Visibility 
Visibility is defined as the distance and clarity that operators can see and identify an object 
on the line or relevant vicinity in order to perceive its emitted information. 
For instance, how far and clear train drivers can see a signal or an obstacle on the track 
under given weather conditions or due to vegetation (sighting). 
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Appendix V The Safety Maturity Model features 
Table V-I The Safety Maturity Model questions 
 Questions 
1 Do you publish an annual safety report (if yes, please say how we can download it, or if not downloadable, send us a copy) 
2 How often do you monitor the safety data in your organisation? 
3 How often do you prioritise the importance of safety related incidents? 
4 How do you calibrate the importance of safety related incidents? 
5 How often do budget constraints prevent your organisation from being safe? 
6 Are processes to generate safety goals & policies effective? Are they explicit? 
7 How explicit / prescriptive are safety procedures and plans? 
8 Where do initiatives for improving safety come from? 
9 How often does your organisation compare itself with other industries (e.g. nuclear plants, 
aviation, oil refineries) and their experience? 
10 Do you keep a register of risks/hazards in order to mitigate them? If so, what category of risks / 
hazards do you monitor? 
 
 
Table V-II Scoring of questions 
 Scoring 
1 Yes=4, No=0 
2 Yearly=1, Monthly=2, Weekly=3, Daily=3, All=4, Daily & Monthly=3, Quarterly & Yearly=1.5, Monthly & Quarterly=2 
3 After a serious accident=2, Every year=3, No fixed time=0, After a serious accident & Every year=4  
4 
Actual impact=2, Potential worst-case scenario=3, Significance of trend=1, Actual impact & 
Potential worst-case scenario & Significance of trend=4, Actual impact & Potential worst-case 
scenario=3.5, Realistic scenario & Significance of trend=2.5 
5 All the time=0, Frequently=1, Rarely=2, Very rarely=3, Never=4 
6 Informal=1, Ineffective=0, Effective= 3, Explicit/detailed=3, Effective & Explicit/detailed=4 
7 Precise & detailed=3, Allow flexibility=2, Rely on qualified individuals=1, Precise & detailed - Allow flexibility=4, Precise & detailed - Rely on qualified individuals=3 
8 Safety specialists=4, Frontline operators=2, Frontline managers=3, Senior managers=1 
9 Never=0, Rarely=1, Annually=4, Always before investment decisions=2 
10 No register=0, Serious risks only=2, Serious & minor=4 
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Table V-III Safety maturity model features 
 Safety Maturity Model features 
 Initial 
(0-10 score) 
Compliance – Driven 
(10-20) 
Defined Risk  
(20-25) 
Managed Risk  
(26-33) 
Optimising 
(34-40) 
S
af
et
y 
de
fin
iti
on
 
Safety is defined in terms of 
technical and procedural 
solutions and compliance 
with regulations, but is not 
seen as a key business risk. 
Safety is defined not only 
in terms of technical and 
procedural solutions and 
compliance with 
regulations but also with 
safety training objectives. 
Safety is seen as a key 
business risk, covering the 
safety of customers, staff, 
contractors and any other 
person on or adjoining the 
organisation’s property. 
The level of safety is 
measured quantitatively 
through monitoring 
precursors and top 
events and changes in 
the QRA model. 
Management is 
constantly searching for 
ways to continue 
reducing the frequency of 
accidents. 
S
af
et
y 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
The primary responsibility for 
safety is perceived to lie with 
the safety department. 
Safety responsibility is 
transferred from the 
safety department to 
operations and 
maintenance. 
CEO treats safety 
management as a critical 
business issue, with a main 
board member responsible 
for safety and all line 
managers responsible for 
safety in their functional 
area. 
As in defined risk but line 
managers are also 
responsible for identifying 
and mitigating risks within 
a defined time period. 
This is then cascaded 
down to frontline 
personnel.  
Management targets for 
year on year reductions in 
indicators of remaining 
risk while ensuring that 
staff responsible for 
reporting such indicators 
are not deterred by these 
targets from reporting all 
such incidents. 
D
es
ig
n 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t 
The design of equipment and 
procedures do not 
consistently incorporate the 
principles of defence in depth 
or the prevention of single 
point failure. 
New equipment and 
procedures are designed 
to incorporate the 
principles of defence in 
depth and the prevention 
of single point failures.  
A programme is under way 
to bring all equipment and 
procedures up to 
recognised design 
standards and meet realistic 
safety targets incorporating 
the principles of risk 
minimisation.  
The programme is 
complete, bringing all 
equipment and 
procedures up to 
recognised design 
standards and meeting 
realistic safety targets, 
incorporating the 
principles of risk 
minimisation. 
Current design standards, 
procedures and other 
barriers to risk are 
constantly reviewed to 
keep pace with 
technological change to 
maintain ALARP.   
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 Safety Maturity Model features 
 Initial 
(0-10 score) 
Compliance – Driven 
(10-20) 
Defined Risk  
(20-25) 
Managed Risk  
(26-33) 
Optimising 
(34-40) 
R
is
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
There is no systematic 
recognition, quantification or 
management of risk. 
Legacy systems and 
system-wide risks are not 
addressed, quantified or 
managed. 
All major safety hazards are 
identified, registered and 
the risk evaluated and 
mitigated. 
Risks are aggregated and 
progress measured using 
a regularly updated 
model of quantified 
probabilistic risk analysis 
(QRA / PRA) or a 
similarly quantified 
system. 
Measurement of risk and 
progress is constantly 
updated to adopt new 
methods and changes in 
best practice.  
V
ar
ia
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
re
lia
bi
lit
y There is undocumented 
variation in operating and 
maintenance processes.  
Operating and 
maintenance processes 
are now consistent with 
little or no variation. 
Operating and maintenance 
processes are consistent 
with minimal variation.  
 
Potential accident 
precursor incidents, near 
misses and any other 
available indices of the 
underlying risk level are 
recorded and monitored, 
while at the same time 
making efforts to ensure 
that all such incidents are 
recorded. 
Progress in the science of 
human reliability is 
identified and the latest 
methods of improving 
reliability are incorporated 
to minimise human errors 
and variability. 
Automation is used 
wherever appropriate.  
H
um
an
 fa
ct
or
s 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
Managers perceive that the 
majority of accidents are 
solely caused by the unsafe 
behaviour of front-line 
personnel. 
There is an emphasis on 
ensuring that qualified 
personnel are used in all 
safety critical roles. 
Personnel responsible for 
safety lapses are 
disciplined.  
Care is taken to ensure that 
all job descriptions include 
safety responsibilities and 
that personnel are not only 
qualified but regularly 
trained to ensure up to date 
compliance.  
Contractors are also 
required to apply similar 
safety standards and 
practices to those of the 
client, including providing 
data on safety indicators, 
incidents, and risks in 
their area of 
responsibility. 
Appropriate and active 
communication takes 
place to ensure that 
passengers are fully 
aware of their own 
responsibilities for safety.  
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 Safety Maturity Model features 
 Initial 
(0-10 score) 
Compliance – Driven 
(10-20) 
Defined Risk  
(20-25) 
Managed Risk  
(26-33) 
Optimising 
(34-40) 
A
tti
tu
de
 to
 h
az
ar
ds
 
Many minor hazardous 
incidents and the occasional 
accident are seen as 
unavoidable and as part of 
the job.  
Some minor hazardous 
incidents and the 
occasional accident are 
seen as unavoidable and 
as part of the job. 
Minor hazardous incidents 
and the occasional accident 
are seen as unavoidable in 
the long term, but their 
probability and frequency is 
seen as manageable and 
programmes are in place to 
lower it. 
All existing safety 
hazards are identified and 
registered. 
The condition and 
degradation of assets is 
regularly monitored to 
ensure that there is no 
deterioration in risk 
levels, either of safety or 
reliability. 
R
ol
e 
an
d 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t o
f s
ta
ff 
Most frontline staff are 
uninterested in safety.  
Organisation is convinced 
that the involvement of 
the frontline employee in 
safety is critical and 
frontline staff are aware of 
safety objectives but do 
not see themselves as 
responsible for mitigating 
safety risks outside their 
own functional 
responsibility.  
Most frontline staff see 
themselves as responsible 
for mitigating safety risks 
within their own function 
and notifying management 
of any other hazards and 
risks whenever they identify 
any that are not already on 
the hazard register.  
All employees are aware 
of the impact of their own 
function on safety and the 
quantified targets for that 
function and for the 
organisation as a whole. 
All employees are trained 
and motivated to look for 
ways of improving safety 
and are incentivised to 
provide ideas to do this 
S
af
et
y 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
Safety performance is 
measured in terms of major 
accidents and fatalities. 
Safety performance is 
measured in terms of 
lagging indicators 
prescribed by 
governments or statutory 
safety bodies. 
Safety performance is 
measured in terms of 
indicators prescribed by 
governments or statutory 
safety bodies and identified 
by the company to be high 
priority potential causes or 
measures of risk of 
accident. 
A full range of indicators 
comprehensively covers 
all of the highest priority 
potential causes or 
measures of risk of 
accident. Some at least of 
these are leading 
indicators that point to a 
change in the level of 
risk. 
The range of indicators is 
regularly reviewed to 
ensure that new trends 
are identified relatively 
quickly and any negative 
trend is quickly mitigated. 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 364 
Appendix VI Report on near-miss at Hanger Lane junction 
 
 
!"#$%&'()*+(,( - ./%01'+(,(
!"#$%&'(()#*)+#,-"$).#,")/0,1*'2,
34)5#$16)3778
92,*",*(
:$";#1"' )
.H\'H¿QLWLRQV' )
<0&&#$=)2;)*6")>"?2$*' 2
3"4'5/0&6'/7$8&'&1"'9:09;":&' 2
<==";9/&"'0/86">'0/86/?'/:;'0$:&%978&$%4'5/0&$%6>'8:;"%?49:@'0/86"6' 2
A"B"%9&4'$5'0$:6"C8":0"6'' D
!"0$==":;/&9$:6'' D
@6")A,1'B",*' E
A8==/%4'$5'&1"'9:09;":&' E
F1"'#/%&9"6'9:B$?B";'' E
G$0/&9$:'' E
HI&"%:/?'09%08=6&/:0"6'' E
F%/9:6' E
A9@:/??9:@'"C89#=":&' ,(
J$:6"C8":0"6'$5'&1"'9:09;":&' ,K
@6")A,C"(*'-#*'2,' +(
A$8%0"6'$5'"B9;":0"' +(
D"=)A,;2$&#*'2,' +,
F%/9:'L#"%/&$%' +,
H/%?6'J$8%&'J$:&%$?'!$$=' +,
M/N"%'A&%""&'J$:&%$?'!$$=' ++
."&1$;6'$5'0$==8:90/&9$:' ++
A9@:/??"%' +-
!8?"'M$$N' +O
P%"B9$86'$008%%":0"6'$5'/'69=9?/%'01/%/0&"%' +2
E,#F=('()' +D
,GHQWL¿FDWLRQRIWKHLPPHGLDWHFDXVH 
,GHQWL¿FDWLRQRIFDXVDODQGFRQWULEXWRU\IDFWRUV 
,GHQWL¿FDWLRQRIXQGHUO\LQJIDFWRUV 
L&1"%'5/0&$%6'5$%'0$:69;"%/&9$:'' --
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 365 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 366 
 
 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 367 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 368 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 369 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 370 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 371 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 372 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 373 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 374 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 375 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 376 
 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 377 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 378 
 
APPENDIX VI   REPORT ON NEAR-MISS AT HANGER LANE JUNCTION 
 
 
 379 
 
 
APPENDIX VII   THE SWISS QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH VERSION) 
 
 
 380 
Appendix VII The Swiss questionnaire (English version) 
 
Zurich, 25/05/2011 
Dear Sir / Madam, 
My name is Miltos Kyriakidis and I am research student at Lloyds Register Educational Trust 
- Transport Risk Management Centre of Imperial College London, undertaking a PhD in 
railway safety. 
My research topic is related to Human Reliability Analysis. The aim of my research is to 
develop a tool, which will be used in order to estimate human error probability of train drivers 
and signalers, based on a new taxonomy of performance shaping factors (PSFs) focused on 
railway operations. 
To do this, I am currently working with the Forschungsgruppe Organisation – Arbeit 
Technologie of ETH Zurich and SBB. I am using SBB accident and incident reports to 
extract the information are needed to develop such taxonomy. To validate the findings of the 
reports and to finalize the taxonomy I would like to ask you to fill in the following 
questionnaire.  
The questionnaire is consisted of two parts. In the first part you are asked to assess the 
factors that influence human performance in four different rail scenarios. In the second part, 
you are asked to indicate the possible interactions amongst the identified PSFs.  
Details and instructions are provided in each part of the questionnaire.   
Thank you in advance for your time and effort. 
 
Sincerely, 
Miltos Kyriakidis 
 
Research Student in Transport Risk Management 
Centre for Transport Studies 
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering 
Imperial College London 
UK 
e-mail: m.kyriakidis@imperial.ac.uk 
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Performance Shaping Factors Taxonomy (PSFs) Questionnaire 
 
Part 1  
In this part you are asked to assess the factors that compromise human performance in four 
different scenarios. The scenarios have been selected from 85 accident and incident reports 
based on their frequency and the severity of their consequences. Please assess the factors 
from the most important to least important one. Indicate as 1 the factor that plays the most 
important role on operator’s performance, while as 18 the least important factor. Finally, in 
the case that you consider as “important” any other factor(s) which is not included in the list, 
please add it in the “blank” area. 
 
Scenario 1:  
Long distance passenger train derails on open line due to excessive speed. Train driver did 
not reduce the speed as the alarm indicated. Competent train driver. No technical failures. 
Night operation. No adverse weather conditions.  
(PSFs evaluation: 1 most important, 18 least important)  
PSFs   PSFs   PSFs   
Communication between  
employees - information    Fatigue (sleep lack, shift pattern)   Quality of procedures   
Teamwork - Supervision   Fit to work - Health   Stress    
Distraction - Concentration   System design - Human Machine Interface   
Time pressure (time to 
respond)   
Expectation - Routine   Perception   Training    
Experience - Familiarity   Safety culture (disregard procedures)   Weather conditions - Visibility   
 Situational awareness     Visibility   Workload    
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Scenario 2:  
Regional passenger train passes a signal at danger on open line (Hauptsignal 
überfahrungen). Train driver is aware of the signal, does not obey though. Competent driver, 
familiar with the route. No technical failures. Day operation, good weather conditions.  
(PSFs evaluation: 1 most important, 18 least important)  
PSFs   PSFs   PSFs   
Communication between  
employees - information    Fatigue (sleep lack, shift pattern)   Quality of procedures   
Teamwork - Supervision   Fit to work - Health   Stress    
Distraction - Concentration   System design - Human Machine Interface   
Time pressure (time to 
respond)   
Expectation - Routine   Perception   Training    
Experience - Familiarity   Safety culture (disregard procedures)   Weather conditions - Visibility   
 Situational awareness     Visibility   Workload    
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Scenario 3:  
Freight train passes signal at danger in station due to wrong interpretation (Hauptsignal 
überfahrungen). Train driver is aware of the signal, fails to interpret and keeps the speed 
constant. Competent driver, familiar with the route. No technical failures. Night operation. No 
adverse weather conditions.  
(PSFs evaluation: 1 most important, 18 least important)  
PSFs   PSFs   PSFs   
Communication between  
employees - information    Fatigue (sleep lack, shift pattern)   Quality of procedures   
Teamwork - Supervision   Fit to work - Health   Stress    
Distraction - Concentration   System design - Human Machine Interface   
Time pressure (time to 
respond)   
Expectation - Routine   Perception   Training    
Experience - Familiarity   Safety culture (disregard procedures)   Weather conditions - Visibility   
 Situational awareness     Visibility   Workload    
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Scenario 4:  
During a shunting operation in depot a shunting train collides with a commercial train. 
Signaller, responsible for the route, gives authorisation to shunting train to advance onto the 
track that the commercial train was moving along. At the time of the occurrence signaller 
was alone in the control room. Procedures available. Competent signaller. No technical 
failures. Day shift.  
(PSFs evaluation: 1 most important, 18 least important) 
PSFs   PSFs   PSFs   
Communication between  
employees - information    Fatigue (sleep lack, shift pattern)   Quality of procedures   
Teamwork - Supervision   Fit to work - Health   Stress    
Distraction - Concentration   System design - Human Machine Interface   
Time pressure (time to 
respond)   
Expectation - Routine   Perception   Training    
Experience - Familiarity   Safety culture (disregard procedures)   Weather conditions - Visibility   
 Situational awareness     Visibility   Workload    
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Part 2  
  
In this section you are asked to indicate the possible interactions amongst the identified 
factors that influence human performance. The interactions represent the irreversible 
influence between two factors or how the factors in the left hand column affect the factors in 
the first row. The reason for irreversible influence lies in the characteristics of the railway 
environment where one factor may influence another one without any reverse effect. For 
instance, task complexity can influence driver or signallerʼs levels of stress, while the 
opposite influence (impact of stress on task complexity) is simply not logical. To indicate that 
a factor has an influence on another factor please use the symbol (!).  
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Most frequent R-PSFs         
Direct influence – 
Influence of Y upon X                  
(Y!X)
Communication between 
employees - Information
Teamwork - Supervision
Distraction - concentration
Expectation - Routine
Experience - Familiarity
Situational awareness
Fatigue
Fit to work - Health
System design -Human 
Machine Interface
Perception
Safety culture  (disregard 
procedures)
Quality of procedures
Visibility
Stress
Time pressure - Time to 
respond
Training
Weather conditions
Workload
Vi
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lit
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Please indicate below your 
Job description: 
Number of years in this job: 
Previous position: 
Number of years in SBB: 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
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Appendix VIII  Crosstabulations of reference database  
Table VIII-1  
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Table VIII-2  
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Table VIII-3  
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Table VIII-4 
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Table VIII-5 
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Table VIII-6  
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Table VIII-7 
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Table VIII-8 
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Table VIII-9  
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Table VIII-10 
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Table VIII-11 
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Table VIII-12 
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Table VIII-13 
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Table VIII-14 
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Table VIII-15 
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Table VIII-16 
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Appendix IX  Loglinear analysis tests 
Table IX-1 
 
 
Table IX-2 
 
 
Table IX-3 
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Table IX-4 
 
 
Table IX-5 
 
 
Table IX-6 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX IX   LOGLINEAR ANALYSIS TESTS 
 
 
 406 
Table IX-7 
 
 
Table IX-8 
 
 
Table IX-9 
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Table IX-10 
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Appendix X  Material to support SME’s common understanding 
of R-PSFs   
The R-PSFs categories 
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The R-PSFs elements 
 
 
 
!"#$%$%&'(')*+,"$,%-,!
"#$%&'()! *(+,-'./'!+0! )1'! 23'%&4%! )52*2! )+!6'!#(.'7)5*'(!
5(.!)1'!7&2*2!,1&%1!)1'!,+7*!,&--!'()5&-8!9(+,-'./'!5(.!2*&--2!
'23'%&5--:!)15)!/5&('.!&(!5!357;%#-57!37+0'22&+(8!
<3'75)+7! =&(>+->'.! &(! 5! )52*?! )75&('.@! A#5-&4'.! 5(.!
%+B3')'()! 2+! )15)! +3'75)'2! &)2! 6#2&('22! 250'-:! 5(.!
'C'%;>'-:8'
.#/$0$#"$12'(')*+,-1#34%'('5463%,!
D! /++.! *(+,-'./'! +0! 2+B')1&(/8! D! 2)7+(/! 6'-&'0! )15)!
2+B')1&(/!,&--!1533'(!+7!6'!)1'!%52'8!
E1'! -'>'-! +0! 05B&-&57&):! ,&)1! 5! )52*@! 7+#)'@! 2%'(57&+@!
37+%'.#7'! +7! 'A#&3B'()8! D! *(+,(! 35F'7(! +0! &(0+7B5;+(@!
-'5.&(/! )+! 5! 2)7+(/! 'G3'%)5;+(! 56+#)! ,15)! &(0+7B5;+(!
533'57'.8! H+7! 'G5B3-'@! .'.&%5)'.! )75&(! .7&>'72! 52! )1':!
'G'%#)'!)1'!25B'!7+#)'!0+7!2'>'75-!;B'2!3'7!.5:8'
.#3&6,'('78$9'+#:,"%'('.$1'14';4"<!
IG)7'B'! ;7'.('22! 7'2#-;(/! 07+B! B'()5-! +7! 31:2&%5-!
'G'7;+(!+7!&--('22!+7!37+-+(/'.!5%;>&):8!
J'>'-!+0!05;/#'!.#'!)+!05%)+72!2#%1!52!-5%*!+0!2-''3@!)++!
B#%1! ,+7*@! 21&K! 35F'7(@! .#75;+(! +0! 67'5*2@! 2)5$(/!
-'>'-2@! 3'72+(5-! -&0'! =61' %41' 7'-5)'.! )+! )75&(&(/! +7!
'G3'7&'(%'8!
>$?1"#-34%'('@4??'4A'-4%-,%1"#34%('
7$16#34%#0'#;#",%,??'('B$&$0#%-,!
D(:)1&(/!)15)!37'>'()2!+3'75)+7! 07+B!%+(%'()75;(/!+(!
,15)!1'L21'!&2!.+&(/!
<)1'7! 3'+3-'! &(L57+#(.! )1'! %568! M7&>'7! B5:! 6'! .&2)75%)'.! 6:!
3'+3-'L'>'()2! +7! 37'+%%#3&'.! ,&)1! 5(! &22#'! +0! %+(%'7(8!
N+BB#(&%5;+(! ,&)1! +)1'7! %+O,+7*'728! P2'! +0! B+6&-'! 31+('8!
M'2&7'!)+!4(&21!.#):8'
!"#$"%&'()*)+(,"#%#",-&'(!
"#$!%&'(')*!)+!,$$-!#$%.-!+.!&$/+0$!%1%.$!+2!,+0$)#'34!
)#.+54#! )#$! ,$3,$,! +.! )#$! 1%*! '3! 1#'/#! ,+0$)#'34! ',!
.$4%.6$6-!536$.,)++6-!+.!'3)$.7.$)$68!
9',.$%6! :',5%(! '32+.0%;+3! +.! 0',#$%.! %56')+.*!
'32+.0%;+38! 9','3)$.7.$)! %56')+.*! <:$.&%(! %36! 3+3=
:$.&%(>!+.!:',5%(!'32+.0%;+38)
.'#/0'-1)*))2,#"33)*)456")%#"337#"!
"#$!%0+53)!+2!1+.?!)+!&$!6+3$!&*!,+0$+3$! '3!%!7$.'+6!+2!
;0$8!"#$!,)%)$!+2!0$3)%(!+.!$0+;+3%(!,).%'3!.$,5(;34!2.+0!
%6:$.,$! +.! 6$0%36'34! /'./50,)%3/$,! +.! %! 4.$%)! 1+..*!
/%5,$6!&*!%!6'@/5()!,')5%;+38!
"#$! ($:$(,! +2!1+.?(+%6! 65$! )+!05(;=)%,?'34! .$A5'.$0$3),-! 6',.57;+3B
2%5(),-! /+07($C! .+5)$-! 53$C7$/)$6! $:$3),! $)/8! "#$! %:%'(%&($! ;0$! )+!
.$,7+36!)+!%3!53$C7$/)$6!$:$3)!+.!)+!/+..$/)!%3!'6$3;D$6!$..+.8!
283,"6)1"359()*):;+!
"#$! 7.+/$,,! +2! 6$D3'34! )#$! %./#')$/)5.$-!
/+07+3$3),-! 0+65($,-! '3)$.2%/$,-! %36! 6%)%! 2+.! %!
,*,)$0!)+!,%;,2*!,7$/'D$6!.$A5'.$0$3),8!!
E#$)#$.!)#$!,*,)$0!1%,!6$,'43$6!%36!/+3,).5/)$6!/+..$/)(*!
+.! )#$.$!%.$! '3/+3,',)$3/'$,-!$848! ,'43%(,! '3,)%((%;+3-! ,)%;+3!
6$,'43-! .+(('34! ,)+/?! $A5'70$3)-! 6',7(%*,-! 5,%&'(')*-! 6$,'43!
%36!A5%(')*!+2!$A5'70$3)8)
27%"#<535'(!
F57$.:',$!%36!'3,7$/)!1+.?-!0%'3)%'3!6',/'7('3$!'3!+.6$.!
)+!7.$,$.:$!)#$!/+07%3*G,!+&H$/;:$,8!
9%3%4'34-! 6$:$(+7'34-! ,577+.;34! ,)%I-! %36! 0$6'%;34! +3! )#$'.!
&$#%(28!J%)#$.'34! '32+.0%;+3!%&+5)!1+.?!%/;:';$,!%36!$C)$.3%(!
/+36';+3,! %I$/;34! )#$! 1+.?K! /#$/?'34! +3! )#$! 7.+4.$,,! %36!
A5%(')*!+2!)#$!1+.?K!$:%(5%;34!)#$!7$.2+.0%3/$!+2!'36':'65%(,!%36!
)#$!$I$/;:$3$,,!+2!)#$!+.4%3'L%;+3%(!53')8)
APPENDIX X   MATERIAL TO SUPPORT SME’S COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF R-PSFS 
 
 
 410 
 
 
!"##$%&'()"%*+*,-(#."/0*
!"#$%&'()*+$,-$.,//&0).'1,0$2#*3##0$#/4(,+##5$3"#0$
0,$ *#."0).'($ -')(&6#$ )5$ )7#018#7$ '07$ ",3$ 4#,4(#$ 3,69$
*,:#*"#6$'07$.,,67)0'*#$*,$'.")#;#$5'-#$4#6-,6/'0.#<$
=#-#65$*,$*"#$(#;#($,-$%&).9>$#?4().)*>$.(#'6$.,//&0).'1,0>$,6'($,6$
"'07$ 5):0'()0:$ '07$ *,$ .(#'6$ 7)510.1,0$ ,-$ 6,(#5@6#54,05)2)()1#5>$
.,(('2,6'1,0$ '07$ %&'()*+$ ,-$ -##72'.9$ 2#*3##0$ .6#3$ /#/2#65>$
(#;#($,-$*6&5*$'07$:#0#6'($5,.)'($.()/'*#<$
1%2"/#()"%*3$(4&56*7*5/$85*
!6&5*$ )0$ 4#65,0$ 46,;)7)0:$ )0-,6/'1,0$ '07A,6$ %&'()*+$B$
';')('2)()*+$,-$ )0-,6/'1,0$:);#0$ )0$46,.#7&6#$;)'$;#62'($
.,//&0).'1,0$C,6$,*"#6$/#*",7D<$
=#-#6$ *,$ '..&6'*#>$ &4$ *,$ 7'*#>$ ';')('2(#>$ 6#(#;'0*$ '07$
#?4().)*$ )0-,6/'1,0$ '07A,6$ *"#$ (#;#($ ,-$ *6&5*$ -,6$ *"#$
4#65,0$*"'*$46,;)7#5$*"#$)0-,6/'1,0<$
9/"'-:$/-8*3$(4&56*7*(;(&4(<&4&56*
!"#$ #?)5*#0.#$ '07$ &5#$ ,-$ -,6/'($ ,4#6'10:$ 46,.#7&6#5$
-,6$ *"#$ *'595$ &07#6$ .,05)7#6'1,0<$ !"#$ ,E.)'($ 6&(#5$ ,6$
7)6#.1;#5$ /'7#$ '07$ /')0*')0#7$ 2+$ *"#$ .,66#54,07)0:$
'&*",6)1#5<$
=#-#65$ *,$ *"#$ #?)5*#0.#>$ .('6)*+>$ ';')('2)()*+>$ '..&6'.+>$
'07$",3$#'5+$*"#$46,.#7&6#5$'6#$*,$2#$-,((,3#7<$$$
=(2-56*'$45$/-*+*=>=*
F'-#*+$ .&(*&6#$ ."'6'.*#6)5#5$ *"#$ 5#*$ ,-$ 'G*&7#>$ ;'(&#5$
'07$ 46),6)1#5$ 4('.#7$ ,0$ '(($ '54#.*5$ ,-$ 5'-#*+$ 2+$ *"#$
,6:'0)5'1,0<$$
H$ 5'-#*+$ /'0':#/#0*$ 5+5*#/$ 7#80#5$ 6,(#5$ '07$
6#54,05)2)()1#5>$ 5#*5$ '66'0:#/#0*5$ -,6$ 5'-#*+$ /#."'0)5/5>$
)0;,(;#5$ 3,69#65$ )0$ *"#$ 46,.#55$ '07$ #05&6#5$ .,010&,&5$
)/46,;#/#0*<$
APPENDIX XI   THE R-PSFS “WEIGHTING” AND “RANKING” QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 411 
Appendix XI  The R-PSFs “weighting” and “ranking” questionnaire 
Human Performance Railway Operational Index Questionnaire 
Dear Madam / Sir, 
This questionnaire is created for the purpose of obtaining information on the factors that influence the 
performance of train drivers during railway operations, such as the level of training, the given 
procedures or the level of fatigue. 
I would, therefore, like to ask you to fill in the following questionnaire. It will only take few minutes of 
your time to fill it in, which will contribute to our effort to assess in a more comprehensive way the 
human factors aspect into railway safety. The information you provide will be used as a part of a PhD 
research project is currently being undertaken at Imperial College London. 
The questionnaire comprises five parts. In the first part you are kindly asked to provide some generic 
personal information in a strictly confidential manner. In the second and third parts you are asked to 
assess both the categories and the factors that most significantly influence human performance for a 
railway operational scenario related to SPADs. In the fourth part, you are asked to rate how good or 
bad each of the factors is with respect to the ability of an operator to conduct a certain action. Finally, 
your feedback about the questionnaire is asked in the fifth part. 
Details and instructions are provided in each part of the questionnaire.   
Upon completion please enclose the questionnaire in the attached envelope. Therefore, anonymity for 
all responders and confidentiality of data are assured.  
Thank you in advance for your time and effort. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
Miltos Kyriakidis 
 
Research Student 
LRET Transport Risk 
Management Center 
Centre for Transport Studies 
Imperial College London 
SW2 2AZ 
e-mail: 
m.kyriakidis@imperial.ac.uk 
pwp: www.miltoskyriakidis.com 
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SECTION 1. Introductory details 
1.1 Date  1.2 What is your grade?  _________________ 
1.3 Which is your job title 
  Train Driver  Safety analyst 
  Signaller  Human Factors expert 
  Controller  Other (please indicate) 
__________________ 
1.4 Where is your main place of work? (dedicated to one line?) ____________________________________ 
1.5 What is your gender? 
  Male  Female   
1.6 Please indicate your age group 
  Under 25  25–34  35–44 
  45–56  Over 56   
1.7 How long have you been working in the railway industry? 
  Less than 1 year  1 to 5 years  6 to 10 years 
  11 to 19 years  20 years or more   
1.8 How long have you been in your current posting? 
  Less than 1 year  1 to 5 years  6 to 10 years 
  11 to 19 years  20 years or more   
1.9 Have you ever been involved to a SPAD before?  (if “No”, ignore question 1.10) 
  Yes  No 
1.10 If you have been involved to a SPAD, can you recall what was the case  
  Fail to detect signal  Wrong signal interpretation 
  Wrong signal observation   Misread previous signal 
  Late signal observation  Braking  
  Anticipation of signal clearance  Other (please indicate) _____________ 
1.11 Based on your experience a SPAD is more likely to happen  
  Inside a tunnel  On open line 
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SECTION 2. R-PSFs Categories “weighting” assessment 
In this part you are asked to assess the categories of R-PSFs that affect Human 
Performance Integrity for the generic scenario described below. 
 
Scenario - Description for Train Drivers 
Train driver fails to stop the train before passes signal at danger on open line (not 
tunnel), although no technical failures are reported. Good weather conditions. Good 
visibility. Day operation. 
 
To assess the influence of each R-PSF category, please keep in mind the following 
question:  
 “Considering the influence of each factor category on the performance of the operator, of 
the two factor categories in each row which one is considered more important and how 
much more important is it with respect to the influence on the reference factor category?” 
 
For the assessment, you have to use the fundamental scale given below: 
The fundamental scale 
Intensity of 
importance 
Definition Explanation 
1 Equal importance Two factors contribute equally to the objective 
2 Weak Compromise between values 1 & 3 
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgment slightly favour one 
factor over another 
4 Moderate plus Compromise between values 3 & 5 
5 Strong importance Experience and judgment strongly favour one 
factor over another 
6 Strong plus Compromise between values 5 & 7 
7 Very strong 
demonstrated 
importance 
A factor is favoured very strongly over another; 
its dominance demonstrated in practice 
8 Very very strong Compromise between values 7 & 9 
9 Extreme importance The evidence favouring one factor over another 
is of highest possible order of affirmation 
Table 2-1: Considering the influence of each factor category on the performance of the 
operator, of the two factor categories in each row which one is considered more important 
and how more important is it with respect to the influence on the personal factors? 
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Table 2-2: Considering the influence of each factor category on the performance of the 
operator, of the two factor categories in each row which one is considered more important 
and how more important is it with respect to the influence on the dynamic personal factors? 
 
Table 2-3: Considering the influence of each factor category on the performance of the 
operator, of the two factor categories in each row which one is considered more important 
and how more important is it with respect to the influence on the task factors? 
 
Table 2-4: Considering the influence of each factor category on the performance of the 
operator, of the two factor categories in each row which one is considered more important 
and how more important is it with respect to the influence on the team factors? 
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Table 2-5: Considering the influence of each factor category on the performance of the 
operator, of the two factor categories in each row which one is considered more important 
and how more important is it with respect to the influence on the organisational factors? 
 
Table 2-6: Considering the influence of each factor category on the performance of the 
operator, of the two factor categories in each row which one is considered more important 
and how more important is it with respect to the influence on the system factors? 
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SECTION 3. R-PSFs Elements “weighting” assessment 
In this part you are asked to assess the R-PSFs elements that affect Human Performance 
Integrity for the generic scenario described below. 
 
Scenario - Description for Train Drivers 
Train driver fails to stop the train before passes signal at danger on open line (not 
tunnel), although no technical failures are reported. Good weather conditions. Good 
visibility. Day operation. 
 
To assess the influence of each R-PSF, please keep in mind the following question:  
“Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the two 
factor elements in each row which one is considered more important and how much more 
important is it with respect to the influence on the reference factor?” 
 
For the assessment, you have to use the fundamental scale given below: 
The fundamental scale 
Intensity of 
importance 
Definition Explanation 
1 Equal importance Two factors contribute equally to the objective 
2 Weak Compromise between values 1 & 3 
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgment slightly favour one 
factor over another 
4 Moderate plus Compromise between values 3 & 5 
5 Strong importance Experience and judgment strongly favour one 
factor over another 
6 Strong plus Compromise between values 5 & 7 
7 Very strong 
demonstrated 
importance 
A factor is favoured very strongly over another; 
its dominance demonstrated in practice 
8 Very very strong Compromise between values 7 & 9 
9 Extreme importance The evidence favouring one factor over another 
is of highest possible order of affirmation 
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Table 3-1: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the two 
factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it, with 
respect to the influence on training? 
 
Table 3-2: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the two 
factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it with 
respect to the influence on familiarity? 
 
Table 3-3: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the two 
factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it with 
respect to the influence on workload? 
 
Table 3-4: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the two 
factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it with 
respect to the influence on distraction? 
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Table 3-5: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the two 
factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it with 
respect to the influence on fatigue? 
 
Table 3-6: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the two 
factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it with 
respect to the influence on perception?  
 
Table 3-7: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the two 
factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it with 
respect to the influence on communication? 
 
Table 3-8: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the two 
factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it with 
respect to the influence on the quality and trust in information?  
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Table 3-9: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the two 
factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it with 
respect to the influence on safety culture?  
 
Table 3-10: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the 
two factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it 
with respect to the influence on the quality of procedures? 
 
Table 3-11: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the 
two factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it 
with respect to the influence on supervision? 
 
Table 3-12: Considering the influence of each factor on the performance of the operator, of the 
two factors in each row which one is considered more important and how more important is it 
with respect to the influence on system design? 
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SECTION 4. R-PSFs Elements “rating”  
In this part, you are asked to rate the condition (optimal) of each R-PSF in the specific task 
context under consideration. 
To rate the influence of each R-PSF on each action, please keep in mind the following 
question:  
“Considering that each R-PSF affects the ability of the operator to conduct a certain action, 
please rate how good or bad do you think that each R-PSF is with respect to the action 
required”.  
Please use a 0 to 100 scale (increment of 10) to rate each R-PSF, where 0 shows the worst 
and 100 the best case. For example, “how would you rate “training” with respect to not signal 
detection”? 
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Finally, please indicate in a 0 (min) to 100 (max) scale how much your performance would 
change under the following conditions with respect to the described scenario? Please 
choose only one of the three options. 
Conditions 
Performance 
Improved Reduced No influence 
Tunnel operation (compare 
to over ground)   0 
Intermediate weather 
conditions (e.g. light rain, 
fog) 
  0 
Adverse weather conditions   0 
Degraded operation   0 
Night operation   0 
  
SECTION 5. Some feedback about the Questionnaire 
We would be grateful for your feedback. 
4.1 About how long has it taken you to complete this questionnaire?________minutes 
4.2 Are there any important issues relating to your work or work environment that we have not asked or discussed about? 
 
 Yes  No 
If Yes, please state what these issues are: 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
4.3 If you have any further comments (both positive and negative) about the questionnaire would be greatly appreciated 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix XII  The ratings of the R-PSFs per human error and 
classification group 
Human error “signal not detected” 
Table XII-1 R-PSFs mean ratings per TOC 
 
 
  
 TOCs 
TOC1 TOC2 TOC3 
Distraction 37 25 31 
Fatigue 36 30 35 
Perception 41 28 33 
Procedures 51 44 45 
Safety Culture 64 53 49 
Supervision 46 35 33 
Familiarity 32 65 42 
Training 65 57 65 
System Design 47 36 53 
Workload 46 49 27 
Communication 51 45 45 
Information 49 46 53 
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Table XII-2 R-PSFs mean ratings per operational experience (train drivers only) 
 
Operational experience 
< 1 year 1 to 4 years 
5 to 10 
years 
11 to 19 
years 
20 years 
or more 
Distraction 30 . 37 19 38 
Fatigue 36 . 30 24 43 
Perception 27 . 39 36 36 
Procedures 46 . 63 37 47 
Safety Culture 70 . 64 47 51 
Supervision 43 . 47 32 37 
Familiarity 17 . 33 53 63 
Training 66 . 61 70 56 
System Design 47 . 47 43 45 
Workload 44 . 36 38 47 
Communication 33 . 66 43 49 
Information 31 . 70 53 45 
 
Table XII-3 R-PSFs mean ratings per age group (train drivers only) 
 Age group 
 24 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 56 Over 56 
Distraction  26 22 39 33 
Fatigue  30 19 46 30 
Perception  24 22 46 38 
Procedures  40 54 49 35 
Safety Culture  63 58 58 35 
Supervision  29 46 43 25 
Familiarity  16 36 64 48 
Training  60 71 61 53 
System Design  37 56 47 33 
Workload  36 31 51 43 
Communication  27 57 56 33 
Information  33 67 53 25 
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Table XII-4 R-PSFs mean ratings per gender and SPAD involvement (train drivers only) 
 
Gender SPAD involvement 
Male Female No Yes 
Distraction 31 40 34 25 
Fatigue 33 40 36 30 
Perception 34 40 36 32 
Procedures 45 70 48 46 
Safety Culture 55 67 56 57 
Supervision 38 47 44 27 
Familiarity 45 43 40 59 
Training 63 57 67 52 
System Design 47 33 48 38 
Workload 42 37 38 51 
Communication 48 43 48 48 
Information 49 57 51 46 
 
Human error “signal wrongly interpreted” 
Table XII-5 R-PSFs mean ratings per TOC  
 
 
 TOCs 
TOC1 TOC2 TOC3 
Distraction 39 33 36 
Fatigue 48 33 44 
Perception 54 35 46 
Procedures 48 47 38 
Safety Culture 59 45 44 
Supervision 49 37 28 
Familiarity 59 43 49 
Training 69 49 55 
System Design 52 36 39 
Workload 41 49 40 
Communication 51 46 44 
Information 46 50 48 
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Table XII-6 R-PSFs mean ratings per operational experience (train drivers only) 
 
Operational experience 
< 1 year 1 to 4 years 
5 to 10 
years 
11 to 19 
years 
20 years 
or more 
Distraction 31 . 37 32 41 
Fatigue 56 . 31 33 47 
Perception 51 . 51 44 39 
Procedures 39 . 60 38 45 
Safety Culture 61 . 59 40 47 
Supervision 44 . 50 32 36 
Familiarity 54 . 44 57 49 
Training 77 . 63 53 50 
System Design 49 . 44 39 43 
Workload 37 . 39 47 48 
Communication 34 . 66 42 48 
Information 37 . 51 56 47 
 
Table XII-7 R-PSFs mean ratings per age group (train drivers only)  
 Age group 
 24 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 56 Over 56 
Distraction  21 29 45 43 
Fatigue  47 27 48 45 
Perception  50 46 47 33 
Procedures  27 59 48 33 
Safety Culture  51 53 53 30 
Supervision  24 51 43 25 
Familiarity  47 53 53 48 
Training  76 66 49 50 
System Design  39 42 47 40 
Workload  36 31 53 50 
Communication  34 53 55 30 
Information  39 53 54 30 
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Table XII-8 R-PSFs mean ratings per gender and SPAD involvement (train drivers only) 
 
Gender SPAD involvement 
Male Female No Yes 
Distraction 37 27 38 32 
Fatigue 42 40 45 34 
Perception 46 37 48 39 
Procedures 44 50 44 46 
Safety Culture 51 43 52 47 
Supervision 40 37 44 29 
Familiarity 52 40 51 51 
Training 59 57 62 51 
System Design 46 13 44 41 
Workload 44 37 40 51 
Communication 48 40 48 46 
Information 49 40 47 51 
 
Human error “correct action not taken” 
Table XII-9 R-PSFs mean ratings per TOC  
 
 
 TOCs 
TOC1 TOC2 TOC3 
Distraction 32 22 27 
Fatigue 32 30 32 
Perception 47 34 38 
Procedures 38 37 27 
Safety Culture 59 48 38 
Supervision 38 40 22 
Familiarity 58 37 50 
Training 50 44 38 
System Design 51 37 45 
Workload 42 40 26 
Communication 45 40 39 
Information 42 47 45 
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Table XII-10 R-PSFs mean ratings per operational experience (train drivers only) 
 
Operational experience 
< 1 year 1 to 4 years 
5 to 10 
years 
11 to 19 
years 
20 years 
or more 
Distraction 30 . 24 21 33 
Fatigue 36 . 19 29 38 
Perception 41 . 34 43 41 
Procedures 21 . 51 30 36 
Safety Culture 54 . 57 40 50 
Supervision 24 . 47 30 35 
Familiarity 61 . 36 58 43 
Training 53 . 46 38 44 
System Design 43 . 49 47 43 
Workload 43 . 29 41 35 
Communication 27 . 60 40 41 
Information 30 . 47 56 43 
 
 
Table XII-11 R-PSFs ratings per age group (train drivers only)  
 Age group 
 24 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 56 Over 56 
Distraction  19 11 39 35 
Fatigue  24 17 41 43 
Perception  31 33 47 48 
Procedures  19 43 39 28 
Safety Culture  51 46 55 35 
Supervision  19 39 41 23 
Familiarity  51 53 47 45 
Training  51 44 43 38 
System Design  34 50 49 35 
Workload  33 29 43 38 
Communication  24 50 50 23 
Information  33 51 51 28 
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Table XII-12 R-PSFs mean ratings per gender and SPAD involvement   
 
Gender SPAD involvement 
Male Female No Yes 
Distraction 28 27 31 19 
Fatigue 32 23 34 25 
Perception 42 23 42 37 
Procedures 34 40 32 42 
Safety Culture 51 40 48 54 
Supervision 35 23 34 35 
Familiarity 50 40 52 41 
Training 46 30 45 43 
System Design 48 10 46 42 
Workload 39 17 34 43 
Communication 43 30 42 42 
Information 46 33 42 51 
!
!
